In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: K. E. S., M. W. C., and T. J. S., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1390

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: K. E. S., M. W. C., and T. J. S., Parents.

Filed April 19, 2021
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Winona County District Court
File No. 85-JV-19-181

Michael D. Schatz, Rochester, Minnesota (for appellant K.E.S.)

Karin L. Sonneman, Winona County Attorn ey, Rebecca R. Church , Assistant County
Attorney, Winona, Minnesota (for respondent county)

Mark Jarstad, Wabasha, Minnesota (for T.J.S.)

A. Michael Kuehn, Winona, Minnesota (for Child 1)

Matthew Stinson, Rochester, Minnesota (for Child 2, Child 3, Child 4)

Heidi Neubauer, Holman, Wisconsin (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Pres iding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
After a termination of parental rights tria l, the district court found that Winona
County Health and Human Services proved by clear and convincing evidence four statutory
grounds for termination of appellant-mother’s parental rights. Beca use the district court

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determined that the best interests of six of mother’s seven children required termination, it
terminated mother’s parental rights to all but her oldest child. On appeal, mother argues
the district court erred when it denied her request for a con tinuance and found that it was
in the best interests of the children to testify informally, outside open court. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant-mother K.E.S.’s lengthy involv ement with the child protection system
began over a decade and a half ago in 2004, the same year she gave birth to the oldest of
her seven children. Since then, mother’s children have experienced every known form of
trauma while in her care. Counties in both Minnesota and Wisconsin intervened many
times to provide mother services and opportunities to remedy the circumstances leading to
their involvement. All, to no avail.
In October 2019, Winona County Health and Human Services (WCHHS) filed a
termination of parental rights (TPR) petiti on alleging four statutory grounds for the
termination of mother’s parent al rights to her seven children. 1 WCHHS alleged four
statutory grounds under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301 (2018): (1) mother is palpably unfit to be
a party to the parent-child relationship u nder subdivision 1(b)(4 ); (2) the children
experienced egregious harm while in mothe r’s care under subdivision 1(b)(6); (3) the
children were neglected and in foster care under subdivision 1(b)(8); and (4) mother has
failed to correct the conditions that led to the children’s out-of-home placement under

1 The district court involuntarily terminated the parental rights of both M.W.C. who is the
father of mother’s five oldest children and T.J.S. who is the father of mother’s two youngest
children. Neither father challenges the termination of their parental rights on appeal.

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subdivision 1(b)(5). 2 Mother denied the allegations in the petition and the matter
proceeded to trial.
Mother’s four-day trial began in August 2020.3 The district court held two pretrial
hearings on July 15 and July 30 , 2020. The parties called 37 witnesses at trial, including
mother’s four oldest children: Child 1, Child 2, Child 3, and Ch ild 4. At the end of trial,
the district court found that WCHHS proved by clear and convin cing evidence four
statutory grounds for termination. The district court thoroughly analyzed the best interests
of each individual child and found that the best interests of mother’s six youngest children
required the termination of mother’s parental rights. But the district court considered Child
1’s “strong and consistent desire to reunify with [m]other and strong opposition to being
adopted” and found that the termination of mo ther’s parental rights was not in the best
interests of Child 1.
Mother appeals from the order of termination.

2 Because the petition to terminate mother’s parental rights was filed in 2018 and her trial
held in 2020, we cite substantive statutes from 2018 and procedural statutes from 2020.
3 Mother’s trial was first sche duled to begin in December 201 9, but was held in August
2020, because the district court granted se veral continuances. During the case, five
different district court judges presided over this matter. In its thorough and thoughtful TPR
order the district court stated, “The Court must also address the perceived procedural
missteps in this case. The Court acknowledges that having five different judges handle
different parts of the case is contrary to well-established best practices.”

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DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its di scretion by failing to grant mother a
continuance.

Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied her motion
to continue her TPR tria l to allow her to obtain substitute counsel. Mother failed to cite
any authority for her argument. Inadequately briefed issues are not properly before this
court. See State, Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480,
480 (Minn. 1997) (declining to address an issue absent adequate briefing); In re Welfare of
Children of J.B., 698 N.W.2d 160, 166 (Minn. App. 2005) (citing this aspect of Wintz in a
TPR appeal). In the interests of completeness, however, we begin by discussing the facts
relevant to mother’s argument.
At a hearing in February 2020, the district court learned that mother’s first court-
appointed attorney had represented the father of mother’s five oldest children in a related
child protection matter in 2009. Mother expr essed her satisfaction with her first court-
appointed attorney and her desi re to move forward with hi m. But after reviewing the
related matter and the rules of professional responsibility, the district court correctly
determined that “it would be a conflict to move forward” with mother’s first court-
appointed attorney and thus disqualified him and assigned mother a second court-appointed
attorney.
Five months later on Thursday, July 30, 2020, at the second pretrial hearing, mother
requested to discharge her second court-appoin ted attorney and to continue the trial to

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“possibly a week or two later.” 4 Mother’s trial was set to begin the following Monday,
August 3, 2020. Mother’s main complaints about her s econd court-appointed attorney
were that she did not feel that he thought the matter was as serious as she did, and she was
displeased with the frequency of his communication. 5 Despite mother’s misgivings, her
second court-appointed attorney testified that he has over twenty-five years of experience
and has represented “a large number of parents in these kind of cases,” and that he was
“ready, willing, and able to represent [mother].” Mother’s second court-appointed attorney
also stated that he was “willing to do what is necessary” and would be a “zealous advocate”
for mother. The district cour t told mother, “If you plan to represent yourself and you’re
ready to go, then you can discharge your atto rney at any point.” But the district court
cautioned mother, “In the event, [mother], you choose to discharge your attorney, I am not
going to appoint additional court appointed co unsel for you.” Still, mother desired to
discharge her second court-appointed attorney. The district court granted mother’s request
to discharge her attorney, but denied her request for a continuance.
The morning of the first day of trial, mo ther immediately requested a continuance
to retain new counsel. Child 1 supported mother’s motion for a continuance. WCHHS
opposed mother’s request and stated that it was in the “children’s best interest that they be

4 Mother also requested that the presiding district court ju dge recuse herself because she
represented mother in a child protection matter in 2009 involving two of mother’s children.
The district court judge mainta ined her ability to be impartia l but later recused herself to
avoid the appearance of impropriety. A fifth district court judge was then assigned to
preside over mother’s trial.
5 Mother testified, “this is a serious matter. I might lose my children and I don’t want to
lose my children. And I would like somebody to represent me that thinks this is as
important as I do.”

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allowed to have permanency established sooner than later.” Child 2, Child 3, Child 4, and
the guardian ad litem (GAL) agre ed with WCHHS. The distri ct court denied mother’s
request and stated that it “was clear that there would be no continuance based on [mother’s]
last-minute decision to discharge [her] expe rienced and prepared attorney.” Mother
challenges the district court’s denial of her continuance request.
Generally, in juvenile protec tion matters, the district c ourt “may” continue a trial
“so long as the timelines for achieving permanency as set for in these rules are not delayed.”
Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 5.01, subd. 1. Trials may not be continued for more than one week
unless the district court specifically finds that the continuance “is in the best interests of
the child.” Id., subd. 2. Whether to grant a con tinuance so that a party may secure
substitute counsel is a ruling within the district court’s discretion, which we will not reverse
absent a showing of clear a buse of that discretion. In re Welfare of J.A.S. , 488 N.W.2d
332, 335 (Minn. App. 1992), review denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 1992).
Our laws grant parents the right to be represented by court-appointed counsel during
a TPR trial when they are financially unable to obtain counsel on thei r own. Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.163, subd. 3(a), (c) (2020); Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 36.02, subd. 2. But a parent may
discharge their counsel in writing or on the reco rd. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 36.05(b). And
a parent may voluntarily and intelligen tly waive their right to counsel. In re Welfare of
G.L.H., 614 N.W.2d 718, 723 (Minn. 2000). “[T]he determina tion of whether a parent’s
waiver of counsel in a TPR proceeding is voluntary and intelligent can be based on the
surrounding circumstances of the case.” Id. at 723. “We will overturn a district court’s

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finding of a valid waiver of the right to counse l only if that finding is clearly erroneous.”
Id.
Here, mother argues that her continuance request was “valid and appropriate.” We
disagree. Based on the circumstances of this case, we determine th at mother voluntarily
and intelligently waived her right to counsel. See G.L.H., 614 N.W.2d at 723 (examining
the circumstances of the case to determine whether a waiver was voluntary and intelligent).
Before permitting mother to discharge her sec ond court-appointed attorney the district
court told mother that she could do so if she planned to represent herself and was prepared.
The district court made clear that if mother chose to discharge her second court-appointed
attorney, the district court would not appoin t another attorney for her and mother would
need to represent herself. Yet, knowing the consequences of her decision, mother
discharged her second court-appointed attorney.
And because mother discharged her seco nd court-appointed attorney one full
business day before trial was set to begin, any continuance to allow mother to secure
substitute counsel would have inevitably delayed the proceedings. This case was already
long past the timelines pres cribed by Minnesota law for permanency proceedings. See
Minn. Stat. § 260C.509 (2018) (stating that a TPR trial “shall be commenced within 60
days of the admit-deny hearing”). And as WCHHS, Child 2, Child 3, Child 4, and the GAL
argued, it was in the children’s best interests that they have permanency established sooner
rather than later. We conclude that because mother discharged her second court-appointed
attorney with full know ledge that she would not be grante d a continuance to seek a third
attorney, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying her continuance request.

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II. The district court did not err by permitting the children to testify outside open
court.

Mother argues that the district court erred when it permitted Child 1, Child 2, Child
3, and Child 4 to tes tify outside open court. 6 We begin by detailing the facts relevant to
mother’s argument. The parties first discussed how the children would testify at trial, if at
all, at a hearing in February 2020. The attorney for Ch ild 1 and Child 2 7 requested that
when the children testify, “[m]other not be present in the courtroom.” There was no
objection to this request and the district court ordered that “the children will be allowed to
testify without [m]other being present in the courtroom.”
At the July 15 pretrial hearing, the attorn ey for Child 1 and Child 2 stated that the
children’s wishes had changed and that they now “would like to testify in front of
everybody including [mother].” Before the July 15 hearing, therapists for Child 1, Child
2, Child 3, and Child 4 submitted letters to the district court stating that they did not believe
it was in the children’s best inte rests to testify in front of mother. In their letters, the
therapists unanimously conclu ded that permitting the childre n to testify in open court
would be detrimental to thei r wellbeing, and stated that the children would benefit from

6 Mother also argues that the district court violated the trial right s of Child 1 when it
prohibited Child 1 from testifyi ng in open court. Because mother lacks standing to
challenge any purported violation of Child 1’s trial rights, we decline to reach this issue on
appeal. In re D.T.R., 796 N.W.2d 509, 513 (Minn. 2011) (stating a party has standing when
“that person had a direct interest in the litigation and that person’s rights were injuriously
affected by the adjudication” (emphasis added)). We also are perplexed as to what remedy
mother seeks. The district court did not terminate mother’s rights to Child 1.
7 At the February 2020 hear ing both Child 1 and Child 2 wanted to be reunified with
mother, so one attorney represented them. Because Child 3 and Child 4 did not want to be
reunified with mother, another attorney represented them.

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shielded testimony “without direct interaction with caregivers or other witnesses in the
courtroom.” The therapists s uggested that if the children must provide testimony, they
could “be protected from undue harm by tes tifying to a judge privat ely in chambers.”
WCHHS, therefore, requested that the distri ct court continue the February 2020 order
permitting the children to testif y without mother present. Mother did not object. The
district court ordered that mother would not be present while Child 1, Child 2, Child 3, or
Child 4 testified.
At the July 30 pretrial hearing the parties again discussed the children’s preferences
regarding testimony. In the time between the July 15 and the July 30 pretrial hearings,
Child 2’s wishes about testifying and reunifyin g with mother “changed just slightly” and
were closer to the wishes of Child 3 and Child 4, than those of Child 1. At the July 30
pretrial hearing, therefore, one attorney repr esented Child 1, who wa nted to be reunified
with mother, and another attorney represented Child 2, Child 3, and Child 4, who did not
want to be reunified with mother. Attorney for Child 1 maintained Child 1’s request that
the district court permit Child 1 to testify in person and in front of mother. Attorney for
Child 2, Child 3, and Child 4, however, stated that “it would be in [his] clients’ best interest
and their wishes, to not have their mother present during questio ning.” WCHHS agreed
and again argued that letters submitted to the district court from the children’s therapists
supported the request that the district court pe rmit the children to testify outside mother’s
presence and that it is in their best interests to do so. And the GAL noted that appearing in
court was traumatic for the children and that Child 2, in particular, struggled after the July
15 pretrial hearing. Mother did not object.

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The district court noted that because mo ther had discharged her second court-
appointed attorney and would be unrepresented at trial, the circumstances had changed
since the February 2020 order allowing the child ren to testify outside mother’s presence.
At that time, while mother’s presence would have been excused, her attorney would have
been allowed to remain presen t while the children testified. The district court reserved
issuing a decision on whether the children would be permitted to testify, but stated that if
they did testify, “such testimony will be with the [district] [c]ourt and Guardian Ad Litem
only.”
At trial, the district court found that it wa s in the best interest s of the children that
they have a chance to testify. While it took the children’s testimony, the district court
permitted only the GAL to be present, but allo wed the children to take breaks and speak
with their attorneys at any time. Again, mother did no t object. Yet, on appeal, she now
challenges how the district court heard the children’s testimony.
We rarely consider matters that were no t argued to and consid ered by the district
court. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988); see also In re Welfare of C.L.L.,
310 N.W.2d 555, 557 (Minn. 1981) (applying Thiele in a TPR appeal). When the district
court took the children’s test imony outside open cour t at trial, mother did not object. 8
Mother similarly did not object at the February 2020 hearing, July 15 pretrial hearing, or
the July 30 pretrial hearing wh en the district court ruled that it would permit the children

8 We recognize that mother was self-represente d at trial but this court has “repeatedly
emphasized that pro se litigants are generally he ld to the same standards as attorneys and
must comply with court rules.” Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald , 629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn.
App. 2001).

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to testify without mother present. Because mother did not object to how the district court
received the children’s testimony, the district court did not consider any argument that
excluding mother was erroneous. And we may decline to reach this issue on appeal. Id.
Even if mother had raised timely objections at trial, it is a well-established rule of
law in Minnesota that objections to evidentiary rulings in juvenile protection proceedings,
“are subject to appellate review only if ther e has been a motion for a new trial in which
such matters have been assigned as error.” In re Welfare of D.N. , 523 N.W.2d 11, 13
(Minn. App. 1994) (declining to review ev identiary issues in a juvenile protection
proceeding where appellant failed to br ing a motion for a new trial) (quoting Sauter v.
Wasemiller, 389 N.W.2d 200, 201 (Minn. 1996)), review denied (Minn. Nov. 29, 1994);
see also Minn. R. Evid. 611 (stating that the district court shall control the mode and order
of interrogation and presentation of evidence); Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 3.02, subd. 1 (stating
the rules of evidence apply in juvenile protec tion matters unless displaced by statute or a
rule). Mother did not bring a motion for a ne w trial. Thus, mother’s argument is not
properly before us.
But even though mother’s argument is not properly before us and we may decline
to consider it on appeal, we may review a TPR order when “the interests of justice” require.
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04. Because the best interests of children are the “paramount
consideration” in termination matters, we will exercise our discretion to address mother’s
argument that the district court prejudicially erred by permitting the children to testify
outside open court. Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subd. 3 (2020).

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Mother argues that the district court erred by offering “little to no explanation for
its decision to take the testimony of the f our children privately” and by denying her the
opportunity to present questions or cross-examine the children. At a TPR trial, parents
have the right to present evidence and witnesses, and to cross-examine witnesses called by
other parties. Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 8 (2020); see also Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 49.02,
subd. 2(a)(1)-(3) (2020). But, by statute, “the paramount c onsideration” in termination
matters is the best interests of the child. Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subd. 3. And the purposes
of the laws relating to juvenile protection proceedings include “provid[ing] judicial
procedures that protect the welfare of the child.” Id., subd. 2(b)(2) (2020).
District courts thus may informally take the testimony of a child alleged to be in
need of protection when it is in the child’s best interests to do so. Minn. Stat. § 260C.163,
subd. 6 (2020). The district court may take the testimony of a child witness outside the
courtroom or require counsel for any party to submit questions to the court before the
child’s testimony is taken. Id. The district court may also “excuse the presence of the
child’s parent” while the child testifies. Id. When it is in the best interests of the child to
excuse the presence of the parent, the parent ’s attorney has the ri ght to continue to
participate in the proceedings. Id., subd. 7 (2020).
It is necessary for the district court to make findings explaining its exercise of
discretion when it determines that it is in the best interests of a child witn ess to testify
informally. Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 249 N.W.2d 168, 171-72 (M inn. 1976) (holding that
findings explaining a district court’s exercise of its discretion are necessary to ensure that
the relevant factors have been addressed, to provide appellate courts with an adequate basis

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to review the exercise of that discretion, and to assure the parties that the relevant factors
have been considered); see also In re Welfare of J.R.R. , 943 N.W.2d 661, 669-70 (Minn.
App. 2020) (citing Rosenfeld in a TPR appeal). When a district court’s findings are
inadequate, an appellate court may undertake “an independent review of the record” to
effectively review the district court’s ruling. In re Welfare of M.M., 452 N.W.2d 236, 239
(Minn. 1990).
Mother argues that the district court made inadequate findings when it exercised its
discretion to take the testimony of the children outside open court. The district court found
that “[i]n weighing on the importance of the considerations, I do conclude that it is in the
best interests of the children that the oldest four children, many of whom wished to tell me
what they wanted me to know, should be provided that opportunity to do so.” The district
court made no other findings and offered no other explanation for its exercise of discretion.
The district court’s findings are thus, inadequate for appellate review.
But based on our independent review of the record, we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that it was in the children’s best interests to take
their testimony informally. Th erapists for Child 1, Child 2, Child 3, and Child 4, made
clear that permitting the children to testify in open court would be detrimental to their
wellbeing. The therapists specif ically stated that if the child ren must testify, they would
benefit from doing so without direct interaction with their caregivers and could be protected
from undue harm by testifying to the district court judge privately in chambers. It is clear
from the record that it was contra ry to the best interests of the children to testify in open
court with mother present.

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Mother also argues that because she was not afforded a chance to present questions
or cross-examine the ch ild witnesses, the district court violated Minn. Stat. § 260C.163
(2020).9 Mother, however, does not argue that it wa s contrary to the best interests of the
children to testify outside her presence. And when the rights of a child and a parent
conflict, “the rights of the parent must yield.” In re Booth , 91 N.W.2d 921, 924 (Minn.
1958) (quotation omitted); see also In re P.T. , 657 N.W.2d 577, 583 (Minn. App. 2003)
(stating that in a TPR appeal, “parental right s are not absolute and should not be unduly
exalted and enforced to the detriment of the child’s welf are and happiness” (quotation
omitted)). We conclude that the district cour t did not abuse its disc retion by taking the
testimony of the children outside open court in the manner that was most consistent with
their best interests.
Even if we concluded that the district court erred by permitting the children to testify
outside open court, mother would not prevail. Mother has not met her burden of proving
that the district court erred or that she was prejudiced by such error. See In re Child of
Simon, 662 N.W.2d 155, 162 (Minn. App. 2003) (affirming a dist rict court’s decision to
terminate parental rights when the parent did not show that an evidentiary error was
prejudicial). The district court found th at WCHHS proved by clear and convincing
evidence four statutory grounds for termina tion of mother’s parental rights. To

9 Minnesota law grants the district court wide discretion to receive the testimony of children
in the manner that is most consistent with th eir best interests and also grants parents the
right to counsel and presumes that during a TPR trial, pa rents will be represented. Minn.
Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 3(a); Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 36.02, su bd. 2. Mother waived her
right to representation and the consequences that flowed from that choice.

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involuntarily terminate parental rights, the di strict court must find at least one statutory
ground for termination exists. In re Welfare of L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1996).
On appeal from a district court’s TPR order, “we will review the district court’s findings
of the underlying or basic facts for clear error, but we review its determination of whether
a particular statutory basis for involuntarily terminating parental rights is present for an
abuse of discretion.” In re Welfare of J.R.B. , 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011),
review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012).
Here, the district court found that all seven children experienced egregious harm in
mother’s care under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(6). Egregious harm is “the
infliction of bodily harm to a child or negl ect of a child which demonstrates a grossly
inadequate ability to provide minimally adequate parental care.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.007,
subd. 14 (2018). The record contains overwhelming evidence, other than from the
testimony of the children, which independently supports the district court’s finding that the
children suffered egregious harm in mother’s care.
A child abuse pediatrician testified that she examined all seven of mother’s children
and determined that:
All of the children had a history of multiple forms of abuse and
neglect especially the oldest five. Two of the children had
positive hair follicle tests [fo r methamphetamine and THC];
the oldest and the youngest. None of the children had acute
injuries at the time of my exam but . . . some had previous
injuries that had left scars that were visible. Three of the
children demonstrated signifi cant emotional dysregulation
during our visits, which was fair ly impressive. And the two
youngest girls also demonstrat ed indiscriminate attachment
during the visit.

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The child abuse pediatrician also testified:
In looking at the lives that these children have lived over the
last six years that I’ve been acquainted with them, my concerns
are that they—at least the oldest five for certain, have
experienced every type of trau ma that we know of multiple
times. Whether it’s physical abuse, sexual abuse, emotional
abuse, chronic homelessness, food insecurity, witnessing their
mother being beaten by their father or the other man in her life,
being threatened with being harmed fatally, living with adults
with substance use disorder, with mental illness. It just goes
on and on.

The record also contains testimony from six therapists and one psychologist who
provided care to the ch ildren. Child 1’s therapist tes tified that Child 1 had distressing
dreams and flashbacks of traumatic events, Ch ild 1 met the “full criteria for PTSD,” and
Child 1 experienced a lot of the trauma while in mother’s care. Child 2’s therapist testified
that Child 2 “met criteria for PTSD due to the significant trauma history including physical,
emotional, and sexual abuse” and Child 2 suffers from “distressing memories of the
trauma,” “impulsivity,” “self-blame,” a “per sistent negative emotional state of fear and
anger,” and “difficulty staying asleep and waking up multiple times throughout the night.”
Child 3’s therapist testified that she diagnosed Child 3 w ith PTSD and he suffers from
“some concerning self-harm behaviors” like “a ttempt[ing] to put forks in outlets, and
throwing himself down the stairs, [and] hiding an d balling up . . . .” Child 4’s therapist
testified that she diagnosed Child 4 with PTSD and Child 4 suffered from “body []base
dysregulation, pressured speech, moving around a lot, [and] frequent topic switching.”
Child 5’s psychologist testified that she diagnosed Child 5 with adjustment disorder with
disruption of emotions and conduct, PTSD, and enuresis because of the significant

17
difficulties Child 5 had with bed wetting, and noted that Child 5 has experienced significant
trauma. Child 6’s therapist te stified that she diagnosed Ch ild 6 with PTSD and Child 6
suffered from nightmares. Child 7’s therapist diagnosed Child 7 with PTSD and stated
Child 7 “experienced direct trauma” and “appeared to be re-experiencing that trauma.”
Excluding any testimony from the children, the record contains sufficient evidence
that the children suffered egre gious harm in mother’s care. We thus conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by finding the statutory ground of egregious harm
to support termination. Mother has not satisfied her burden on appeal of showing that the
district court erred and that she was thereby prejudiced.
Affirmed.