State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1415

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Abdirahman Jama Ali,
Appellant.

Filed August 2, 2021
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-18-10768

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Kyle R. Triggs, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Karen Venice Bryan, KB Law, PLLC, Minnetonka, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Pres iding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
In this direct appeal from final judgment , appellant argues that his conviction of
fifth-degree controlled-substance crime must be reversed because there is insufficient
circumstantial evidence that he possessed the controlled substance. Because the evidence
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was sufficient to establish that appellant constructively possessed the controlled substance,
we affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged a ppellant Abdirahman Jama Ali with one
count of fifth-degree possession of a controlle d substance, in viol ation of Minn. Stat.
§ 152.025, subd. 2(1) (2016). The following facts derive from the court trial.
In June 2018, a Melrose police officer wa s on patrol on I-94 wh en his speed radar
showed a vehicle traveling 93 miles per hour in a 70-mile-per-hour zone. The officer
activated the squad vehicle’s emergency lights and the driver eventually drove the vehicle
to the side of the road and stopped.
The officer approached the vehicle and iden tified the driver as Ali. The officer
asked Ali for his driver’s license and proof of insurance, at which point Ali told the officer
he was borrowing the vehicle from a friend to visit his wife who was at a hospital in Fargo
soon to give birth to their child. The o fficer observed a green leafy substance on Ali’s
pants in his groin area and on the driver’s seat and floor below the driver’s seat. The officer
observed that Ali appeared nervous and his hands were shaking.
Ali then stepped out of the vehicle upon the officer’s request. The officer observed
that Ali appeared to have something in his mouth. He asked Ali to open his mouth but Ali
refused. The officer then pl aced Ali in the back of his s quad and Ali told the officer
multiple times that he did not want him to search the vehicle. While sitting in the back of
the squad car Ali stuck his foot out to prev ent the door of the squad car from closing on
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him. Upon arrival of another officer to assist , the officer was able to close the door and
then search the vehicle.
The officer found a “black plastic bag” w ith three plastic “sandwich-size” baggies
inside, each of which contained a leafy green substance, loca ted on the floo r behind the
driver’s seat of the vehicle. The officer se nt the substance to the BCA for testing, which
confirmed that it was cathinone, a controlle d substance commonly known as khat. The
officer testified that in his training and experience khat is “chewed” by the user.
The district court judge found Ali guilty of the fifth-degree controlled substance
offense. At sentencing, the district court stayed adjudication and placed Ali on probation
for five years. This appeal follows.
DECISION
“A conviction based on circumstantial evidence warrants particular scrutiny.” State
v. Bolstad, 686 N.W.2d 531, 539 (Mi nn. 2004). Appellate courts must apply a two-step
analysis when reviewing the suffic iency of circumstantial evidence. State v. Silvernail ,
831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). Firs t, the reviewing court must identify the
circumstances proved and “construe conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict.” Id. at 598-99 (quotation omitte d). In doing so, the re viewing court must defer
“to the [finder of fact’s] acceptance of the pr oof of these circumstances and rejection of
evidence in the record that conflicted with the circ umstances proved by the State.” State
v. Andersen , 784 N.W.2d 320, 329 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted). Second, the
reviewing court must “determi ne whether the circumstances proved are consistent with
guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt, not simply whether
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the inferences that point to guilt are reasonable.” Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 599 (quotations
omitted). To be sufficient, th e state’s evidence must establish that “the circumstances
proved are consistent with guilt and inconsiste nt with any rational hypothesis except that
of guilt.” State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2008) (quotations omitted). The
circumstances proved must “form a complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole,
leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any
reasonable inference other than guilt.” State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn.
2010) (quotation omitted).
To be found guilty of fifth-degree controlled substance possession, the state needed
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ali “unlawfully possesse[d] one or more mixtures
containing a controlled substa nce classified in Schedule I, II, III, or IV.” Minn. Stat.
§ 152.025, subd. 2 (2016). To establish unlawful possession of a controlled substance, “the
state must prove that defendant consciously possessed, either physically or constructively,
the substance and that defendant had actual knowledge of the nature of the substance.”
State v. Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609, 610 (Minn. 1975). Physical possession involves “direct
physical control.” State v. Barker , 888 N.W.2d 348, 353 (Minn. App. 2016) (quotation
omitted). The parties agree, as do we, that Ali’s guilt was based on a theory of constructive
possession of the khat found in the vehicle.
Constructive possession may be established either (1) by proof that the item was in
a place under the defendant’s “exclusive cont rol to which other pe ople did not normally
have access,” or (2) by proof of a “strong probability” that the “defendant was at the time
consciously exercising dominion and control over it,” even if the item was in a place to
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which others had access. Id. at 353-54 (quoting Florine, 226 N.W.2d at 611). Because the
khat was found in a borrowed vehicle owned by Ali’s friend, it was located in a place
accessible to others, so we must review whether the circumstantial evidence was sufficient
to establish that Ali consciously exercise d dominion and control over the khat in the
baggies at the time of the stop.
Ali argues that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to support a finding of
guilt because the circumstances proved allow for the rational hypothesis that another
person possessed the khat found in the baggies behind the driver’s seat of the vehicle.1
Circumstances Proved
The following circumstances were proved at trial, and are consistent with the finding
of Ali’s guilt:
 A Melrose city police officer initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle
on I-94 in the city of Melrose, Stearns County, Minnesota.

 The officer identified Ali as the vehicle’s driver and confirmed
that the vehicle belonged to Ali’s friend.

 While speaking with Ali throu gh the driver-side window, the
officer observed a leafy green su bstance in the groin area of
Ali’s pants and on the seat and front floor of the vehicle.

 The officer observed that Ali appeared to be nervous.

1 Ali also argues for the first time on appeal that law enforcement “unlawfully expanded
the traffic stop of the vehicle Mr. Ali was driving to a warrantless, no-consent unlawful
search.” Because “[a] reviewin g court must generally consider only those issues that the
record shows were presented and considered by the trial court in deciding the matter before
it,” Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (M inn. 1988) (quotation omitted), this issue is
not properly before our court and thus not addressed.
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 The officer observed that Ali appeared to be chewing
something in his mouth. Ali refused to open his mouth or tell
the officer what was in his mouth.

 The officer searched the vehicl e and found three clear plastic
baggies inside of a larger bag on the floorboard behind the
driver’s seat.

 The baggies contained a leafy green substance that the BCA
tested and confirmed was khat, a schedule I controlled
substance in Minnesota.

 The officer testified that, in his training and experience, khat is
typically chewed.

No Rational Hypothesis Other Than Guilt
Ali acknowledges that khat is a controlled substance that is illegal to possess in
Minnesota and that khat was found in the vehicle he was driving. He asserts, however, that
the district court should have determined from the circumstances proved that he did not
exercise dominion and control over the khat because it was not his vehicle. We disagree.
First, the officer observed a green leafy substance resembling khat on Ali’s pants in
his groin area and on the driver’s seat and floor where Ali was sitting. Second, the officer
observed that Ali appeared “nervous.” Th ird, the officer observed Ali “chewing” on
something during the stop, Ali refused to open his mouth, and the officer testified that khat
is “chewed.” These circumstances suggest th at the khat belonged to Ali and does not
support a rational hypothesis that it belonged to someone else. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d
at 599.
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In sum, the circumstances proved are consistent with the district court’s conclusion
that Ali possessed the khat in the baggies, and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis
other than Ali’s guilt.
Affirmed.