Amy Luann Seelye, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1459

Amy Luann Seelye, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed June 28, 2021
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-17-10109

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Erik I. Withall, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Michael J. Lieberg, Chief Deputy County
Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judg e; Ross, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
Appellant Amy Seelye, charged with thir d-degree driving while impaired—with her
seven-year-old son in the car—entered into a plea agreement w ith the state. In exchange
for Seelye’s guilty plea, the stat e agreed to a six-year stay of imposition of her sentence.

2
Seelye entered an Alford plea to third-degree driving while impaired, and the district court
accepted the plea and sentenced her according to the terms of the plea agreement.1
Nearly two years later, after her convictio n interfered with her ability to adopt her
grandchild, Seelye asked the district court to “dismiss” her conviction. The court denied
Seelye’s request as untimely but also found that she was not entitled to relief on the merits
of her claim. We affirm.
FACTS
A state trooper stopped appellant Amy Se elye after receiving a report of erratic
driving and observing her cross the fog line. A blood test confirmed the presence of THC.2
Based on the results of the blood test and the fact that Seelye’s seven-year-old son was in
the car, the state charged Seelye with one co unt of third-degree driving while impaired
(DWI).3 The state also offered Seelye a pl ea agreement: if she pleaded guilty to
third-degree DWI, the state would request a six-year stay of imposition of her sentence.
Seelye agreed to the offer and entered an Alford plea to third-degree DWI. The
district court accepted Seelye’s plea, finding that there was a sufficient factual basis to do
so and that she knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to a jury trial on the issue of

1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 167 (1970) (holding that a
district court may, in some circumstances, accept a defendant’s guilty plea even when he
or she maintains their innocence).
2 THC—tetrahydrocannabinol—is a chemical found in marijuana. THC and its metabolites
are Schedule I controlled substances. Minn. Stat. § 152.02, subd. 2(h) (Supp. 2017).
3 Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd . 1(2), .26, subd. 1(a) (2016 ). A person is guilty of
third-degree DWI if, while committing a DWI, th ere was an aggravating factor present.
Minn. Stat. § 169A.26, subd. 1(a). Here, the aggravating factor was the presence of a child.
See Minn. Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 3(3) (2016) (defining “aggravating factors”).

3
guilt. The court then senten ced Seelye, granting a stay of imposition and pl acing her on
probation for a period of up to six years.4
Nearly two years later, Seelye sent a lette r to the district court requesting that the
court “dismiss” her conviction because it pr evented her from adopting her grandchild.
Seelye explained that in entering her Alford plea, she believed that her conviction would
not be used against her in th e adoption process. Had she known the impact of pleading
guilty, she “would have plead[ed] not guilty and [gone] to trial.” The court construed
Seelye’s letter as a petition for postconviction relief and notified the state of the filing.
A public defender was assigned to Seel ye’s case and an amended petition for
postconviction relief was filed shortly thereafte r. In her amended petition, Seelye raised
four issues: (1) her plea was not accurate beca use of an insufficient factual basis; (2) her
plea was not accurate because she did not acknowledge that the evidence was sufficient to
convict her under a reasonable-doubt standard; (3) she was entitled to a jury determination
on the issue of the presence-of-a-child aggravating factor; and (4) her plea was not knowing
and voluntary because sh e did not believe her plea woul d prevent her from adopting her
grandchild. As such, Seelye argued, the postconviction court should vacate or set aside the
judgment of conviction and allow her to withdraw her guilty plea.
The postconviction court denied Seelye ’s petition for relief, finding that it was
untimely “as to the new issues alleged.” Desp ite this, the court addressed the merits of
Seelye’s petition and found that her plea was accurate, voluntary, and intelligent, and that

4 The court also sentenced Seelye to 30 days’ imprisonment, with credit given for one day
and the remaining 29 days to be served by electronic home monitoring.

4
she was not entitled to a jury determination on whether a child was pr esent at the time of
the offense.
Seelye appeals.
DECISION
Seelye challenges the postconviction cour t’s decision on two grounds. First, she
assigns error to the postconv iction court’s denial of her petition for relief on timeliness
grounds, arguing that because she filed her initial petition before the two-year deadline, it
was timely. Second, Seelye argues that the di strict court should ha ve advised her of her
right to a jury determination on the “aggrav ating sentencing factor ”—the presence of a
child—because that fact was us ed to “enhance” her senten ce from fourth-degree DWI to
third-degree DWI. Based on this alleged error, Seelye asserts that we should vacate the
“aggravating factor” and reduce the severity of her conviction to fourth-degree DWI. We
address each argument in turn.
I. We need not consider the ti meliness of Seelye’s petition.

Seelye argues that the postc onviction court’s denial of her petition for relief was
erroneous because she filed her petition befo re the two-year statutory deadline passed. 5
The state concedes that the court’s findings on the timeliness issue are unclear and suggests
that we need not reach this issue because the postconviction court de cided Seelye’s case
on the merits. We agree.

5 Generally, a petition for postconviction relief mu st be filed within two years of entry of
judgment of a conviction or a sentence. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a)(1) (2018).

5
The postconviction court, in denying Seelye’s petiti on for postconviction relief,
found that her petition was “untimely as to the new issues alleged.” But the court did not
explain whether it concluded that all of Seelye’s claims were untimely or that only the
additional claims raised in her amended petition were un timely. And although the
postconviction court acknowledged that Seel ye’s initial petition to the court was filed
before the postconviction de adline expired, the court did not specify whether any
deficiencies of service made that petition invalid. Nevertheless, the court still considered
the merits of Seelye’s petition. Accordingly, we review Seelye’s claims on those grounds
and do not address the timeliness issue here.
II. The postconviction court did not err by denying Seelye’s petition for relief.

Seelye’s second argument, and the focus of our review, is that she was entitled to a
separate jury determination on the presence-of-a-child a ggravating factor, but was not
advised of that right, resulting in an invalid plea. Her argument is based upon the premise
that the DWI statutes, when read together, create a “core” DWI offense and resultant
sentences. Under this interpretation, Seelye contends, the degrees of DWI are sentencing
provisions of the “core” DWI statute, not dis tinct offenses. To grant her relief, Seelye
asserts that we must vacate the “aggrava ting factor” and reduce her sentence to
fourth-degree DWI.
Seelye’s argument raises a question of statutory interpretation which we review
de novo. Dupey v. State, 868 N.W.2d 36, 39 (M inn. 2015). In interpreting a statute, we
first determine whether it is ambiguous as a pplied to the facts of the present case. Id. If
the statute is unambiguous, we enforce the plain meaning of the statute. Id. If the statute

6
is ambiguous, then we look beyond the plai n language of the statute to determine the
legislature’s intent in enacting the statute. Id.
Our de novo review begins with an overvi ew of the statutes at issue: those that
define each degree of driv ing while impaired. Mi nn. Stat. §§ 169A.20-.27
(2016 & Supp. 2017). As is re levant to this appeal, Minneso ta Statutes section 169A.20,
subdivision 1(2), establishes that “[i]t is a crim e for any person to driv e, operate, or be in
physical control of any motor vehicle” when that person is “under the influence of a
controlled substance.” The statute then identifies the different degrees of DWI with which
a person may be charged:
A person who violates this section may be sentenced as
provided in sectio n 169A.24 (first-degree driving while
impaired), 169A.25 (second-degr ee driving while impaired),
169A.26 (third-degree drivin g while impaired), or 169A.27
(fourth-degree driving while impaired).

Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 3. Because Se elye was charged with third-degree DWI, we
turn to section 169A.26, subdivision 1(a), for the definition of the crime:
A person who violates sec tion 169A.20, subdivision 1,
1a, 1b, or 1c (driving while impaired crime), is guilty of
third-degree driving while impaired if one aggravating factor
was present when the violation was committed.

(Emphasis added.) Having al ready determined what constitu tes a violation of section
169A.20—driving a motor vehicle while unde r the influence of a controlled substance—
the only remaining inquiry is how the statute defines an “aggravating factor.” For that

7
answer, we look to Minnesota Statutes secti on 169A.03, subdivision 3, which establishes
that, in the context of DWI offenses, aggravating factors include:
(1) a qualified prior impaired dr iving incident within the ten
years immediately preceding the current offense;
(2) having an alcohol concentr ation of 0.16 or more as
measured at the time, or with in two hours of the time, of
the offense; or
(3) having a child under the age of 16 in th e motor vehicle at
the time of the offense if the child is more than 36 months
younger than the offender.

(Emphasis added.) With the relevant statutory language in mind, we consider the parties’
arguments about the proper interpretation of these provisions.
Seelye contends that the structure of th e DWI statutes establishes a “core” offense
of DWI—defined in section 169A.20—which is then divide d into degrees based on the
presence of “sentencing aggravating factors.” The state, on the other hand, argues that the
aggravating factors listed in the degrees of DWI enhance the offense level, not the sentence.
Both parties contend that their interpretation derives from the plain language of the statute.
Despite the parties’ opposing interpretati ons, our review of these provisions leads
us to conclude that, as applied to the fa cts here, the third-degree DWI statute is
unambiguous. Seelye was charged with third-degree DWI.
6 Under the plain language of
the statute, in order to convict Seelye, the state would have had to prove at trial that
she: (1) operated a motor vehicle, (2) while under the influence of a controlled substance,
(3) with a child in the car . Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.03, subd. 3(3), .20, subd. 1(2), .26,

6 Seelye further asserts that the complaint and the warran t of commitment support her
interpretation of the DWI statutes because both distinguish section 169A.20 from section
169A.26. But for the reasons described in our analysis, we are unpersuaded.

8
subd. 1(a). Therefore, the presence-of-a-child aggravating factor is an element of the crime
of third-degree DWI.
Our interpretation is bolstered by simila r statutory constructs found in Minnesota
criminal statutes. For example, our statutes distinguish first-degree controlled substance
crime from aggravated first-degree controlled substance crime based on the presence of
additional facts which the state must prove in order to convict. Mi nn. Stat. § 152.021,
subds. 1-2, 2b (2020). After defining fi rst-degree sale and possession crimes in
subdivisions 1 and 2, the stat ute identifies aggravated firs t-degree controlled substance
crime in subdivision 2b:
A person is guilty of aggr avated controlled substance
crime in the first degree if th e person violates subdivision 1,
clause (1), (2), (3), (4), or (5), or subdivision 2, paragraph (a),
clause (1), (2), or (3), and the person or an accomplice sells or
possesses 100 or more grams or 500 or more dosage units of a
mixture containing the controlled substance at issue and:
(1) the person or accomplice possesses on their person
or within immediate reach, or uses . . . a firearm; or
(2) the offense involves two aggravating factors.

(Emphasis added.) As with the DWI statutes, aggravated first-degree controlled substance
crime requires proof of additional factors in order to convict. Not only must the state prove
that a person sold or possessed a c ontrolled substance, the state must also prove that the
person did so with a certain amount of the controlled substance, while either possessing or
using a firearm or while two aggravating factors were present.
A similar distinction is also present in our criminal statutes for simple and
aggravated robbery. Minn. Stat. §§ 609.24-.245 (2020). A person is guilty of first-degree
aggravated robbery if, while committing a robbery , the person was also armed with a

9
dangerous weapon. Minn. Stat. § 609.245. Again, the state must prove both the underlying
crime (robbery) and additional facts to convict a person of the aggravated crime.
Still, Seelye asserts that Blakely v. Washington , 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531
(2004), Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), and
State v. Dettman, 719 N.W.2d 644 (Minn. 2006), support her argume nt that the presence
of a child was a sentencing aggr avating factor requiring a separate jury determination.
Seelye makes much of the fact that these cases involved aggravating factors which the
district court erroneously relied upon to increase the defend ants’ sentences. Blakely,
542 U.S. at 299, 124 S. Ct. at 2535 (“The Act lists aggravating factors that justify such a
departure . . . .”); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, 120 S. Ct. at 2365 (“[T]he effect of New
Jersey’s sentencing ‘enhancement’ here is unquestionably to turn a second-degree offense
into a first degree offense . . . .”); Dettman, 719 N.W.2d at 650 (“Dettman notes that he
neither stipulated to the aggravating factors nor consented to judicial fact finding on those
issues.”). But Seelye’s re liance on these cases is misgui ded. The use of the word
“aggravating factor” to describe both a senten cing factor and an element of third-degree
DWI in two different contexts does not transform an element of a crime into a sentencing
factor requiring fact-finding by a court or a jury or advisement of that right in a plea
hearing.
Seelye further relies on State v. Schwartz , 957 N.W.2d 414 (Minn. 2021), and
State v. Kjeseth, 828 N.W.2d 480 (Minn. 2013), review denied (Minn. June 18, 2013), to
support her assertion that the degrees of DWI are sentencing provisions. We remain
unpersuaded. Schwartz addressed whether the state was required to prove knowledge as

10
an element of DWI. 957 N.W.2d at 418. Although the supreme court referenced the DWI
statutes, it did not consider the specific issue before us: whether an aggravating factor is an
element of a DWI offense or a sentencing factor. Id. at 418-25. And in Kjeseth, while the
supreme court noted that “[a] person violati ng the DWI statute is se ntenced under one of
four separate penalty statutes,” the court we nt on to state that “[f]irst-degree DWI is a
felony offense.” 828 N.W.2d at 482 (emphasis added).7
Finally, Seelye attempts to persuade us to adopt he r interpretation of the DWI
statutes by citing to legislative history. 8 But because the statutes are unambiguous, we
need not look beyond the language of the statutes to determine the intent of the legislature
in enacting them. Dupey, 868 N.W.2d at 39.
In sum, the presence of an “aggravating factor”—in this case, the presence of a
child—is an element of the cr ime of third-degree DWI. See Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.03,
subd. 3(3), .20, subd. 1(2), .26, subd. 1(a). When Seelye waived her right to a jury trial on
the issue of guilt, she waived her right to a jury determination on all of the elements of the

7 Seelye also relies on State v. Hayes , 826 N.W.2d 799 (Minn. 2013), to support her
interpretation of the DWI statutes. But the supreme court’s interpretation of the drive-by-
shooting statute in Hayes further undermines her argument. There, the supreme court
determined that the language “may be sentenced” indicated that the statutory provision at
issue was a sentencing provision. Id. at 805. But the supreme court also stated that the
phrase “is guilty of a felony” indicated “that the provision creates and defines a criminal
offense.” Id. (emphasis added). Although Seelye focuses on the language of section
169A.20 to support her assertions, we note that section 169A.26—the third-degree DWI
statute—states that “[t]hird-degree driving while impaired is a gross misdemeanor.” Minn.
Stat. § 169A.26, subd. 2. As the supreme cour t noted, this sort of language in a statute,
“creates and defines a criminal offense.” Hayes, 826 N.W.2d at 805.
8 We further observe that Se elye only cites to a House Research Bill Summary when
referencing legislative history.

11
charged offense—including the presence of a child. And because the district court advised
Seelye of her right to a jury trial on the issu e of guilt, the postconviction court did not err
by denying her petition for relief.
Affirmed.