In the Matter of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1423

In the Matter of:

Michelle Antionette Frison, and OBO minor child,
Respondent,

vs.

Ermiase Mesfin Asfaw,
Appellant.

Filed June 1, 2021
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-DA-FA-20-699

Brittney M. Miller, Susan C. Rhode, Moss & Barnett, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Thomas A. Sieben, Sieben & Cotter, PLLC, South St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ga їtas, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s issuance of an order for protection (OFP)
against him in favor of his infant child. He argues that (1) the dist rict court abused its

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discretion by admitting certain testimony regarding the nature of the infant’s injuries, and
(2) the record is insufficient to support the issuance of the OFP. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Ermiase Mesfin Asfaw and resp ondent Michelle Antionette Frison had a
romantic relationship that lasted for approxima tely two-and-a-half years. The two never
married but had an infant child together, born in 2020. When the infant was just over two
months old, Asfaw drove Frison to a doctor’s appointment while Frison’s mother watched
the infant. When Frison returned home, she noticed that the infant’s leg was swollen. She
called the infant’s primary-care physician. At that time, she believed the infant’s swollen
leg might have been a reaction to immunizati on shots he received ten days earlier. Later
that day, she brought the infant to the hospital.
While at the hospital, the infant had x-ra ys taken, and Frison learned from a doctor
that the infant had multiple broken bones. Th e infant received immediate care at United
Hospital and was then transferred to Children’s Hospital. The infant left the hospital in a
cast. Doctors prescribed pain medication and two anti-seizure medications to the infant.
Frison observed that the infant was in pain wh ile he was in the cast. The infant required
careful handling even after getting out of the cast, and his injuries made traveling difficult
for him.
The following day, Ramsey County placed the infant child in the emergency custody
of the county and began an in vestigation. Police arrested Asfaw—but not Frison or the
infant’s grandmother—and the state criminally charged him in connection with the infant’s
injuries. As part of that criminal proceeding, a domestic-abuse no-contact order (DANCO)

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prevented Asfaw from having contact with the infant. In addition to the criminal charges,
the county initiated a child protection case against Asfaw.
In July 2020, Frison filed a petition fo r an OFP in district court against Asfaw
seeking protection for both hersel f and the infant child. A referee for the district court
issued an emergency ex parte OFP. Asfaw timely requested a hearing. In September 2020,
the district court held a hearing.
At the hearing, Frison testified regarding the infant’s injuries and condition. Asfaw
objected to a portion of her testimony on the grounds that the testimony lacked foundation
and constituted inadmissible hearsay. Frison testified that she believed that Asfaw caused
the infant’s injuries, and she believed that the infant would be in danger if left in his care.
In addition to her testimony about the infant, Frison also testified about an incident in which
Asfaw attempted to force her to have sex with him. She provided this testimony to explain
why she sought an OFP in favor of herself in addition to an OFP in favor of the infant.
On cross-examination, Frison admitted that the only people present in the house on
the night before the hospital visit were hersel f, her mother, Asfaw, and the infant. Frison
also admitted that only her mother was alone with the infa nt on the morning of June 25.
Frison testified that she did not recall any particular difficulty getting the infant to bed on
the night of June 24, and that she did not notice him being fussy or having any problems
with his leg that night. She also admitted that when she was interviewed by police the day
after bringing the infant to the hospital, she stated that she did not believe that Asfaw was
the source of the infant’s injuries.

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On redirect examination, Frison testified that, while sh e did not originally believe
that Asfaw caused the infant’s injuries, she had changed her mind and now believed that
Asfaw hurt the infant. Frison testified that she changed her mind based on the criminal and
child protection proceedings against Asfaw. Frison rested after she testified. Asfaw rested
without calling any witnesses.
During closing arguments, Frison’s attorney argued that Frison had established that
Asfaw had committed acts of domestic abuse against Frison and the infant. Frison’s
attorney emphasized that Asfaw did not deny attempting to assault her or inflicting injuries
on the infant. Asfaw’s attorn ey conceded that Frison had met her burden for an OFP in
favor of herself. But he argued that Frison had not met her burden with respect to the infant
because the criminal and child protection pr oceedings involving Asfaw were insufficient
to establish that Asfaw caused some type of physical injury to the infant. Asfaw’s attorney
renewed his objections to portio ns of Frison’s testimony and argued that without that
testimony, Frison had not met her burden becau se there was no allegation that Asfaw
committed any act that injured the infant.
After hearing closing arguments, the distri ct court orally granted the OFP in favor
of both Frison and the infant child. The district court acknowledged that the question was
“a little more difficult” with respect to the infant but concluded that the evidence supported
issuance of an OFP in favor of the infant child as well as Frison. In reaching this
conclusion, the district court recognized th at Frison’s testimony re garding the infant’s
“specific medical condition” lacked foundation. But the district court concluded that the

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remaining evidence was sufficien t to support issuance of th e OFP. The district court
reasoned:
[H]ere’s what is not disputed, that baby went into the hospital
and came out in some pretty si gnificant casts . . . with pain
medication, with difficulty in ev en taking a car ride. That
[Frison] was investigated, not arrested, no Child Protection
case against her. The other . . . person who was caring for [the
infant] that evening has not be en arrested, does not have a
Child Protection case. The only other adult in that home,
[Asfaw] was arrested, does have a Child Protection
case. . . . So while it is a more difficult case I find [Frison] to
be a credible witness, I find he r testimony to be credible, her
petition to be credible.

The district court subsequently issued a written order granting the requested OFPs in favor
of Frison and the infant.
Asfaw appeals the order issuing the OFP but only with regard to the infant child.
DECISION
The Minnesota Domestic Abuse Act allows a person alleging domestic abuse to file
a petition for an OFP. Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 4 (2020). “Domestic abuse” includes
“the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault” against a
family or household member. Id., subd. 2(a) (2020). The pe titioner bears the burden of
demonstrating that domestic abuse occurre d by a preponderance of the evidence.
Oberg v. Bradley, 868 N.W.2d 62, 64 (Minn. App. 2015). If the petitioner demonstrates
that domestic abuse occurred, the district c ourt “may” issue an OFP and provide certain
forms of relief, such as “restrain[ing] the abusing party from committing acts of domestic
abuse” and “order[ing] the abus ing party to have no contac t with the petitioner.” Minn.
Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 6(1), (10) (2020).

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We review a district court’s decision to grant an OFP for an abuse of discretion.
Thompson ex rel. Minor Child v. Schrimsher , 906 N.W.2d 495, 50 0 (Minn. 2018). A
district court abuses its discretion “if it acts against logic and the facts on record, or if it
enters fact findings that are unsupported by the record, or if it misapplies the law.” In re
Adoption of T.A.M. , 791 N.W.2d 573, 578 (Minn. App. 2010) (quotation and citations
omitted). In conducting such a review, this court gives “deference to the opportunity of
the [district] court to assess th e credibility of th e witnesses.” Thompson, 906 N.W.2d at
500-01 (quotation omitted).
Asfaw argues that the district court abus ed its discretion by issuing the OFP because,
in his view, the record does not support the district court’ s finding that domestic abuse
occurred. He first argues that the district court received inadmissible evidence. He then
argues that, with or without the inadmissible evid ence, the record do es not support the
district court’s decision to issue the OFP. We address each argument in turn.
I. Asfaw has not demonstrated prejudice from the district court’s evidentiary
ruling.
Asfaw argues that the district court ab used its discretion by allowing Frison to
testify, over his objection, to the infant’s medical condition as reported to Frison by the
infant’s doctor.
1 Frison contends that the evidence was properly admitted. She further
argues that any alleged error regarding the admission of the evidence was not prejudicial.

1 Asfaw also argues that “[t]he district cour t clearly erred in its factual findings,” but he
does not identify any specific findings of fact by the district court that he characterizes as
clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we review only his claim that the district court abused its
discretion by allowing Frison to testify about the child’s specific injuries.

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“The admission of evidence rests within th e broad discretion of the [district] court
and its ruling will not be distur bed unless it is based on an e rroneous view of the law or
constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Olson ex rel. A.C.O. v. Olson , 892 N.W.2d 837, 841
(Minn. App. 2017) (quotation omitted). A dist rict court abuses its discretion “if it acts
against logic and the facts on record, or if it enters fact findings that are unsupported by the
record, or if it mi sapplies the law.” T.A.M., 791 N.W.2d at 578 (q uotation and citations
omitted). Because an OFP is a civil remedy, Asfaw must demonstrate a prejudicial error
to be entitled to a new hearing based on an erroneous evidentiary ruling. Olson,
892 N.W.2d at 841.
Asfaw argues that the district court abused its discretion by allowing Frison to testify
to her understanding that her son had two broken legs, all of his toes were broken, and he
sustained multiple skull fractur es. Asfaw contends that th is testimony was inadmissible
because (1) Frison lacked fo undation to provide such test imony because she is not a
medical expert, and (2) the evidence was hearsay, conveyed to her by a medical doctor, not
falling within any recognized exception.
We need not decide whether the district court abused its discretion by admitting the
challenged testimony because Asfaw has not demonstrated any resulting prejudice. When
explaining the basis for its decision to issue the OFP with regard to the infant child, the
district court expressly addressed Asfaw’s c oncern about the challenged testimony. The
district court noted: Asfaw “doe s have a point that [Frison] does lack the foundation to
speak to [the infant’s] specific medical conditi on.” As a result, the district court did not
rely on that testimony when it found the infant was injured. Instead, the district court relied

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on the following undisputed evidence of physical injury to the infant: “th[e] baby went into
the hospital and came out in some pretty significant casts, . . . with pain medication, with
difficulty in even taking a car ride.” Because the district court did not rely on the testimony
that Asfaw argues was erroneously admitted, we discern no prejudice resulting from the
district court’s decision to admit the testim ony. And, absent pr ejudice to Asfaw, the
admission of the challenged testimony provides no basis for reversal. See W.G.O. ex rel.
A.W.O. v. Crandall, 640 N.W.2d 344, 349 (Minn. 2002) (noting that erroneous admission
of evidence that is cumulative of other admissible evidence is “harmless”); Minn. R. Civ.
P. 61 (requiring harmless error to be ignored).
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by issuing the OFP.
Asfaw next argues that the district cour t abused its discreti on by issuing the OFP
because there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that he committed an act of domestic
abuse against the infant child. Frison contends that the record supports the district court’s
issuance of the OFP based on its determination that the infant child sustained some sort of
physical injury caused by Asfaw. We agree with Frison.
As noted above, we review a district court’s decision to grant an OFP for an abuse
of discretion. Thompson, 906 N.W.2d at 500. In doing so, we defer to the district court’s
opportunity “to assess the credibility of the witnesses.” Id. at 500-01.
In determining whether domestic abuse oc curred, the district court considered
whether the infant had sustained a physical inju ry. As discussed abov e, the district court
specifically found that the undisputed evidence showed that the infant child left the hospital
“in some pretty significant casts,” with pain medication, and with difficulty riding in the

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car. Based on these facts, the district court fo und that the child had a “physical injury.”
The record supports the district court’s findi ngs. At the hearing, Fr ison testified that she
took her son to the hospital be cause she observed that one of his legs was swollen. She
further testified that her son left the hospital in a cast and that he was in a lot of pain while
in the cast. By the time of the hearing, she still had to be gentle with her son’s
“legs . . . because they [were] still healing.” And, while not referenced by the district court,
she also testified that the infant takes two medications to avoid having seizures, a condition
that did not exist prior to the infant child’s admission into the hospital. Thus, even without
the challenged testimony, there is sufficient evidence to support the district court’s finding
that the infant sustained a physical injury.
Asfaw also argues the record does not support the district court’s determination that
he caused the physical injury to the infant. Specifically, As faw contends that the record
does not support the district court’s dete rmination because Frison did not identify a
particular incident where Asfaw abused the infant. Asfaw cites Aljubailah ex rel.
A.M.J. v. James to support his argument that the di strict court abused its discretion by
issuing the OFP without finding a particular instance of domestic abuse. 903 N.W.2d 638
(Minn. App. 2017). Although the OFP at issue in Aljubailah was based upon an identified
incident of domestic abuse against a child, that decision does not condition a district court’s
issuance of an OFP on the finding of a specific instance of domestic abuse. Id. at 643-44.
Asfaw cites, and we are aware of, no case law that imposes such a requirement. Therefore,
we conclude that the district court properly based its finding of do mestic abuse on the
totality of the circumstances. See Pechovnik v. Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d 94, 99-100 (Minn.

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App. 2009) (reviewing totality of the circum stances to determine whether the record
supported the district court’s issuance of an OFP).
Asfaw further argues that the totality of the circumstances do not establish that he
caused the infant child’s physical injury. He maintains the injury to the infant could have
been the result of an accident. We are not persuaded.
In reaching its decision to issue the OFP, the district court carefully considered the
question of causation. The district court explained that the evidence showed that only three
people were caring for the infant during the relevant time frame: Frison, her mother, and
Asfaw. The district court also found that the evidence showed th at Asfaw was the only
one of the three who was arrested as a result of the infant’s physical injury. Asfaw also
had an open child-protection cas e at the time of the OFP hearing. And, at the hearing,
Frison testified that she believed that Asfaw caused the infant’s injuries and was concerned
for the infant’s well-being if Asfaw were allo wed to have contact with the infant. Based
on this evidence, the district court found that Asfaw caused “physical injury” to the infant
child and thereby engaged in “domes tic abuse” against the infant. See Minn.
Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(a)(1) (defining “dom estic abuse” to incl ude physical harm and
bodily injury committed against a family or household member by a family or household
member).
The district court, in reaching this conclusion, expressly found Frison to be credible.
We defer to “the opportunity of the [district] court to assess the credibility of the
witnesses.” Thompson, 906 N.W.2d at 500-01. Asfaw has not shown that the district court
abused its discretion by concluding that he physically injured the child, based on Frison’s

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testimony. See Hughs ex rel. Praul v. Cole , 572 N.W.2d 747, 752 (Minn. App. 1997)
(holding that while the evid ence of domestic abuse submitte d to the district court was
“minimal,” the district cour t did not abuse its discretion in issuing the OFP because
appellant “failed to submit any evidence to re but the[] allegations”). Asfaw’s contention
that the infant child’s physical injury could have been caus ed by an accident is not
supported by any evidence in th e record. We discern no ba sis for concluding that the
district court abused its discretion when it found that the evidence was sufficient to support
the issuance of an OFP against Asfaw with regard to the infant.
In sum, Asfaw has not shown a basis for reve rsal of the district court’s order granting
the OFP.
Affirmed.