Bunny Annette Byington,

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STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A20-1441

Court of Appeals Hudson, J.

Bunny Annette Byington,

Appellant,

vs. Filed: October 26, 2022
Office of Appellate Courts
State of Minnesota,

Respondent.

________________________

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael McLaughlin, Assistant
Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian J. Melton, Clay County Attorney, Michael D. Leeser, Assistant County Attorney,
Moorhead, Minnesota, for respondent.

________________________

S Y L L A B U S
In a postconviction proceeding, a district court has the authority to order the State
to refund restitution that the defendant has paid because of a conviction when that
conviction has been invalidated, and no retrial will occur.
Reversed and remanded.
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O P I N I O N
HUDSON, Justice.
This appeal requires us to determine whether a district court in a postconviction
proceeding may order the refund of restitution that the defendant has paid because of a
conviction when that conviction has been invalidated , and no retrial will occur. In 2009,
appellant Bunny An nette Byington was convicted of one count of coercion —threat to
expose a secret or disgrace, Minn. Stat. § 609.27, subd. 1(4) (2020). As part of Byington’s
sentence, the district court ordered her to pay fines, fees, and restitution.
Byington later filed a petition for postconviction relief. When Minn. Stat. § 609.27,
subd. 1(4) was declared facially overbroad and unconstitutional in another case, State v.
Jorgenson, 946 N.W.2d 596, 600 (Minn. 2020), Byington asked the district court to vacate
her conviction and sentence . Relying on Nelson v. Colorado , 581 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct.
1249, 1257– 58 (2017), which held that “a State may not impose anything more than
minimal procedures on the refund of exactions dependent upon a conviction subsequently
invalidated,” she further asserted that she was entitled to a refund of all restitution payments
made because of her invalid conviction. The district court granted Byington’s petition in
part by vacating her conviction and sentence. B ut it denied her request for a refund of
restitution, concluding that it lacked authority to do so , in part because “there is no legal
vehicle under Minnesota law, in the context of a criminal case, to provide reimbursement
of restitution.” The court of appeals affirmed, holding that “nothing in the postconviction
statute governing this matter authorizes a court to refund restitution,” and that “the source
of a court’s authority to return restitution is the Minnesota Incarceration and Exoneration
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Remedies Act,” (MIERA), Minn. Stat. §§ 611.362–.368 (2020), which requires a timely
petition— which Byington never filed—seeking an o rder that the person is eligible for
compensation based on exoneration.
We granted review on whether a postconviction court has authority to refund
restitution that a defendant paid on an unconstitutional conviction, or whether MIERA is
the only procedure for receiving a refund of restitution paid. We conclude that in a
postconviction proceeding, a district court has the authority under the postconviction
statute, Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2020), to order the State to refund restitution that the
defendant has paid because of a conviction when that conviction has been invalidated, and
no retrial will occur. We therefore reverse the court of appeals and remand to the district
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTS
On July 1, 2009, respondent State of Minnesota charged Byington with two felony
counts of coercion, Minn. Stat. § 609.27, subd. 1(4), and one felony count of attempted
coercion, Minn. Stat. § § 609.27, subd. 1(4), 609. 275 (2014). The State alleged that
Byington obtained $7,000 from the victim under the threat of revealing their relationship
to his wife and local church leadership. During the same time, Clay County Social Services
(CCSS) conducted a fraud investigation, which revealed that Byington received $5,831.44
in fraudulent overpayments of public assistance benefits when she did not report the money
that she had received from the victim as income.
On September 4, 2009, Byington pleaded guilty to one felony count of coercion .
Under the terms of the plea agreement, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges
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and not to pursue fraud charges, and Byington agreed to pay restitution to both the victim
and CCSS. The victim and CCSS submitted affidavits of loss and requests for restitution.
The district court sentenced Byington to 1 year and 1 day in prison, with execution stayed
for 10 years, and placed her on probation. It also ordered her to pay $585 in fines, $7,000
in restitution to the victim, and $5,831.44 in restitution to CCSS. Byington made periodic
restitution payments and satisfied her fines with community service. On October 30, 2019,
Byington was discharged from probation.
After Byington completed probation, the court of appeals held that Minn. Stat.
§ 609.27, subd. 1(4) was facially overbroad, in violation of the First Amendment. State v.
Jorgenson (Jorgenson I), 934 N.W.2d 362, 375 (Minn. App. 2019). Following the court
of appeals decision, Byington filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief seeking
to vacate her conviction and sentence. We affirmed the court of appeals, agreeing that
subdivision 1(4) of section 609.27 is fa cially overbroad, in violation of the First
Amendment, and thus invalid . State v. Jorgenson ( Jorgenson II), 946 N.W.2d 596, 600
(Minn. 2020).
After we issued our decision in Jorgenson II, Byington , with the assistance of
counsel, amended her postconviction petition to request that the district court vacate her
conviction and sentence and “refund any restitution payments made by her pursuant to the
illegal and void sentence.” Byington asserted that Nelson v. Colorado, 581 U.S. ___,
137 S. Ct. 1249, 1257 (2017), creates a substantive right to the refund of restitution she
paid because of a conviction that was later invalidated, and that the court is thus obligated
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to order her a restitution refund. The State agreed that Byington’s conviction should b e
vacated, but it argued that she was not entitled to a refund of restitution.
The district court granted in part and denied in part Byington’s petition for
postconviction relief. In light of Jorgenson II, the district court granted Byington’s request
to vacate her conviction and sentence. Regarding her request for a refund of restitution,
the district court acknowledged that under Nelson, “it would appear that [Byington] is
entitled to a refund of all fines, fees, and restitution paid in this case, as these obligations
were all imposed as part of the sentence stemming from [Byington]’s conviction.”
Nevertheless, the district court concluded that “the issue of who specifically must pay back
the restitution money, and how that payment is secured , is beyond the scope of this case
and beyond the authority of this court.”
The district court found it “important to note that the Nelson case focused on
Colorado’s statutory scheme” for exonerated defendants to obtain restitution. But
according to the district court, “[u]nder Minnesota law, there is no such statutory scheme,”
nor was there any “legal vehicle under Minnesota law, in the context of a criminal case, to
provide reimbursement of restitution.” Although t he district court agreed that it had th e
authority to require a “refund of fines, fees, and other judicial branch retained monies,” it
concluded that it “lack[ed] the authority to impose any legal obligations on the part of
non-parties (i.e. the victims), or Order a party in the case (the prosecuting authority) to pay
out monies it never received in the first place.” As a result, the court vacated Byington’s
restitution order and ordered the refund of any monies paid by her that w ere applied “to
fines, fees, or judicial branch retained monies.” The district court also vacated any “civil
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judgment” that “has been entered solely by virtue of the Restitution Order in this matter.”
The court, however, denied Byington’s request that she receive a refund of the amounts
that she paid to the victims in restitution.
In a nonprecedential opinion, the court of appeals affirmed the district court.
Byington v. State , No. A20-1441, 2021 WL 2406681, at *1 (Minn. App. June 14, 2021).
First, the court of appeals determin ed that nothing in the postconviction statutes, Minn.
Stat. §§ 590.01–.06 (2020), under which Byington’s present action was brought, authorizes
a court to refund fines, fees, or restitution. Byington, 2021 WL 2406681, at *1.
Second, the court of appeals rejected Byington’s contention that Nelson
“unequivocally grants a district court the authority” to refund restitution. Id. at *2. Instead,
the court of appeals stated that Nelson ’s “conclusion was premised on the determinati on
that Colorado’s exoneration-compensation statute imposed too many procedural hurdles to
comport with due process” and thus “did not establish a broad substantive right to the
automatic refund of restitution payments made pursuant to an invalidated conviction.” Id.
Accordingly, the court of appeals reasoned , “[Nelson] is not an independent source of
authority upon which a district court may order the return of restitution.” Id.
Third, the court of appeals instead identified the Minnesota Incarceration and
Exoneration Remedies Act (MIERA), Minn. Stat. §§ 611.362–.368, as “the source of a
court’s authority to return restitution.” Byington, 2021 WL 2406681, at *2. But the court
of appeals observed that “Byington did not obtain or even seek an order that she is eligible
for compensation based on exoneration.” Id. The court of appeals thus declined to consider
the constitutionality of MIERA, finding that “[t ]he district court did not have the
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opportunity to consider [Byington’s] eligibility under the act, or to consider any arguments
as to whether the act passes constitutional muster.” Id. Because Byington had not
established that she was eligible for MIERA compensation, and because the court of
appeals concluded that “nothin g in the postconviction statute governing this matter
authorizes a court to refund restitution,” the court of appeals saw no error in the district
court denying her request for a restitution refund. Id.
We granted Byington’s petition for further review.
ANALYSIS
Byington asserts that she is entitled to a refund of all the money, including
restitution, that she paid because of her invalidated conviction. The crux of her argument
is that Nelson establishes a substantive, constitutional right to a refund of restitution when
a defendant’s conviction has been invalidated and no retrial will occur. She further argues
that the court of appeals construed the postconviction statute too narrowly and that courts
have the authority in a postconviction proceeding to order the State to refund restitution
the defendant paid because of such an invalidated conviction. To evaluate Byington’s
arguments, we begin with a discussion of Nelson and then consider whether Byington has
a right to receive a refund of the restitution she paid because of her invalidated conviction.
A.
Nelson addressed the consolidated petitions of two defendants, Nelson and Madden,
who petitioned for a return of the court costs, fees, and restitution they paid as a condition
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of their respective convictions that were later overturned.1 581 U.S. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at
1253. After the Colorado Court of Appeals concluded that both defendants were entitled
to seek refunds, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that there must be a
statute that authorizes the refund of the funds, that Colorado’s Exoneration Ac t provided
the “exclusive process” for refunds, and that the petitioners’ failures to file a claim under
that Act rendered the courts without authority to order refunds. Id. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at
1254.
The U.S. Supreme Court determined that “[w]hen a criminal conviction is
invalidated by a reviewing court and no retrial will occur, . . . the State [ is] obliged to
refund fees, court costs, and restitution exacted from the defendant upon, and as a
consequence of, the conviction.” Id. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1252. Applying the procedural
due process test from Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319 (1976), t he Court held that
Colorado’s Exoneration Act did not comport with the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee
of due process. Nelson, 581 U.S. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1255–58. The Court concluded that
“[t]o comport with due process, a State may not impose anything more than minimal
procedures on the refund of exactions dependent upon a conviction subsequently
invalidated.” Id. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1258. The Supreme Court reversed the judgments
of the Colorado Sup reme Court and “remanded for further proceeding s not inconsistent
with this opinion.” Id.

1 Nelson had her convictions overturned on direct appeal, and she was acquitted of
all charges after a retrial. Nelson, 581 U.S. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1252–53. Madden had
one of his convictions reversed on direct appeal and the other reversed in a postconviction
proceeding; the State elected not to retry him. Id. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1253.
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Byington asserts that, based on Nelson, she has a constitutional right to a refund of
the restitution she paid pursuant to her now invalidated conviction. She argues that Nelson
entitles a person to a refund of conviction -related monetary assessments if three
requirements are met: (1) the assessments were imposed solely because of a conviction,
(2) the state exacted the money to be refunded from the defendant, and (3) the conviction
has been invalidated with no prospect of retrial. Byington asserts that she has satisfied
each element of a “Nelson refund claim,” arguing that the court-ordered restitution was a
monetary assessment that the State imposed solely because of her conviction, that the
record shows that she paid restitution, and that her conviction was invalidated under
Jorgenson II with no prospect of retrial since the conduct underlying the invalidated
conviction is constitutionally protected. She further argues that the court of appeals
incorrectly concluded that she could not receive this refund in a postconviction proceeding.
The State disagrees and argues that the court of appeals correctly determined that
Nelson does not create a broad substantive right to an automatic refund of restitution
payments made pursuant to an invalidated conviction . According to the State, Nelson
simply held that “ [t]o comport with due process, a State may not impose anything more
than minimal procedures on the refund of exactions dependent upon a conviction
subsequently invalidated.”
581 U.S. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1258. The State further argues
that the court of appeals correctly concluded that Byington must use the procedures of
MIERA to receive a refund of restitution.
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B.
We do not need to decide whether there is a constitutional right to a refund of
restitution. We do not reach constitutional issues if there is an alternative path to resolving
the case. State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 926 (Minn. 2006) (noting that “[o]ur general
practice is to avoid a constitutional ruling if there is another basis on which a case can be
decided” (alteration in original) (quoting Erlandson v. Kiffmeyer, 659 N.W.2d 724, 732 n.7
(Minn. 2003))).
There is such an alternative here—a postconviction petition. Determining whether
an alternative path exists involves the interpretation of a statute, which is a question of law
that we review de novo. State v. Jones, 678 N.W.2d 1, 23 (Minn. 2004).
Postconviction proceedings are governed by Minnesota Statutes chapter 590 (2020).
They authorize a person convicted of a cri me to “secure relief” by petitioning the district
court “to vacate and set aside the judgment and to discharge the petitioner or to resentence
the petitioner or grant a new trial or correct the sentence or make other disposition as may
be appropriate.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1. After a petition is filed, the district court
must “determine the issues, make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect
thereto, and either deny the petition or enter an order granting appropriate relief.” Minn.
Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1.
The purpose of statutory interpretation is to “ascertain and effectuate” the
Legislature’s intent. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2020). When interpreting a statute, the
threshold question is whether the statute’s language is ambiguous . S tate v. Gibson ,
945 N.W.2d 855, 857 (Minn. 2020). We “construe[]” statutory “words and
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phrases . . . according to their common and approved usage.” Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1)
(2020). When a statute does not define a word or phrase, we often determine plain
meaning by looking to dictionary definitions and applying them in the context of the
statute. State v. Haywood, 886 N.W.2d 485, 488 (Minn. 2016). “If the Legislature’s intent
is clear from the statute’s plain language, then we interpret the statute according to its plain
meaning . . . .” State v. Al arcon, 932 N.W.2d 641, 645 (Minn. 2019) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation mark omitted). If, however, the disputed language is subject to more
than one reasonable interpretation, then the statute is ambiguous, and we can employ
canons of construction to resolve the ambiguity. State v. Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432,
435 (Minn. 2017).
Thus, we first consider the language of the statute. By its plain meaning, a district
court can make a disposition other than what is specifically listed in the statute. The statute
provides that a person convicted of a crime can “secure relief” by petitioning t he district
court “to vacate and set aside the judgment and to discharge the petitioner or to resentence
the petitioner or grant a new trial or correct the sentence or make other disposition as may
be appropriate.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (emphasis added). What this phrase means
is a matter of first impression. On its face, the plain meaning of “other disposition” is a
final determination of the court different from what is implied or specified in the statute.
The statutory language does, however, require that any disposition or relief a district
court orders be “appropriate.” Id. (stating a person can petition the district court to “make
other disposition as may be appropriate”); Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (stating that the
district court must “either deny the petition or enter an order granting appropriate relief”).
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“[A]ppropriate” is defined as “[s]uitable for a particular person, condition, occasion , or
place.” The American Heritage Dictionary of t he English Language 88 (5th ed. 2011).
Accordingly, a district court’s ability to grant “other disposition as may be appropriate”
plainly means a final determination of the court other than what is specifically listed, which
is suitable for a particular person or occasion.
Applied here, the statutory language gives a district court the authority to grant a
remedy such as the refund of restitution a petitioner paid because of a conviction that is
later invalidated. Such a remedy is a disposition other than what is listed. And this remedy
is certainly appropriate. We have long recognized that when a judgment is reversed, the
parties are to be returned to the positions that they were in before the judgment, including
having property restored to the initial owner. See Carl v. De Toffol , c, 483 (Minn. 1946)
(explaining that if a person’s “property is taken under a judgment” and that judgment is
reversed, the person is “entitled to restitution of the property,” and that “[t]he plain reason
for the rule is that reversal of a judgment nullifies it and restores the parties to the same
situation in which they were prior to its rendition”); Fisk v. Toner, 41 N.W. 972, 972 (Minn.
1889) (“Upon the dismissal of the action the judgment could no longer stand, and the
property, which had been delivered to the plaintiff only by force of the judgment, should
be restored.”); see also Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 781, 786 (1929)
(“The right to recover what one has lost by the enforcement of a judgment subsequently
reversed is well established.”).
This restoration is essentially the relief Byington requests. Byington was required
to pay restitution because she was convicted of a crime. See Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1
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(2020) (“A victim of a crime has the right to receive restitution as part of the disposition of a
criminal charge . . . against the offender if the offender is convicted . . . .”). A restitution order
is enforceable “in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action.” Id. , subd. 3 (2020).
Byington asks to have the funds she was required to pay because of her conviction restored
to her because her judgment of conviction has been reversed and no retrial will occur.2
We hold that in a postconviction proceeding, a district court has the authority to
order the refund of restitution when the monetary assessments the defendant paid were
imposed solely because of the conviction, the State exacted those assessments, and the
conviction was invalidated with no prospect of retrial.
C.
In determining that Byington has a right to relief, we must necessarily decide the
scope of that relief. Byington asserts that we should rule that she is entitled to recover a
specific amount, stating that she has paid $10,070.84 , which was credited toward her
financial obligations in the criminal case, including restitution. The State suggests that if

2 Here, the court of appeals determined that MIERA was the sole mechanism for a
defendant like Byington to recoup her restitution payments, and because she did not file
her claim under MIERA, she was not entitled to relief. Byington, 2021 WL 2406681, at
*2. The Supreme Court’s analysis in Nelson that Colorado’s Exoneration Act did not
comport with due process was in part predicated on that state’s use of that act as the
“exclusive remedy” for a defendant to pursue the return of monetary exactions. See
581 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1256 (“Is there a risk of erroneous deprivation of defendants’
interest in return of their funds if, as Colorado urges, the Exoneration Act is the exclusive
remedy? Indeed yes . . . .”). Because we hold that the postconviction statute provides
another mechanism for a defendant to receive the repayment of restitution, we decline to
consider whether MIERA denies procedural due process by imposing more than minimal
procedures on a defendant’s request for a refund of restitution.
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there is a right to relief, we should remand to the district court to determine the proper
amount of any refund.
We conclude that a remand to the district court is appropriate for an accounting of
what Byington is owed. It is unclear from the record how much Byington actually paid in
restitution. For example, CCSS credits Byington with having paid $2,725.84 in restitution,
but there is no accounting for the amount paid to the other victim, the amount paid in fines
and fees, or whether the balance owed to CCSS is accurate. While Byington asserts that
“most” of the $10,078.84 went toward restitution, she does not point to anything specific
in the record to account for how much of that total was specifically credited toward
restitution. Further, the district court made no determination on the amount that she paid.
Payments Byington made to CCSS and the victim should be credited toward restitution on
remand because she was ordered to pa y this restitution as part of her sentence for a
conviction that has been invalidated and no retrial will occur.
3 The State of Minnesota will
be responsible to pay this amount.

3 The State asserts that Byington’s repayment agreement with CCSS was outside the
sentencing order and entirely not connected with the criminal file. Because the State failed
to argue this claim before the district court, it is forfeited. See Brocks v. State, 753 N.W.2d
672, 676 (Minn. 2008) (stating that claims raised for the first time on appeal, where a
district court did not consider it, are forfeited for the purposes of the appeal). Even if the
issue were properly preserved, however, the record shows that Byington was ordered to
pay restitution to CCSS as part of her sentence for her coercion conviction. As part of her
sentence, Byington was ordered to pay fines, fees, and restitution , including restitution to
CCSS. CCSS requested restitution as a victim of the crime that led to Byington’s
prosecution, and the plea agreement included that Byington would pay this restitution. The
record also includes a probation violation report that lists the conditions of her offense as
including restitution to CCSS and correspondence from C CSS reflecting payments
Byington made were to be credited toward restitution Byington owed. Together, the record

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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and
remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.

shows that Byington paid restitution as part of her sentence , and her payments to C CSS
were appropriately credited as restitution.