In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: A. H.-N. and L. V., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1431

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: A. H.-N. and L. V., Parents.

Filed May 24, 2021
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Kandiyohi County District Court
File No. 34-JV-20-169

John E. Mack, New London Law, PA, New London, Minnesota (for appellant mother
A. H.-N.)

Shane D. Baker, Kandiyohi County Attorney, Willmar, Minnesota (for respondent
Kandiyohi County Health and Human Services)

John Mueller, Litchfield, Minnesota (for father L.V.)

Janelle Schmoll, Lake Lillian, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant-mother argues that the district court abused its discretion in terminating
her parental rights because the record does not support its determinations that (1) she is a
palpably unfit parent ; (2) the county made reasonable efforts to reunify the family ;
(3) termination is in child 1’s best interest ; and (4) it could take judicial notice of factual
findings from a related child-in-need-of-protection-or-services (CHIPS) case. We affirm.
2
FACTS
Appellant A.H. -N. (mother) gave birth to M.L.A.H. (child 1) in 2018, and to
C.J.L.A.H. (child 2) in 2019. As mother was not married at the time child 2 was born, she
had sole legal custody and sole physical custody of child 2. See Minn. Stat. § 257.541
(2020) (addressing custody of child born to mother not married when child born or
conceived). But L.V., child 1’s father, shared join t legal custody of child 1 while mother
had sole physical custody of child 1.
Respondent Kandiyohi County Health and Human Services (the county) first
became involved with mother on August 28, 2019 , when it received a child -maltreatment
report that child 1 had second-degree burns on the child’s foot, hand, and thigh ( the burn
incident). Mother stated that child 1 had climbed up a chair onto the stove w hile mother
was not watching. Reviewing prior medical visits, social worker 1 noted mother visited
the hospital when child 1 drank “vape juice” (April 25, 2019),1 fell off the bed resulting in
face injuries (July 25, 2019), and fell down the stairs just days before the burn incident.
The following day, the county investigated mother’s home, noting concerns that it was not
baby proofed, had two to three totes stacked throughout the house, smelled of urine, that
the stove burner knobs easily turn, and that mother did not maintain a healthy or consistent
schedule for the children. The county recommended ongoing child-protective services and
setting up a safety meeting to work with mother on the concerns.

1 The medical record states that mother explained that “vape juice” is a “juice flavoured
concentrated nicotine solution.”
3
On November 5, 2019, the county removed the children from mother’s care after
child 2 had been hospitalized twice for failure to thrive; the second time, t he medical
provider reported failure to thrive from parental neglect: “My concern is this baby is
intentionally not being fed the appropriate amount of formula and he is not gaining weight
(the failure-to-thrive incidents). He is being neglected and the l ack of nutrition will have
serious effects on his brain development, growth and psychological well -being.” During
each hospitalization, child 2 gained weight. The county placed Child 2 in a nonrelative
foster home and placed child 1 out-of-state with L.V.
On August 7, 2020, the county filed a petition to terminate parental rights (TPR) of
mother to her children, asserting that (1) mother abandoned the children; (2) mother failed
to satisfy her parental duties ; and (3) reasonable efforts failed to correct the concerns
leading to the out -of-home placements. The petition also asserted that the county made
reasonable efforts to reunite the family and that termination was in the chi ldren’s best
interests. Mother entered denial of the petition on September 1, 2020. On October 13,
2020, the county amended its petition, adding a claim under Minn. Stat. §260C.301, subd.
1(b)(4) (2020), that mother is a palpably unfit parent.
The district court held a bench trial on the petition on October 14, 2020, at which
mother, L.V., three social workers, the guardian ad litem, mother’s marriage and family
therapist, a family development specialist, a police officer, and an Adult Rehabilitative
Mental Health Services (ARMHS) worker testified. On October 29, 2020, the district court
terminated mother’s parental rights to the children based on its finding that she is palpably
unfit to parent the children, that reasonable efforts failed to correct th e conditions leading
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to the children’s placements, that the county made reasonable efforts to reunite the family,
and that termination is in the children’s best interest. The district court dismissed the other
two statutory grounds. This appeal follows.2
DECISION
“We affirm the district court’s termination of parental rights when at least one
statutory ground for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence and
termination is in the best interests of the child, provided that the c ounty has made
reasonable efforts to reunite the family.” In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d
381, 385 (Minn. 2008) . We give “considerable deference” to the district court’s TPR
decision but must still “closely inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence to determine
whether the evidence was clear and convincing.” In re Welfare of K.L.W. , 924 N.W.2d
649, 653 (Minn. App. 2019), review denied (Minn. Mar. 8, 2019). When reviewing a
district court’s TPR decision, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error
but review “its determination of whether a particular statutory basis for involuntarily
terminating parental rights is present for an abuse of discretion.” In re Welfare of Children
of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. Ap p. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012).
“A finding is clearly erroneous if it is either manifestly contrary to the weight of the
evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Children of T.R.,
750 N.W.2d 656, 660–61 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).

2 L.V., who was granted sole legal custody and physical custody of child 1, takes n o part
in this appeal.
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I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that mother is
palpably unfit to parent.
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that she is
palpably unfit to be a party to the parent -child relationship because (1) it relied on her
mental-health issues not related to the parent -child relationship and (2) its underlying
findings of fact are clearly erroneous. We disagree.
Under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4), the county can prove a ground for
termination by clear and convincing evidence if:
[The] parent is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and
child relationship because of a consistent pattern of specific
conduct before the child or of specific conditions directly
relating to the parent and child relationship either of which are
determined by the court to be of a duration or nature that
renders the parent unable, for the reasonably foreseeable
future, to care appropriately for the ongoing physical, mental,
or emotional needs of the child.”

To show palpable unfitness, the party seeking termination must “prove a consistent
pattern of specific conduct or specific conditions existing at the time of the hearing that, it
appears, will continue for a prolonged, indefinite period and that are permanently
detrimental to the welfare of the child.” T.R., 750 N.W.2d at 661. But conditions relating
solely to the parent such as mental illness, substance abuse, or sexual misconduct do not,
by themselves, result in “palpable unfitness.” Id. at 662. Rather, there must be a “causal
connection” between the condition and the parent’s inability to care for the child. Id.
The district court found that mother’s failure to address her own mental-health needs
and substance use prevent s her from meeting the children ’s needs for the foreseeable
future. The record supports this finding. Social worker 1 testified that , early in her
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investigation, she was concerned that mother did not provide a consistent schedule for the
children; mother admitted she and the children would fall asleep between 10 p .m. and
midnight, waking up around 11:30 a .m. The social worker testified that the schedule is
“concerning for [child 1’s] long term well-being.” This is causally connected to the district
court’s finding that mother’s mental-health symptoms include lack of motivation, fatigue,
and inconsistent sleeping patterns that prevent her from adequately caring for her children.
Mother’s cannabis use contribute d to her inability to keep a schedule, meaningfully
progress in the case plan, and consistently attend appointments. Social worker 3 testified
that mother’s “inconsistency over a long period of time shows that she’s unable to meet
her own needs and she would struggle to meet her children’s.” The record shows that
mother has tested positive for cannabinoids from May to September 2020 and that she
failed to provide urin alysis samples several times. The guardian ad litem testified that
mother “has consistently tested positive for [cannabinoids], and [her] behaviors do not
demonstrate she can saf ely assume the parental role.” In discussing contacts with t he
therapy, visitation, and ARHMS appointments, mother concedes that “[v]irtually all of
these contacts have been inconsistent. She often has been late to these sess ions, but has
attended them.” On this record, the district court did not err by finding th at mother’s
chemical use is causally connected to her palpable unfitness.
Next, mother appears to argue that the district court clearly erred in its underlying
factual findings regarding (1) inconsistent visitations; (2) the burn incident ; (3) a feeding
log; (4) her unemployment; (5) her positive urinalyses; (6) child 2’s failure to thrive ; and
(7) her unsafe parenting. The district court here found that:
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• [Mother] has not shown a desire to maintain a
relationship with the children.
• She has shown a lack of motivation and commitment
with working the case plan and addressing her mental
health needs.
• She has prioritized codependent, unhealthy, and abusive
relationships versus focusing on her parenting skills,
child development education, and attachment with [ the
children].
• [Mother] has been inconsistent following the visitation
plan.
• Her lack [of] safe parental supervision resulted in [child
1] suffering hospitalization for burns, and due to her
lack of parenting skills, [child 2] was diagnosed as
failure to thrive.
• [Mother] has been unable to complete a feeding log for
her children’s health and nutrition
• [Mother] has not established an independent, safe, and
stable home.
• [Mother] has not gained employment to financially
provide for the children’s needs.
• [Mother] has consistently tested positive for THC.
• [Mother’s] behaviors do not demonstrate t hat she can
safely assume the parenting role for [the children].
First, mother acknowledges that she missed some visitations but argues that “[m]ost
of them were accompanied by legitimate reasons.” The guardian ad litem testified that her
visitations were inconsistent, and the family development specialist testified that mother
was “late a lot” and cancelled 11 visits.
Second, without citation to law, mother suggests that , because the burn incident
occurred before the county became involved, the district c ourt should not consider it.
Mother provided direct testimony on the burn incident and the other hospital visits at trial,
all of which are relevant to whether she is palpably unfit. Nothing in our law requires the
district court to turn a blind eye to negligent or intentional acts that result in harm to a child
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before the county is involved , especially when one of the asserted bases for termination
includes a pattern of conduct by the parent.
Third, she argues that “not keeping [a feeding log] did not deprive her children of
food.” Instead of focusing on the opportunity to show her commitment to feed adequately
her three-month old child, mother argues her failure “merely frustrated the social workers.”
Contrary to mother’s characterization, those soci al workers were concerned by child 2’s
two hospitalizations for failure to thrive and the doctor’s assessment during the second
hospitalization that she was concerned the child “is intentionally not being fed the
appropriate amount.”
Fourth, social worker 2 explained to mother that she should first establish therapies,
parenting skills, and her mental -health services before seeking employment that would
accommodate her availability. But as discussed below, mother did not mak e sufficient
progress to begin seeking employment.
Fifth, the record shows that mother tested negative for cannabinoids in September .
But that does not render clearly erroneous the district court’s finding that she “consistently
tested positive” for cannabinoids before September and failed to provide a urinalysis on
two dates in May and again in June . We also note that mother’s first negative urinalysis
occurred a month before her parental rights were terminated, after she had a year to
demonstrate sobriety.
Sixth, mother argues that she never had an opportunity to show she can take care of
child 2. But that ignores that mother received specific instructions to feed child 2 after the
9
first hospitalization, and she nevertheless failed to provide the necessary care, which
resulted in a second hospitalization.
Seventh, on unsafe parenting, mother argues that the burn incident and failure to
thrive are only two incidents that harmed the children. But mother ignores her own trial
testimony admitting she took chi ld 1 to the hospital after he fell from the bed, fell down
the stairs, and drank “vape juice.” These are at least five examples in which the children
were taken to the hospital under her care. For these reasons, we are not persuaded that the
district court clearly erred in its factual findings relevant to mother’s palpable unfitness.
Lastly, mother appears to suggest that the district court’s dismissal of the other two
statutory grounds is inconsistent with and exclusive of its finding that she is palpably unfit.
But because mother does not provide any legal support for this argument, we conclude that
she has forfeited that argument. See State, Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers,
Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997) (declining to address issue absent adequate
briefing); In re Welfare of Children of J.B., 698 N.W.2d 160, 166 (Minn. App. 2005) (citing
this aspect of Wintz in TPR appeal).
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the county
made reasonable efforts.
Mother appears to argue that the district court abused its discretion by determining
that the county made reasonable efforts because the county (1) made no effort to offer
mother treatment for marijuana use and (2) had an obligation to help her find employment
or other sources of income, which it did not satisfy. We are not persuaded.
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We review a district court’s decision that the county made reasonable efforts to
reunite the family for an abuse of d iscretion. See In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D. , 865
N.W.2d 315, 323 (Minn. App. 2015), review denied (Minn. July 20, 2015). When a child
is removed from the family home, the county must, generally, make “reasonable efforts”
to reunify the parent(s) and child. Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (2020). In determining whether
the county made “reasonable efforts ,” the district court considers whether the services
were: (1) relevant to the safety and protection of the child; (2) adequate to meet the needs
of the child and family; (3) culturally appropriate; (4) available and accessible;
(5) consistent and timely; and (6) realistic under the circumstances. Minn. Stat.
§ 260.012(h) (2020). “The county’s efforts must assist in alleviating the conditions that
gave rise to the dependency determination.” In re Welfare of H.K., 455 N.W.2d 529, 532
(Minn. App. 1990), review denied (Minn. July 6, 1990). “Whether the county has met its
duty of reasonable efforts requir es consideration of the length of time the county was
involved and the quality of the effort given.” Id. The district court must make
“individualized and explicit findings regarding the nature and extent ” of the county’s
efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8(1)
(2020). We review those specific findings for clear error. D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d at 321.
Here, the district court found that the county referred mother for a chemical -use
assessment, individual therapy, and drug testing among other reasonable efforts to reunify
her with the children. The record supports these findings . It also supports the district
court’s finding that mother was inconsistent in her appointments. Social worker 2 testified
that, over the course of nearly a year, the county offered mother individual therapy through
11
several providers. She missed the first session, arrived an hour and a half late for the second
session, and attended two more before her insurance expired. Social worker 3 testified that
the county offered mother transportation to appointments and visitation.
We also note that during the psychological and parenting assessments on January
15 and 27, 2020, mother did not disclose her cannabis use to the psychologist and drug
counselor. Mother merely stated that she had used marijuana twice with her mother three
years ago, but that she had not done so recently. Based on mother’s failure to disclose her
cannabis use, it is reasonable that the assessment did not recommend chemical-dependency
treatment or testing. As the record reflects, the county provided drug testing from March
through September 2020. Social worker 2 testified that after mother tested positive for
THC, the county referred mother for a chemical-use assessment which recommended no
treatment at the time. The district court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion by finding
that the county made reasonable efforts to address mother’s marijuana use.
Mother’s argument that the county had a duty to help mother obtain employment or
some other source of income is flawed as a matter of law and fact. First, it misunderstands
the only statutory ground on which the district court granted the TPR: palpable unfitness.
The district court relied prima rily on mother’s inability to respond to the safety and well -
being of the children as demonstrated by the numerous hospital visits , and the record
contains no indication that mother’s inability to respond to the safety and well-being of the
children was related to her lack of a job. The county therefore did not have a duty to find
her employment as that was not the principal concern underlying the petition. It is true that
the case plan asked mother to obtain stable employment . But social worker 2 explai ned
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that the county wanted her to “get established in her therapies and her parenting skills and
all her mental health services before she would seek employment because we just didn’t
know what her availability would be.” Mother testified she understood this. Additionally,
the county provided alternative means of support by referring WIC for the children and
offering transportation assistance to the services. On this record, we are not convinced that
the county owed mother an absolute duty to help her fi nd employment or that it failed to
satisfy its obligations to provide her support. Nor has mother shown that, if the county did
help her find a job, this would have addressed the principal concerns underlying the
petition.
III. Mother forfeited her argument th at the district court abused its discretion by
determining that the TPR is in child 1’s best interest.
Mother makes a conclusory argument that the district court abused its discretion by
finding that the TPR is in child 1’s best interest .3 But mother identifies neither a specific
error in the district court’s best-interest factors nor any other abuse of discretion in the
district court’s best-interests analysis. Because we cannot discern mother’s argument, and
because she provides no legal sup port for any alleged error , we conclude that she has
forfeited the argument. See J.B., 698 N.W.2d at 166.
IV. The district court did not abuse its discretion by taking judicial notice of
findings from the parallel CHIPS case.
Mother argues that the district c ourt abused its discretion by taking judicial notice
of certain facts from a CHIPS order because that CHIPS proceeding has not been formally

3 Mother makes no argument as to child 2.
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closed. This argument fails because (1) mother did not preserve the appeal in a posttrial
motion and (2) mother has not shown prejudice resulting from the alleged evidentiary error.
We review a district court’s evidentiary decision to take judicial notice for an abuse
of discretion. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Mitchell, 862 N.W.2d 67, 71 (Minn. App.
2015) (“A district court’s decision whether to take judicial notice of proffered facts is an
evidentiary ruling that we review only for abuse of discretion.”), review denied (Minn. June
30, 2015). Under the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure , a district court
may take judicial notice as allowed by the rules of evidence. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 3.02,
subd. 3. In addition, the district court “upon its own motion . . . , may take judicial notice
only of findings of fact and court orders . . . in any other proceeding in any other court file
involving the child or the child ’s parent.” Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 3.02, subd. 3 (emphasis
added). Consistent with rule 3.02, this court has recognized that a district court may take
judicial notice of “court records and files from prior adjudicative proceedings.” See In re
Welfare of D.J.N., 568 N.W.2d 170, 174 (Minn. App. 1997).
As an initial matter, appellant has not preserved this issue for appeal. Generally, a
party must assign error to an evidentiary ruling, like the decision to take judicial notice, in
a motion for a new trial or amended findings to preserve the issue for appellate review.
Cont’l Retail, LLC v. County of Hennepin , 801 N.W.2d 395, 399 (Minn. 2011) ; In re
Welfare of D.N. , 523 N.W.2d 11, 13 (Minn. App. 1994) (applying this rule to juvenile
cases), review denied (Minn. Nov. 29, 1994). The purpose for requiring such a question to
be raised in a motion for a new trial or amended findings is that it “gives the [district] court
time to consider the context of the object ion and the effect the error may have had on the
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outcome of the case. This permits the [district] court to more fully develop the record for
appellate review or to correct its own mistake and alleviate the need for appellate review.”
Jacobson v. $55,900 in U.S. Currency , 728 N.W.2d 510, 524 (Minn. 2007) (considering
objections to issues that arose during trial) (quotation omitted). Mother did not move for
a new trial or for amended findings, and as such, she has not preserved t he alleged error
for appeal.4
Even if mother had sufficiently preserved the issue, her argument would fail because
she has not identified any prejudice. Appellant bears the burden of showing that the district
court abused its discretion in its evidentiary ruling resulting in prejudicial error. In re
Welfare of Child. of J.B., 698 N.W.2d 160, 172 (Minn. App. 2005). “An evidentiary error
is prejudicial if the error might reasonably have changed the result of the trial.” Cloverdale
Foods of Minn., Inc. v. Pioneer Snacks , 580 N.W.2d 46, 51 (Minn. App.1998). Without
identifying any specific findings that were prejudicial, mother merely states that the
“judicially noticed findings were critical to the District Court’s ultimate determination.
They cover pages four through 11 in the District Court’s order and constitute the basis for

4 During the trial, t he district court put counsel on notice that it would be taking judicial
notice of various aspects of the CHIPS file when it said “I’m wondering why we’re
focusing so much on the CHIPS facts when we have very limited time to use for trial. Is
there a way where I could take judicial notice of findings of fact that I’ve already found in
another proceeding?” Counsel for the county responded , “I just wanted this evidence
because [mother] has been questioning the failure to thrive diagnosis recently.” At the
conclusion of the mother’s testimony, the district court then stated “I’m also making a
record of that I’m going to be taking judicial notice of all the Findings of Fact in the CHIPS
case and I will cut and paste those findings directly into my order from this—this trial, and
it’ll be—I’ll identify it all those findings very obviously so that you know where they’ve
come from.” Mother made no objection at that time. Nor did mother raise the question in
a posttrial motion.
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its ultimate determination.” Mother fails to address the fact that, even if the district court
had not taken the contested judicial notice, most, if not all, of those findings could have
been independently based on testimony presented at trial, including her own. Specifically,
mother testified about the main safety concerns, including the hospital visits that resulted
in the CHIPS petition. Mother also had an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who
testified about her inability to keep appointments, lack of progress in parenting skills, and
safety concerns for the children. As such, mother has not met her burden to show prejudice.
See In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T. , 814 N.W.2d 76, 93 (Minn. App. 2012) (stating that
“[a]n evidentiary error i s not prejudicial if the record contains other evidence that is
sufficient to support the findings ”); see also Waters v. Fiebelkorn , 13 N.W.2d 461, 465
(1944) (noting, generally, that “error without prejudice is not ground for reversal.”).
Affirmed.