State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1410

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Alexander Charles Leboeuf,
Appellant.

Filed October 4, 2021
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-20-1594

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Gaïtas, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
The state charged appellant with multiple drug- and firearm-related offenses, based
on evidence obtained from the search of an ap artment and two vehicles associated with
appellant. At the close of the state’s case at trial, the district court granted appellant’s
motion for judgment of acquittal related to th e counts arising from the drugs found in the
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two vehicles. But the district court did not in struct the jury that it could not consider the
evidence obtained from the vehicl es. In this appeal from the judgment of conviction on
the remaining counts, appellant argues that the district court committed plain error by
failing to instruct the jury on this point. We affirm.
FACTS
In January 2020, law enfo rcement officers executed a search warrant on an
apartment and two vehicles believed to be linked to appellant Alexander LeBoeuf. 1 The
officers discovered cocaine, a firearm, and ammunition in the apartment bedroom, and they
found more cocaine in the tw o vehicles. Respondent State of Minnesota later charged
LeBoeuf with four counts: second-degree sale and third-degree possession of ten or more
grams of a narcotic drug other than heroin (counts I and II), in violation of Minn. Stat.
§§ 152.022, subd. 1(1), .023, subd. 2(a)(1) (2018); and two counts of unlawful possession
of a firearm or ammunition (c ounts III and IV), in violati on of Minn. Stat. § 624.713,
subd. 1(2) (2018). In June 2020, the state amended the criminal complaint to add three
more counts: first-degree sale of 17 grams or more of cocaine (count V) and two counts of
fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance (counts VI and VII), in violation of Minn.
Stat. §§ 152.021, subd. 1(1), .0 25, subd. 2(1) (2018). The amended complaint specified
that counts I and II were based on the cocaine discovered in the bedroom, counts VI and
VII were based on the cocaine discovered in the vehicles, and count V was based on the

1 The caption of this opinion spells appellant’s name as “Leboeuf.” The caption on appeal
must match the caption as it appear ed before the district court. See Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 143.01. In appellant’s brief and in the transcripts, however, appellant spells his name as
“LeBoeuf.” We therefore use that spelling throughout this opinion.
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total amount of cocaine found in the apartmen t and the vehicles. Counts III and IV were
based on the firearm and ammunition found in the bedroom.
Jury Trial
The case proceeded to a jury trial. The state presente d the following evidence. In
January 2020, law enforcement officers obtained a warrant to search an apartment unit in
St. Louis Park and two vehicles. When the officers arrived at the apartment to execute the
warrant, four individuals were sitting in th e living room—LeBoeuf, his fiancée, and two
children. The fiancée rented the apartment. It was a “very small” one-bedroom apartment,
consisting of a living room, a bedroom, a kitchen area, and a bathroom.
During a search of the apartment, the officers discovered many illegally possessed
items. A semiautomatic assault rifle was found in the bedroom closet, on the left side. The
rifle was loaded with ammunition. The left side of the closet also held men’s shirts and a
shoebox for men’s shoes, but contained no women’s clothing. The right side of the closet,
on the other hand, held women’s clothing and shoes. There were no firearms, ammunition,
or drugs on the right side of the closet.
The officers found a magazine for the rifle in the drawer of a nightstand on the left
side of the bed. An unspent round of ammunition was also in the drawer. Men’s clothing
was on top of the nightstand and on the left side of the bed. On the ground next to the
nightstand was a letter from the Minnesota Department of Pu blic Safety addressed to
LeBoeuf at that apartment unit. On the right side of the bed were children’s clothing,
women’s hair extensions, and a breast pump, but no adult men’s items. The officers also
found a shoebox at the foot of the bed containing live rounds of ammunition.
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The officers found more contraband in and around two dressers in the bedroom. On
top of one dresser were tw o shoeboxes, which containe d crack cocaine, narcotics
packaging, baggies commonly used for narcotics packaging, a small digital scale with
cocaine residue, and more than $7,000 in cash. A mailing a ddressed to LeBoeuf at that
apartment was also on the dresser near the shoeboxes. Underneath the other dresser was a
cereal bowl with a “yellow substance and residue in the bottom” that was found to be crack
cocaine. Men’s clothing was inside that dresser and on the floor around it. Also inside the
dresser was a wallet containing a Hennepin County library card for LeBoeuf.
Officers also executed the search warrants on the two vehicles, which were owned
by LeBoeuf’s fiancée. The vehicles were parked next to each other outside the apartment
building. The officers found cocaine in both vehicles—inside a “little green tube” in the
driver’s side door of one vehicle, and in an identical green tube underneath the front
passenger seat of the other vehicle. LeBoeuf’s driver’s license was in the cup holder of
one vehicle. In the other vehicle was a plastic bag containing an identification bracelet for
LeBoeuf.
The state introduced eviden ce that, in November 2019— about two months before
the search warrants were executed—LeBoeuf was driving one of the vehicles when police
stopped him for speeding. During that encounter, LeBoeuf told the officer that his fiancée
was the owner of the vehicle, and he gave as his address the apartment complex that was
the subject of the search warrant.
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Dismissal of Three Counts and Jury Instructions
After the state rested its case in chief, defense counsel moved for judgment of
acquittal on the five drug-related charges. The district court agreed that there was
insufficient evidence to suppor t a guilty verdict on counts VI and VII, which were based
on the cocaine found in the two vehicles. Th e district court reasoned that the state had
introduced evidence that LeBoeuf had access to the vehicles, but that it failed to meet its
burden to show that he exercised dominion or control over any of the drugs recovered from
the vehicles. The state then agreed to dismiss the first-de gree sale charge (count V)
because, without the cocaine fro m the vehicles, the weight of the drugs did not reach the
17-gram threshold necessary for first-degree sale. The district court denied the motion for
judgment of acquittal as to counts I and II, relating to the drugs found in the apartment.
The prosecutor asked the district court to permit the state to re ly on th e evidence
discovered during the searches of the vehicles, and to discuss that evidence before the jury
during closing argument. The prosecutor likened the evidence of the drugs in the vehicles
to Spreigl evidence of “other acts,” which need only be proven by clear and convincing
evidence. The district court disagreed. It explained that, because the state could not prove
LeBoeuf’s exclusive control ov er the vehicles, that eviden ce was “too prejudicial” to
LeBoeuf, and the district court was “not going to allow [the state] to talk about the drugs
in the car.” The district court told the attorneys that “[t]he cars, the whole entire vehicles,
are out.”
LeBoeuf waived his right to testify, and he did not call any witnesses. During
closing arguments, the prosecutor told the jury that it was being asked to consider counts I
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through IV, which “all relate to the evidence about what was inside the apartment.” The
prosecutor summarized the evidence about the drugs found in the apartment and explained
that counts I and II “relate[] to the approxima tely 16.2 grams of coca ine that was in the
Nike shoebox on the dresser drawer.” Defense counsel similarly told the jury that “[t]here
are four charges that we’re dealing with that all occurred in the apartment.” The prosecutor
urged the jury to conclude that LeBoeuf possessed the drugs, firearm, and ammunition
because mailings were found associating him with the apartment a nd because the illegal
items were near men’s clothing rather than women’s clothing.
During the jury instructions, the district court told the jury that some counts had
been dismissed:
At the beginning of the trial, I described the charges
against the defendant. For r easons that do not concern you,
count 5, drugs in the first degree, possession with intent to sell;
count 6, drugs in the fifth de gree, possession; and count 7,
drugs in the fifth degree, possession, are no longer before you.
Do not speculate about why the charges are no longer part of
this trial.
The defendant is on trial only for the charges of
remaining counts 1 through 4. You may consider the evidence
presented only as it relates to the remaining counts.
The district court did not instruct the jury that it could not consider the evidence obtained
from the searches of the vehicles. The jury found LeBoeuf guilty on the remaining counts.
The district court entered convictions on counts I, III, and IV. It sentenced LeBoeuf
to 78 months in prison on the second-degree sale conviction and to 60 months in prison on
the unlawful-possession convicti on, with the sentences to be served concurrently. This
appeal follows.
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DECISION
LeBoeuf urges us to reverse his convictions, arguing that the district court erred by
failing to instruct the jury th at it could not consider the ev idence seized from the two
vehicles after the district court granted LeBoeuf’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the
three counts connected to the vehicle searches. Because LeBoeuf did not object to the jury
instructions at trial, we review the alle ged error under the plain-error standard. State v.
Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Min n. 1998). Under this sta ndard, we determine whether
there was (1) error, (2) that was plain, and (3) that affects the defendant’s substantial rights.
Id. If these three prongs are satisfied, we then consider “whether [we] should address the
error to ensure fairness and the integr ity of the judicial proceedings.” Id. If any
requirement of the plain-error standard is no t satisfied, we need not consider the other
requirements. State v. Lilienthal, 889 N.W.2d 780, 785 (Minn. 2017). We examine each
requirement of the plain-error standard in turn.
We agree with LeBoeuf that the district c ourt’s failure to instru ct the jury not to
consider the evidence obtained from the vehicle searches wa s error. The state does not
argue otherwise. The district court granted LeBoeuf’s motion for judgment of acquittal on
three counts based on the determination that the state had not presented sufficient evidence
to prove LeBoeuf’s dominion or control over the cocaine in the vehicles. The district court
emphatically told the attorneys that they could not discuss the evidence from the vehicles
and that none of that eviden ce could be considered in d eciding LeBoeuf’s guilt on the
remaining charges. The district court should have communicated th is information to the
jury. Because the district court acquitted LeBoeuf on the charges connected with the drugs
8
found in the vehicles, it was erroneous not to instruct the jury that it could not consider that
evidence. LeBoeuf satisfies the first prong of the plain-error standard.
LeBoeuf cannot, however, satisfy the second prong, that the error was plain. “An
error is plain if it was clear or obvious.” State v. Ramey , 721 N.W.2d 29 4, 302 (Minn.
2006) (quotations omitted). This prong is met when the error “violates or contradicts case
law, a rule, or an applicable standard of conduct.” State v. Mosley, 853 N.W.2d 789, 801
(Minn. 2014).
To support his contention that the error was plain, LeBoeuf cites State v. Wakefield,
in which the supreme court held that the st ate may not introduce evidence of a crime for
which the defendant has been acquitted. 278 N.W.2d 307, 308-09 (Minn. 1979). Under
this rule, LeBoeuf maintains, th e jury instructions should have told the jury that it could
not use the evidence from the ve hicle searches after the district court granted his motion
for judgment of acquittal on the charges arising from the vehicle searches. While LeBoeuf
accurately characterizes the holding in Wakefield, that holding does not apply here. In
Wakefield, the state introduced evidence that the defendant had allegedly committed a rape
six years earlier, even though he had been found not guilty of that offense. Id. at 308. And
the supreme court has moreover limited Wakefield’s application, e xplaining that when
“there has been no acquittal befo re the state attempts to in troduce evidence related to a
separate offense . . . Wakefield is not a bar to its admission.” State v. Ross, 732 N.W.2d
274, 281 (Minn. 2007). Wakefield therefore applies only when the acquittal occurred
before trial. Here, there is no contention that the evidence found in the vehicles was
improperly admitted at trial; the state properly introduced the evidence to prove the charges
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still before the jury at that point. Instead, the alleged error is the district court’s instructions
to the jury after dismissing some charges. The district court did not clearly contravene the
rule in Wakefield by failing to instruct the jury not to consider the evidence from the
vehicles.
LeBoeuf cites no authorities addressing the precise issue here—whether the district
court must instruct the jury not to consider evidence relati ng to a charge for which it has
granted a motion for judgment of acquittal. To show that an error is plain, a defendant on
appeal generally must show that a court has spoken directly on the issue challenged. See
State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 807 (Minn. 2012) (determining that district court’s error
in instructing jury was not plain when court had “not yet clearly required district courts to
include” specific language at issue); State v. Moore , 863 N.W.2d 111, 122 (Minn. App.
2015) (concluding that jury-instruction error was not plain when other cases “involved an
analogous situation but did not answer the question pres ented” by current appeal), rev.
denied (Minn. July 21, 2015). Without any caselaw that stands for the proposition LeBoeuf
asserts, he cannot show that the error was clear or obvious. LeBoeuf therefore fails to meet
the plainness prong.
Even if LeBoeuf could show that the erro r was plain, he cannot satisfy the third
prong—that the error affected his substantial rights. A criminal defendant bears a “heavy
burden” to meet this prong. Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 741. A defendant satisfies this prong
by showing that “the error was prejudicial and affected the outcome of the case.” Id. And
an error is considered prejudicial if there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the error “had a
significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” State v. Watkins, 840 N.W.2d 21, 28 (Minn. 2013)
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(quotation omitted). “An erroneous jury instruction will not or dinarily have a significant
effect on the jury’s verdict if there is considerable evidence of the defendant’s guilt.” State
v. Kelley, 855 N.W.2d 269, 283-84 (Minn. 2014).
We conclude that there is no reasonable lik elihood that the error had a significant
effect on the jury’s verdict. During closin g arguments, both the pr osecutor and defense
counsel told the jury that th e remaining counts related to the evidence found in the
apartment. The attorneys pr operly focused their closing arguments on the evidence from
the apartment, and neither mentioned the evidence from the vehicles. And the state
presented strong circumstantial evidence that Le Boeuf possessed the drugs, firearm, and
ammunition in the apartment. The jury could readily infer that LeBoeuf was living at the
apartment based on his presen ce there at the time police a rrived to execute the search
warrant, mailings sent to him at that address, and the fact that he had given the apartment
as his address when stopped by police two mo nths earlier. The state produced evidence
that the illegal items in the apartment were found in places where men’s clothing was
located and not women’s clothing. Based on th is evidence, the jury could conclude that
LeBoeuf, rather than his fian cée, was the one exercising do minion or control over the
contraband.
LeBoeuf maintains that th e evidence from the vehicles may have improperly
influenced the jury, suggesting that “[e]ven if the jury determined the state had not proved
possession of the rifle and drugs found inside the apartment, it could have used the evidence
from the cars and determined LeBoeuf had a propensity to commit crimes.” He also posits
that “the jury could have be en motivated to puni sh LeBoeuf for the drugs found in the
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vehicles even if it did not believe the state ha d proved he possessed the drugs, rifle, or
ammunition found in the apartment.” We are not persuaded. LeBoeuf’s connection to the
apartment was far strong er than his connection to the vehi cles. The jury heard evidence
that cocaine was found in both the vehicles and the apartment, but far more drugs and drug-
related items were recovered from the apartmen t than the vehicles. With this evidence
before the jury, it is hard to imagine that the jury would have believed that LeBoeuf
possessed the drugs in the vehicles but not the drugs in the apartment. For these reasons,
LeBoeuf cannot meet his heavy burden to show that he was prejudiced by the error.
Finally, even if LeBoeuf could satisfy all three prongs of the plain-error standard,
we will not reverse unless it is necessary to ensure the fairness and integrity of the
proceedings. Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 740. We have no concerns about the fairness or
integrity of LeBoeuf’s trial. The evidence found in the vehicles was properly admitted at
trial, so there were no issues with allowing the ju ry to hear evidence that was improper.
And after the district court dismissed the c ounts connected to the evidence found in the
vehicles, the parties appropriately focused th eir closing arguments on the evidence found
in the apartment. Under these circumstances, we are satisfied that LeBoeuf received a fair
trial, and the error is not of the type that undermines the integrity of the proceedings.
In sum, LeBoeuf cannot show that the error was plain, that it affected his substantial
rights, or that the fairness or integrity of the proceedings require reversal. Because
LeBoeuf cannot satisfy all the requirements of the plain-error standard, he is not entitled to
reversal of his convictions.
Affirmed.