Diamond Lee Jamal Griffin,

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STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A20-1449

Hennepin County Hudson, J.

Diamond Lee Jamal Griffin,

Appellant,

vs. Filed: July 7, 2021
Office of Appellate Courts
State of Minnesota,

R e s p o n d e n t .

________________________

Diamond Lee Jamal Griffin, Rush City, Minnesota, pro se.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.

________________________
S Y L L A B U S
The district court did not abuse its disc retion when it summarily denied appellant’s
third petition for postconviction relief.
Affirmed.
Considered and decided by the court without oral argument.

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O P I N I O N
HUDSON, Justice.
Appellant Diamond Lee Jamal Griffin appe als the district court’s summary denial
of his third petition for postconvi ction relief. Griffin filed th e petition more than 2 years
after his direct appeal. The petition did not invoke an exception to the 2-year statute of
limitations. Consequently, the district cour t concluded that the petition was untimely.
Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the untimely petition, we
affirm.
FACTS
On July 8, 2013, Griffin attempted to rob three men. 1 When the men resisted,
Griffin fatally shot one of the men. The police arrested Griffin the next day. The medical
examiner provided the victim’s finger and palm prints to the police. The prints matched
fingerprint cards issued to Francisco Benitez and Joseph Bernardo Lopez. Both cards listed
the same date of birth.
One month later, a grand jury heard testimony from the two men who survived the
robbery (P.Y.-E. and L.B.-H.) and a law enforcement officer. All three witnesses identified
the shooting victim as Franci sco Benitez-Hernandez. The grand jury returned an
indictment charging Griffin with six offenses, including first-degree felony-murder.2

1 A full recitation of the facts underlyi ng Griffin’s conviction can be found in State v.
Griffin (Griffin I), 887 N.W.2d 257, 260–61 (Minn. 2016).

2 The five other charges were second-d egree intentional murd er, attempted first-
degree felony murder, attempted second-degree intentional murder, second-degree assault,
and first-degree aggravated robbery.

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At trial, the jury found Gr iffin guilty of first-degree felony murder in connection
with the shooting victim. The jury also found him guilty of attempted first-degree felony
murder and second-degree a ssault in connection with th e two men who survived the
robbery. The district court sentenced Griffi n to life in prison with possibility of release
after 30 years for the conviction of first-degree felony murder. 3 We affirmed Griffin’s
conviction and sentence on direct appeal. State v. Griffin (Griffin I), 887 N.W.2d 257, 265
(Minn. 2016).
Representing himself, Griffin filed his firs t petition for postconviction relief in April
2017. In it, Griffin claimed he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because his
attorneys told him not to accept the State’s 2014 plea o ffer. After a limited evidentiary
hearing, the district court de nied Griffin’s first petition fo r postconviction relief. Griffin
appealed, but later asked that we stay his appeal to allow hi m to file a second petition for
postconviction relief. We stayed his appeal.
Griffin then filed his second petition for postconviction relief in March 2019, more
than 2 years after his conviction became final. His second petition for postconviction relief
alleged (1) a Brady violation,4 (2) a claim of ineffective assi stance of appellate counsel,
and (3) a failure to safeguard his right to a fair trial.

3 The district court also imposed a 1 53-month sentence for the conviction of
attempted first-degree felony murder, to be served consecutively to the sentence for first-
degree felony murder, and a 36-month senten ce for the conviction of second-degree
assault, to be served consecutively to the 153-month sentence.

4 A Brady violation occurs when the State does not produce material evidence
favorable to the defendant despite a re quest for production by the defense. Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).

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Regarding the Brady claim, Griffin alleged that newly discovered evidence showed
the State withheld material evidence. More specifically, he claimed that the State failed to
disclose the aliases of Francisco Benitez-He rnandez and P.Y.-E. To support his claim,
Griffin provided affidavits signed by a private investigator. In the first affidavit, dated
March 4, 2019, the private investigator said , “[H]e was unable to locate anyone in the
country using the name [P.Y.-E.] anywhere in the country.” In the second affidavit, dated
March 6, 2019, the private investigator said, “[H]e was unable to verify that the within-
named Francisco Benitez-Hernandez . . . al so went by the name of Joseph Bernardo-
Lopez.” The district court summarily denied the second postconviction petition for relief.
Griffin appealed. We lifted the stay and consolidated his two appeals.
In April 2020, we affirmed the district c ourt’s denial of Griffin’s first and second
petitions for postconviction relief. Griffin v. State (Griffin II), 941 N.W.2d 404, 410 (Minn.
2020). We held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Griffin’s first
petition. Id. at 409. As part of our analysis of th e claim for ineffective assistance of trial
counsel, we wrote, “[t]he district court considered [the] conflicting testimony, made
detailed findings regarding the respective claims , and did not clearly err when it credited
the trial attorneys’ testimony and rejected Griffin’s testimony.” Id. Then, turning to the
claims raised in Griffin’s se cond petition for postconviction re lief, we held that district
court did not abuse its discretion in summari ly denying the petition as time-barred under
Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a) (2020). 941 N.W.2d at 410.

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We recognized that Griffin’s second petition had invoked an exception to the 2-year
time-bar by alleging newly discovered evidence5 of a Brady violation. Id. But, even taking
Griffin’s factual allegations as true, we co ncluded that the use of aliases by Benitez-
Hernandez and P.Y.-E. did not prove that Gri ffin was innocent of any of the offenses for
which he was convicted. Id. Thus, we concluded that Griffin’s Brady-violation claim did
not satisfy the newly-discovered-evidence exception and the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it denied the second petition as time-barred. Id.
In July 2020, Griffin filed his third petitio n for postconviction relief. In his third
petition, Griffin claimed the Stat e violated his right to due pr ocess during the grand jury
proceedings. More specifically , he claimed the State’s w itnesses provided “falsified
evidence” when they us ed the name Francisco Benitez-He rnandez when referring to the
shooting victim.6 Griffin also claimed P.Y.-E. lied to the grand jurors when he told the

5 The newly-discovered-evidence exception a llows a court to consider the merits of a
petition for postconviction relief despite the 2-ye ar time bar if the “petitioner alleges the
existence of newly discovered evidence” that “could not have been ascertained . . . within
the two-year time period for filing a post conviction petition, a nd the evidence . . .
establishes by a clear and convincing stan dard that the petitioner is innocent of the
offense . . . for which the pe titioner was convicted.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(2)
(2020).

6 As part of his argument, Griffin cite s Minn. Stat. § 634.051 (2020), which provides,
“No person shall be convicted of murder . . . unless the death of the person alleged to have
been killed, and the fact of the killing by the defendant, as alleged, are each established as
independent facts beyond a reasonable doubt.” Here, the petit jury found that the death of
the shooting victim and the fact of the k illing by Griffin were each proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.

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grand jurors his name was P.Y.-E. 7 The district court summar ily denied Griffin’s third
petition because, among other th ings, it determined that th e claim was time-barred under
Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a). Griffin appealed.
ANALYSIS
We review the district court’s denial of a postconviction petition for an abuse of
discretion. Griffin II, 941 N.W.2d at 408. A district court “abuses its discretion when its
decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the
record.” Riley v. State, 792 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Minn. 2011). In reviewing the summary
denial of a postconviction petition, we review the facts alleged in the petition in the light
most favorable to the petitioner. See Fox v. State, 913 N.W.2d 429, 433 (Minn. 2018).
A district court must grant a postconv iction evidentiary hearing “[u]nless the
petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is
entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2020). But a “hearing is not required
when the petitioner alleges facts that, if true, are legally insufficient to grant the requested
relief.” Rhodes v. State, 875 N.W.2d 779, 786 (Minn. 2016). Accordingly, a district court
may summarily deny an untimely claim. Id. at 787.
In Griffin’s case, the 2-year limitations pe riod in the postconviction statute expired
in February 2019. Griffin II , 941 N.W.2d at 409. Gri ffin filed his third petition for
postconviction relief 17 months later in July 2020. Accordingly, his petition is time-barred

7 Griffin argues his right to confrontation was violated when P.Y.-E. allegedly used
an alias during the grand jury proceedings.

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unless he invoked and then established one of the five exceptions in Minn. Stat. § 590.01,
subd. 4(b).
We liberally construe the petition in de termining whether the petitioner has invoked
one of the statutory exceptions. See Wallace v. State, 820 N.W.2d 843, 849 (Minn. 2012);
see also Minn. Stat. § 590.03 (2020) (instructi ng courts when reviewing postconviction
petitions to “liberally construe the petition” and to “look to the substance thereof and waive
any irregularities or defects in form”). The petition does not need to “include [a] specific
citation to a subdivision 4(b) exception to invoke it.” Roby v. State, 787 N.W.2d 186, 191
(Minn. 2010). But if the petiti oner does not invoke any of the time-bar exceptions in the
petition, we need not consider them. Griffin II, 941 N.W.2d at 410.
Even when liberally construed, Griffin’s petition does not invoke any of the time-bar
exceptions in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b ). Unlike Griffin’s second petition, which
alleged newly discovered evidence of a Brady violation, his third petition does not allege
any newly discovered evidence. Instead, Griffin relies on the same evidence he submitted
in connection with his second postconviction petition. A new legal argument based on old
evidence does not satisfy the newl y-discovered-evidence exception. 8 We therefore

8 Even if the evidence su bmitted with Griffin’s third petition was newly discovered,
none of the evidence establishes by a clear and convincing standard that Griffin is innocent
of the offense for which he was convicted. See Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(2)
(requiring petitioners show, among other th ings, that newly discovered evidence
establishes their innocence by a “clear and convincing standard” to satisfy the exception).

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conclude that Griffin has not invoked the ne wly-discovered-evidence exception, nor any
of the other subdivision 4(b) exceptions, to support his due process claim.9
Because Griffin’s third petition for postcon viction relief was untimely, the district
court did not abuse its discretion when it summarily denied the petition.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court.
Affirmed.

9 Griffin uses the phrase “interest of justic e” on pages 11 and 16 of his brief. Because
Griffin failed to invoke the interest-of-justice exception in the district court, he has forfeited
appellate review of such an argument. Brocks v. State, 753 N.W.2d 672, 676 (Minn. 2008)
(holding that petitioner forfeited a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to
include the issue in his postconviction petition). In addition, the petition does not contain
any facts explaining the reason for the delay in filing his petition. See Sanchez v. State ,
816 N.W.2d 550, 557 (Minn. 2012) (explaining that “the interests-of-justice referred to in
subdivision 4(b)(5) relate to the reason the petition was filed after the 2-year time limit in
subdivision 4(a)”).