In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: B. L. W., M. T. L. II, and T. B. (deceased), Commissioner of Human Services, Legal Custodian.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1426

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
B. L. W., M. T. L. II, and T. B. (deceased),
Commissioner of Human Services, Legal Custodian.

Filed April 19, 2021
Reversed and remanded; motion denied
Reyes, Judge

Steele County District Court
File No. 74-JV-19-1488

Mallory K. Stoll, Blahnik, Prchal & Stoll, PLLC, Prior Lake, Minnesota; and

Brooke Beskau Warg, Mitchell Hamline School of Law Child Protection Clinic, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for appellant C.W.)

Daniel A. McIntosh, Steele County Attorney, Sasha J. Henning, Assistant County
Attorney, Owatonna, Minnesota (for respondent Minnesota Prairie County Alliance)

Thomas J. Nolan, Jr., Nolan Law Offices, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court erred by denying , without holding an
evidentiary hearing, her motion for adopti ve placement because it (1) failed to treat
properly her motion and supporting documents; (2) abused its discretion by concluding that
appellant failed to make a prima facie showing that the agency acted unreasonably; and

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(3) “abused its discretion” by concluding that appellant did not timely file her motion with
an approved adoption home study . We reverse and remand with instructions to hold an
evidentiary hearing on appellant’s motion for adoptive placement , and we deny as moot
appellant’s motion to strike.
FACTS
B.L.W. is the biological mother of K.W. and A.L . (the children). K.W.’s father is
deceased, and A.L.’s putative father is M. T.L. (putative father). On October 9, 2018, the
children were removed from B.L.W.’s care, adjudicated children in need of protection or
services (CHIPS), and placed in foster care with G.H. and M.S. (foster parents).
On January 15, 2019, A.L.’s paterna l grandmother told respondent Minnesota
Prairie County Alliance (MNPrairie) of appellant C.W.’s interest in serving as a placement
for the children. C.W. is A.L.’s biological great-great aunt and lives in the state of Virginia.
MNPrairie did not contact C.W. Then on April 15 and 22, 2019, A.L.’s paterna l
grandmother again informed MN Prairie of C.W.’s interest. Over three months after first
being notified of C.W.’s interest, on April 26, 2019, MNPrairie finally contacted C.W. for
the first time. C.W. expressed interest in being a placement for the children.
By June 12, 2019, MNPrairie sent a request and a corrected request for a foster-care
home study for C.W. through the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC)
to the Virginia ICPC office. The Virginia ICPC office rejected both requests because
MNPrairie provided insufficient documentation and closed their case on the matter. Over
two months later, on August 22, 2019, the Virginia ICPC office informed MNPrairie it
would need to submit a new referral packet.

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From August 22, 2019, to August 24, 2019, C.W. visited the children in Minnesota
and maintained weekly video phone calls thereafter. On August 23, 2019, MNPrairie filed
a termination of parental rights (TPR) petition against B.L.W. and M.T.L. Upon return to
Virginia, C.W. began foster -care training which she completed by October 2, 2019. The
Virginia ICPC office did not receive the co mpleted referral packet from MN Prairie until
October 3, 2019.
On November 13, 2019, MN Prairie emailed the attorneys for B.L.W. , M.T.L., and
the guardian ad litem, explaining the ICPC process and identifyi ng only one permanency
option: the foster parents.
On the day of the TPR trial, November 18, 2019, B. L.W. and M. T.L. executed a
consent-to-adopt agreement for each of the children. The consent -to-adopt agreements
identified the foster parents as the prospective adoptive parents and stated, in relevant part:
If [the foster parents] do not finalize the adoption of my
children within six (6) months of the execution of this consent,
Minnesota Prairie County Alliance must find another adoptive
parent for my children, unless the failure t o finalize the
adoption is not due to the action or failure to act by the
prospective adoptive parent [s]. With the understanding
pursuant to Minn. Stat. 260C .212 subd. 2 and Minn. Stat.
260C.605 subd. 1 family will be considered first for a proposed
adoptive family.
(Emphasis added.)
The consent-to-adopt agreements also stated:
I understand that I will have no ability to name another
prospective adoptive parent in the event that [ the foster
parents] do not adopt. With the understandin g family will be
considered first for a proposed adoptive family.

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(Emphasis added.)
The following day, MNPrairie informed C.W. that the parents signed the consent -
to-adopt agreem ents to move forward with a non relative foster -parent placement. On
November 26 , 2019, Virginia’s ICPC office finally approved C.W.’s ICPC foster -care
home-study results.
On December 16, 2019, the district court accepted B. L.W. and A.L.’s consent -to-
adopt agreements and ordered the children transferred to the Minnesota C ommissioner of
Human Services (the commissioner) for adoptive placement. The district court’s order also
incorporated the parties’ six -month timeline with the following language: “If adoption is
not finalized by the identified prospective adoptive parents, due to the prospective parents’
actions, within 6 (six) months of the signing of this consent to adopt, the Commissioner or
Commissioner’s delegate shall pursue adoptive placement in another home considering
other relatives as potential adoptive placements.”
On April 1, 2020, C .W. filed a motion to intervene in the adoption proceedings ,
which the district court later granted in its June 25, 2020 order. The district court cancelled
the postpermanency review hearing scheduled for April 29, 2020 , due to the COVID-19
pandemic and, instead, held the hearing on July 17, 2020, more than six months after the
parties executed the consent-to-adopt agreement. At this postpermanency review hearing,
the district court granted C.W.’s request for an expedited ICPC a doption home study as
reflected in its June 25 order. Although the district found that MNPrairie made reasonable
efforts toward finalizing adoption, MNPrairie did not request, and the district court did not

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make, an express finding that the failure to finalize the adoption was not attributable to
foster parents’ actions or inaction.1
On July 6, 2020, MN Prairie notified the parties that the nonrelative foster parents
and the department executed a placement agreement . By July 10, 2020, MN Prairie
submitted a request for an adoption home study for C.W.
On August 4, 2020, the Minnesota ICPC office received the approved adoption
home study for C.W. but did not send the study to C.W., despite her requests that it do so.
On August 5, 2020, C.W. filed a motion for adoptive placement with a supporting affidavit
and memorandum of law. On the morning of August 6, 2020, the Minnesota ICPC office
emailed the approved adoption study to C.W. , which, minutes later, she fil ed with the
district court. Less than five minutes later, MNPrairie filed a motion to dismiss C.W.’s
motion, alleging that C.W. failed to timely file the adoption home study and that her
submissions failed to make a prima facie showing that MNPrairie acted unreasonably in
denying her requested placement.
The district court denied C.W.’s motion for adoptive placement , relying on the
consent-to-adopt agreements as dispositive of the fact that MNPrairie did not act
unreasonably in denying C.W.’s requested placement and concluding that C.W. did not
timely file her motion with an approved adoption home study. This appeal follows.

1 MNPrairie later conceded that there is no specific finding that the failure to finalize the
adoption after six months was not due to the foster parents’ action or inaction.

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DECISION
I. The district court err ed by denying , without an evidentiary hearing, C.W.’s
motion for adoptive placement because it failed to properly consider her
motion and supporting documents and abused its discretion by misapplying
the law.
C.W. argues that the district court erred by determining that she failed to mak e a
prima facie showing that MNPrairie acted unreasonably because the district court (1) failed
to properly consider her motion and supporting documents and (2) abused its discretion by
improperly applying the law. We agree.
“Adoption is a creation of statute and therefore the [district] court’s authority in
matters relating to adoption is limited to the authority set forth by [the Juvenile Court Act].”
In re Adoption of C.H., 554 N.W.2d 737, 740 (Minn. 1996); see Minn. Stat. §§ 260C.001-
.637 (2020) (addressing adoption of children who, like those here, are under guardianship
of commissioner of human service).
When the district court places a child under the commissioner’s guardianship after
a termination of the parental rights of that child’s parents, an agency acting on behalf of
the commissioner must make “reasonable efforts” to finalize an adoption. Minn. Stat.
§§ 260C.601, subd. 2, .605, subd. 1. Under Minn. Stat. § 260C.605, subd. 1(d), “reasonable
efforts” to finalize an adoption include, among other things, identifying an appropriate
prospective adoptive parent based on an updated assessment of child’s needs as described

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in Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(b)2, and performing an up-to-date relative search, Minn.
Stat. § 260C.605, subd. 1(d)(3)(i).
A relative or foster parent who is not selected for an adoptive placement but who
has a competing interest in adopting the child may, within the statutory time period, move
the district court for an adoptive placement of the child . Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd.
6(a). “The motion and supporting documents must make a prima facie showing th at the
agency has been unreasonable in failing to make the [movant’s] requested adoptive
placement.” Id., subd. 6(b). If the district court determines that the movant’s motion and
supporting documents assert a prima facie case that the agency acted unreas onably in
denying the movant’s requested placement, “the court shall set the matter for evidentiary
hearing.” Id., subd. 6(c) (emphasis added).
When, as here, a relative or foster parent with a competing interest in adopting a
child moves the district court for an adoptive placement of the child and the district court,
without an evidentiary hearing, denies that motion, this court reviews that denial in three
steps. In re Welfare of L.L.P., 836 N.W.2d 563, 570 (Minn. App. 2013). First, we review
de novo whether the district court treated the parties’ supporting documents “properly.”

2 To determine the needs and best interests of the child, the agency must consider various
factors, including: (1) the child’s current functioning and behaviors; (2) the medical needs
of the child; (3) the educational needs of the child; (4) the developmental needs of the child;
(5) the child’s history and past experience; (6) the child’s religious and cultural needs;
(7) the child’s connection with a community, school, and faith community; (8) the child’s
interests and talents; (9) the child’s relationship to current caretakers, parents, siblings, and
relatives; (10) the reasonable preference of the child, if the court, or the child -placing
agency in the case of a voluntary placement, deems the child to be of suffi cient age to
express preferences. Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(b).

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Id. (citing Boland v. Murtha, 800 N.W.2d 179, 185 (Minn. App. 2011)). Second, we review
the district court’s determination that the movant failed to make a prima facie showing for
an abuse of discretion. Id. And third, we review de novo the district court’s denial of an
evidentiary hearing. Id. (noting that failure to make prima facie showing is dispositive of
need for evidentiary hearing). We consider each step in turn.
A. The district court erred by failing to properly consider C.W.’s motion
and supporting documents.
C.W. argues that the district court improperly weighed evidence against her motion
and supporting documents, namely that it did not accept the facts alleged and considered
the consent-to-adopt agreements against the children’ best interests and against allegations
that MNPrairie acted unreasonably. We agree.
“A motion for adoptive placement is analogous to a motion to modify custody.”
L.L.P., 836 N.W.2d at 570. In the custody-modification context, we have stated that: “At
the prima-facie-case stage of the proceeding, [the movant] need not establish anything.
[The movant] need only make allegations which, if true, would allow the district court to
grant the relief [the movant] seeks.” Amarreh v. Amarreh, 918 N.W.2d 228, 231 (Minn.
App. 2018), review denied (Minn. Oct. 24, 2018); see Tousignant v. St. Louis County, 615
N.W.2d 53, 59 (Minn. 2000) (stating that prima facie case is “one that prevails in the
absence of evidence invalidating it .” (quotation omitted)). Because, at the prima -facie-
case stage of the proceeding, the district court must accep t the moving party’s allegations
as true, the district court may only consider a nonmovant’s documents to the extent they
explain or provide context to the movant’s allegations. L.L.P., 836 N.W.2d at 570.

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On the first step, C.W. alleges facts in her motion and supporting documents that, if
true, could show that MNPrairie acted unreasonably in denying her requested placement.
These facts predate the consent -to-adopt agreements. 3 Specifically, C.W. asserts that ,
before contacting her about the possibility of being a placement for the children, MNPrairie
waited nearly six months after the children were removed and four months after A.L.’s
paternal grandmother told MNPrairie of C.W.’s interest in being a placement option. C.W.
also states that MNPrairie fa iled to keep her informed of the status of the placement
proceedings, never sent her an initial relative-search notification, delayed her foster home
study and adoption home study, and failed to timely inform the putative father that C.W.’s
foster-care home study was pending. The result, according to C.W., was that the putative
father executed the consent -to-adopt agreements without knowing the status of C.W.’s
attempts to become a placement for the children. Indeed, C.W. supplemented her affidavit
with one of two letters that M. T.L. wrote to the district court stating that he did not make
an informed decision to sign the consent-to-adopt agreements. The district court, however,
stated: “To say [C.W.] was excluded from considerati on by MNPrairie is not true.” We
believe that the district court accurately summarized C.W.’s allegations as asserting that
MNPrairie functionally excluded her from consideration. But by rejecting that assertion,
the district court failed to assume that C.W.’s allegations wer e true as is required by
caselaw.

3 MNPrairie conceded at oral argument that its actions before the execution of the consent-
to-adopt agreements are part of the record and relevant to the question of whether it was
reasonable in its efforts to place the children. We agree.

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Additionally, the district court ’s order relies primarily on the consent -to-adopt
agreements as not just evidence of, but as dispositive of the fact that MNPrairie did not act
unreasonably in failing to make C.W.’s request ed placement. But because, at the prima -
facie-case-stage of the proceeding, the district court assumes the movant’s allegations are
true, it does not weigh evidence. The district court can, however, consider the procedural
history of a case to provide context for the movant’s allegations. See L.L.P., 836 N.W.2d
at 570 (stating that district court can consider nonmovant’s documents for context).
MNPrairie counters that the district court properly considered the consent -to-adopt
agreements under In re Welfare of the Children of J.L.G ., 924 N.W.2d 9, 15 (Minn. App.
2018), review denied (Minn. July 16, 2019) . But J.L.G. involved a qualitatively distinct
set of facts and legal question in which the district court relied on an implied finding from
a prior TPR order to determine that a relative had been “ruled out” as a suitable permanency
resource under Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 2(5). Id. (reversing and remanding to
reconsider whether relative made prima facie showing that county acted unreasonably
because district court erroneously relied on implicit finding of ineligibility from prior
order). Here, the district court did not determine that C.W. was “ruled out” as a suitable
permanency resource for the children and MNPrairie makes no argument that C.W. is not
a suitable permanency resource. Under J.L.G., any such finding would need to be an
explicit finding. Id. To the extent that J.L.G.’s limited holding applies, it suggests that the
district court may not rely on implicit findings from prior orders to avoid addressing
whether the movant has made a prima facie showing of unreasonableness. Id. It does not

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support the proposition that a district court may weigh a consent -to-adopt agreement as
wholly dispositive or even contrary to the movant’s motion and supporting documents.
C.W. also alleged facts that it is in the children’s best interests to live with a family
member who can impart their African -American culture and tradition and that living in
Owatonna, a predominantly White community in which the children have already
experienced racial prejudice, is not in the children’ s best interests. C.W. states that her
home would provide a culturally and racial ly diverse community, surrounded by family
members who can help the children navigate the racial prejudice that Black people
experience. C.W. argues that the children are already beginning to display worry and feel
abandoned by their biological relatives. C.W. also alleged that it is in the children’ s best
interests to have their medical needs, educational opportunities, and connection to faith met
through her care. “The paramount consideration in all juvenile protection proceedings is
the health, safety, and best interest” of the children, Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subd. 2(a).
The district court did not address those considerations when it employed conclusory
language and stated: “It would have been unreasonable for MNPrairie to make a different
adoptive placement with [C.W.] than that agreed upon by the natural parents.” In making
this conclusion, the district court erred both by failing to accept C.W.’s allegations and
supporting documents as true and by weighing the consent-to-adopt agreements against the
best interests of the children.

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B. The district court abused its discretion by concluding that C.W. failed
to make a prima facie showing that MNPrairie acted unreasonably by
not making her requested placement.
C.W. argues that the district court abused its discretion because it failed to consider
that MNPrairie did not (1) involve and assess her as the children’s relative for placement;
(2) fulfill its duty to make an individualized determination of the most suitable placement
options for the children; and (3) pursue adoptive placement for the children in “another”
home after six months and instead relied on the consent-to-adopt agreements as dispositive.
We agree.
We review the district court’s determination that the movant failed to make a prima
facie showing that the county was unreasonable by not making the requested placement for
an abuse of discretion. L.L.P., 836 N.W.2d at 570. A district court abuses its discretion if
it makes findings of fact not supported by the record, improperly applies the law, or
otherwise resolves the discretionary question in a manner that is contrary to logic and facts
on the record. Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997). Because the district
court does not make findings of fact at the prima facie inquiry, the “facts” are those that
C.W. alleges. See L.L.P., 836 N.W.2d at 570-71 (stating that district court must accept
petitioner’s allegations as true).
First, chapter 260C is designed to prioritize relative adoption and imposes statutory-
notice requirements for relatives when the district court assesses the progress the
responsible social -services agency makes toward the child’s permanency. Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.607, subd. 2(5); see also J.L.G., 924 N.W.2d at 13. Additionally, the responsible
social-services agency has a duty to identify, notify, and consider relatives of the children

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as a placement “without delay.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.221(a). C.W.’s allegations of
MNPrairie’s delays in dealing with her, and MNPriarie’s failure to give her timely
information about the proceedings, amount to an assertion that MNPrairie failed to satisfy
its obligations under these provisions.
Second, C.W. also asserts that MNPrairie did not make an individualized
assessment of the children’s needs and best -interests under section 260C.212 and that its
conclusory analysis excluded her as a potential placement for the children despite its
awareness of her pending foster -care home study. Section 260C.212, subdivision 2(a) ,
provides, “The policy of the state of Minnesota is to ensure that the child ’s best interests
are met by requiring an individualized determination of the needs of the child and of how
the selected placement will serve the needs of the child being placed.” Thus, C.W.’s
motion and supporting documents assert that MNPrairie also failed to satisfy its duties
under these provisions.
Third, C.W. argues that the district court misapplied the law and misinterpreted the
consent-to-adopt agreements, both of which she argues require the agency to consi der
“another” adoptive place ment for the children after six months if the adoption is not
finalized. We review the district court’s application of the law de novo. In re Welfare of
Children of M.A.H. , 839 N.W.2d 730, 746 (Minn. App. 2013). Minn. Stat. § 260C.515,
subd. 3(7) provides:
[I]f an adoption is not finalized by the identified
prospective adoptive parent within six months of the execution
of the consent to adopt under this clause, the responsible social
services agency shall pursue adoptive placemen t in another
home unless the court finds in a hearing under section

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260C.317 that the failure to finalize is not due to either an
action or a failure to act by the prospective adoptive parent.
(Emphasis added.) The plain language of the statute requires the district court to find that
failure to finalize adoption is not due to the foster parents, if the agency has not finalized
the adoption after six months. MNPrairie concedes that no such finding occurred here after
six months or even at the postpermanency review hearing on June 17, 2020 . And
MNPrairie also concedes that section 260C.515 applies when it discusses the implications
of a consent-to-adopt agreement that is “properly executed under §260C.515[,] subd . 3.”
MNPrairie argues that Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd.7, limits those who may “qualify” for
adoptive placement in this case to the foster parents. Section 260C.607 , subdivision 7 ,
provides:
When the child’ s parent has consented to adoption
under section 260C.515, subdivision 3 , only the person
identified by the parent and agreed to by the agency as the
prospective adoptive parent qualifies for adoptive placement of
the child until the responsible social ser vices agency has
reported to the court and the court has found in a hearing under
this section that it is not possible to finalize an adoption by the
identified prospective adoptive parent within 12 months of the
execution of the consent to adopt under sec tion 260C.515,
subdivision 3, unless the responsible social services agency
certifies that the failure to finalize is not due to either an action
or a failure to act by the prospective adoptive parent.
Because section 260C.607 , subdivision 7 , incorporates by reference section
260C.515, subdivision 3, we must read the statutes to give effect to both. Minn. Stat.
§ 645.26, subd. 1 (2020) (“ When a general provision in a law is in conflict with a special
provision in the same or another law, the two shall be c onstrued, if possible, so that effect
may be given to both.”). Reading the two statutes together to give effect to each imposes

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two duties on MNPrairie. First, under the more general provision of section 260C.515,
subdivision 3, if MNPrairie has not finalized the adoption with the foster parents within six
months, it must pursue adopt ive placement with “another ” home unless the district court
finds that the delay is not attributable to the foster parents. Second, under the more specific
provision to change the adoptive plan under section 260C.607, subdivision 3, MNPrairie
also has a duty to certify that any delay is not attributable to the foster parents anytime
within 12 months from the date the consent-to-adopt agreements are executed. Accepting
that only the foster parents “qualify” as adoptive placements for 12 months after execution
of the consent -to-adopt agreements under section 260C.607 does not eliminate the
MNPrairie’s first duty under section 260C.515, subdivision 3 , to “pursue adoptive
placement in another home.”
Because MNPrairie nevertheless had the duty to pursue adoptive placement with
“another home,” and the consent -to-adopt agreements make clear that “family will be
considered first for a proposed adoptive family” if the adoption is not finalized within six
months, the district court erred by not analyzing whether MNPrairie acted unreasonably in
its duty to pursue another adoptive placement with C.W. after six months or any time before
the consent-to-adopt agreements were executed. Additionally, the district court misapplied
the law when it applied the incorrect chapter, Minn. Stat. § 259 (2020), rather than
interpreting and applying chapter 260C.
Because the district court’s determination that CW failed to make a prima facie case
that MNPrairie acted unreasonably in denying her requested adoptive placement was based
on its misapprehension of the law, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion.

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And because the first two steps of our review are dispositive of whether an eviden tiary
hearing is warranted, we reverse and remand to the district court with instructions to hold
an evidentiary hearing on C.W.’s motion for adoptive placement. Minn. Stat. § 260C.607,
subd. 6(c) (“If the court determines a prima facie basis is made, the court shall set the matter
for evidentiary hearing.”).4
II. The district court erred by concluding that C.W. failed to timely file the
approved adoption home study with the motion for adoptive placement.
C.W. argues that the district court “abused its discretion ” by concluding that her
motion for adoptive placement failed to meet the procedural requirements under Minn.
Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 6 (2020). We are persuaded that the district court erred.
As an initial matter, we note that the district court did not dismiss C.W.’s motion on
this ground, but rather denied it on the merits. It nevertheless concluded that C.W. failed
to meet the procedural requirements when she did not file the approved adoption home
study with her motion. This presents a question of statutory interpretation.
Statutory interpretation is a question of law which we review de novo. In re
Application of J.M.M., 890 N.W.2d 750, 753 (Minn. App. 2017) (J.M.M. I). “The goal of
statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intention of the legislature.” Id. We first ask
“whether the statute’s language, on its face, is clear or ambiguous.” In re Application of
J.M.M, 937 N.W.2d 743, 747 (Minn. 2020) ( J.M.M. II). When interpreting a statute, we
give words and phrases their plain and ordinary meaning. Id.

4 We express no opinion on the merits or outcome of the evidentiary hearing.

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Section 260C.607 allows an out -of-state relative to file a motion for an order for
adoptive placement of the children “any time after the district court order s the child under
the guardianship of the commissioner of human services, but not later than 30 days after
receiving notice” that the agency has made an adoptive placement. Minn. Stat. § 260C.607,
subd. 6(a). An out -of-state relative who “has an approved adoption home study . . . and
the study is filed with the motion for adoptive placement” may move for adoptive
placement of the children. Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 6(a)(2) (emphasis added).
C.W. argues that the plain meaning of the word “with” in se ction 260C.607,
subdivision 6, does not require the adoption home study and motion be filed simultaneously
or together. We are not persuaded. C.W. focuses on a dictionary definition which defines
“with” as “used as a function word to indicate a close ass ociation in time.” Merriam-
Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1438 (11th ed. 2014). That same source provides another
definition: “used as a function word to indicate combination, accompaniment, presence, or
addition,” for example, “went there with her.” Id. This last example is closest to the statute
as it requires the relative to complete an action (file a motion) accompanied by a nother
component (an approved adoption home study). See also The American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language 1989 (5th ed. 2011) (defining “with” as
“accompanying”). The plain language of the statute, thus, unambiguously requires the
approved adoption home study accompany the motion when filed.
C.W. contends next that the district court abused its discretion because courts must
construe juvenile protection proceeding laws liberally to accomplish the enumerated
purposes of chapter 260C. Although we disagree about the standard of review, we agree

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with C.W.’s ultimate conclusion. We review the district court’s applicati on of the law de
novo. M.A.H., 839 N.W.2d 730, 746 . “The laws relating to the juvenile protection
proceedings shall be liberally construed to carry out [the] purposes” of chapter 260C.
Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subd. 4 (2020) (emphasis added). “Adoption statutes are to be
liberally construed to accomplish their purpose, and there need not be more than a
substantial compliance with their requirements.” In re Jordet, 80 N.W.2d 642, 646 (1957)
(interpreting similar liberal construction language in different adoption context). One of
the enumerated purposes of chapter 260C is to “preserve and strengthen the child’s family
ties whenever possible.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subd. 2(b)(3).
The circumstances here show that (1) C.W. made every effort to timely s ubmit the
approved adoption home study; (2) the Virginia ICPC office completed the approved
adoption home study on Sunday, August 2, 2020; (3) by August 4, the Virginia ICPC office
confirmed with C.W. that it had sent the home study to the Minnesota ICPC o ffice;
(4) C.W. requested the home study from the Minnesota ICPC office on August 4; (5) when
C.W. did not receive the home study by August 5, she filed her motion for adoptive
placement with an affidavit and emails detailing these efforts; and (6) she rec eived the
home study from the Minnesota ICPC office the following morning and immediately filed
it. Contrary to the guardian ad litem’s assertion, these circumstances are materially
different from this court’s unpublished opinion in which no adoption home study had ever
been received, approved, or even completed. In re Welfare of Children of: D.K., No. A18-
1195, 2018 WL 6596275 at *3 (Minn. App. Dec. 17, 2019), review denied (Minn. Jan. 16,
2019). Based on these circumstances, our requirement to construe the laws liberally to

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“preserve and strengthen family ties whenever possible,” Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subd.
2(b)(3), and the fact that MNPrairie and the children were not prejudiced by the mere hours
delay, we cannot accept the district court’s conclusion as an alternative basis for dismissal.
Accordingly, the district court erred by concluding that C.W. did not timely file her
approved adoption home study with her motion for adoptive placement.
III. C.W.’s motion to strike parts of the guardian ad litem’s brief is denied as moot.
C.W. moved to strike portions of the guardian ad litem’s brief that included
information outside of the record . C.W. is correct that we may not base our decision on
the information outside the record that the guardian ad litem provided. Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 110.01 (stating that record on appeal is limited to “documents filed in the trial court, the
exhibits, and the transc ript of the proceedings, if any.”). Nevertheless, because we have
decided this matter solely on the record properly before us, we deny C.W.’s motion as
moot. See Drewitz v. Motorwerks, Inc., 728 N.W.2d 231, 233 n.2 (Minn. 2007) (denying
motion to strike as moot because supreme court did not rely on challenged material).
Reversed and remanded; motion denied.