Ronald T. Seaworth, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1414

Ronald T. Seaworth,
Relator,

vs.

ABRA Auto Body & Glass,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed June 21, 2021
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 39066068-3

Ronald T. Seaworth, Ramsey, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Jennifer Moreau, Barna, Guzy & Steffen LT D, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent
ABRA Auto Body & Glass)

Keri A. Phillips, Anne B. Froelich, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Minnesota Department of Employment
and Economic Development)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and
Florey, Judge.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Relator challenges the decision of an unemployment-law judge that he is ineligible
for unemployment benefits because he quit his employment without a good reason caused
by his employer. We affirm.
FACTS
Relator Ronald T. Seaworth worked as a full-time auto-body technician for
respondent ABRA Auto Body & Glass (ABRA) from Decem ber 2019 to March 2020.
ABRA paid Seaworth on a commission basis us ing “flag hours.” A flag hour is “the
amount [of] book time that is written out by [the] industry” and di ffers from the actual
number of hours an employee spends working on a job. ABRA assigns a set number of
flag hours for each job and only bills the customer for those flag hours. ABRA only pays
the technician for the flag hours assigned to the job. If a technician fails to complete a job
properly, the technician must repair the job without additional pay and ABRA will not bill
the customer for the additional repair work. Seaworth was aw are of ABRA’s use of flag
hours when he was hired. Seaworth was also aware of ABRA’s policy to correct repairs
without additional pay.
In February 2020, a customer brought in a truck with rust damage on a panel.
Seaworth believed the panel needed to be replaced, but ABRA’s estimator instructed him
to repair the panel rather than replace it. Seaworth complied with this instruction and did
not discuss his concerns with his direct supervisor about replacing the rusted panel. ABRA
billed the customer 7.1 flag hours for this repair. About a month later, the customer

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returned to ABRA because he was unhappy w ith the original repa irs performed on the
truck. ABRA agreed to replace the panel and subtract the amount the customer had already
paid for the repair. Seaworth’s supervisor gave him a work order for the replacement job.
Normally, ABRA would have allotted 20.1 flag hours for a replacement job. But the work
order showed that Seaworth would be paid only for 13 flag hours to account for the amount
the customer had paid for the earlier repair work.
Seaworth refused to complete the replacement job because he believed it constituted
wage theft. The next day, Seaworth told hi s supervisor that he wa s resigning because he
did not feel that he was being paid the appropriate amount to fix the truck. His supervisor
offered to discuss the issue w ith Seaworth, but Seaworth refu sed to discuss the matter.
Seaworth stated that he would complete wo rk on the remaining vehicles he was fixing,
which he estimated could be completed in one or two days. Seaworth returned to his work
space and began speaking to other technicians about his belief that the company was
committing wage theft. One technician compla ined to the supervisor that Seaworth was
being distracting. The supervisor told S eaworth to leave that day because he was
“disturbing the production process.”
Seaworth applied for unemployment benef its with respondent Department of
Employment and Economic Development (DEED). DEED determined that Seaworth was
eligible for unemployment benefits. ABRA appealed the eligibility determination, and the
unemployment-law judge (the UL J) conducted a de novo evid entiary hearing in August
2020. The ULJ determined that Seaworth quit his employment when he gave notice to his
employer that he was going to quit after he completed his remaining two repair jobs. The

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ULJ noted that, later that day, Seaworth’s employer decided that Seaworth’s employment
should end immediately, rath er than after he completed his final two jobs. The ULJ
determined that Seaworth was not discha rged for employment misconduct. The ULJ
explained: “Seaworth was discharged on March 31, but the separation [became] a quit on
April 1 because the discharge occurred within 30 days of the intended date of quitting.”
The ULJ ultimately determined that Seaworth did not quit for a good reason caused by the
employer and was therefore ineligible for unemployment benefits. Seaworth filed a request
for reconsideration, which the ULJ denied. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Seaworth challenges the ULJ’s decision that he quit employm ent without a good
reason caused by his employer. On review, we may affirm the decision of the ULJ, remand
the case for further proceedings, or reverse and modify the decision if the substantial rights
of the relator have been prejudiced because, among other things, the decision is affected
by an error in law or is unsuppo rted by substantial evidence. See Minn. Stat. § 268.105,
subd. 7(d) (2020). We view th e ULJ’s factual findings in the light most favorable to the
decision, deferring to the ULJ’s credibility determinations. Wiley v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc.,
834 N.W.2d 567, 569 (Minn. App. 2013). But whether a statutory exception to ineligibility
applies is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. Johnson v. Walch & Walch,
Inc., 696 N.W.2d 799, 800 (Minn. App. 2005), review denied (Minn. July 19, 2005).
Generally, an employee who quits employ ment is ineligible for unemployment
benefits unless a statutory exception applies. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1 (2020). One
exception allows a person who quits “because of a good reason caused by the employer”

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to receive unemployment benefits. Id., subd. 1(1). A good reason caused by the employer
for quitting is a reason: “(1) that is directly related to the employment and for which the
employer is responsible; (2) that is adverse to the worker; a nd (3) that would compel an
average, reasonable worker to quit and become unemployed ra ther than remaining in the
employment.” Id., subd. 3(a)(1)-(3) (2020). “Wh ile an employee may have a good
personal reason for quitting, it does not necessarily constitute a good reason caused by the
employer for quitting.” Werner v. Med. Prof’ls, LLC, 782 N.W.2d 840, 842 (Minn. App.
2010), review denied (Minn. Aug. 10, 2 010). And although th e good-reason analysis
should be performed in light of the unique f actual context of each case, those facts must
demonstrate an employer-caused reason that would compel “an average, reasonable worker
to quit.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(a)(3); Werner, 782 N.W.2d at 843. Thus, simple
frustration or dissatisfaction with working conditions is not a good reason for quitting
caused by the employer. Trego v. Hennepin Cty. Family Day Care Ass’n, 409 N.W.2d 23,
26 (Minn. App. 1987). We re view de novo whether an employee had a good reason to
quit. Peppi v. Phyllis Wheatley Cmty. Ctr., 614 N.W.2d 750, 752 (Minn. App. 2000).
Here, the ULJ determined that a preponderance of the evidence demonstrated that
Seaworth did not quit because of a good reason caused by his employer. Seaworth argues
that this determination is erroneous because an average, reasonable worker would quit if
an employer was committing wage theft. We discern no error in the ULJ’s determination.
The record shows that Seaworth was aware of ABRA’s use of flag hours, which is
considered an industry standard. Seaworth also knew about ABRA ’s policy to correct
repairs without additional pay and acknowledge d that “[e]very time I’ve had an issue on

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the job, missing a dent, or having to redo something, it has always been done. Okay. I’ve
always had no problem with that.” But Seaworth did not want to complete the replacement
job on the truck because he ha d followed the estimator’s inst ruction on the initial repair
work and believed ABRA was committing wage theft.
If an employee claims to ha ve quit due to adverse work ing conditions, he “must
complain to the employer and give the empl oyer a reasonable opportunity to correct the
adverse working conditions before that may be [considered] a good reason caused by the
employer for quitting.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(c) (2020). Seaworth did not discuss
his concerns with his employer before he resigned. After Seaworth resigned, his supervisor
offered to discuss the billing i ssue with him. Seaworth refu sed. At the hearing, the
supervisor testified that if Seaworth “would have c[o]me and just discussed [the issue] with
me, we could have worked something out and I wouldn’t have even done, you know, taken
off the [disputed] hours. But I didn’t even get the o pportunity to discuss that with him.”
The record supports the ULJ’s determination that Seaworth did not speak to his employer
about his concerns and did not give ABRA a reasonable opportunity to correct the situation
before he resigned.
Because Seaworth did not give ABRA an opportunity to correct the adverse working
conditions, the good-reason exception does not apply. The ULJ correctly determined that
Seaworth is ineligible for unemployment benefits because he quit his employment and no
exception applies.
Affirmed.