Ronald Lee Schlangen, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1388

Ronald Lee Schlangen, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed August 9, 2021
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Morrison County District Court
File No. 49-CR-17-276

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rachel F. Bond, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian J. Middendorf, Morrison County Attorn ey, Michel P. Chisum , Assistant County
Attorney, Little Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Florey, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
After being found with roughly 130 grams of methamphetamine in his car, appellant
Ronald Schlangen was convicted of first-degree controlled substance crime. Schlangen
contested his conviction in a petition for po stconviction relief, which was denied. On

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appeal, Schlangen argues that the postconvic tion court erred by de nying his petition in
three respects: (1) the state’s primary la w-enforcement witness provided unnoticed and
improper expert-witness testimony; (2) th e prosecutor committed misconduct by asking
the witness about Schlangen’ s guilt; and (3) the district court admitted unnoticed and
prejudicial evidence of prior ba d acts. In a pro se supplem ental brief, Schlangen further
argues that the district court violated his right to a speedy trial and that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.
FACTS
While on patrol, a state trooper observed a car driving with a broken windshield.
Upon running the license plate information on his squad car computer, the trooper learned
that the car was registered to appellant Ronald Schlangen, who also had an active warrant
for his arrest. Unbeknownst to the trooper, his computer system was not up to date and did
not reflect the fact that Schlangen had transferred the title to the SUV to his daughter days
earlier.
After stopping and approaching the vehicle, the trooper found K.L. in the driver’s
seat and Schlangen—who gave the trooper a false name—in the passenger seat. According
to K.L. and Schlangen, they were on their way to the casino. While talking with the pair,
the trooper noticed that K.L.’s eyes were wa tery and bloodshot and that her pupils were
smaller than normal. K.L. also had a grayis h film at the corners of her mouth and was
“very animated” and speaking rapidly. During their brief conversation, the trooper spotted
a miniature baseball bat in the center console that he perceived to be a weapon, a butane
torch, and a pink box that a ppeared to be “out of plac e.” The trooper commanded a

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drug-sniffing dog to search the SUV. The d og alerted to the pink box, which contained
83.6 grams of methamphetamine inside plastic baggies. The trooper placed Schlangen and
K.L. under arrest, and the vehicle was impounded.
After the arrests, a neighboring law en forcement agency rece ived multiple calls
from anonymous callers asking how to retrieve the contents of the SUV. Believing there
were more drugs or paraphernalia in the vehi cle, the trooper obtained a search warrant.
While searching the vehicle, the trooper discove red a satchel behind the driver’s seat that
contained multiple pieces of ma il addressed to Schl angen, gift cards to the casino in
Schlangen’s name, drugs (such as LSD and mushrooms), and marijuana. There was also a
fluorescent green bag in the satchel that contained a digital scale and a box labeled “Mike
and Ikes.” The box contained several baggies holding 47.077 grams of methamphetamine
in total. The state ultimately charged Schla ngen with a first-degree controlled substance
crime (possession of 50 grams or more of methamphetamine), and a second-degree
controlled substance crime (possession of 25 grams or more of methamphetamine). Minn.
Stat. §§ 152.021, subd. 2(a)(1), .022, subd. 2(a)(1) (2016).
During a three-day trial, the jury h eard testimony from the trooper, Schlangen’s
friend L.R. (who Schlangen claimed was the rightful owner of the methamphetamine), a
fingerprint specialist, and Schlangen.
The trooper testified that he was certif ied as a drug-recognition evaluator, which
included training to recognize the “signs and symptoms” of persons under the influence of
a controlled substance. He also stated that he “specializes” in “traffic based narcotics
interdiction,” which involves training to identify signs that someone is hiding and

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transporting drugs. The trooper testified th at Schlangen’s conduct was consistent with
many of the general drug-courier traits. Some of these signs include having a female drive
the car, having matching stories of where th e passengers are going, and hiding drugs in
items off of their person as to not create a direct link to the drugs. The trooper also noted
common items he looks for in a stop, like weapons and butane torches—items he perceived
as being present in Schlangen’s vehicle.
Through the trooper’s testimony, the state further introdu ced recordings of phone
calls made from Schlangen while he was in jail to his daughter, nephew, and others present
with K.L.1 In the recordings, Schlangen demonstrated his knowledge of the importance of
the green fluorescent bag, which he mentioned in a call before he was asked about it by the
trooper. He also repeatedly discussed the pink box, relayed that there was “stuff . . . in
those bags,” and referred to K.L. as his “ace in the deck” for knowing the “true details” of
the arrest and agreeing to claim ownership of the drugs. And in a call with his nephew,
Schlangen gave the following advice: to travel as little as possible, to always have a story,
to travel with a girlfriend if possible because “they don’t like to harass women,” and that
areas under the hood of the car and in the tr unk are “better.” When asked about this
recording, the trooper explained that Schlan gen was giving his nephew advice on how to
transport narcotics without getting caught and stated that Schlangen generally appeared to
be “following much of his own advice” on transporting drugs.

1 Six calls were played at trial, although th ere were additional calls that were declared
inadmissible during a pre-trial hearing.

5
Next on the stand was Schl angen’s friend L.R. She testified to meeting Schlangen
when he worked as a driver, a job where he transported her to her medical appointments.
Before Schlangen’s arrest, he came to L.R.’s house, gave her cash and a bag containing
cash and methamphetamine, and asked her to hold on to it. But L.R. got nervous and asked
Schlangen to take the items ba ck. L.R. placed the drugs and cash inside a pink flowered
box and taped it shut. She then took the box with her to a medical appointment and showed
Schlangen which car the box was in. When L.R. returned, the box was gone. At trial, L.R.
identified the pink box found in Schlangen’s car as the same box in which she had placed
the methamphetamine and cash.
Following L.R.’s testimony, the fingerprint expert testified about fingerprints found
on the pink box. The expert explained that, although she concluded that L.R. was the
source of some of the fingerprints found on both the box itself and the tape on the box, the
expert could not conclusively identify any fingerprints on the box as belonging to K.L. or
Schlangen. Despite this, the expert testifie d that it was possible for someone to touch an
item without leaving fingerprints behind.
Finally, Schlangen testified. He said that on the day of his arrest he and K.L.—with
whom he was living at the time—had planned on going to the casino. But before doing so,
the pair had a few stops to make. First, K.L. grabbed some of his mail to take with them.
She told Schlangen that they needed to meet L.R. at her doctor’s office. Once there, K.L.
got out of the SUV and retrieved the pink box left by L.R. Schlangen then drove the pair
to Walmart to meet his daughter. Because Schlangen planned on turning himself in for his
outstanding warrant, he needed to give his da ughter access to his ap artment. Schlangen

6
and K.L. then stopped for gas and switched seats. It was at this point, Schlangen testified,
that he first noticed the pink box.
Regarding the items found in the car, Schlangen claimed that the butane torch and
the bat did not belong to him, and that the green bag belonged to K.L. And although the
satchel also belonged to K.L. and was predominately filled with her belongings, Schlangen
stated that the LSD, mushro oms, and marijuana found inside were his. As for the
methamphetamine in the Mike and Ike’s box, Schlangen said he had no knowledge of it at
the time. Schlangen also denied most of th e trooper’s characterizations of his jail phone
calls, saying that when he referred to “stu ff” he only meant the non-methamphetamine
drugs and paraphernalia. He also explained that K.L. was his “ace in the deck” because
the methamphetamine belonged to her. But on cross-examination, Schlangen admitted to
giving his nephew advice on how to transport illegal drugs.
The jury found Schlangen gu ilty on both counts. At sent encing, the district court
entered a conviction for first-degree controlled substance crime, and sentenced Schlangen
to 140 months’ imprisonment.2
Following his conviction, Schlangen filed a petition fo r postconviction relief,
arguing that he should be granted a new trial based on severa l errors that occurred during
his trial. Specifically, he argued that (1) the trooper gave improper drug courier profile
evidence; (2) the trooper testified as an unnoticed expert witness; (3) the trooper improperly

2 After initially filing a direct appeal, Schl angen discharged his attorney, dismissed his
appeal, and sought pro se postconviction relief. Eventually, Schlangen requested a public
defender to represent him in the postconv iction proceedings, and the district court
appointed one.

7
testified that Schlangen constructively possessed the methamphetamine found in the SUV;
and (4) the district court improperly admitted unnoticed Spreigl evidence. The
postconviction court denied relie f, concluding that while some of the evidence admitted
against Schlangen was improper and constituted plain error, the errors did not affect
Schlangen’s substantial rights because there was no reasonable likelihood that they had a
significant effect on the jury’s verdict.
Schlangen appeals.
DECISION
Before addressing Schlangen’s arguments, we begin with the overarching standard
for postconviction relief. On appeal, a decision denying postconviction relief is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. Griffin v. State, 941 N.W.2d 404, 408 (Minn. 2020). We will
not reverse a district court’s denial of a petition for relief unless the court “exercised its
discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manne r, based its ruling on an erroneous view of
the law, or made clearly e rroneous factual findings.” Id. (quotation omitted). With this
standard in mind, we turn to the four central issues before us.
I. The state’s primary law-enforcement witness opining on drug-courier
behaviors did not affect Schlangen’s substantial rights.

First, Schlangen argues that we should reverse his conviction and remand for a new
trial because the trooper testified as an unnotic ed expert witness. We generally review
evidentiary rulings, including those relating to expert testimony, for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Thao , 875 N.W.2d 834, 840 (Minn. 2016). When challenging a district court’s
evidentiary ruling, an appellant must estab lish both that the district court abused its

8
discretion and that, as a consequen ce, the appellant was prejudiced. State v. O’Meara,
755 N.W.2d 29, 33 (Minn. App. 2008). We review the admission of unobjected-to expert
testimony for plain error. State v. Martinez, 725 N.W.2d 733, 738-39 (Minn. 2007).
Under the plain-error test, we examine evidentiary rulings to determine whether
there was (1) an error, (2) that was plain, and (3) that affected appellant’s substantial rights.
State v. Gunderson, 812 N.W.2d 156, 159 (Minn. App. 2012).3 When considering whether
someone’s substantial rights were implicated, we consider fact ors such as the strength of
the evidence against the defendant, the perv asiveness of the improper behavior, and
whether the defendant had an opportunity to rebut the improper suggestions. State v. Davis,
735 N.W.2d 674, 682 (Minn. 2007).
With that standard in mind, we turn to the caselaw and rules surrounding the alleged
error—improper expert-witness testimony. A la y witness may only testify about matters
to which they have “personal knowledge.” Mi nn. R. Evid. 602. La y witnesses may give
testimony in the form of opinions if the op inions are rationally based on the witness’s
perception. Minn. R. Evid. 701. But a lay witness may not give opinion testimony that is
based on “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.” Id. Conversely, a witness
qualifying as an expert may te stify based on their “scientific , technical, or otherwise
specialized knowledge.” Minn. R. Evid. 702. But before the state may offer expert

3 An error affects substantial rights if ther e is a reasonable likel ihood that the error
substantially affected the verdict. State v. Strommen, 648 N.W.2d 681, 688 (Minn. 2002).
If any requirement of the plain-error test is not satisfied, we do not need to address any of
the others. State v. Lilienthal , 889 N.W.2d 780, 785 (Minn. 2017); see also
Montanaro v. State, 802 N.W.2d 726, 733 (Minn. 2011) (applying the plain-error test by
reviewing substantial rights without analyzing error).

9
testimony it must disclose to the defense the identity of the expert witness and provide a
written summary of the subject matter of the expert’s testimony, including any findings,
opinions, or conclusions the expert will give. Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01, subd. 1(4)(c).
In the context of police officers, we have allowed police officers to testify as expert
witnesses based on factors like their education and training. See State v. Valentine ,
787 N.W.2d 630, 639 (Minn. App. 2010) (determining that an officer’s bachelor’s degree
in criminal justice, years on the job, and training sessions qualified her as an expert on
domestic violence). But we have warned that a police officer giving expert testimony
utilizing a drug-courier profile to establish guilt is “plainly inadmissible.” State v. Barajas,
817 N.W.2d 204, 222 (Mi nn. App. 2012) (quoting State v. Litzau, 650 N.W.2d 177, 185
(Minn. 2002)). Police officers may, however, testify about relevant techniques employed
by other drug dealers to explain the “significan ce of certain evidence or the defendant’s
conduct.” Id. (citing State v. Williams, 525 N.W.2d 538, 548 (Minn. 1994)).
Here, the trooper testified that he had training in “narcotics interdiction” which
involved identifying and comparing behavior s and tactics used by people transporting
drugs. The trooper proceeded to testify about the common traits of a drug courier and
compared those traits to what he witnessed during the traffi c stop. While this type of
testimony may be narrowly pe rmitted to explain the significance of evidence or
Schlangen’s conduct as instructed in Williams and Litzau, the trooper here made broad
comparisons informed by his education, experience and training. But, despite its decision
to elicit this testimony, the st ate had not made the required e xpert disclosures, even after
Schlangen’s demand for discovery asking for a li st of the state’s expert witnesses. Minn.

10
R. Crim. P. 9.01, subd. 1(4)(c). The postconviction court said this evidence was improper
and constituted plain error, but that the state de monstrated that the errors did not affect
Schlangen’s substantial rights.
We need not decide if the admission of th is portion of the trooper’s testimony was
plain error because we agree with the postconviction court that the testimony did not affect
Schlangen’s substantial rights. In so concluding, we begin with the observation that the
state’s case hinged on proving that Schlange n was in joint, constructive possession of
methamphetamine with K.L. Even without the portion of the trooper’s testimony that was
related to narcotics interdiction, the state’s case against Schlangen that related to possession
was strong. L.R.’s testimony that Schlangen planned the transfer of the methamphetamine
in the pink box not on ly showed that Schlangen knew about the methamphetamine, but
also directly placed it in his possession , demonstrating his constructive possession of the
drugs.4 And at the scene, Schlangen was qu ick to disclaim ownership of the box before
being told there were drugs inside. Furthermore, the phone calls Schlangen made while in
jail—in particular his discussion with his daug hter about the “stuff . . . in those bags”—
displayed that he knew about the drugs in the green bag and the pink box. These phone
calls showed that Schlangen was not only a pa rticipant in the transportation of drugs, but

4 Schlangen also contends that because the trooper corroborated L.R.’s accomplice
testimony, as required by Minnesota Stat utes section 634.04 (2020), Schlangen’s
substantial rights were affected. But L.R.’s testimony corroborated by the trooper was
from undeniably admissible evidence, includi ng finding the pink box in Schlangen’s car
and discovering methamphetamine within the box. We conclude that L.R.’s testimony was
not corroborated in error and did not affect Schlangen’s substantial rights.

11
that he was the one in charge. Moreover, all of the drugs were found in a vehicle that was
still registered to Schlangen at the time of his arrest.
Finally, we observe that Schlangen’s words and L.R.’s testimony constituted the
bulk of the state’s closing argument, whereas the references to the “expert” testimony took
up less than a page of the 21 pages of the state’s closing argument. Cf., Davis, 735 N.W.2d
at 682 (concluding that one page of improper suggestions in a 64-page transcript was not
pervasive).
In sum, because the state had a strong ca se against Schlangen, even without the
trooper’s expert drug-interdiction testimony and his testimony comparing Schlangen’s
behavior to those who transport drugs, th e admission of that testimony did not affect
Schlangen’s substantial rights. The postco nviction court therefore did not abuse its
discretion by denying Schlangen’s petition for relief on this basis.5
II. The prosecutor committed misconduct by asking about guilt, but the
misconduct did not affect Schlangen’s substantial rights.

Next, Schlangen argues that he is entitle d to a new trial be cause the prosecuting
attorney elicited inadmissible testimony, which was plain error and amounts to
prosecutorial misconduct.

5 Schlangen also argues that the prosecut or committed misconduct by eliciting testimony
about general drug-courier tra its. Eliciting inadmissible test imony, such as undisclosed
expert-witness testimony, is prosecutorial misconduct. State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294,
300 (Minn. 2006). When an appellant has fa iled to object during trial, we review
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct under a modified plain-error standard. Id. at 302.
Here, the prosecuting attorney questioned th e trooper about his expertise in narcotic
interdiction, including drug-courier traits. For the same reasons as our analysis above, the
invocation of this testimony by the prosecutor did not affect Schlangen’s substantial rights.

12
A prosecutor engages in misconduct when they violate clear or established standards
of conduct, including rules, laws, or orders by a district court. State. v. McCray ,
753 N.W.2d 746, 751 (Minn. 2008). Eliciti ng inadmissible testimony is prosecutorial
misconduct. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 300. When, as here, an appellant has objected to
misconduct, we review under the harmless-error standard. An error is harmless if there is
“no reasonable possibility that it substantially influence[ d] the jury’s decision.”
State v. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d 1, 14 (Minn. 2015) (alteration in original) (quotation omitted).
Testimony as to the ultimate issue in a case, by either expert or lay witnesses, is not
objectionable unless the testimony is “conc lusion testimony which embraces legal
conclusions.” State v. DeWald , 463 N.W.2d 741, 744 (Minn. 1990). Opinions that are
questions of law or tell a jury “wha t result to reach” are improper. State v. Moore ,
699 N.W.2d 733, 740 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted).
Here, the objected-to testimony involved two instances in which Schlangen claims
the prosecutor elicited the trooper’s opinion te stimony on the issue of guilt. In the first
instance, the prosecutor asked:
Q: Trooper, after discovering the satchel on the 28th and
seeing what was inside that, and after hearing the
defendant reference the green bag and knowing what
you had discovered in the gr een bag, thinking back to
the traffic stop, did you have any th oughts about the
pink box?
A: Yes.
Q: What were those thoughts?
A: That Mr. Schlangen knew what was in it, and it was in
his possession.

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(Emphasis added.) The prosecutor later asked:
Q: Did you hear the defendant ask about when the pink
box—or the flowered box was opened?
A: Yes.
Q: Did that spark or give you cause for concern?
A: Yes.
Q: Why?
A: It’s showing knowledge that Mr. Schlangen had about
the pink box and its importance.

Both instances were objected to and sustained. The district court later gave the jury
instructions to disregard all evidence that was struck fro m the record su ch as these
exchanges.
As to the first question, the prosecutor wa s clearly asking the trooper to testify as to
whether Schlangen knew that he constr uctively possessed the methamphetamine.
Opinions that address questions of law or tell a jury “what resu lt to reach” are improper.
Id. We conclude that the first instance was misconduct because it was an explicit question
as to Schlangen’s guilt. The second instance , however, did not rise to this level because
explaining that Schlangen had knowledge of the pink box is not a legal conclusion that he
constructively possessed the pink box. See, e.g., DeWald, 463 N.W.2d at 744 (stating that
conclusion testimony that “embraces legal conclusions” are improper). Nevertheless, the
state has shown that the objected-to first question—which we emphasize was sustained by
the district court—did not affect the outcome of the trial. Notably, both Schlangen and the
state go to great lengths to argue whether th e drug-courier testimony was improper, like
citing to and arguing about the applicability of cases involving improper witness testimony
such as Williams and Litzau. But these arguments do not ch ange the end result. For the

14
same reasons as we stated earlier, this testimony was overshadowed by the state’s
substantial evidence against Schlangen.
Because the inadmissible testimony did no t affect Schlangen’s substantial rights,
the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the same.
III. The district court did not err by ad mitting Schlangen’s phone call to his
nephew.

Next, Schlangen argues that he is entitled to a new tria l because by allowing the
state to introduce the record ed jail phone call between Sc hlangen and his nephew, the
district court admitted unnoticed and prejudicial Spreigl evidence.
We review a district court’s decision to admit evidence of prior bad acts for an abuse
of discretion. State v. Griffin , 887 N.W.2d 257, 261 (Mi nn. 2016). The erroneous
admission of Spreigl evidence must create “a reasonabl e possibility that the wrongfully
admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict” in order to warrant a new trial .
State v. Fardan, 773 N.W.2d 303, 320 (Minn. 2009). The defendant bears the burden of
showing that an error occurred and that the defendant was prejudiced as a result. Griffin,
887 N.W.2d at 261.
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b) governs admission of evidence of other crimes
or bad acts—often called “ Spreigl evidence.” State v. Kennedy , 585 N.W.2d 385, 389
(Minn. 1998). The district court may admit Spreigl evidence only in limited cases and this
evidence may not be admitted to prove a pers on’s character or that a person acted in
conformity with a past action. Minn. R. Evid. 404(b); State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 685
(Minn. 2006).

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The postconviction court analyzed Schlangen’s challenges6 to the admission of the
phone call with his nephew and concluded that it constituted Spreigl evidence, but that the
call was admissible because it demonstrated a common scheme or plan.7 But, even if the
phone call constituted Spreigl evidence, Schlangen bears the burden of demonstrating that
he was prejudiced by the admission of the evidence. Fardan, 773 N.W.2d at 320. For the
same reasons we have discusse d, the other evidence agains t Schlangen was strong. The
phone call was not the “critical push beyond a reasonable doubt” required to make this
evidence harmful. Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 691.
Therefore, the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded
that the errors of admitting certain testimony did not impact the verdict.8

6 Schlangen challenged the admission of the p hone call in four ways: (1) there was not
sufficient notice; (2) the evidence did not show a common scheme or plan; (3) the probative
value of the phone call was not outweighed by its highly prejudicial nature; and (4) the
admission was not harmless.
7 Using evidence of prior bad acts to demonstrate a common scheme or plan is an exception
to the general inadmissibility of Spreigl evidence. Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 685.
8 Schlangen further argues that he is entitled to a new tria l due to excessive, cumulative
errors. An appellant may be entitled to a new trial if the cumulative impact of several errors
taken together “had the effect of de nying [the] appellant a fair trial.” State v. Yang ,
774 N.W.2d 539, 560 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted). Cumulative error is generally
reserved for “very close factual case[s]” in which multiple errors rendered the appellant’s
trial fundamentally unfair. State v. Erickson , 610 N.W.2d 335, 340-41 (Minn. 2000)
(quotation omitted). In weighing a cumu lative-error argument, we consider the
egregiousness of the errors and the strength of the prosecution’s case. See State v. Cermak,
350 N.W.2d 328, 333-34 (Minn. 1984). Here, for reasons similar to those we have
discussed above, Schlangen failed to demonstrate that any error fundamentally affected his
trial. The prosecution had a strong case, and the isolated errors were not pervasive. Even
taken cumulatively, we conclude that the errors did not deprive Schlangen of his right to a
fair trial.

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IV. Schlangen’s pro se supplemental brief ra ises only forfeited, duplicative, or
otherwise unwarranted claims.

Schlangen also submitted a pro se supplemental brief. Half of the arguments are a
summation of those made in the appellant ’s brief and are addressed above. See
State v. DeWalt, 757 N.W.2d 282, 290 (Minn. App. 2008) (declining to address pro se
arguments that are fully addressed in the pub lic defender’s appellate brief). Of the new
arguments, we consider only the two arguments th at rely on facts in the record or include
citations to authority—that Schl angen’s right to a speedy trial was violated and that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel. See id. (declining to address pro se arguments
that are dependent on facts not in evidence, or have no apparent importance, and are not
supported by any legal argumen t or citation to authority). We address each argument in
turn.
Speedy Trial Violation
The right to a speedy trial is as “fundamental as any of the rights secured by the
Sixth Amendment.” State v. Windish , 590 N.W.2d 311, 315 (Minn. 1999) (quoting
Klopfer v. North Carolina , 386 U.S. 213, 223, 87 S. Ct . 988, 993 (1967)). In order to
determine whether a delay in any given case constitutes a de privation of the right to a
speedy trial, we use the balancing test ann ounced by the United States Supreme Court in
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192 (1972). The test provides that a
court must consider: (1) the le ngth of the delay; (2) the r eason for the delay; (3) whether
the defendant asserted his or her right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the delay prejudiced
the defendant. Id.; see also State v. Widell, 258 N.W.2d 795, 796 (Minn.1977) (adopting

17
the four-part Barker inquiry for speedy trial demands). No one factor trumps another; all
are related and must be considered together with any other relevant circumstances.
Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 315.
Schlangen was arrested on February 23, 2017, and did not demand a speedy trial
until May 1, 2017. His original trial was sc heduled for June 26, 20 17, which was within
the 60-day period established in Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.09(b). See
Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 315-16 (observing that, in Minnesota, delays beyond 60 days from
the demand are presumptively prejudicial). Hi s trial was ultimately held on October 11-
13, 2017—after the 60-day threshold. But, his attorney requested a rule 20 examination
and hearing, which were not completed un til mid-September. Wher e a defendant’s own
actions caused the delay, there is no violation of the right to a speedy trial. State v. Griffin,
760 N.W.2d 336, 340 (Minn. App. 2009) (citation omitted); see also State v. DeRosier ,
695 N.W.2d 97, 109 (Minn. 2005) (concluding th at a delay caused in part by a rule 20
evaluation did not violate the right to a speedy trial).
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Schlangen also argues that he received in effective assistance of counsel, citing his
attorneys’ failure to raise the other issues presented in his pro se supplemental brief.
The party alleging ineffective assistance must show that representation “fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness” an d “that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the re sult of the proceeding would have been
different.” Gates v. State , 398 N.W.2d 558, 561 (Minn. 1987) (quoting
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 69 4, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984)).

18
That objective standard is defined as “r epresentation by an attorney exercising the
customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under
similar circumstances.” State v. Gassler , 505 N.W.2d 62, 70 (Minn. 1993) (quotation
omitted). The supreme court has repeatedly stated that appellate courts will not
review attacks on counsel’s trial strategy. See, e.g., Boitnott v. State, 631 N.W.2d 362, 370
(Minn. 2001).
Here, Schlangen appears to claim that hi s attorneys should ha ve objected to the
squad car video and the phone calls. But his counsel did object to much of this evidence
at the contested omnibus hearing and pre-trial hearings. Schlangen’s remaining
accusations of ineffective assistance of counsel , such as failing to ask a different trooper
who may have witnessed portions of this arrest to testify, are matters of trial strategy that
we do not review. Opsahl v. State, 677 N.W.2d 414, 421 (Minn. 2004).
In sum, viewing this decision as a whole, the postconviction court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Schlan gen’s petition for postconviction relief. Schlangen failed to
demonstrate that his substantial rights were affected by: (1) the trooper’s expert testimony;
(2) the prosecutor’s elicitation of expert te stimony or questioning regarding Schlangen’s
guilt; or (3) the admission of th e phone call with his nephew. Schlangen also failed to
show that the cumulative effect of the district court’s errors deprived him of a fair trial.
And we conclude the arguments raised by Schlangen in his supplemental pro se brief are
forfeited, duplicative, or otherwise do not warrant relief.
Affirmed.