L.J.P., Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1433

L.J.P.,
Relator,

vs.

Minnesota Department of Health,
Respondent.

Filed May 24, 2021
Affirmed
Cleary, Judge*

Minnesota Department of Health
Background Study No. 2278064

L.J.P., Pennock, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lindsay K. Strauss, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Cleary,
Judge.

*Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CLEARY, Judge
In this certiorari appeal, relator L.J.P. challenges Minnesota Department of Health’s
(MDH) decision on reconsideration to disqualify her from employment as a healthcare
professional, arguing that she does not “pose a risk of harm” to vulnerable persons. Because
relator has not shown that MDH’s conclusion that she poses a risk of harm was arbitrary ,
capricious, or otherwise erroneous, we affirm.
FACTS
In August 2020, relator received notice that she was disqualified from any
employment that requires licens ure by MDH. The disqualification decision, made by
MDH, stemmed from a background study conducted by the Minnesota Department of
Human Services (DHS) under the Background Studies Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 245C.01-.34
(2020).1 The background study on relator revealed three misdemeanor -theft convictions,
see Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subds. 2(a)(1) (2012), 3(5) (2018), from January 2020, March
2014, and January 2013. As a result, relator was terminated from her position as a certified
medical assistant.
One month later, relator requested reconsideration of MDH’s decision and that the
disqualification be set aside, claiming that she does not pose a risk of harm to patients.

1 MDH contracts wit h DHS to do background studies. MDH then considers requests for
reconsideration with regard to programs licensed by it, and issues the fi nal appealable
agency decision. See Minn. Stat. § 144.057, subds. 2, 3 (2020). The legislature amended
Minn. Stat. § 144.057, subd. 3 in 2019. See 2019 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 9, art. 2,
§ 12, at 44. This amendment, however, does not affect the issues raised in this appeal.
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Upon reconsideration, MDH concluded that relator “failed to show that [she] does not pose
a risk of harm” to patients, denied the request, and declined to set aside the disqualification.
This certiorari appeal followed.
DECISION
Relator argues that MDH’s disqualification decision should have been set aside
because she presents no risk of harm to the patients she cares for in her employment within
the healthcare field. Before turning to relator’s arguments, we first discuss the Background
Studies Act and the legal framework governing MDH’s decision to deny relator’s request
to set aside the disqualification.
Disqualification under the Background Studies Act
Minnesota law requires performance of background studies on certain individuals
seeking employment that requires licensure by MDH or DHS , chiefly in healthcare,
childcare, and related fields. See Minn. Stat. §§ 245C.02, subd. 12 (defining “license”), .03
(specifying individuals to be studied), 245A.032 (explaining who must be licensed) (2020).
When a studied individual has been convicted of certain qualifying criminal offenses, that
individual is per se disqualified from maintaining employment that requires such licensure.
Minn. Stat. §§ 245C.14, subds. 1(1), 2 (explaining when an individual is disqualified from
direct contact with and access to persons receiving services from the license holder ), .15,
subd. 4(a) (providing for a seven-year disqualification for various criminal convictions).

2 The legislature amended section 245A.03 during special sessions in 2019 and 2020. See
2019 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 9, art. 2, § 22 at 47; 2020 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess.
ch. 2, art. 5, § 4 at 81-83. But again, the amendments to this provision have no impact here.
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A disqualified person may seek to have their disqualification set aside by timely
requesting reconsideration. Minn. Stat. § 245C.21, subds. 1, 3. If the studied individual
submits sufficient information to show that they do not pose a risk of harm to the persons
served in the course of their employment, MDH is afforded the discretion to set aside a
disqualification. Minn. Stat. § 245C.22, subd. 4(a). The legislature has enumerated nine
statutory factors to guide this inquiry:
(1) the nature, severity, and consequences of the event or
events that led to the disqualification;
(2) whether there is more than one disqualifying event;
(3) the age and vulnerability of the victim at the time of the
event;
(4) the harm suffered by the victim;
(5) vulnerability of persons served by the program;
(6) the similarity between the victim and persons served by the
program;
(7) the time elapsed without a repeat of the same or similar
event;
(8) documentation of successfu l completion by the individual
studied of training or rehabilitation pertinent to the event; and
(9) any other information relevant to reconsideration.

Id., subd. 4(b). “[A]ny single factor . . . may be determinative of [MDH’s] decision
whether to set aside the individual’s disqualification.” Id., subd. 3.
Standard of Review
We have appellate jurisdiction to review MDH’s decision, which is considered a
“quasi-judicial” decision, through a petition for certiorari. Jackson v. Comm’r of Human
Servs., 933 N. W.2d 408, 413 (Minn. 2019); see Minn. Stat. § 606.01, .06 (2020). We
examine a quasi-judicial decision of this sort to determine whether the agency’s decision
was “arbitrary, oppressive, unreasonable, fraudulent, under an erroneous theory of law, or
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without any evidence to support it.” Jackson, 933 N.W.2d at 413 (quotation omitted). An
agency’s decision will generally be upheld unless shown to be “arbitrary and capricious,”
lacking the support of substantial evidence, or otherwise erroneous. Wilhite v. Scot t Cty.
Hous. & Redevelopment Auth., 759 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn. App. 2009); see also Citizens
Advocating Responsible Dev. v. Kandiyohi Cty . Bd. of Com m’rs, 713 N.W.2d 817, 832
(Minn. 2006) (“Agency decisions are reversed when they reflect an error of law, the
findings are arbitrary and capricious, or the findings are unsupported by substantial
evidence.”).
With this framework in mind, we now turn our attention to relator’s arguments.
Relator’s Risk of Harm
The sole issue in this appeal is whether MDH ’s quasi-judicial determination that
relator poses a risk of harm to patients was arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise erroneous in
terms of the facts or the law. Agency rulings are arbitrary and capricious if the agency:
(a) relied on factors not intended by the legislature; (b) entirely
failed to consider an impor tant aspect of the problem;
(c) offered an explanation that runs counter to the evidence; or
(d) the decision is so implausible that it could not be explained
as a difference in view or the result of the agency’s expertise.

Id. Moreover, substantial evidence supports an agency’s decision “if it is supported by such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the
conclusion.” Minn. Ctr. for Envtl. Advocacy v. Minn. Pollution Control Agency , 644
N.W.2d 457, 468 (Minn. 2002).
Here, MDH determined that relator was disqualified from maintaining her
employment in the healthcare field because of her three misdemeanor -theft convictions.
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See Minn. Stat. § 245C.15, subd. 4(a) (prescribing seven-year disqualification for, among
other crimes, misdemeanor theft in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.52 (2018)). In support of
that decision, MDH considered each of the nine statutory factors and found that they
established that relator poses a risk of harm to patients in her role as a certified medical
assistant. We consider each of the nine factors in turn.
Factor one considers “the nature, severity, and consequences” of the events that led
to relator’s disqualification. Minn. Stat. § 245C.22, subd. 4(b)(1). In denying relator’s set-
aside request, MDH st ated, “In all of your offenses, you stole from retail stores.” Relator
shares in her brief that she understands the nature and impact of her actions, but she does
not directly challenge this factor. MDH reasserts here that the nature and relative recentness
of relator’s offenses amply demonstrates that relator poses a risk of harm to patients
because these circumstances raise concern that she might steal from patients or exercise
poor judgment while patients are in her care.
Because the record confirms that relator has several misdemeanor-theft convictions,
including the third January 2020 conviction , MDH’s concern —that relator’s criminal
conduct exhibits a risk that she might exploit patients or exercise poor judgment while
patients are in her care—is not unreasonable. Thus, given the rational connection between
the facts and the agency’s decision, MDH’s reasoning is neither arbitrary nor capricious
and its determination is supported by substantial evidence. See In re Review of 2005 Annual
Automatic Adjustment of Charges for All Elec. & Gas Utils., 768 N.W.2d 112, 120 (Minn.
2009).
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The second factor re gards the number of disqualifying events underlying MDH’s
decision. See Minn. Stat. § 245C.22, subd. 4(b)(2). MDH found on reconsideration , and
relator concedes here, that she has “a pattern of theft offenses” based on her three theft
convictions. Because even one such conviction is alone disqualifying, there is substantial
evidence supporting MDH’s determination that three theft offenses establish a pattern of
criminality. Minn. Stat. § 245C.15, subd. 4(a). We discern no arbitrary or capricious
decision-making on MDH’s part in relation to the second factor.
Factor three relates to the age and vulnerability of the victims, and factor four
considers any harm they suffered. Minn. Stat. § 245C.22, subd. 4(b)(3), (4). On
reconsideration, MDH acknowledged that relator’s victims were business es that suffered
financial harm because of relator’s theft crimes. And relator again concedes this fact to be
true in her brief. But she urges that she only steals or breaks the law while “high” on drugs
and she insists that she has never harmed or stolen from another person. In response, MDH
argues that relator “seems to minimize her culpability” through her assertion s that her
substance use led to her offenses and that the affected business es were able recoup their
losses at the time of each offense.
Relator’s assertions are unpersuasive because, despite her justificat ion, she has not
shown that MDH’s consideration of the third and fourth factors was arbitrary or capricious
or otherwise unsupported by substantial evidence. See Citizens Advocating Responsible
Dev., 713 N.W.2d at 832.
The fifth factor pertains to the vu lnerability of the persons relator served in the
course of her employment as a certified medical assistant. Minn. Stat. § 245C.22, subd.
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4(b)(5). MDH found , and relator again concedes, that the population she serves in her
employment includes vulnerable pe rsons with cognitive and physical impairments who
rely on professional assistance with daily living activities and, as a result, those persons are
susceptible to theft . MDH stresses in its brief that background studies are designed to
protect vulnerable individuals, which is why the statute requires that “preeminent weight”
be given to the safety of the persons who would be served by relator, see id., subd. 3.
We have held that background studies on Minnesota workers are indeed necessary
to protect the h ealth and safety of vulnerable individuals and therefore this interest is of
“paramount importance.” Obara v. Minn. Dep ’t. of Health, 758 N.W.2d 873, 880 (Minn.
App. 2008) (citing Minn. Stat. § 245C.22, subd. 3; Sweet v. Comm’r of Human Servs., 702
N.W.2d 314, 321 (Minn. App. 2005), review denied (Minn. Nov. 15, 2005)). Once more,
we conclude that MDH’s consideration of factor five was rationally connected to
substantial evidence in the record. See Sweet, 702 N.W.2d at 318 (explaining that an agency
decision is arbitrary and capricious when not rationally connected to the facts). We also
agree with MDH that its decision rested on “its experience and knowledge of the
maltreatment of vulnerable adults ,” and, therefore, MDH properly evaluated the risk of
harm posed by relator’s employment.
The sixth factor focuses on the similarity between the victims of relator’s crimes
and the persons served by relator. Minn. Stat. § 245C.22, subd. 4(6). MDH recognized that
the victims here were businesses, while the persons served by relator are patients with
significant health problems. Despite this dissimilarity, MDH asserts that proper patient care
demands responsibility, “the exercise of sound judgment,” and “wise decision -making
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skills.” Relator’s claim that she has never harmed or stolen from another person is
implicitly related to this factor. So is her insistence that, with continued sobriety, she will
be able to exercise appropriate judgment moving forward and properly care for her patients.
While we do not doubt that relator’s sobriety will lead to better decision -making,
MDH’s disqualification decision is nonetheless based on the record evidence and
persuasively highlights a valid risk of harm relative to relator’s criminal condu ct. In
essence, MDH conveys that relator’s criminal record establishes that she is sometimes
unable to exercise prudent judgment critical for patient care. Though relator’s
shortcomings may largely be tied to substance abuse, the record supports MDH’s informed
conclusion. Relator has not shown that MDH’s consideration of the sixth factor was
arbitrary or capricious or otherwise erroneous.
Factor seven addresses the duration of time since the disqualifying events. Id., subd.
4(b)(7). In addressing this factor, MDH pointed to the length of the disqualification period
designated by statute , which is seven years in this case. Relator points out that she is
currently on unsupervised probation in relation to her January 2020 conviction, which
seems to allude to the fact that her actions were not severe enough for supervised probation.
In response, MDH argues that “it had not even been a year since her last offense” when
relator requested reconsideration, noting also that she was still on probat ion at the time of
the request.3 MDH maintains that too little time has passed to minimize relator’s risk of
harm.

3 MDH seems to have misread the language of this statutory factor by relying on the date
of relator’s conviction rather than the date of the theft offense underlying her conviction.
10
The record establishes that when relator requested reconsideration in mid -
September 2020, just over one year had elapsed since her September 2019 theft offense. It
was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious for MDH to determine that the recentness of
relator’s offense and resulting conviction warranted disqualification. In fact, relator’s
disqualification was statutorily mandated and presumptively will remain in place until
seven years have passed since the discharge of her probation from the most recent offense.
Minn. Stat. §§ 245C.14, subd. 1(1) (requiring disqualification for certain convictions), .15,
subd. 4(a) (explaining seven-year disqualification for theft convictions under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.52). While relator had the right to request reconsideration within the seven -year
period, we agree with MDH that the requested set aside came too soon. Factor seven
therefore supports MDH’s conclusion.
The eighth factor addresses relator’s successful completion of training or
rehabilitation in connection with the disqualifying events. Minn. Stat. § 245C.22, subd.
4(b)(8). Here, relator was not ordered to complete treatment as part of her January 2020
sentence and, as stated in her brief, she went to treatment voluntarily and she willingly
disclosed treatment records to MDH. Relator also emphasizes that she now has more than
300 days of sobriety and has taken various positive steps to further her addiction recovery

Factor seven concerns “ the time elapsed without a repeat of the same or sim ilar event.”
Minn. Stat. § 245C.22, subd. 4(b)(7). “[T]he relevant date is the date of the event, not the
date of its judicial disposition.” Johnson v. Comm’r of Health , 671 N.W.2d 921, 924 n.1
(Minn. App. 2003) (examining identical factors under a similar statutory scheme).
Relator’s most recent offense occurred September 16, 2019, and resulted in conviction on
January 22, 2020. Accordingly, the time elapsed between the offense and relator’s request
for reconsideration —which was filed September 24, 2020 —was about one year. This
distinction, however, has little effect on MDH’s overall evaluation of this factor.
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process. MDH acknowledged relator’s efforts in rendering its decision, but again found her
efforts “very recent” and determined that it was “too soon to know if [she has] made long-
term changes to [her] behavior.”
Although relator’s rehabilitative efforts are commendable and deserve recognition,
those efforts do not entitle her to relief on the record before us . Despite relator taking
positive steps in the interest of her health and profession, she has not shown that MDH’s
consideration of the eighth factor was arbitrary or capricious. Moreover, substantial
evidence supports MDH’s determination that relator’s request to set aside the
disqualification came too soon—as the request was made mere months after her completion
of treatment. We also note again that the disqualification here was mandated by statute and
is presumed to remain in place for seven years beyond the point at which she is discharged
from supervision on her most recent criminal conviction. See Minn. Stat. § 245C.15, subd.
4. Relator requested a set aside just months after completing treatment and only after about
one year since her latest criminal offense. Relator was unable to show that she has mitigated
the risk she poses to patients during that brief period.
The final factor considers any other relevant information bearing on the
disqualification decision. Minn. Stat. § 245C.22, subd. 4(b)(9). MDH reiterated the same
points already discussed in support of this factor, specifically reemphasizing the relatively
short amount of time that has passed since relator’s most recent offense . We understand
relator’s brief as a request for us to consider “the whole picture,” and to give weight to the
more positive aspects of her life not directly captured within the rec ord. Still, the points
reexamined by MDH on this factor are supported by substantial evidence in the record and
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do not appear arbitrary or capricious. And relator’s request for consideration of any aspects
not contained in the record are not properly raised in this appeal. Pfoser v. Harpstead, 939
N.W.2d 298, 316 n.13 (Minn. App. 2020) (“We do not generally consider matters outside
the record on appeal.”), aff’d, 953 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 2021); see also Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 110.01, 115.04, subd. 1.
In sum, relator has not demonstrated that MDH committed reversible error by
declining to set aside her disqualification from employment in the healthcare field.
Affirmed.