In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: K. H. and D. L., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1386

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
K. H. and D. L., Parents.

Filed April 26, 2021
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Lyon County District Court
File No. 42-JV-20-51

Douglas D. Kluver, Kluver Law Office and Mediation Center, P.L.L.C., Montevideo,
Minnesota (for appellant D.L.)

William J. Toulouse, Quarnstrom & Doering, P.A., Marshall, Minnesota (for respondent
K.H.)

Richard R. Maes, Lyon County Attorney, Nicole A. Springstead, Assistant County
Attorney, Marshall, Minnesota (for respondent Southwest Health and Human Services)

Shanna Latterell, Redwood Falls, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant-father challenges the district court’s decision to terminate his parental
rights. He argues that (1) the district court denied his due-process rights when it ordered
that his termination trial be held remotely because of concerns about COVID-19 exposure,
and (2) the district court erred when it determined that reasonable efforts had failed to
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correct conditions leading to the children’s out-of-home placement. Because we determine
the district court did not violate father’s due-process rights, and the district court did not
abuse its discretion by terminating father’s parental rights, we affirm.
FACTS
The following summarizes the district court’s written findings after a two-day bench
trial.
Background
Appellant D.L. (father) and respondent K.H. (mother) have three children (child 1,
child 2, and child 3), who ranged from one to three years old at the time of the trial. Father
and mother lived together from November 2018 until May 2019, shortly before child 3 was
born. “Father physically and verbally abused Mother when they resided together.” “The
verbal abuse commonly occurred in the presence of the children.” Although “the physical
abuse generally did not occur in the presence of the children,” the district court found that,
in November 2019, father pushed mother “over the toilet and held her down” while the
children were present. Father also was very controlling and “placed recording equipment
in and around the home to monitor Mother and the children.”
In May 2019, a district court imposed a domestic-abuse no-contact order (DANCO)
directing father to have no contact with mother. While the DANCO was still in place, father
went to the hospital to see mother after child 3 was born and “caused an altercation,
resulting in Father getting tased by law enforcement.” Officers arrested father, and later,
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the state charged father with fifth-degree drug possession, obstruction of the legal process,
violation of his DANCO, and possession of a hypodermic needle.
Father used drugs, starting after child 1 was born. Father’s “drug of choice” is
methamphetamine and , while living with mother and the children, he kept drugs and
paraphernalia “on his person, in the basement, or in the garage.” While there was “no
evidence” the children were exposed to drugs, f ather “was under the inf luence of
methamphetamine” when the children were in his care.
Child-protection proceedings
At about the same time the DANCO was issued, respondent Southwest Health and
Human Services (the county) petitioned the district court and alleged that child 1 and
child 2 needed protection or services. The county filed a similar petition for child 3 three
months later. The petitions alleged that “[ d]ue to the ongoing chemical dependency
concerns and the domestic violence occurring in the home in the presence of the
children . . . an adjudication is necessary to ensure the children’s needs are being met.” In
July and August 2019, the district court adjudicated the children to need protection or
services. The district court placed the children in the custody of the county, and the county
placed the children in foster care in August 2019.
The county developed a case plan for f ather that had four key provisions:
(1) complete outpatient, chemical-dependency treatment, comply with drug testing, and
attend Alcoholics Anonymous/Narcotics Anonymous (AA/NA) meetings; (2) complete a
parenting class, attend all scheduled visitations with the children, “demonstrate the skills
[father] has learned from parenting [class] during his visitation,” and obtain a diagnostic
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assessment, which recommended individual therapy and medication management;
(3) cooperate with the social worker; and (4) maintain appropriate housing and obtain
employment. During f ather’s incarceration, the county social worker reviewed the case
plan with father, who “verbally agreed” to the plan.1
During the child-protection proceedings, f ather was placed on supervised
conditional release because of the criminal charges. But father violated his conditions of
release, which lead to local jail time “at least one day every month while the [child-
protection] proceedings were pending.” Father pleaded guilty to all four charges in
November 2019. The district court sentenced him to prison on January 16, 2020, with an
anticipated release date of January 26, 2021.
In July 2020, the county petitioned to terminate the parental rights of father and
mother. The petition alleged four statutory bases for termination: (1) father and mother
refused or neglected to comply with their parental duties; (2) father and mother were
palpably unfit; (3) despite reasonable efforts to reunite the family, father and mother had
not corrected conditions leading to out-of-home placement; and (4) the children were
neglected and in foster care. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4), (5), (8) (2020).

1 The county adjusted father’s case plan during his incarceration. For example, the case
plan called for f ather to “write letters and draw pictures for the children” during
incarceration, and the county facilitated father’s phone conversations with the children by
purchasing phone cards.
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Termination trial
The district court scheduled a court trial for September 15, 2020, and ordered father
to appear in person. 2 The day before trial, the district court emailed the parties to inform
them that it had “received information that there may have been positive cases of COVID”
where father was incarcerated. The district court found that “due to concerns for the health
and safety of parties, attorneys, and witnesses, I am going to require that [father] appear
remotely from [the jail] . . . to minimize any possible exposure.” 3 On the first day of trial,
the district court elaborated on its reasoning: while it had “no reason to believe that [father]
is symptomatic,” the district court also did not know “if he may actually have the virus ”
and wanted to limit exposure “as much as possible for the health and safety of all the other
individuals involved.” Father did not move for a continuance.
All parties and witnesses appeared remotely by videoconference during the two-day
trial. On the first day of trial, mother consented to third parties adopting the children. Thus,
the only issue before the district court was termination of father’s parental rights. The
district court heard testimony from father, mother, f ather’s probation officer, two social
workers, the guardian ad litem, and father’s sister and mother.
In October 2020, the district court issued written findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and an order terminating father’s parental rights. The district court determined that

2 Father’s brief to this court asserts that, before the judge’s order, he asked the district court
for an order that he appear in person for trial. Although the record does not include this
motion, the county does not disagree with father’s assertion.

3 Father was unable to appear remotely from prison, so the district court ordered father
transported to the county jail for his trial appearance.
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clear and convincing evidence supported termination of f ather’s parental rights under all
four statutory grounds. The district court also found that the county provided reasonable
efforts to reunite the family. Additionally, the district court found, “F ather has not
demonstrated that he is able or willing, outside of a controlled prison environment, to
comply with the case plan.” And the district court determined that termination of f ather’s
parental rights is in the best interests of the children.
Father appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not violate f ather’s due-process rights by holding the
bench trial remotely.

Father argues that “allowing witnesses to testify remotely during trial would impair
[his] procedural rights,” and that “the practical realities of a virtual hearing unquestionably
made it more difficult for the father and his attorney to communicate privately and
continuously throughout the proceedings.” “Whether a parent’s due-process rights have
been violated in a [termination of parental rights] proceeding is a question of law, which
we review de novo.” In re Welfare of Children of D.F., 752 N.W.2d 88, 97 (Minn. App.
2008).
The county first argues that because the due- process issue was not “raised at the
district court level, it should be precluded from being addressed.” Generally, appellate
courts do not address issues that were not raised before and decided by the district court.
See In re Welfare of C.L.L., 310 N.W.2d 555, 557 (Minn. 1981) (declining to address a
constitutional issue raised for the first time on appeal from an order terminating parental
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rights). Father’s brief acknowledges that he did not object or seek a continuance when the
district court ordered remote proceedings. Father argues he is still entitled to “plain error”
review.
We need not decide whether plain-error review applies . We have discretion to
review issues raised for the first time on appeal in the interests of justice. Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 103.04; see Tischendorf v. Tischendorf, 321 N.W.2d 405, 410 (Minn. 1982)
(addressing constitutional issues in the interest of justice when the parties had adequate
briefing time and the issues were “implied in the lower court”). Becau se the parties have
briefed the due-process issue, the record is adequate for our review, and the county does
not claim prejudice, we address the issue in the interests of justice.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee that no person shall be
“deprive[d] of life, liberty , or property without due process of law.” U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1; see also Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. Parents have “substantial and
fundamental rights . . . to the custody and companionship of their children.” In re Welfare
of HGB, 306 N.W.2d 821, 825 (Minn. 1981). The Minnesota Supreme Court has accorded
due-process review to termination proceedings and specifically considered what process is
due when a parent is in prison and unable to be physically present for a termination trial.
Id. at 822 (“Due process of law does not compel the physical attendance of a parent at a
termination of parental rights proceeding.”). In doing so, the supreme court held that “the
nature of due process is flexibility,” therefore, courts balance “the interests involved in the
specific case under consideration.” Id. at 825. Thus, the “amount of process due varies with
the circumstances of the case,” and “both the interests of the parent and the child[ren] are
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considered along with the circumstances of the particular case in an effort to determine
which of these interests is to predominate.” Id. at 825-26.
Here, we consider father’s interests along with the county ’s and the children’s
interests. Father’s interests include his “fundamental right” to “make decisions concerning
the care, custody, and control of his . . . children.” SooHoo v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 815,
820 (Minn. 2007). The county “has a compelling interest in identifying and protecting
abused children, and in safeguarding the physical and psy chological well- being of
children.” In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 134 (Minn. 2014) (quotations
and citations omitted). The children’s interests are well-established: “Under our law,
children are not to be kept waiting, uncertain who will raise them or where they will grow
up.” Id. at 135.
The county’s interests align with the children’s interests in the speedy determination
of father’s parental rights to advance permanent placement options for the children. The
children’s interests are reflected in Minnesota’s juvenile protection rules, which provide
that proceedings intend to “secure for each child under the jurisdiction of the court a home
that is safe and permanent,” “provide a just, thorough, speedy, and efficient determination”
of parental rights while ensuring due process, and “reduce unnecessary delays in court
proceedings.” Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 1.02(b), (e). When father’s termination trial started,
the children had been in out-of-home placement over 405 days and were all very young:
three years old or less.
Father’s argument assumes that he has a right to attend a termination trial in person.
He certainly has an interest in attending a trial addressing whether to terminate his parental
9
rights, and it is undisputed that in-person attendance is preferable. The applicable rules
recognize a parent’s procedural right to attend child-protection proceedings. Minn. R. Juv.
Prot. P. 38.02 (parties who are entitled to a summons “shall have a right to attend the
hearing.”); id. 53.02 (summons required to terminate parental rights). While a parent has
an interest in attending a termination trial, due process does not require in-person or
“physical attendance” of that parent at the termination trial. See HGB, 306 N.W.2d at 822.
In HGB, the supreme court affirmed the termination of a mother’s parental rights when she
could not attend the trial because she was incarcerated in another state. Id. at 824. The
supreme court determined that the mother’s due-process rights were vindicated because
she was represented by counsel, who could submit depositions or interrogatories on her
behalf. Id. at 825-27.
We later noted that “H.G.B. did not create an absolute rule for allowing termination
proceedings without the physical presence of a parent.” In re Welfare of A.Y.-J. ,
558 N.W.2d 757, 760 (Minn. App. 1997), review denied (Minn. Apr. 15, 1997). Yet HGB
established that there is no constitutional right for a parent to attend a termination trial in
person. 306 N.W.2d at 822; see also A.Y.- J., 558 N.W.2d at 760 (holding father’s
due-process rights were not violated when he was not allowed to attend a termination trial
in person due to incarceration because father was represented by counsel and could submit
evidence). Thus, we next consider whether the district court’s decision to conduct a remote
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termination trial provided adequate due pro cess under the circumstances by balancing
father’s interests with the children’s interests.4
The rules allow that “[b]y agreement of the parties, or in exceptional circumstances
upon motion . . . or on the court’s own initiative, the court may hold hearings and take
testimony by telephone or interactive video.” Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 11.02. Father’s brief
to this court did not discuss whether the current pandemic is an exceptional circumstance,
nor did he argue that rule 11.02 violates due- process guarantees. The county argues that
“[a] pandemic should qualify as an exceptional circumstance.”
We agree with the county. On March 13, 2020, the Governor of Minnesota issued
an executive order declaring a peacetime emergency in response to the pandemic. Emerg.
Exec. Order No. 20- 01, Declaring a Peacetime Eme rgency & Coordinating Minnesota’s
Strategy to Protect Minnesotans from COVID-19 (Mar. 13, 2020). That peacetime
emergency has been extended many times, and was still in effect during the trial. See
Emerg. Exec. Order No. 20-89, Extending the COVID-19 Peacetime Emergency Declared
in Executive Order 20-01 (Sept. 11, 2020).

4 Father asserts that “there exists no compelling state interest in having a trial during a
pandemic when an in-person trial is not possible.” He contends that “[c]learing the court’s
docket or adhering to timelines when all other rules and resources have been paused during
the public health crisis do not amount to a compelling state interest outweighing
constitutional rights.” But this argument both ignores a child’s right to the prompt
resolution of juvenile- protection matters and assumes father has a constitutional right to
physical atten dance at the termination trial —a legal conclusion that the supreme court
rejected in HGB. 306 N.W.2d at 822. HGB instead directed that the correct analysis
determines what process is due by balancing the interests of the parent and the children. Id.
at 826. Father’s brief to this court does not cite or discuss HGB.
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In connection with the peacetime emergency, the supreme court ordered that “[n]o
person who has an elevated risk of transmitting the novel coronavirus that causes
COVID-19 may attend any in-court hearing or proceeding.” Continuing Operations of the
Courts of the State of Minnesota Under a Statewide Peacetime Declaration of Emergency,
No. ADM20-8001 at 3 (Minn. Mar. 13, 2020). At the time of father’s trial, the judicial
branch had implemented “transitional case strategies” but still required adherence to the
Minnesota Judicial Branch COVID-19 Preparedness Plan, which in turn cited to Center for
Disease Control guidelines recommending that “if a household member or close contact
has tested positive for COVID-19, stay home.” See Order Governing the Operations of the
Minnesota Judicial Branch Under Emergency Order Nos. 20-53, 20-56, No. ADM20-8001
(Minn. May 15, 2020). These orders support the district court’s decision to order father’s
termination trial by videoconference. Given the health concerns of COVID-19 exposure at
father’s prison, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that
exceptional circumstances warranted a remote hearing. We determine that the district
court’s decision, which followed the rules of juvenile-protection procedure and
appropriately balance d the interests of father and the children, did not violate father’s
due-process rights.
Even if we assume that the district court’s order for a remote trial compromised
father’s due-process rights, “prejudice as a result of the alleged violation is an essential
component of the due process analysis.” In re Welfare of Child of B.J.-M. and H.W.,
744 N.W.2d 669, 673 (Minn. 2008). Father makes two arguments for prejudice.
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First, father argues that remote participation prevented him, his attorney, and the
district court from realizing his “right to confront witnesses” because he could not
“adequately and fairly evaluate the reliability of testimony given by the State’s witnesses.”
Father claims that the district court also was “deprived [of] the opportunity to decipher the
nonverbal expressions of witnesses appearing over a computer screen, the nuances of the
father’s demeanor and body language was undoubtedly flattened and lost to technology.”
Father cites no legal authority recognizing a “right to confront witnesses” in civil or
child-protection proceedings. The right to confront witnesses exists in the criminal context.
See Minn. Const. art. I, § 6 (“In all criminal prosecutions . . . . the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”). But at least one jurisdiction
has refused to extend the right to confrontation to child-protection proceedings. Cabinet
for Health & Family Servs. v. A.G.G., 190 S.W.3d 338, 346-47 (Ky. 2006). And even if
we assume father has a right to confront witnesses, that right was vindicated here. Because
the termination trial to ok place by videoconference, father, his attorney, and the district
court had the opportunity to perceive nonverbal expressions of the witnesses. While
in-person testimony is generally preferable to remote testimony, videoconferencing still
provides clear and detailed observation of a witness’s demeanor.
Second, f ather argues that remote participation precluded effective assistance of
counsel because it “profoundly limited the strategic options available to the father and his
counsel by precluding eye contact” and limited their confidential discussions of a
“witness’s body language.” Minnesota statute establishes that father has a right to effective
assistance of counsel at a termination hearing. Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 3 (2020).
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The county responds that, during his termination trial, father “was able to meet with
his attorney whenever he asked or when his attorney asked to meet with him.” The record
supports the county’s position. The district court asked father regularly if he would like to
speak with his attorney. Father used “breakout room” sessions many times during trial
proceedings. Father cites no instance in which videoconferencing hampered his
communication with his attorney.
In sum , father’s due-process claim fails because he has no right to attend a
termination trial in person, and he has not shown prejudice by the district court’s decision
to conduct remote proceedings in his case. The district court did not abuse its discretion by
determining that exceptional circumstances warranted re mote proceedings for father’s
termination trial given the COVID-19 outbreak at father’s prison, the long out-of-home
placement of the children, who are very young, and the availability of videoconference
proceedings. Because the district court’s use of videoconference technology allowed father
to appear and participate in the termination trial, we discern no constitutional violation and
no prejudice.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the county
provided reasonable efforts and that father failed to correct the conditions
leading to the children’s out-of-home placement.

Father argues that the district court erred by finding that the county provided
reasonable efforts to reunite the family given his incarceration and the restrictions imposed
because of the pandemic. Father also argues the district court focused on his past failings
and did not consider conditions at the time of the termination trial. On appeal, we examine
the record to determine whether the district court applied the appropriate statutory criteria
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and whether its factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly
erroneous. In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). We
review a district court’s determination that a county made reasonable efforts to reunite the
family for abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of the Child of D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d 315, 323
(Minn. App. 2015), review denied (Minn. July 21, 2015).
A district court may terminate parental rights when (1) at least one statutory ground
for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence; (2) termination is in the best
interests of the child; and (3) the county has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family.
S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385. We note that f ather does not challenge the district court’s
determinations on the first and second steps. On the first step, the district court determined
that the county provided clear and convincing evidence for each of the four statutory
grounds for termination: (1) father refused or neglected to comply with his parental duties,
(2) father is palpably unfit to be a parent, (3) father had not corrected conditions leading to
out-of-home placement, and (4) the children were neglected and in foster care. See Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4), (5), (8). On the second step, the district court
determined that termination of father’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children.
See In re Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990) (“The child’s best
interests, however, remain the paramount consideration in every termination case.”).
Father’s appeal solely addresses the third step: whether the county has provided
reasonable efforts to reunite the family . The district court must consider whether the
services provided were “(1) relevant to the safety and protection of the child; (2) adequate
to meet the needs of the child and family; ( 3) culturally appropriate; (4) available and
15
accessible; (5) consistent and timely; and (6) realistic under the circumstances.” Minn. Stat
§ 260.012(h) (2020). We agree with father that, while he was incarcerated , “this
circumstance might change what qualifies as ‘reasonable’ under the county’s duty to make
‘reasonable efforts’ to reunite father and child.” In re Welfare of A.R.B., 906 N.W.2d 894,
899 (Minn. App. 2018).
Although an issue statement and point heading in father’s brief to this court identify
the claimed error as the county’s failure to provide reasonable efforts, he does not articulate
how the county failed. The district court found that the county provided these services to
the children and father: case management, purchase of phone and phone card to facilitate
contact while father is in prison, chemical-use assessment, diagnostic assessment, random
drug testing, anger- management classes, and supervised visitation, among other things.
The district court found the services provided were relevant, adequate, and appropriate, as
well as realistic under the circumstances. The district court also found that father never told
the guardian ad litem or social worker that he needed any assistance with accessing services
or that he needed additional services. Based on these findings, the district court determined
that the county had provided reasonable efforts.
Father appears to contend that the county’s efforts were not sufficient because he
could not overcome some of the challenges of comply ing with his case plan during
incarceration and under COVID restrictions. Father argues that “based on the evidence
adduced at trial,” the district court’s finding that father did not substantially comply with
the case plan “could hardly be more erroneous.” He requests that this court “reverse the
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termination and remand for a determ ination as to whether the COVID-19 pandemic
constitutes good cause for extending the [child-protection] proceedings.”
We are not persuaded. First, we note that father did not ask the district court to
extend child-protection proceedings. Second, in determining whether father had complied
with the case plan and had corrected conditions leading to out -of-home placement of the
children, the district court specifically commented on COVID restrictions that affected plan
compliance. Still, father’s incarceration and COVID restrictions posed circumstances not
addressed by existing caselaw. Thus, we consider father’s specific challenges to the district
court’s findings that he failed to comply with his case plan. The district court analyzed
father’s compliance with each of the four aspects of the case plan.
First, the district court found that f ather failed to abstain from methamphetamine.
Before going to prison, f ather “either refused to submit to testing or tested positive for
illegal drugs at least 5 times.” The district court found that father “chose to interact with
drug users” and told his social worker that this was “not a risk to him.” The district court
found that father’s “assessment . . . shows a lack of insight into the actions needed to
maintain sobriety.”
The district court also found that f ather failed to adequately comply with his
recommended outpatient chemical -dependency treatment. Father wanted to attend a
particular program, “but could not because Mother was currently participating in that
program.” Father petitioned the program “to make an exception for him ,” but was
ultimately rejected. Before entering prison, f ather completed orientation at an alternative
program, but began his prison sentence before he could begin the program. The district
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court found that “[i]f Father had immediately contacted [the second program], or another
treatment program, when he was denied admission into [the first program], instead of
pursuing his own agenda, he would have been able to complete at least a portion of the
outpatient treatment program. Father chose not to do so.” This finding is supported by the
record and not clearly erroneous.
Father challenges the finding by pointing to his testimony that he has been involved
in AA/NA group sessions while in prison. But father’s failure to complete outpatient
treatment while he was outside the controlled environment of prison is material
noncompliance with his case plan. Father also argues that “[d]ue to the prison’s COVID-19
restriction . . . chemical dependency treatment and parenting classes were simply not
available” while he was in prison. The district court considered that father “has attempted
to access treatment in prison, but has not been able to do so.” The district court determined,
however, that father failed to complete chemical -dependency treatment because he
“intentionally took actions that delayed his entry.” The district court also found that father
“has not been able to demonstrate any significant period of sobriety outside of a
correctional setting.”
Second, the district court found f ather “did not comply with [the case-plan]
requirement” that he attend individual therapy or participate in visitation.5 Father correctly
points out, and the district court found, that he completed anger management. It is also true

5 The case plan also required father to participate in medication management, but the record
on appeal lacks any specific information about what was required or father’s compliance.
While the district court found that father did not participate in medication management, the
district court did not include it in the analysis of father’s compliance with the case plan.
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that father was not charged with acts of domestic violence after his 2020 conviction for the
DANCO violation. And, before entering prison, father attended his first individual therapy
session, but father then cancelled the rest. The district court found that “[s]ome of the
failures to attend were due to F ather’s local incarceration that occurred as a result of his
violations of conditions of release.” To his credit, father attended therapy in prison, but the
district court found that, “based on Father’s testimony, the therapy does not involve issues
related to his ability to parent children.”
The district court also found that father’s parenting time was “inconsistent.” Before
his commitment to prison, f ather attended “only 16 out of 31 visits.” Some missed visits
were because of father’s local incarceration after he violated conditions of release, while
other missed visits were “due to no-s hows or cancellations.” While in prison, f ather
maintained some contact with his children through phone calls, though “[s]ince Father has
had phone contact with the children, [child 1] has become more angry and noncompliant
in the foster home.” Thus, father’s compliance with therapy requirements and parental
visitation was mixed, and the district court’s finding that he did not comply with his case
plan is supported by the record.
Third, the district court found that f ather “did not consistently comply with [the]
requirement” that he maintain contact with his social worker. Father was “not responsive
to calls and messages” and failed to update his first social worker on his current address.
“Father would frequently come to the social service office, without an
appointment, . . . demand to see the social worker,” and “become angry and cause a
scene in the lobby if the social worker was not available.” The district court recognized,
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however, that “[m]any of the failures in communication occurred between Father and the
initial social worker.” The district court found that “these difficulties seem to have
dissipated” with a new social worker, “at least in part because Father [was] in prison.”
Thus, the district court’s finding that father was inconsistent in maintaining contact is
supported by the record.
Finally, father’s case plan required him to obtain employment and maintain
appropriate housing. The district court found father testified that “he plans [to] work for a
foundation to help persons with housing” fol lowing his release from prison. The district
court found that “Father’s role with the foundation is unclear.” Father told a social worker
that the foundati on had “$60 million” in assets but the district court found this “not
credible.” Father also told the social worker that he had saved enough money to allow him
to live with the children without working, though the district court determined this was
“entirely incredible.”
Father’s last e mployment was in December 2018, and he was terminated after
failing a drug test. The district court noted that when f ather was employed at a different
business, he “quit, even though he had no other employment prospects, because he got into
a verbal arg ument with his boss about a minor issue.” The district court found that this
work history was “emblematic of Father’s poor decision-making skills and poor impulse
control.” Father ultimately testified that his employment plans for after prison were not
“concrete.” The district court found father’s employment plans, “assuming they exist, are
not reasonable and realistic.”
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Father testified that he had found a home for after his release from prison. But father
could not identify the price of the home, and the county “discovered that the asking price
of the home is $461,000.” The district court found that “Father’s mother testified that there
were no concrete plans to assist Father in purchasing the home.” The district court found
that father testified, when he and mother lived together, he “quit making the mortgage
payments because he got mad at the lender.” The district court found that this was
“emblematic of Father’s poor decision- making skills and poor impulse control.” The
district court determined that father’s deficits in employment “directly and adversely affect
his ability to care for the children.”
After reviewing each of the four components of father’s case plan, we conclude that
the record supports the district court’s findings that father did not comply with his case-plan
requirements to complete chemical -dependency treatment, complete individual therapy
and a parenting class, attend all scheduled visitations with the children, cooperate with his
social worker, and secure appropriate housing and employment.
Father insists that the district court “focused disproportionately on the court-ordered
programming that was not completed due to the COVID-19 pandemic.” But even if father
had completed his case plan, the district court’s determination that he had not corrected the
conditions leading to out-of -home placement of the children would still be supported by
the record. “The critical issue is not whether the parent formally complied with the case
plan, but rather whether the parent is presently able to assume the responsibilities of caring
for the child.” In re Welfare of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 89 (Minn. App. 2012).
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Thus, the record supports the district court’s finding that the county provided
reasonable efforts to reunite the family and that father still failed to correct the conditions
leading to the children’s out-of-home placement. The district court’s findings are supported
by record evidence and are not clearly erroneous. The district court also did not abuse its
discretion by determining that father was not now able to assume the responsibilities of
caring for the children. In making this determination, the district court appropriately
considered the difficulties posed by father’s incarceration and COVID restrictions.
Because we also determine that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that terminating f ather’s parental rights is in the children’s best interest and
the statutory grounds for termination a re fully supported by the record, we affirm the
district court’s order.
Affirmed.