Paul Matthew Ashfeld, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1450

Paul Matthew Ashfeld, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed June 21, 2021
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge

Meeker County District Court
File No. 47-CR-17-207

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Christopher L. Mishek, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brandi Schiefelbein, Meeker County Attorn ey, John P. Fitzgera ld, Assistant County
Attorney, Litchfield, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decide d by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and
Bratvold, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HOOTEN, Judge
In this appeal from an order denying postconviction relief, appellant argues that the
district court erred by admitting prejudicial hearsay statements of the victim and the

2
prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument by comparing the victim to a
“hunted animal.” We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Appellant Paul Matthew Ashfeld with first-
degree, second-degree, and third-degree criminal sexual conduct, as well as misdemeanor
domestic assault. These charges were based on allegations that Ashfeld had used force to
engage in sexual contact and sexual penetration with the victim—his ex-girlfriend and the
mother of his child—and had thereby caused the victim physical harm.
Prior to trial, the state filed a motion in limine seeking admission of two audio
recordings of out-of-court statements the victim had made about the assault, arguing that
they were admissible as prior consistent statem ents and statements of identification. The
district court granted the state’s motion, and both recordings were eventually played for
the jury at trial. Ashfeld objected to the admission of the second of these recordings, a
statement the victim had made to law en forcement, as being both cumulative and
inadmissible hearsay. The district court al so permitted, over Ashf eld’s objection that it
was cumulative and repetitive, testimony by a police detective in which the detective
recounted an out-of-court statement the victim had made describing the sexual assault. The
jury found Ashfeld guilty on all counts, and the district court entered a judgment of
conviction on count one—the charge of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.
Instead of filing a direct appeal, Ashfel d petitioned for postc onviction relief. He
waived an evidentiary hearing and instead requested that the postconviction court base its
decision on the petition, responsive pleadings, and trial record. A district court judge other

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than the trial judge, sitting as the postconviction court, denied Ashfeld’s petition. Ashfeld
now appeals.
DECISION
“We review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of
discretion.” Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017). “A postconviction court
abuses its discretion when it has exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious
manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual
findings.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Legal issues are reviewed de novo.” Id.
I. The postconviction court correctly concluded that the district court had
not abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the victim’s out-of-
court statements.

Ashfeld first argues that the district c ourt abused its discretion in admitting two
pieces of evidence: an audio recording and tran script of a statement the victim made to
police on the morning of the sexual assault and testimony by a police detective recounting
the victim’s statements describing the assault. Ashfeld asserts that he was prejudiced by
these errors and that the postconviction court therefore erred by denying his petition. We
discuss each piece of evidence in turn.
A. Evidence of the Victim’s Out-of-Court Statement
The state filed a motion in limine seeking to admit evid ence of an out-of-court
statement the victim had made to law enforcement later on the same morning of her assault.
In this recorded statement, the victim described how Ashfel d had returned, drunk, to the
home they shared earlier that same day and had violently sexually assaulted her over a span
of nearly two hours. The state argued that evidence of this stat ement was admissible

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because the statement was both a prior c onsistent statement and a statement of
identification and therefore not hearsay. Th e district court granted the state’s motion,
announcing that it was “allowing the victim’s prior consistent statements and statements of
identification . . . [assuming], of course, [that] the victims [sic] testifies prior to any – any
of these consistent statements being discussed.”
During opening argument, Ashfeld’s tria l counsel argued that the victim was
fabricating her allegations against Ashfeld. Then, during the prosecutor’s direct
examination of the victim, a recording of the victim’s prior statement was played for the
jury over the objection of Ashfeld’s trial counsel that it was “cumulative and hearsay.” A
transcript of the recording was also admitted into evidence. The district court did not make
any explicit findings that the victim’s credibility had been challenged, that the evidence of
the victim’s prior statement would be helpful to the trier of fact, or that the prior statement
and appellant’s trial testimony were consistent.
Ashfeld challenged the district court’s ev identiary ruling on two grounds in his
postconviction petition. First, Ashfeld argued that the district c ourt erred by concluding
that the victim’s statement was admissible as a statement of identification. Second, Ashfeld
contended that the district court erred by c oncluding that the vi ctim’s statement was
admissible as a prior consistent statement.
The postconviction court concluded that Ashfeld’s first argument—that the district
court had erred by concluding that evidence of the victim’s out-of-court statement was
admissible as a statement of identificati on—was “without merit.” Specifically, the
postconviction court concluded that the district court had not relied on the rule exempting

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statements of identification fro m the definition of hearsay, because identification of the
perpetrator had not been at issue at trial. Finally, the postconviction court concluded that,
even if the district court had abused its di scretion in admitting the victim’s out-of-court
statement, Ashfeld had “failed to establish how this admission would have had a prejudicial
effect on the jury’s verdict,” given the strength of the state’s case against him.
The postconviction court also concluded that the district court had not abused its
discretion in admitting evidence of the victim’s out-of-court statement to law enforcement
as a prior consistent statement. The postconviction court found “that credibility was central
to this case,” as “the alleged victim and suspect were the only ones with personal
knowledge thereby making each account apposite at times a nd challenged.” Noting that
Ashfeld’s trial counsel challe nged the victim’s credibility during opening statement, the
postconviction court concurred that the victim’s out-of-court statement “was helpful to the
jury to evaluate her testimony as the victim of the crime and aided the jury in determining
credibility by demonstrating whether her memory was similar or if she had an improper
motive to fabricate the incident .” The postconviction court further determined that the
victim’s “trial testimony was not inconsistent with her prior out of court statement,” as “she
was consistent as to where the assault occurred, who the perpetrator was, and the nature of
the acts that occurred.”
“Evidentiary rulings rest w ithin the sound discretion of the district court, and [an
appellate court] will not reverse an evidentiary ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion.”
State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2014). “Under an abuse-of-discretion standard,
[an appellate court] may reverse the district court when the district court’s ruling is based

6
on an erroneous view of the law or is agai nst logic and the facts in the record.” State v.
Bustos, 861 N.W.2d 655, 666 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). “When challenging
evidentiary rulings, the appellant has the burden of establishing that the [district] court
abused its discretion and that a ppellant was thereby prejudiced.” State v. Valentine, 787
N.W.2d 630, 638 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2010) (alteration in
original) (quotation omitted). Where a postconviction petitioner has not had his conviction
reviewed on direct appeal, the standards of review normally applied to a direct appeal are
applied to his postconviction petition. Santiago v. State , 644 N.W.2d 425, 439 (Minn.
2002).
Hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible. Minn. R. Evid. 802. Hearsay “is a
statement, other than one made by the declaran t while testifying at th e trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Minn. R. Evid. 801(c). But
several types of out-of-court statements are excluded from the definition of hearsay—and
are therefore not barred by the general rule against hearsay—even though they are offered
to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
A statement is excluded from the definition of hearsay if the declarant—that is, the
person who made the statement—“testifies at th e trial or hearing and is subject to cross-
examination concerning the statement, and th e statement is . . . consistent with the
declarant’s testimony and helpful to the trier of fact in evaluating the declarant’s credibility
as a witness.” Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1). Such a “prior consistent statement” may only be
admitted if the district court makes several determinations. State v. Bakken, 604 N.W.2d
106, 109 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn. Feb. 24, 2000). First, the district court

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must determine that the witness’s credibility has been challenged. Id. The witness’s
credibility may be challenged on cross-examination, but it may also be challenged in an
opening statement. State v. Grecinger, 569 N.W.2d 189, 193 (Minn. 1997). Second, the
district court must determine that “the prior consistent statement would be helpful to the
trier of fact in evaluating the witness’s credibility.” Bakken, 604 N.W.2d at 109. “It is
unlikely that mere repetition of a statement implies veracity.” Id. “But a prior consistent
statement might bolster credib ility by showing a fresh compla int, obviating an improper
influence or motive, providing a meaningful context, or demonstrating accuracy of
memory.” Id. Finally, the trial court must determine that “the prior statement and the trial
testimony are consistent with each other.” Id. The trial testimony and the prior statement
need not be identical to be consistent. Id.
A statement is also exclud ed from the definition of he arsay if “[t]he declarant
testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement,
and the statement is . . . one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person,
if the court is satisfied that the circumstances of the prior identification demonstrate the
reliability of the prior identification.” Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1). This rule “does not extend
to the out-of-court accusation against an o ffender whose identity was well-known to the
victim.” State v. Robinson, 718 N.W.2d 400, 408 (Minn. 2006).
The postconviction court correctly concluded that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting evidence of the victim’s out-of-court statement to law enforcement
as evidence of a prior consistent statement. A prior consistent statement is only admissible
if the district court determines that (1) the declarant-witness’ s credibility has been

8
challenged, (2) the prior statement would be helpful to the factfinder in assessing the
declarant-witness’s credibility, and (3) the pr ior statement and the declarant-witness’s
testimony are similar. Bakken, 604 N.W.2d at 109. As not ed, Ashfeld’s trial counsel
challenged the victim’s cred ibility during opening statement by claiming that she was
fabricating her allegations against Ashfeld. It would be reasonable to conclude that
evidence of the victim’s prio r statement would help the fa ctfinder assess her credibility;
this evidence went beyond “mere repetition” and bolstered the victim’s credibility by
demonstrating that she reported the assault to police soon after it occurred and showing
that her memory of the assault was consiste nt with her prior stat ement at the time she
testified. And the prior statement and the victim’s trial testimony were consistent in terms
of location, perpetrator, and manner of abuse. Finally, while it is true that the district court
did not make explicit findings regarding the Bakken factors, Ashfeld cites no authority as
support for the proposition that the district court was required to make such findings on the
record before admitting evidence of the victim’s out-of-court statement.
The postconviction court did, however, err in concludi ng that Ashfeld’s other
argument—that the district court had erred by concluding that evidence of the victim’s out-
of-court statement was admissible as a statement of identif ication—was “without merit.”
Here, the district court stated prior to trial that it was “allowing the victim’s prior consistent
statements and statements of identification.” It is unclear whether the district court was
relying, in part, on the rule exempting statements of iden tification from the definition of
hearsay when it admitted ev idence of the victim’s out -of-court statement to law
enforcement. That rule “does not extend to the out-of-court accusation against an offender

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whose identity was well-known to the victim,” Robinson, 718 N.W.2d at 408, and Ashfeld
was well known to the victim in this case, as the two share a child. As such, if the district
court relied on the rule concerning statements of identification to ad mit the statement at
issue, that decision would have been legally erroneous.
Nevertheless, the district court and the postconviction court correctly concluded that
the statement at issue was a prior consistent statement and that evidence of the statement
was therefore admissible non-hearsay. Accordingly, Ashfeld has failed to demonstrate that
the postconviction court erred by concluding that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting evidence of the victim’s out-of-court statement to law enforcement.
B. The Detective’s Testimony
The district court permitted the prosecu tor to elicit testimony from a police
detective, in which the detective recounted statements the victim had made describing the
assault. Specifically, the detective testifie d about how the victim took him through the
crime scene, describing what happened where and how damage to the home resulted from
Ashfeld’s actions. The detective also testifie d about how he collected physical evidence
and took photographs during this tour of the crime scene. A number of these photographs
were admitted into evidence. Ashfeld’s trial counsel objected to the detective’s testimony
as cumulative, but the district court overruled that objection.
In his petition for postconviction relief, Ashf eld argued that the district court had
abused its discretion in permitting this testimony by the detective, as the minimal probative
value of the evidence was outweighed by its cumulative character. The postconviction
court disagreed, concluding that the detective’s testimony “was not cumulative because he

10
aided the jury in the integrity of the entire case, allowed the jury to assess pieces of the
case, or determine credibility of the other evidence and witnesses and not just [the victim].”
In Minnesota, all relevant evidence is admissible at trial unless the United States or
Minnesota Constitutions, the Minnesota Rules of Evidence, or other court rules provide
otherwise. Minn. R. Evid. 402. Minn. R. Evid. 403 provides that “evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substa ntially outweighed” by the consideration
of “needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Evidence may be needlessly
cumulative when it is “merely duplicative,” Moore v. State, 945 N.W.2d 421, 438 (Minn.
App. 2020), review denied (Minn. Aug. 11, 2020) (quotation omitted), or when it is offered
as proof of a fact, the existe nce of which has been shown th rough other evidence and has
not been contradicted by the opposing party. See State v. Zumberge, 888 N.W.2d 688, 696
(Minn. 2017).
The postconviction court correctly concluded that the district court had not abused
its discretion in admitting the detective’s tes timony. Contrary to Ashfeld’s suggestions,
the evidence at issue did more than merely repeat the statements the victim had made while
testifying and in the various audio recordings pl ayed for the jury. It provided context for
law enforcement’s investigation of the assault, linking the photographs of the crime scene
that were admitted into evidence with the events that the victim described in her testimony
and elsewhere. Without this connection, the jury would have been left to speculate about
whether those photographs depi cted damage that resulted from the events the victim
described, or whether this damage was instea d unrelated to the assault. And while the
detective’s testimony did, to some extent, repeat the victim’s statements about the assault,

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those statements were not the focus of the testimony. The testimony was, instead, focused
on the investigative process whereby law enforc ement gathered evidence. Therefore, the
postconviction judge did not err by concluding that the district court properly admitted the
detective’s testimony.
II. The postconviction court correctly concluded that the prosecutor had
not committed prejudicial plain erro r by inflaming the passions of the
jury during closing argument.

The prosecutor made the following stat ement during his rebuttal to Ashfeld’s
closing argument:
There was also some comment ab out [the victim’s] first call.
The first call to her boyfriend . . . . I believe when she testified
she indicated just as to why sh e didn’t immediately call 911.
She was – she was scared and she was alone. And think about
the context of this whole thing. She had just previously called
under duress and told her boyfri end her sit – that she cares
about, the person that she’s still dating that things were over
between them. Why wouldn’t she call him first? Why wouldn’t
she call the person she cares about, she loves, to tell him what
happened to her? And of course, this all is in a context of a rape
just occurring, something terrible had happened to her,
something that might make a ra tional person not think or act
the way we expect them to. You know, some of you – I didn’t
– I didn’t ask this during jury selection, maybe it was somewhat
covered but some of you may be hunters or know hunters. And
with hunting you see animals, you see deer, what are their
impulses when they encounter a threat? Sometimes they flee,
sometimes they freeze. Some animals, they fight. Fight, flight,
freeze. All of those reactions you heard about. [The victim]
fought. She tried to get away an d then this whole context of
things that during and the after she wasn’t quite reacting to the
way – way things maybe we didn ’t expect her to. Maybe she
didn’t call 911 right away but [t he police detective] told you
about that in his nine plus years of experience working criminal
sexual conduct investigations, it is common – it is common for
individuals who have been sexu ally assaulted not to call 911
right away. He wasn’t telling you to ignore your common

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sense. He was telling you about his experience on the job in
this role. Take that back to you – to the deliberation room when
your analy – when you’re analyzing that issue.

Ashfeld did not object to this statement before the district court. He nevertheless contends
that it constitutes prejudicial plain error requiring the reversal of his conviction.
In his petition for postconviction relief, Ashfeld argued that the prosecutor’s
statements constituted prejudici al plain error requiring reversal of his conviction. The
postconviction court disagreed, concluding that “there was no prosecutorial misconduct in
closing arguments with reference to [the vi ctim] as a hunted animal whose behavior was
to freeze initially while experiencing the trauma of the incident.” The postconviction court
went on to conclude that, “[e]ven if erro r was committed in closing arguments, and the
error was plain, [Ashfeld] is not entitled to the relief he seeks because he failed to establish,
when assessing the closing ar guments as a whole, how the jury was prejudiced by the
analogy raised one time in the entire context of all closing arguments.”
“A prosecutor must avoid inflaming the jury’s passions and prejudices against the
defendant.” State v. Morton , 701 N.W.2d 225, 236 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted).
“When credibility is a central issue, we pay special attention to statements that may inflame
or prejudice the jury.” Id. When an appellant has failed to object during trial, we review
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct u nder a modified plain error standard. State v.
Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006). Under this standa rd, the appellant bears the
burden of establishing an error that is plain. Id. An error is plain when it is “clear or
obvious,” as where the error “contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.” State
v. Cao, 788 N.W.2d 710, 715 (Minn. 2010). If th e appellant establishes plain error, “the

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burden shifts to the State to demonstrate that the plain error did not affect the [appellant]’s
substantial rights.” State v. Parker, 901 N.W.2d 917, 926 (Minn. 2017). The state bears
the burden of proving that “there is no re asonable likelihood that the absence of the
misconduct in question would have had a signifi cant effect on the verdict of the jury.”
Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302 (quotations omitted). In deciding whether the misconduct
significantly affected the jury’s verdict, we consider such factors as “the pervasiveness of
improper suggestions and the strength of evidence against the defendant.” Parker, 901
N.W.2d at 926 (quotations omitted). If the state fails to demonstrate that the error did not
affect the appellant’s substantial rights, we then consider “whether the error should be
addressed to ensure fairness and the integrity of judicial proceedings.” Id.
The postconviction court correctly concluded that the prosecutor had not committed
prejudicial plain error. First, it is far from “clear or obvious” that the statement at issue
amounted to prosecutorial misconduct by inflaming the passions and prejudices of the jury.
During his closing argu ment, Ashfeld’s trial counsel atta cked the victim ’s credibility by
questioning why the first call she made after the assault was to her boyfriend, why she then
went to her friend’s house, and why she did not call 911 until she arrived at her place of
work later that morning. The prosecutor’s st atement appears to have been a response to
this line of argument, not an attempt to inflame the passions and prejudices of the jury
against Ashfeld. While Ashfeld is correct in noting that we have previously held that a
prosecutor impermissibly inflames the passions and prejudices of the jury by referring to a
criminal defendant as a “predator,” State v. Duncan , 608 N.W.2d 551, 556 (Minn. App.
2000), review denied (Minn. May 16, 2000), the present case is distinguishable: nowhere

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in his closing argument and rebuttal did the prosecutor refer to Ashfeld as a predator or any
variation of that term, and, as noted abov e, the prosecutor’s statement comparing the
victim’s behavior to that of a hunted animal was an attempt to respond to Ashfeld’s attacks
on her credibility, not to implicitly argue that Ashfeld was a predator.
Second, the state has carried its burden of demonstrating that there is no reasonable
likelihood that the absence of the statement at issue would have substantially affected the
verdict of the jury. The statement at issue was only one page in a 23-page closing argument
and rebuttal. The characterization of the vic tim as a hunted animal was not the central
motif of the state’s case against Ashfeld, which instead focused on the victim’s own
testimony at trial and the physic al, audio, and photographic evidence of the assault. And
most importantly, the state’s case was strong, as is discussed above. On this record, there
is not a reasonable likelihood that the abse nce of the statement at issue would have
substantially affected the verdict of the jury. As such, and because that statement did not
amount to plainly erroneous prosecutorial misconduct, we need not reverse Ashfeld’s
conviction.
Affirmed.