State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1389

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Mitchell Curtis Madsen,
Appellant.

Filed September 7, 2021
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CR-19-1259

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Pete Orput, Washington County Attorney, Nicholas A. Hy dukovich, Assistant County
Attorney, Stillwater, Minnesota (for respondent)

Mark D. Kelly, Law Offices of Mark D. Kelly, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Slieter, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant pleaded guilty to receiving stolen property. Before sentencing, appellant
retained new counsel and moved to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court denied the
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motion. In this direct appeal, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion
by denying his motion to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing. We affirm.
FACTS
In March 2019, respondent State of Mi nnesota charged appellant Mitchell Curtis
Madsen with receiving stol en property under Minn. Stat. § 609.53, subd. 1 (2018), and
possession of burglary or theft tools under Minn. Stat. § 609.59 (2018). According to the
complaint, a police officer observed a pickup truck leave a gas station without signaling a
turn. Shortly thereafter, the truck suddenly cut across all lanes of traffic and headed in the
other direction. The officer then initiated a traffic stop. The officer identified the driver as
Madsen. When the officer requested the vehicle’s registration, Madsen told the officer that
he did not have the registra tion because he had recently acquired the truck through a
“trade-in.” After checking th e vehicle identification number, the officer learned that the
truck had been reported as stolen. Police arrested Madsen. During a search incident to the
arrest, police found a “punch ignition key” in Madsen’s jacket. Police also found a bag on
the passenger seat of the truck containing two similar “punch[] ignition keys” and dozens
of car keys. The complaint alleges that “[p]unch ignition keys are commonly used to steal
motor vehicles.”
Madsen obtained counsel, and his case was sc heduled for trial. On the day his trial
was scheduled to begin, Madsen informed the district court that he would enter a guilty
plea pursuant to a plea agreement with the state. Madsen pleaded guilty to receiving stolen
property, and the state dismissed the remaining charge.
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At the plea hearing, Madsen’s counse l presented a plea petition completed by
Madsen and discussed the petition with Madsen on the record. Madsen testified that he
did not have title to the vehicle, that he did not know the regi stered owner of the vehicle,
and that he never received permission from the registered owner to possess or operate the
vehicle. He then answered “Yes” when the district court asked, “[G]iven all of the
circumstances, you’re agreeing you knew or had reason to know that this vehicle was not
legitimately in your possession?” Following Madsen’s testimony, the district court
accepted the factual basis for the plea.
Prior to sentencing, Madsen obtained new counsel and moved to withdraw his guilty
plea. The motion was supported by an affidavit of Madsen’s new counsel. In the affidavit,
Madsen’s new counsel states that Madsen ga ve “numerous documents in support of his
defense” to his original counsel and “provide d his [c]ounsel with the names and contact
information for witnesses in support of his defense.” According to the affidavit, Madsen’s
original counsel did not interview the witnesses or provide the necessary notice to the state
so that the documents and witness testimony could be received at trial. The affidavit further
states that Madsen received a plea proposal from the state just prior to the start of trial.
Madsen “was disinclined to accept” the offer, but his original counsel “convinced” him to
plead guilty. The affidavit asserts that Madsen’s decision to plead guilty “was influenced
in large part by his perception that his attorney wa s not prepared to pr esent his case to a
jury.”
The district court held a hearing on Ma dsen’s motion to withdraw. Only Madsen
testified. During his testimony, he adopted the statements made by his new counsel in the
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affidavit. Madsen also testified that he owns a car dealership and th at, at the time of his
arrest, he had title to approximat ely 55 vehicles that he had been holding for resale. He
claimed that he sent copies of the titles to his original counsel and that he also sent “a bullet
point list regarding some things . . . to look at for the trial.” Acco rding to Madsen, this
information would have shown that he was in the business of buying and selling vehicles
and that he was unaware that the truck he was driving was stolen. Madsen further testified
that on the day that trial was scheduled to be gin, he learned that his counsel had not filed
an exhibit list or a witness list. As a result, he believed that if he went to trial, his counsel
would not have been able to in troduce the information that Ma dsen had provided to him.
Madsen did not testify as to how he came to this belief but stated that it affected his decision
to plead guilty rather than go to trial because he felt he “wasn’t being represented.”
On cross-examination, Ma dsen acknowledged that he had gone through the plea
petition with his original counsel prior to pleading guilty and had signed the petition. He
further acknowledged that the plea petition states that he was satisfied that his attorney had
represented his interests and fully advised him of his rights. And he agreed that he never
asked for more time to speak with his origin al counsel during the plea process and that it
was not until after he pleaded guilty that he changed his mind.
Following Madsen’s testimony, his ne w counsel argued that the testimony
demonstrated that Madsen’s original counsel was ineffective. He asserted that the
documents that Madsen provided to his original counsel would have explained “the nature
of how [Madsen] came into possession of th[e] vehicle [and] the short period of time he
had possession of the vehicle,” and demonstrated that Madsen did not have the requisite
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knowledge to be convicted of receiving a stolen vehicle. Madsen’s new counsel contended
that it would be fair and just to allow Madsen to withdraw hi s plea due to “lack of trial
counsel preparation.”
After hearing Madsen’s testimony and argum ents from both attorneys, the district
court denied Madsen’s motion to withdraw his plea. The district court explained that it
had not noted any concerns about the factua l basis for Madsen’s plea during the plea
hearing. The district court also emphasized that the failure of Mads en’s original counsel
to file a witness list or exhibit list did not provide a basis for withdrawing the plea. The
district court noted that criminal defense counsel “hardly ever” file such lists and the court
has “never excluded” witnesses or exhibits fo r that reason. The district court concluded
that Madsen had not shown that it would be “fair and just” to permit him to withdraw his
plea.
In accordance with th e plea agreement, the district court imposed a stayed 15-month
sentence and placed Madsen on probation. Madsen appeals.
DECISION
Madsen challenges the district court’s deni al of his motion to withdraw his plea.
We review a district court’s decision to de ny a plea-withdrawal motion for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 97 (Minn. 2010). “A district court abuses its
discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic
and the facts in the record.” State v. Hallmark , 927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019)
(quotation omitted). We will reverse the denial of a plea -withdrawal motion “only in the
rare case.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 97 (quotation omitted).
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“A defendant has no absolute right to w ithdraw a guilty plea after entering it.” Id.
at 93. But, where a defendant moves to withdr aw a plea prior to sentencing, the district
court “may allow” withdrawal “if it is fair a nd just to do so.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05,
subd. 2. Under the fair-and-just standard, the district court must give “due consideration”
to two factors: “(1) the reasons a defenda nt advances to support withdrawal and
(2) prejudice granting the motion would cause the [s]tate given reliance on the plea.”
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 97; see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2. However, the district
court does not need to find pr ejudice to the state to deny a plea-withdrawal motion when
the defendant fails to provide any “substantia ted reasons for withdrawal of his plea.”
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 98; see also State v. Cubas , 838 N.W.2d 220, 224 (Minn.
App. 2013) (“Even when there is no prejudice to the state, a district court may deny plea
withdrawal under rule 15.05, subdivision 2, if the defendant fails to advance valid reasons
why withdrawal is fair and just.”), review denied (Minn. Dec. 31, 2013). The defendant
bears the burden of advancing reasons to su pport withdrawal, while the state bears the
burden of demonstrating prejudice. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 97.
Madsen contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his request
to withdraw his plea because he established that he would not have pleaded guilty but for
ineffective assistance of counsel. The United States and Minnesota Constitutions
guarantee criminal defendants the right to effec tive assistance of counsel. U.S. Const.
amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. A guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel
is constitutionally invalid. State v. Ellis-Strong, 899 N.W.2d 531, 541 (Minn. App. 2017).
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of c ounsel, a defendant must satisfy a two-prong
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test set forth in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
Peltier v. State, 946 N.W.2d 369, 372 (Minn. 2020). First, the defendant “must show that
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. (quotation
omitted). There is “a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable.”
Zornes v. State, 880 N.W.2d 363, 370 (Minn. 2016). Second, the defendant must establish
prejudice by showing that “there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors,
the result of the proceedings w ould have been different.” Peltier, 946 N.W.2d at 372
(quotation omitted). In the context of a plea withdraw al, the defendant can establish
prejudice by showing “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not
have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Campos v. State ,
816 N.W.2d 480, 486 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). When one prong of the Strickland
test is determinative, an appellate c ourt need not address the other prong. Peltier,
946 N.W.2d at 372.
Madsen argues that he met his burden unde r the fair-and-just standard before the
district court because both prongs of the Strickland test were met. He contends that his
original counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness because
the attorney failed to properly investigate and interview Madsen’s proposed witnesses and
subsequently failed to disclose those witne sses and certain documents to the state and
district court prior to trial. He argues that those alleged errors were prejudicial to him
because he would not have pleaded guilty if his original counsel had properly investigated
and introduced this eviden ce, which Madsen contends would have established his
innocence. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the district court did not
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abuse its discretion by denying Madsen’s motion to withdraw his plea based on ineffective
assistance of counsel.
Which witnesses to call and which evidence to present are decisions that lie within
the discretion of trial counsel. Leake v. State , 737 N.W.2d 531, 539 (Minn. 2007).
Similarly, when considering an alleged failure to investigate, the extent of an attorney’s
investigation constitutes trial strategy that “should not be readily second-guessed.”
State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 506 (Minn. 2013). No netheless, “a failure to investigate
a potential defense may constitute ineffec tive assistance if it results not from
counsel’s considered choice but rath er from inattention or neglect.” Swaney v. State ,
882 N.W.2d 207, 218 (Minn. 2016).
Madsen did not demonstrate to the district court that his attorney’s alleged lack of
investigation of Madsen’s proposed witne sses resulted from inattention or neglect as
opposed to a considered choice. Madsen did not provide any evidence to shed light on his
original counsel’s reason, or lack of a reason, for purportedly not interviewing his proposed
witnesses. He further did not provide any evidence, such as affidavits from his proposed
witnesses, to show that testimony from thos e witnesses would have supported a viable
defense. Rather, Madsen merely provided the sworn statement of his new counsel that
“[t]hese witnesses were not interviewed by defense counsel.” This assertion is not
sufficient to show that the exte nt of his original counsel’s i nvestigation into his proposed
witnesses was objectively unreasonable.
Madsen’s testimony that his counsel did no t file a witness list prior to trial is
likewise insufficient to establis h that his counsel acted unrea sonably by failing to do so.
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Madsen presented no evidence as to why his counsel refrained from submitting a witness
list. Counsel may have had sound strategic reasons for not listing the individuals identified
by Madsen on a witness list. Additionally, the district court’s statement that counsel for
criminal defendants “hardly ever” file witne ss lists prior to tria l further undermines
Madsen’s claim that his original counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable, as
courts look to “prevailing professional norm s” in the legal commu nity to determine
whether an attorney’s representation was reasonable. Ellis-Strong, 899 N.W.2d at 539
(quotation omitted).
Similarly, Madsen provided no support fo r his assertion that his attorney acted
unreasonably by not including certain documents on an exhibit list. Madsen established
that his attorney did not provide an exhibit lis t to opposing counsel or the district court
prior to trial, but he did not present any evidence to explain why his attorney did not include
certain documents on an exhibit list. Without such a showing, Madsen provided no reason
for the district court to conclude that hi s counsel did not have a strategic reason for
declining to provide notice of that evidence. Furthermore, because Madsen never offered
the documents into the reco rd, Madsen’s claim that the documents would have
demonstrated his innocence is speculative. Without the documents themselves, the district
court had no basis upon which to conclude that counsel’s decision to refrain from filing an
exhibit list fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Madsen failed to
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demonstrate to the district court that his coun sel acted unreasonably by declining to file a
witness list or exhibit list.1
Madsen contends that he discovered his counsel’s alleged errors on the day trial was
scheduled to begin and he de cided to plead guilty under the “mistaken belief” that his
counsel would not be able to pr esent his evidence to the jury. But Mads en did not assert
that his mistaken belief was due to any misrep resentation by his original counsel, and he
did not otherwise provide any information about how he developed that belief. And, based
on the district court’s statement that it has “nev er excluded” evidence due to the lack of a
witness or exhibit list, Madsen’s belief at the time of his guilty pl ea that he would be
prejudiced by the lack of such a filing is unsupported by the record. Rather, the record
supports the district court’s suggestion that Madsen’s desire to w ithdraw his guilty plea
was likely based on “regrets about entering his plea.”
In sum, Madsen failed to present sufficient evidence to the district court to establish
that his original counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Because Madsen did not meet the first prong of the Strickland test, we need not address
the second prong. See Peltier, 946 N.W.2d at 372. And, because Madsen did not advance
a valid reason for withdrawing his plea, we also need not address the second factor of the

1 In its brief, the state relies on a memorandum it submitted to the district court in opposition
to Madsen’s plea-withdrawal motion. In the memorandum, the state purported to recount
statements that Madsen’s original counsel made to the prosecutor relating to the original
counsel’s reasons for declining to pursue certain witnesses or admit the documents that
Madsen provided to him. Beca use the state neglected to incl ude any of those statements
in an affidavit or have any i ndividual testify to them at th e motion hearing, we have no
basis on which to accept them as fact.
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fair-and-just standard—pre judice to the state. See Cubas , 838 N.W.2d at 224.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Madsen’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
Affirmed.