Maurice Lovell Anderson, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1381

Maurice Lovell Anderson, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed May 17, 2021
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-K8-06-002768

Zachary A. Longsdorf, Longsdorf Law Firm, PLC, Inver Grove Heights, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Alexandra Meyer, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges the postconviction court’s summary denial of his petition for
relief as untimely and procedurally barred. Appellant also asks this court to grant him a
new trial in the interests of justice. We affirm and otherwise deny relief.
FACTS
In July 2006, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Maurice Anderson
with second -degree intentional murder and two counts of second -degree assault. The
charges were based on evidence that i n July 2006, Anderson killed J.R. by shooting him
twice after a dispute in a crowded bar , as well as evidence that t he t wo bullets passed
through J.R. and struck two bystanders. Four days before trial, the state amended the
complaint, replacing the two assault charges with two charges of attempted second-degree
intentional murder and adding a charge of second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon
based on an allegation that Anderson pointed his gun at the bartender.
At trial, Anderson claimed self-defense. At the close of evidence, the district court
granted the state’s request to instruct the jury on the following additional crimes, which the
state described as lesser-included offenses: one count of second -degree felony murder,
two counts of first-degree assault, and two counts of second-degree assault. The jury found
Anderson guilty of those additional offenses, but not guilty of the other charged offenses.
The district court sentenced Anderson to serve 322 months in prison.
Anderson appealed to this court, and we concluded that the district court erred by
adding the “lesser-included” assault charges. State v. Anderson, No. A07-1934, 2009 WL

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816974, at *4 (Minn. App. Mar. 31, 2009) ( Anderson I), review denied (Minn. June 30,
2009). But this court affirmed Anderson’s convictions, concluding that he failed to show
that the error affecte d his substantial rights, and the supreme court denied further review.
Id.
In October 2009, Anderson petitioned for postconviction relief. The postconviction
court denied relief, and Anderson ap pealed. This court dismissed the appeal because
Anderson failed to file a brief. Anderson v. State , No. A09 -2190 (Minn. App. Apr. 22,
2010) (order) (Anderson II).
In April 2011, Anderson filed a habeas -corpus petition in federal court claiming,
inter alia, that his right to due process as provided by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to
the United States Constitution was violated by the district court’s addition of the second-
degree felony -murder charge and the first- and second -degree assault charges aft er
jeopardy had attached. Anderson v. King, No. 11-0948 RHK/JJK, 2011 WL 7293399, at
*5 (D. Minn. Nov. 21, 2011) (Anderson III). The federal district court denied relief. Id. at
*12. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Anderson’s habeas-corpus
petition. Anderson v. King, 732 F.3d 854, 855, 860 (8th Cir. 2013) (Anderson IV).
In September 2015, Anderson filed his second petition for postconviction relief,
asserting three grounds for relief: (1) the erroneous lesser -included offenses violated his
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, (2) he received ineffective assistance of trial and
appellate counsel, and (3) the interests of justice require d granting him a new trial. The
postconviction court denied the petition as untimely, procedurally barred, and previously
addressed by other courts. Anderson appealed, and this court affirmed, concluding t hat

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Anderson’s claims were time barred. Anderson v. State, No. A16-0588, 2017 WL 164419,
at *2-3 (Minn. App. Jan. 17, 2017) (Anderson V), review denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2017).
In May 2020, Anderson filed his current postconviction petition claiming that he
has newly discovered scientific evidence that shows he is innocent; that he was denied the
right to a fair trial and a trial by jury i n violation of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights; and that he should be granted a new trial in the interest of justice. The
postconviction court denied relief without a hearing , concluding that Anderson’s claims
were time and procedurally barred, and that none of Anderson’s asserted exceptions to
those bars applied. Anderson appeals.
DECISION
I.
Minnesota’s postconviction statute enables “a person convicted of a crime” to seek
postconviction relief by filing a petition claiming that the conviction “violated the person’s
rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of the state.” Minn. Stat.
§ 590.01, subd. 1(1) (2020) . “The person seeking postconviction relief bears the burden
of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that his claims merit relief.” Crow v.
State, 923 N.W.2d 2, 10 (Minn. 2019). An evidentiary hearing on a postconviction petition
must be held “unless the petition and the files and records o f the proceeding conclusively
show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Hannon v. State, __ N.W.2d __, __, 2021
WL 1287557, at *6 (Minn. Apr. 7, 2021) (quotation omitted).
We review the denial of a postconviction petition, including a denial based on time
and procedural bars, for an abuse of discretion. Colbert v. State, 870 N.W.2d 616, 621-22

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(Minn. 2015). In doing so, we review legal issues de novo and factual findings for clear
error. Id. at 621. The district court “abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an
erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Nicks,
831 N.W.2d 493, 503 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted).
A. Time Bar
A postconviction petition must be filed within two years of “an appellate court’s
disposition of [a] petitioner’s direct appeal.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a)(2) (2020).
The supreme court denied review of Anderson’s direct appeal on June 30, 2009.
Accordingly, the postconviction court co ncluded that Anderson’s May 2020
postconviction petition was untimely.
Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b) (2020), contains five exceptions to the two -year
time bar. Anderson argues that two of those exceptions apply and that the postconviction
court erred by concluding otherwise. See id. , subd. 4(b)(2), (5). We address the
postconviction court’s ruling regarding each exception in turn.
1. Newly-discovered-evidence Exception
The newly-discovered-evidence exception allows a court to consider the merits of
an untimely petition for postconviction relief if “the petitioner alleges the existence of
newly discovered evidence” that “cou ld not have been ascertained by the exercise of due
diligence by the petitioner or petitioner’s attorney within the two-year time period for filing
a postconviction petition.” Id., subd. 4(b)(2) . The petitioner must also show that the
evidence is “not cumulative to evidence presented at trial, is not for impeachment purposes,

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and establishes by a clear and convincing standard that the petitioner is innocent ” of the
offenses for which he was convicted. Id. (emphasis added).
Anderson argues that he presented newly discovered evidence in the form of letters
from a consulting forensic scientist who reanalyzed the trajectory of the bullets fired from
Anderson’s gun. He argues that the evidence “calls into question most of the arguments
made by both his attorney and the prosecuting attorney, and exposes that th[o]se arguments
are inconsistent with the physical evidence of the case .” Anderson further argues that he
could not have obtained the evidence by the exercise of due diligence because he had been
incarcerated and lacked the funds necessary to obtain the proffered forensic evidence.
The postconviction court rejected Anderson’s request for application of the newly -
discovered-evidence exception. In doing so, the court reasoned that Anderson’s proffered
forensic evidence is not “newly discovered” because the trajectory of the bullets could have
been analyzed after the trial c oncluded and before the expiration of the two -year deadline
for seeking postconviction relief. The court noted that the proffered forensic evidence was
not discovered using technology or methods that were not available at that time.
The postconviction court also reasoned that Anderson’s “incarceration and lack of
funds does not change the fact that the evidence was available to be ascertained/discovered
before, during, and after trial” and that Anderson ha d not cited authority supporting his
assertion that inability to pay for an expert witness is a basis to support an untimely
postconviction claim for relief based on newly discovered evidence.
The postconviction court further reasoned that Anderson failed to establish that his
proffered forensic evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that he is innocent of

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the offenses of which he was convicted . The clear -and-convincing standard is satisfied
“only when the evidence is unequivocal, intrinsically probable, and free from frailties.”
Andersen v. State, 913 N.W.2d 417, 425 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted) . As the
postconviction court noted, the proffered forensic evidence “only offers a reinterpretation
of the existing evidence as to what may have happened on the night of the incident”; it does
not unequivocally establish that Anderson is innocent of the offenses of which he was
convicted.
For all of those reasons, the postconviction court ruled that the newly -discovered-
evidence exception to the statutory time bar does not apply. Our review o f the record
satisfies us that the postconviction court correctly applied the law and that its decision is
not against logic and the facts in the record.
2. Interests-of-justice Exception
The interests-of-justice exception permits consideration of an untimely petition for
postconviction relief if the petitioner establishes that his petition “is not frivolous and is in
the interests of justice.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(5). However, claims made under
this exception “must be filed within two years of the date the claim arises.” Id., subd. 4(c)
(2020). A claim arises under section 590.01, subdivision 4(b)(5) , when “the petitioner
knew or should have known that he [or she] had a claim.” Sanchez v. State, 816 N.W.2d
550, 560 (Minn. 2012). An d as the supreme court has explained, “[a] claim under the
interests-of-justice exception must relate to an injustice that delayed the filing of the
petition, not to the substantive merit of the petition, and applies only in exceptional and

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extraordinary situations.” Fox v. State, 938 N.W.2d 252, 256-57 (Minn. 2020) (emphasis
added) (quotation omitted).
The postconviction court rejected Anderson’s request for application of the
interests-of-justice exception, reasoning that Anderson failed to request application of that
exception “within the two year statutory period from the date [he] knew or should have
known that the claim existed,” noting that “[i]t is evident that [Anderson] was aware of this
argument as early as 2013 where it was mentioned [in] the Eight[h] Circuit’s opinion.”
In Anderson’s habeas proceeding before the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, he
argued that “he could have drawn upon evidence regarding bullet trajectories to argue he
did not fire the bull ets that struck [the bystanders].” Anderson IV, 732 F.3d at 860. Th at
argument demonstrates that Anderson knew that a potential claim based on bullet
trajectories existed in 2013, when the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals filed its opinion.
But Anderson did not file the underlying postconviction petition until May 2020,
approximately seven years later.
As to the injustice that delayed the filing of the petition , Anderson notes that he
“was in prison and lacked the financial ability to have such [ballist ics] review conducted”
and that “it was a long struggle to obtain the funds and ability to have this review done and
the evidence presented.” Once again, Anderson does not cite authority indicating that those
circumstances—incarceration and lack of financ ial means —constitute an injustice that
warrants application of the interests -of-justice exception to the statutory time bar.
Moreover, the interest s-of-justice exception applies “only in exceptional and
extraordinary situations.” Fox, 938 N.W.2d at 256-57 (quotation omitted). We appreciate

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the challenges an inmate faces when attempting to pursue postconviction relief . But we
cannot say that incarceration and limited financial means are exceptional and extraordinary
circumstances justifying application of the interests-of-justice exception. If we were to do
so, the exception would likely swallow the rule.
We conclude that the postconviction court’s ruling that Anderson may not pursue
his untimely petition for postconviction relief under the interests-of-justice exception to the
two-year time limit was based on a correct application of law and is not against logic and
the facts in the record.
In sum, the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by summarily denying
Anderson’s petition as time barred. We note that “the postconviction two-year limitations
provision serves the public interest in finality.” Vazquez v. State , 822 N.W.2d 313, 319
(Minn. App. 2012). Anderson’s convictions became final more than ten years ago, after
the supreme court denied review of his direct appeal in 2009. Reversing Anderson’s
conviction now, based on arguments that were known to him i n 2009 and evidence that
does not clearly and convincingly establish his innocence , would negatively affect the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See id. (“[T]he reversal of
a conviction may seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” (emphasis and quotation omitted)).
B. Procedural Bar
Under the Knaffla rule, if a “ direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised
therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent
petition for postconviction relief.” State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976) .

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In addition, if a claim “could have been raised in a previous postconviction petition, the
Knaffla rule bars consideration of the claim in a subsequent petition for postconvictio n
relief.” Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 597 (Minn. 2017). “There are two exceptions
to the Knaffla rule: (1) if a novel legal issue is presented, or (2) if the interests of justice
require review.”1 Taylor v. State, 691 N.W.2d 78, 79 (Minn. 2005).
The postconviction court rejected Anderson’s argument that the interests-of-justice
exception to the Knaffla rule applies here, noting that this exception is applicable only if
“the claim has substantive merit and the petitioner did not deliberately and inexcusably fail
to raise the issue in the direct appeal or a previous postconviction petition.” Colbert, 870
N.W.2d at 626. The postconviction court reasoned that “[t]he previous courts have already
decided . . . the merits of all claims raised by [Ande rson] in this post -conviction petition.
Even with [his] newly presented ballistic evidence, [he] had the opportunity to bring this
evidence forward in [his] second post-conviction petition back in 2015, however, he chose
not to do so.” Indeed, in his brief to this court , Anderson states, “Since the beginning of
the federal court proceedings in 2011, [he] has been using arguments related to bystander
placement and bullet trajectory, which every court has either ignored or deemed
debatable.”
Once again, the postconviction court correctly applied the law , and we cannot say
that the court’s decision is against logic and the facts in the record. Thus, the

1 We note that it is an open question whether these two exceptions apply to postconviction
petitions after the 2005 amendments to chapter 590 of the Minnesota Statutes, which
codified the Knaffla bar. Swaney v. State, 882 N.W.2d 207, 215 n.4 (Minn. 2016).

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postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by summarily denying Anderson’s petition
as procedurally barred.
II.
Anderson argues that he “should be granted a new trial in the interests of justice
based upon a showing of actual innocence” or “to ensure the fair administration of justice.”
He relies on caselaw indicating that the Minnesota Supreme Court has granted new trials
in the interest of justice based on its inherent supervisory authority, but he does not cite
any precedent indicating that this court has the authority to grant such relief. See State v.
Beecroft, 813 N.W.2d 814, 846 (Minn. 20 12) ( acknowledging that the supreme court’s
power to reverse “prophylactically or in the interests of justice” comes from its power to
supervise trial courts (quotation omitted)); State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 n.6 (Minn.
2006) (stating that the court of appeals does not exercise supervisory powers that are
reserved for the supreme court). Anderson made a similar argument in his appeal of his
2015 petition for postconviction relief, and this court declined to address the argument ,
concluding that we do not have authority to grant a new trial in the interests of justice .
Anderson V, 2017 WL 164419, at *3. We reach the same conclusion in this appeal and
deny Anderson’s request for a new trial in the interests of justice.
Affirmed.