State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1452

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Stanley Paul Wenell-Jack,
Appellant.

Filed December 20, 2021
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Itasca County District Court
File Nos. 31-CR-17-1624, 31-CR-17-1661, 31-CR-17-613

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Matti R. Adam, Itasca County Attorney, Jacqueline A. Destache, Assistant County
Attorney, Grand Rapids, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Kathryn J. Lockwood, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
After initially not showing up for his plea hearing, appellant Stanley Paul
Wenell-Jack pleaded guilty to a felony charge of failure to appear. He now seeks to
withdraw that plea (as well as two pleas to fifth-degree possession of a controlled
2
substance), arguing that there was an inadeq uate factual basis to establish that he
intentionally failed to appear. Because the factua l basis adequately establishes that
Wenell-Jack pleaded guilty to felony failure to appear, we affirm.
FACTS
In March 2017, the state charged Wenell- Jack with felony fifth-degree possession
of a controlled substance and a misdemeanor for providing a false name to police.1 In June,
Wenell-Jack failed to appear for his plea hear ing and was charged with felony failure to
appear.2 The following week, the state further charged Wenell-Jack with fifth-degree
possession of a controlled substance and misdemeanor possession of pharmaceutical
medication without a prescription.3
Over that summer, Wenell-Jack reached a plea agreement with the state.
Wenell-Jack pleaded guilty to two counts of fifth-degree possession and to felony failure
to appear. The state agreed to dismiss the remaining misdemeanor charges.
The factual basis for Wenell-Jack’s felony failure-to-appear plea consisted of the
following:
COURT: Okay. And were you told at some point that you
had to make all of your appearances and if you
didn’t show up you c ould be charged with a
failure to appear?
WENELL-JACK: Yes, sir.
COURT: Were you scheduled for court on June 20 of this
year?
WENELL-JACK: Yes, sir. I wa s not in the county. I was
unable to attend.

1 Minn. Stat. § 152.052, subd. 2 (2016); Minn. Stat. § 609.506, subd. 1 (2016).
2 Minn. Stat. § 609.49 subd. 1(a) (2016).
3 Minn. Stat. § 152.052, subd. 2; Minn. Stat. § 151.37, subd. 1 (2016).
3

COURT: Why weren’t you able to attend?
WENELL-JACK: I was dealing with my son. He was in a—
he’s still in the same pos ition, except I had to
send him back and he’s still in the same—he’s
not in a good place and that’s—that’s why I’m
not sure where I’m going to be at upon—like I’m
not sure what’s going to happen with the—with
the Wellness Court and stuff because I got to go
try to get him again an d so I could be in
Koochiching County, I could be in Beltrami, I
could be here, I could be in Hibbing, I mean—or
I just—I’m not sure where I’m going to be. It’s
going to be based on what happens when I get
my son.
COURT: Did you get any permission from the court or
from your attorney or an yone like that not to be
in court on June 20?
WENELL-JACK: No—that was—that was—that was on my
fault, sir.

Wenell-Jack filed a pro se notice of motion and motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.
Over two years later, the district court denied Wenell-Jack’s motion to withdraw his guilty
pleas.
4 The district court then sentenced Wenell-Jack to two concurrent 19-month prison
sentences for both fifth-degree controlled-substance convictions, but stayed the execution
of those sentences, and placed him on probation for two years. The court also sentenced
him to 17 months in prison fo r his failure-to-appear convic tion, stayed execution, and
placed him on probation for two years.5
Wenell-Jack appeals.

4 D u r i n g m u c h o f t h i s t w o -year interval, Wenell-Jack wa s in custody on unrelated
convictions.
5 After imposing his sentences, the district court gave Wenell-Jack credit for all time served
and immediately discharged Wenell-Jack fro m probation because his custody credit was
enough to satisfy all three sentences.
4
DECISION
Wenell-Jack argues that his guilty plea to felony failure to appear is inaccurate, his
conviction must be vacated, and he should be allowed to withdraw his plea. His plea is
inaccurate, Wenell-Jack asserts, be cause he did not admit that he intended to fail to
appear—an element of the crime.6
To evaluate this claim, we begin by acknowledging that a defendant does not have
an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. State v. Nicholas, 924 N.W.2d 286, 292 (Minn.
App. 2019), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 24, 2019). But a district court may allow a defendant
to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing if “it is fair a nd just to do so.” Minn. R.
Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2. In order for a guilty plea to be c onstitutionally valid, it must be
accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251-52 (Minn. 1983).
Here, Wenell-Jack only challenges the accuracy of his plea. An accurate plea must be
“established on a proper factual basis.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010).
A proper factual basis “must establish sufficient facts on the record to support a conclusion
that defendant’s conduct falls within the char ge to which he desire s to plead guilty.”
Munger v. State , 749 N.W.2d 335, 337-3 8 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). This may
include facts from which the defendant’s guilt can be reasonably inferred. Nelson v. State,
880 N.W.2d 852, 859 (Minn. 2016). We review the vali dity of a plea de novo. Raleigh,
778 N.W.2d at 94.

6 Wenell-Jack also asserts that because his two misdemeanor pleas were part of a global
plea, he also should be allowed to withdraw those guilty pleas as invalid. But not only do
we conclude that his guilty plea to felony fa ilure to appear is va lid, the record does not
reflect that, regardless, the three guilty pleas were part of a global plea.
5
To assess whether the plea’s factual basi s addresses each element of the crime
charged—as it must—we first consider the el ements of felony failure to appear. The
elements here are straightforward. A pers on is guilty of failure to appear if they
“intentionally fail[] to appear when required after having been notified that a failure to
appear for a court appearance is a criminal offense.” Mi nn. Stat. § 609.49 subd. 1(a)
(emphasis added).
We next turn to whether the factual basis establishes that these elements of felony
failure to appear were met. Here, Wenell-Ja ck did not expressly say at the plea hearing
that he intentionally failed to appear. But an admission of the requisite intent is not required
if the proper factual basis of the requisite intent can be inferred from the record. The record
establishes that it was. There is no dispute th at Wenell-Jack failed to appear at his court
appearance when he was required to do so after having been notified that failure to appear
is a criminal offense. At a July 2017 hearing, the court asked him “were you told at some
point that you had to make a ll of your court appearances a nd if you didn’t show up you
could be charged with a failure to appear?” Wenell-Jack responded, “Yes, sir.” Yet he
decided to attend to his son rather than to attend the hearing. Wenell-Jack does not even
assert that his failure to appear was due to circumstances beyond his control. Minn.
Stat. § 609.49 subd. 3 (2016) (“If proven by a preponderance of the evidence, it is an
affirmative defense to a violation of subdivisi on 1, 1a, or 2 that the person’s failure to
appear in court as required was due to circ umstances beyond that person’s control.”).
Accordingly, we conclude that the factual ba sis adequately establishes that Wenell-Jack
intentionally failed to appear at his hearing, thus making his plea valid.
6
Still, Wenell-Jack argues that although he admitted to missing the hearing because
he was “not in the county” and was “dealing with [his] son,” that he never admitted to
intentionally doing so. But, as previously discussed, the factual basis needs only to
establish the inference that Wenell-Jack’s be lief that attending to his son would result in
failing to appear at his hearing. Nelson, 880 N.W.2d at 861. It did so here.
Wenell-Jack further argues that under State v. Mikulak, the factual basis of his plea
is insufficient because he made statements that negated the “inten tionally” element of
felony failure to appear. 903 N.W.2d 600, 605 (Minn. 2017) (holding that the factual basis
of defendant’s plea was insufficient because de fendant made statements that negated the
mens rea element of thei r charged offense). But Mikulak does not discuss the
“intentionally” element—it addressed when the “knowingly” element is met. Id. a t
604-05. More fundamentally, Wenell-Jack’s statements do not negate his intent. His
statements simply show that he chose to attend to the obligation of his son rather than the
obligation of his court hearing.
Because the factual basis adequately establishes that Wenell-Jack is guilty of felony
failure to appear, his entire plea agreement is valid.
Affirmed.