State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1411

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Antoine Phillip Demry,
Respondent.

Filed March 22, 2021
Reversed and remanded
Frisch, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-20-3002

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicole Cornale , Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Mary F. Moriarty, Chief Hennepin County Public Defender, Paul J. Maravigli, Assistant
Public Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Judge
The state challenges an order suppressing evidence of respo ndent’s unlawful
possession of a firearm, arguing that the district court erred by concluding that officers

2
lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to stop and frisk respondent.
We reverse and remand.
FACTS
On January 31, 2020, police responded to a n initial report that numerous people at
a church funeral possessed guns and a second report that one of the people at the funeral
pointed a firearm at a nother person at the funeral. Within minutes, police located and
stopped respondent Antoine Phillip Demry, who matched the physical description of the
person described in the second report . Officers located a firearm on Demry’s person and
discovered that he was ineligible to posses s firearms due to past convictions. The state
charged Demry with one count of prohibited possession of a firearm in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2018).
Demry moved to suppress the evidence against him, arguing that the evidence was
obtained as the result of an illegal stop and that he gave certain statements after the stop
under circumstances that violated his Miranda rights. At an August 2020 contested
suppression hearing, the district court heard testimony from arresting officers and received
body-camera video recordings into evidence.
The Suppression Hearing
A responding officer testified that on the morning of January 31, 2020, he and other
officers learned during roll call that a funeral for a homicide victim was scheduled later
that day at a local church. Officers were notified that the funeral might be associated with
gang activity, and they were therefore “concerned about . . . retaliatory crimes.” That same
afternoon, officers were dispatched to the funeral following a report that numero us

3
individuals were at the church with guns. Upon cross-examination, t he officer described
the nature of the initial report and response as follows:
Q: [T]here was the 911 call in this case, correct?
A: Correct.

Q: And that initial 911 call w as made by an unknown
woman at the church, correct?
A: It was not unknown. I saw her name as an employee of
the church.

. . . .

Q: Okay. And this woman had reported that there were
multiple people in the basement of the church, correct?
A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: 200 to 300 people is what she told dispatch.
A: Correct.

Q: And she reported that there were a number of . . . guns
there?
A: Correct.

Q: And she did not know the exact number of guns.
A: Correct.

Q: And she did not know who had the guns.
A: Correct.

Q: She was getting whatever information she was
rel[a]ying to the 911 operator from someone else.
The state objected , arguing that the question called for speculation. The officer
clarified he “would not know that,” and the district court sustained t he objection. The
officer continued his testimony as follows:
Q: In her 911 call, she says, “They came and reported that
there were guns.”
A: I’m sorry. I can’t testify to that, ma’am.

4

Q: I’m going to refresh your recollection to listen to the 911
call.
A: It would be my first time listening to the 911 call.

Q: Okay. Well, let’s do it this way. She had no descriptio n
of anyone with a gun.
A: Correct.

Q: She did not report that she had seen anyone with a gun.

The state objected, again arguing th at the question called for speculation because
the officer had not heard the 911 call but instead received his information from the
dispatcher. The district court sustained the objection again. The testimony continued:
Q: The report that you received fro m dispatch did not
indicate that the 911 caller had seen anyone with a gun.
Would you like to review the incident report again?
A: No, ma’am. [I’m trying] to phrase the answer here. The
. . . initial report was multiple people at the church with
firearms, and that was our initial call. And then it was
updated while we were en route as to the specific
incident that occurred.

Q: The initial report says, “An unknown number of people
have guns,” correct?
A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: And the caller had no description of anyone with a gun.
. . . .
A: While we were en route, yes, ma’am.

Q: All right. And at the time you got this first informatio n
from the 911 call, just the first information, you didn’t
have any allegations of an assault.
A: Correct. Just people in the church with firearms.

Q: Okay. And aside from the information that you got
from dispatch . . . you didn’t have any information about
the source of the information on the 911 call.

5
A: I checked the caller, who the caller was, and it said it
was an employee of the church and gave her name.

Q: Sure. But you won’t know where she was [getting] the
information that she was providing to the police.
A: No, ma’am.

Officer testimony and body-camera footage detailed how the investigation evolved
after the initial 911 call and report from dispatch. One officer’s body camera captured
audio of the dispatcher informing the officers that a police inspector was “calling the
caller.” Approximately 20 seconds later, dispatch identified the 911 caller by n ame and as
an employee of the church. Approximately two minutes thereafter, the inspector aired
additional information, notifying responding officers that a “[ B]lack male with a black
coat, blue hat and a Cadillac symbol on it” had pointed a gun at someone during the funeral,
remained in possession of the firearm, and was walking westbound on North 26th Avenue
from North Bryant Avenue toward North Emerson Avenue.
A responding officer testified that he understood that the police inspector had
spoken to so meone at the church. But the officer also testified that he did not know to
whom the inspector spoke.
The officer explained that he and another responding officer traveled northbound
on North Emerson Avenue and observed a Black male —later identified as De mry—
wearing a blue hat and a black jacket with a Cadillac symbol and walking westward on
North 26th Avenue approximately two blocks from the church . Officers approached
Demry with guns drawn, ordered him to the ground, and asked whether he was in
possession of a gun. Demry admitted that he did have a gun. Officers asked if he had a

6
permit for the weapon. Demry admitted that he did not. Officers asked if he was a
convicted felon. Demry admitted that he was. Officers handcuffed Demry, restored him
to h is feet, and located a handgun and ammunition in Demry’s pockets . Demry
subsequently made incriminating statements regarding his possession of a firearm both
before and after officers advised him of his Miranda rights.
Order Granting Motion to Suppress
The district court granted Demry’s motion to suppress the state’s evidence. It found,
in part:
[A]n employee of the . . . [c]hurch, later identified [by name],
called the Minneapolis Police Department and reported a black
male, wearing a black coat and bl ue hat with a Cadillac
insignia, pointed a gun at someone during a funeral for an
alleged gang-affiliate. [The 911 caller] reported [s]he did not
personally see the alleged altercation, but [s]he was made
aware of the altercation by other individuals atte nding the
funeral. [The 911 caller] stated the suspect left the funeral,
headed westbound on Bryant Avenue North. [The 911 caller]
never identified the individual from whom [s]he received the
aforementioned information.
In considering whether the officers possessed the requisite reasonable suspicion to
stop and frisk Demry , the district court determined that “under the totality of the
circumstances, the police lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to believe criminal
activity was afoot” because the caller “did not personally see [Demry’s] alleged criminal
conduct or any firearms at the funeral.” The district court reasoned that the relevant
information “originated from an unidentified third party” and found that the police “failed
to take any action to identify the original source or corroborate [the employee’s] tip.” It
concluded that “[t]he fact that the source of the tip was anonymous and the police failed to

7
corroborate the tip cuts directly at the core of [the employee’s] reliability.” In consider ing
whether the police were justified in frisking Demry, the district court emphasized that the
employee “simply did not have any personal knowledge to support the claim [that Demry]
was armed or dangerous,” and therefore the officers lacked a n objective, articulable basis
to search Demry’s person. The district court suppressed the evidence of Demry’s firearm
possession based on the illegal stop, and it suppressed his statements as fruit of the
poisonous tree. The district court did not consider Demry’s s eparate argument regarding
violations of his Miranda rights.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
The state argues officers possessed reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to stop
and frisk Demry because (1) the 911 caller was a presumptively reliable informa nt and
(2) investigating officers sufficiently corroborated the tip . Demry urges us to affirm ,
arguing that the tip lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to form the basis for a valid stop
because the source of the information was an anonymous third pa rty and the officers failed
to corroborate any meaningful details related to criminal behavior.
When reviewing a district court’s suppression order, we “accept the district court’ s
factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous” and “review de novo a district court’s
determination of reasonable suspicion of illegal activity.” State v. Smith, 814 N.W.2d 346,
350 (Minn. 2012) . “Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if, on the entire evidence, we
are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred. ” State v. Diede, 795
N.W.2d 836, 846-47 (Minn. 2011).

8
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect against “unreasonab le
searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. An officer may
conduct “a brief, investigatory stop ,” commonly referenced as a Terry stop, “when the
officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Illinois v.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 (1968)) ; see also Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 842-43. “[T]he police
may stop and frisk a person when (1) they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a
suspect might be engaged in criminal activity and (2) the officer reasonably believes the
suspect might be armed and dangerous.” State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 250 (Minn.
2007) (quotation omitted).
I. The district court erred by concluding that the officers lacked the requisite
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to stop Demry.
Reasonable suspicion is not a high standard. State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390,
393 (Minn. 2008). “ While the standard is less demanding than probable cause or a
preponderance of the evidence, it requires at least a minimal level of objective justificatio n
for making the stop.” Id. (quotation omitted). Reasonable suspicion is an “elusive
concept,” but it demands that “the detaining officers must have a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 -18, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695 (1981). “Of course, an officer
may stop and question a person if there are reasonable grounds to believe th at person is
wanted for past criminal conduct. ” Id. at 417 n.2, 101 S. Ct. at 695 n.2. We must allow
“officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from

9
and deductions about the cumulative information available to t hem that might well elude
an untrained person.” United States v. Arvizu , 534 U.S. 266, 273 , 122 S. Ct. 744, 750-51
(2002) (quotation omitted).
“We consider the totality of the circumstances when determining whether
reasonable suspicion exists, and seemingly innocent factors may weigh into the analysis. ”
State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173, 182 (Minn. 2007). “[T]he totality of circumstances— the
whole picture—must be taken into account. Based upon that whole picture the detaining
officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person
stopped of criminal activity.” Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18, 101 S. Ct. at 695.
We now consider the whole picture surrounding the Terry stop.
The Informant’s Tip
The information leading officers to stop Demry originated from a police inspector’s
follow-up call to the 911 caller . The state contends that the district court erred by failing
to presume the information from the 911 caller, an identified citizen informant , was
reliable. Demry contends that the presumption of reliability does not apply and that the
police had no information regarding the basis of the caller’s knowledge.
An informant’s tip may support reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. In re
Welfare of G.M. , 560 N.W.2d 687, 691 (Minn. 1997). “But information given by an
informant must bear indicia of reliability that make the alleged criminal conduct
sufficiently likely to justify an investigatory stop by police.” Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d at
393-94. In considering the reliability of an informant, “ we look both at the informant and

10
the informant’s source of the information and judge them against all of the circumstances. ”
G.M., 560 N.W.2d at 691 (quotation omitted).
We presume that tips from private citizens are reliable. Davis, 732 N.W.2d at 182.
“This is particularly the case when informants give information about their identity so that
the police can locate them if necessary. ” Id. at 183. The Minnesota Supreme Court has
explained that “[o]ne who voluntarily comes forward and identifies herself is more likely
to be telling the truth because she presumably knows that the police could arrest her for
making a false report. ” State v. Lindquist , 205 N.W.2d 333, 335 (Minn. 1973).
Anonymous tips are typically less reliable than tips provided by identifiable citizen
informants. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 269, 120 S. Ct. 1375, 1378 (2000). “Unlike
a tip from a known informant whose reputation can be assessed and who can be held
responsible if her allegations turn out to be fabricated . . . an anonymous tip alone se ldom
demonstrates the informant’s b asis of knowledge or veracity.” Id. at 270, 120 S. Ct. at
1378.
We begin our analysis by identifying certain clearly erroneous findings by the
district court. The district court found that the 911 caller “ called the Minneapolis Police
Department and reported a [B]lack male, wearing a black coat and blue hat with a Cadillac
insignia, pointed a gun at someone during a funeral for an alleged gang -affiliate.” This
finding is clearly erroneous in part , because it conflates the evidence of two separate
contacts with the 911 caller. The first contact was the 911 call itself. An officer testified
that the information he received from dispatch originating from the 911 call concerned
“multiple people at the church with firearms,” and he clarified that dispatch did not relay

11
any information originating from the initial call regarding an assault by any specific
individual. The second contact was between the 911 caller and the police inspector.
During that contact, the inspector called the 911 caller. T he 911 caller inf ormed the
inspector that a Black male with a black coat and blue hat traveling west from the church
had pointed a gun at someone at the funeral. The district court clearly erred by finding that
the crime- and suspect-specific information was relayed during the initial 911 call.1
More importantly, the district court found that the 911 caller “reported [s]he did not
personally see the alleged altercation ”2 and “was made aware of the altercation by other
individuals attending the funeral.” These findings are also unsupported by the record and
are clearly erroneous.
We note that the parties did not introduce direct evidence of the information relayed
during either the 911 call itself or the inspector’s follow -up call. The absence of this
evidence presents significant challenges in reviewing the totality of the circumstances. The
record contains no direct evidence of the 911 caller’s basis of knowledge for the
information supplied during the 911 call. The parties did not submit the 911 call as
evidence during the hearing, and the officer confirmed during his testimony that he “didn’t
have any information about the source of the information on the 911 call.” Likewise, the

1 The district court’s finding that the 911 caller reported identifying information to police
is not clearly erroneous; body -camera footage indicated that the police inspector was
“calling the caller” and the inspector aired the crime- and suspect-specific informatio n
shortly thereafter.

2 The district court used the word “altercation” to refer to a man having “pointed a gun at
someone.”

12
record contains no direct evidence of the 911 caller’s basis of knowledge regardin g the
information she later gave to the police inspector. T he inspector did not testify, and the
testifying officers claimed they did not know who provided the information to the
inspector.
Our review of the record shows that t he suggestion that the 911 caller relay ed
secondhand information originated with defense counsel. During cross-examination of one
officer, defense counsel asked the officer to affirm that the 911 caller “was getting whatever
information she was rel[a]ying to the 911 operator from someone else” and that the 911
caller said during her call that “[t]hey came and reported that there were guns.” (Emphasis
added.) Both questions drew objections from the state, and the district court sustained both
objections. Yet the district court in its findings apparently relied on the informatio n
embedded in the questions.
Further, both questions concerned the 911 caller’s basis of knowledge for the
information reported during the 911 call . The questions did not address the basis of
knowledge for the information later communicated to the inspector in the second call. And
as Demry himself argued to the district court, “The entire basis for stopping [him] . . . came
from the second piece of information . . . . ” (Emphasis added.)
Because the district court clearly erred by finding that the 911 caller reported that
she was relaying secondhand information, we are left with the findings supported by the
record: the 911 caller identified herself by name and as an employee of the church, and she
provided police with a description of a crime, a suspect, the suspect’s location , and the
suspect’s direction of travel. On this record, we conclude that the presumption of reliability

13
applied to the 911 caller as an identified citizen informant. The 911 caller could have been
held accountable for any false information she provided to the police. By identifying
herself in the initial 911 call , she rendered herself available to follow -up questioning;
indeed, that is how the police inspector contacted her. See, e.g., City of Minnetonka v.
Shepherd, 420 N.W.2d 887, 890 n.1 (Minn. 1988) (reasoning that police could have called
gas station to verify caller’s employment and noting that officers subsequently identified
caller); Magnuson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 703 N.W.2d 557, 560 (Minn. App. 2005)
(concluding that tip carried sufficient indicia of reliability where caller provided name and
telephone number “with which the police could locate the informant and hold her
accountable”); Rose v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 637 N.W.2d 326, 328-29 (Minn. App. 2001)
(concluding that reliability was established where caller identified himself as employee of
specific business and dispatcher informed officer that caller provided full complainant
information), review denied (Minn. Mar. 19, 2002); Playle v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 439
N.W.2d 747, 74 8 (Minn. App. 1989) (concluding presumption of reliability applied to
identified restaurant employee and noting that officer identified informant after seizure) .
We next consider the basis of knowledge for the information relayed by the 911
caller during the second call. Even though the district court clearly erred by finding that
the caller reported that she was relaying second -hand information from an unidentified
source, the fact remains t hat the state failed to provide any direct evidence reg arding the
basis of knowledge for the information communicated to the inspector . See, e.g., G.M. ,
560 N.W.2d at 691 (“Any weakness in the state’ s knowledge of the tipster ’s identity is

14
overcome by the state’s extraordinarily strong knowledge of the circumstances forming the
basis for the tipster’s information.”).
Although there is no direct evidence of the 911 caller’s basis of knowledge, the
United States Supreme Court and the Minnesota Supreme Court have inferred that
observation forms a basis of knowledge when it is clear from the circumstances of the
reporting. See, e.g., Navarette v. California , 572 U.S. 393, 399 , 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1689
(2014) (“By reporting that she had been run off the road by a specific vehicle . . . the caller
necessarily claimed eyewitness knowledge of the alleged dangerous driving.”); Shepherd,
420 N.W.2d at 888-89 (reasoning that attendant’s report of observing an intoxicated driver
leave gas station “ suggested that the driv er had been in the station and that the caller’ s
information was based on personal observation of the driver himself”); State v. Davis, 393
N.W.2d 179, 180 -81 (Minn. 1986) (reasoning that passenger’s report that nearby car ran
red light indicated she “had obtained her information in a reliable way” because “[c]learly,
either the informant or the driver had seen the car in question drive through the red light”).
Here, the 911 caller reported (1) an observable, recent incident of criminal activity ;
(2) observable physical characteristics of the suspect; and (3) observable details regarding
the suspect’s location and direction of travel. Such circumstances are distinguishable from
those in which a stronger basis of knowledge is required to establish the reliability of a tip
regarding future criminality. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 227, 103 S. Ct. 2317,
2326 (1983) (involving matter where “the letter gives absolutely no indication of the basis
for the writer’s predictions regarding th e Gateses’ criminal activities”). The nature of the
allegation here—that someone had pointed a gun at a person attending a funeral ceremony

15
at a church—indicates that the act was observed. See id. at 233-34, 103 S. Ct. at 2330
(explaining that “if an unquestionably honest citizen comes forward with a report of
criminal activity—which if fabricated would subject him to criminal liability —we have
found rigorous scrutiny of the basis of his knowledge unnecessary ”).
The context and timing of the 911 caller’s reports are also relevant in determining
reliability. The United States Supreme Court has explained that contemporaneous reports
have “long been treated as especially reliable.” Navarette, 572 U.S. at 399, 134 S. Ct. at
1689. Here, the inspector’s follow-up call to the 911 caller occurred minutes after police
were dispatched on the initial 911 call. Accordingly, officers could reasonably infer that
the information given to the inspector was reasonably contemporaneous with the alleged
assault. See id. at 400, 134 S. Ct. at 1689 (explaining that tips relayed contemporaneo usly
with the observation of criminal activity or made under the stress of excitement caused by
a startling event weigh in favor of a tipster’s veracity).
Even if we were to accept th e premise that the 911 caller relay ed secondhand
information to the inspector, the tip carried other indicia of reliability. The situatio n
developed quickly; the officers’ initial response, the inspector’s follow-up contact, and the
Terry stop spanned mere minutes. Nothing indicates that the information was stale, and
the 911 caller presumably could have either identified the source of any secondhand
information to the inspector or provided identifying information if asked. See G.M., 560
N.W.2d at 691 (“ It is highly likely the confidential reliable informant knows the identity
of this unknown person, and that the BCA agent conceivably could contact this unknown
person through the confidential reliable informant. ”); United States v. Vandergroen, 964

16
F.3d 876, 880 (9th Cir. 2020 ) (explaining that “the fact that the anonymous tipsters were
[the bar’s] patrons who were still at the bar when the 911 call was being made narrowed
the likely class of informants, making their reports more reliable ” (quotati on omitted )).
And the nature of the tip itself underscores that the described events were observed. In
other words, regardless of the source of the information, the information itself indicates
the knowledge was based on observation.
This is a close cas e. The state failed to introduce the 911 recording into evidence.
It failed to call the police inspector to testify regarding his conversation with the 911 caller.
And the witnesses the state did produce lacked any information regarding the 91 1 caller’s
basis of knowledge. Although the better practice would be to produce direct evidence of
the relevant communications, t he absence of such evidence does not preclude our ability
to decide the issue. Given the presumptive reliability of the identified citi zen informant
and the nature of the information, we are satisfied that the tip carried sufficient indicia of
reliability to support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and that the Terry stop was
justified.
Although the presumptive reliability of the information relayed in the second call
was sufficient by itself to support the Terry stop, we observe that information corroborated
by or otherwise known to the officers —the whole picture —demonstrates that officers
possessed reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop Demry.
Investigation and Corroboration
The investigation and corroboration of the tip by authorities further contributes to
officers’ reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop Demry. Even assuming the informatio n

17
in the tip originated f rom an unidentified source, such a tip may exhibit sufficient indicia
of reliability if the tip is appropriately corroborated by the police. J.L., 529 U.S. at 270,
120 S. Ct. at 1378. The corroboration of key details is preferable but even the corroboration
of minor details will “lend credence to the informant’s tip.” State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d
265, 269 (Minn. 1985).
We are guided by two United States Supreme Court cases in ass essing the quality
of investigative and corroborative efforts upon receipt of an informant’s tip. The state
likens Demry’s case to Alabama v. White, in which police received an anonymous tip
stating that [the defendant] would be leaving 235 –C Lynwood
Terrace Apartments at a particular time in a brown Plymouth
station wagon with the right taillight lens broken, that she
would be going to Dobey’s Motel, and that she would be in
possession of about an ounce of cocaine inside a brown attaché
case.
496 U.S. 325, 327, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2414 (1990) . Officers observed a matching vehicle at
the apartment complex and saw the defendant enter the vehicle and proceed toward the
motel. Id. Officers stopped the defendant, informed her of their suspicion that she was
transporting drugs, asked to search her vehicle, located the brown attaché case, discovered
marijuana inside it, and found cocaine inside her purse. Id. at 327, 110 S. Ct. at 2414 -15.
The Supreme Court concluded “ that when the officers stopped [the defendant], the
anonymous tip had been sufficiently corroborated to furnish reasonable suspicion that [the
defendant] was engaged in criminal activity.” Id. at 331, 110 S. Ct. at 2416. The Supreme
Court explained that the officers corroborated most of the inform ant’s information and

18
emphasized that the informant’s “ability to predict [the defendant’s] future behavior”
indicated that the informant was well informed. Id. at 332, 110 S. Ct. at 2417.
Demry meanwhile contends that his case is comparable to J.L., in which “ an
anonymous caller reported to the Miami–Dade Police that a young [B]lack male standing
at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun.” 529 U.S. at 268, 120
S. Ct. at 1377. The Supreme Court distinguished J.L.’s case from White, explaining that
“[t]he tip in the instant case lacked the moderate indicia of reliability present in White and
essential to the Court’s decision in that case. The anonymous call concerning J.L. provided
no predictive information and therefore left the police without means to test the informant’s
knowledge or credibility.” Id. at 271, 120 S. Ct. at 1379. The Supreme Court rejected the
contention that the tip was reliable because officers corroborated the description “of the
suspect’s visible attributes.” Id. at 271-72, 120 S. Ct. at 1379. The Court explained:
An ac curate description of a subject’ s readily observable
location and appearance is of course reliable in this limited
sense: It will help the police correctly identify the person
whom the tipster means to accuse. Such a tip, however, does
not show that the tipster has knowledge of conceale d criminal
activity. The reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a
tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its
tendency to identify a determinate person.
Id. at 272, 120 S. Ct. at 1379.
Neither case aligns directly with the circumstances here. Demry’s physical
description, his general location, and his direction of travel are “easily obtained facts and
conditions existing at the time of the tip” and are not predictive in the sense descri bed by
the Supreme Court. White, 496 U.S. at 332, 110 S. Ct. at 2417 (quotation omitted). The

19
officers’ corroboration of these details demonstrates the “limited” reliability of the identity
of “the person whom the tipster mean[t] to accuse” as described in J.L. 529 U.S. at 272,
120 S. Ct. at 1379.
But the circumstances here differ from th e “bare -boned” and anonymous tip
presented in J.L. insofar as officers here received information that the identified suspect
had just engaged in the criminal act of po inting a gun at someone at the funeral. See id. at
273-74, 120 S. Ct. at 1380. The distinction is critical, because the Supreme Court rejected
“an automatic firearm exception” to the “established reliability analysis” because it “would
enable any person seeking to harass another to set in motion an intrusive, embarrassing
police search of the targeted person simply by placing an anonymous call falsely reporting
the target’s unlawful carriage of a gun.” Id. at 272, 120 S. Ct. at 1379 -80 (emphasis
added). But the Supreme Court also expressly limited its holding, explaining:
The facts of this case do not require us to speculate about the
circumstances under which the danger alleged in an
anonymous tip might be so great as to justify a search even
without a showing of reliability. We do not say, for example,
that a report of a person carrying a bomb need bear the indicia
of reliability we demand for a report of a person carrying a
firearm before the police can constitutionally conduct a frisk.
Id. at 273-74, 120 S. Ct. at 1380. Numerous courts have distinguished J.L. on this basis
and considered emergent situations as relevant in assessing reliability under the totality of
the circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Simmons , 560 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir. 20 09)
(noting that “an anonymous 911 call reporting an ongoing emergency is entitled to a higher
degree of reliability and requires a lesser showing of corroboration”); United States v.
Elston, 479 F.3d 314, 319 (4th Cir. 2007) (“Of additional significance is the fact that Taylor

20
was reporting an imminent threat to public safety —an individual who had expressly
threatened to shoot someone in the very near future. No such emergency was presented in
. . . J.L.”).
We observe that the district court’s finding that “the investigating police officers
failed to . . . corroborate [the 911 caller’s] tip” and “none of the officers took any action to
corroborate [the] tip” is not accurate. This determination is inconsisten t with the district
court’s accurate finding that officers “located an individual, wearing a black jacket with a
Cadillac insignia and a blue hat, walking westbound on Bryant Avenue North ,” a find ing
directly corresponding with the information the identified caller provided to the police
inspector. Even if we construe the district court’s order as concluding that the
corroborative efforts were insufficient, we disagree with that conclusion.3
Police corroborated each piece of information originating from the second call. As
the state argues, “[t]he male stopped by [the officer] was a [B]lack male, on foot, walking
west away from the direction of the Church on 26th between Bryant Avenue and Emerson
Avenue, wearing a blue hat and black jacket with a unique Cadillac Symbol on it.”4
Other circumstances known to the officers at the time afforded additional
corroborative information to support the reliability of the tip. T he officers received

3 The state rightly emphasizes that the district court failed to conduct any meaningful
analysis regarding corroboration. But because the district court made findings about the
officers’ observations of Demry, we may consider the sufficiency of corroboratio n as a
matter of law. See State v. Morse, 878 N.W.2d 499, 502 (Minn. 2016).

4 The state also cites the fact that Demry possessed a gun, but that fact is not a corroborative
circumstance, as his firearm possession was discovered after the stop. See J.L., 529 U.S.
at 271, 120 S. Ct. at 1379.

21
information first that 200 to 300 people were present at a funera l and that multiple people
at the funeral had guns . Shortly thereafter, they learned that an individual matching
Demry’s description had just pointed a gun at someone and left the funeral on foot,
traveling in the same area and direction in which officers observed Demry. Police located
and stopped Demry within two blocks of the church. Given the emergent nature of the
report, Demry’s presence in the vicinity of the incident, and the ongoing threat of an armed
and dangerous suspect, the need for additiona l corroboration was diminished. See, e.g.,
Robinson v. Howes, 663 F.3d 819, 830 (6th Cir. 2011) (“We . . . find that the emergency
nature of the call in this case adds to the totality of the circumstances comprising reasonable
suspicion.”); Simmons, 560 F .3d at 105 (explaining that “higher degree of reliability” of
911 callers is rooted in “special reliability inherent in reports of ongoing emergencies” and
therefore “the requisite level of corroboration is lower” (quotation omitted)); United States
v. Wooden, 551 F.3d 647, 650 (7th Cir. 2008) (reasoning that “a need for dispatch can make
reasonable a stop that would not be reasonable if the police had time to investigate at
leisure”); United States v. Hicks, 531 F.3d 555, 560 (7th Cir. 2008) ( “[W]hen an officer
relies on an emergency report in making a stop, a lower level of corroboration is
required.”); Elston, 479 F.3d at 319 (recognizing presence of “imminent threat” as carrying
“substantial weight in assessing reasonableness ” of officers’ actions) ; United States v.
Terry-Crespo, 356 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Police delay while attempting to
verify an identity or seek corroboration of a reported emergency may prove costly to public
safety . . . .”).

22
Further, responding officers testified that they were anticipating the possibility of
retaliation at the funeral, a circumstance consistent with the informant’s report of a gun -
pointing incident. We agree that the officers’ knowledge regarding the funeral’s gang
affiliation and the possibility of r etaliation further factors into the totality of the
circumstances. See United States v. Pelusio, 725 F.2d 161, 166 (2d Cir. 1983) (considering
officers’ knowledge of defendants’ brother’s murder and likelihood of retaliation as motive
for earlier crime under totality of circumstances); State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 843
(Minn. 1992) (noting that presence in high -crime area is independently insufficient to
justify a stop but that “departure from a building with a history of drug activity” factored
into totality of circumstances).
The Totality of the Circumstances

In light of the foregoing, the totality of the circumstances establishes that the officers
had the requisite reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to stop Demry. The officers
were aware that the funeral was affiliated with gang activity, and they were on heightened
alert of the possibility of retaliation. They received information from an identified citizen
informant—an identified employee of the church at which the funeral took place —that a
man had pointed a gun at someone. The church employee gave a detailed description of
the suspect, his general location, and his mode and direction of travel. Officers located
Demry—who matched the physical description —walking in the reported locatio n and
direction within minutes of the police inspector airing the information. Under the totality
of the circumstances, the tip bore sufficient indicia of reliability.

23
II. The district court erred by concluding that the officers lacked reasonable
suspicion that D emry was armed and dangerous.
The district court concluded that the officers lacked the requisite reasonable
suspicion that Demry was armed and dangerous to frisk him because the 911 caller did not
observe the alleged assault. “[A]n officer may conduct a protective search of the passenger
compartment of the vehicle, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or
hidden, if the officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular
person stopped of criminal activity a nd the officer possesses a reasonable belief, based on
specific and articulable facts, that the suspect is dangerous and may gain immediate control
of a weapon.” Flowers, 734 N.W.2d at 251 (quotations omitted). Here, the officers had
information that the suspect had just pointed a gun at someone at a church funeral, still had
the gun, and was walking down the street just outside of the church. F or the same reasons
that the officers had the requisite reasonable suspicion to justify stopping Demry, they were
justified in conducting a protective frisk of his person.
III. The district court erred by suppressing the evidence on the basis of an illegal
stop and frisk.
Because the district court erred by concluding that the stop and frisk were
unsupported by reasonable suspicion, the district court also erred by suppressing the state’s
evidence on the basis of an illegal stop and frisk. The district court did not consid er
Demry’s Miranda arguments, and we do not address them here. We reverse the district
court’s suppression order and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.