State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1468

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

David William Reynolds,
Appellant.

Filed August 30, 2021
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge

Otter Tail County District Court
File No. 56-CR-19-1759

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Ed Stockmeyer, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Michelle Eldien, Otter Tail County Attorney, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Hooten , Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M , Judge; and
Halbrooks, Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HOOTEN, Judge
In this appeal from a conviction for possession of a firearm by an ineligible person
in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1 (2018), appellant argues that his conviction
must be reversed for insufficient evidence because the state failed to prove that a shotgun
and a rifle found in his residence constituted “firearms.” We affirm.
FACTS
In January 2019, Reynolds was sentenced to supervised probation following his
convictions of first-degree arson and three counts of mistreatment of animals. Due to his
convictions, Reynolds was prohibited from possessing firearms or dangerous weapons. On
June 19, 2019, Reynolds’ supervising probation agent, Wade Erickson, received a tip from
the Otter Tail County sheriff’s office that Reynolds may be violating express conditions of
his parole. Agent Erickson, accompanied by two other department of corrections agents,
three police officers, and a member of the Otter Tail County Hu mane Society, went t o
Reynolds’ home to investigate.
While Agent Erickson and another department of corrections agent were speaking
with Reynolds inside of his home, one of the police officers, who was standing in the “door
jam,” saw what appeared to be a shotgun inside of th e home. The officer alerted Agent
Erickson, who investigated and determined that the item was a 12 -guage double -barrel
break-action shotgun. After handing the shotgun to law enforcement, Ag ent Erickson
searched Reynolds’ home and located a .22 caliber, bolt-action rifle. Respondent State of
Minnesota charged Reynolds with two counts of possession of a firearm by an ineligible
person, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2018).
At trial, the state introduced photographs of the shotgun and the rifle. Agent
Erickson testified that he is not a firearms expert but is “very much so” familiar with
shotguns and that based on his experience, the shotgun found in Reynolds’ home appeared
to be function al. Agent Erickson testified that the shotgun w as a real firearm and that
neither the shotgun nor the rifle appeared to be toys . When asked about the purpose of a
firearm, Agent Erickson testified that they “propel a projectile by means of gas, powder,
or any type of compressed air.” He further testified that this was true for the guns found in
Reynolds’ home; the shotgun “would shoot a shell” and the rifle “would shoot a cartridge.”
Sergeant Axness, a firearms instructor for the Otter Tail County sheriff’s office who
had ac companied Erickson to Reyno lds’ home, also testified at trial. He testified that
neither the shotgun nor the rifle located in Reynolds’ home appeared to be toys or replicas.
Sergeant Axness stated that “firearms” are used for “[a]nything from target [shooting], to
self-defense, to hunting.” According to Sergeant Axness, Reynolds’ rifle “could be used
for small game or for target shooting” and Reynolds’ shotgun “would be used for killing
much larger game .” Sergeant Axness also testified that firearms operate by a hammer
striking the ammunition primer, causing an explosion that propels the ammunition from
the barrel.
Reynolds testified in his defense. He testified that the guns found in his home were
a double-barrel, 12-guage shotgun that originally belonged to his grandfather between 1882
and 1945, and an “ordinary” single-shot .22 caliber rifle that a neighbor gave to him when
he was a child. Reynolds maintained that both guns were “antiques,” that the shotgun had
not been fired “for a long time,” and that the last time he fired the rifle was “80 years ago.”
Reynolds admitted to having seen his shotgun used “some time ago,” probably for
“shooting a tin can in the air.” Reynolds remarked that shotguns are usually used to shoot
“fowl.” When asked if the shotgun could shoot at a p erson, Reynolds responded, “If you
had shells, maybe. I suppose it could be.”
Reynolds acknowledged that, when the .22 rifle was functional “80 years ago,” it
could be used to shoot a “rabbit,” if it “stood 3 feet in front of you” and could be used to
shoot at a person if “they were 3 feet in front of you.” However, Reynolds testified that
the rifle could not be used to shoot a deer. Reynolds admitted to having shot the .22 caliber
rifle when he was younger—around 80 years ago.
The jury found Reynolds guilty of ineligible possession of a firearm for possessing
both a 12-guage double-barrel shotgun (count 1) and a .22 caliber rifle (count 2). Since
count 2 was a lesser included offense of count 1, the district court adjudicated Reynolds
guilty of count 1 only and sentenced him to 60 months. Reynolds appeals.
DECISION
Reynolds claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of
either count of ineligible possession. He does not contest that the state proved that he
possessed two guns ( a double-barrel shotgun and a .22 caliber rifle) inside his home on
June 19, 2019. Rather, Reynolds argues that the state did not present sufficient evidence
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that either gun satisfied the legal definition of “firearm”
under Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1, given the Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding in
State v. Glover. 952 N.W.2d 190 (Minn. 2020).
When reviewing a case for sufficiency of the evidence , our review “is limited to a
painstaking analysis of the record to deter mine whether the evidence, when viewed in a
light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the
verdict which they did.” State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). We assume
that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.”
State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989). We will not reverse a conviction for
insufficient evidence if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence
and the necessity of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the
defendant was guilty of the offense. Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476–77 (Minn.
2004).
The jury found Reynolds guilty o f two counts of ineligible possession of a firearm
under Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2), which prohibits people previously convicted of a
crime of violence from posses sing any “pistol or semiautomatic military -style assault
weapon or . . . any other firearm.” However, the term “firearm” is not defined by the
statute. Glover, 952 N.W.2d at 193. “Neither does the criminal code provide a general
definition.” State v. K naeble, 652 N.W.2d 551, 554 (Minn. App. 2002), review denied
(Minn. Jan. 21, 2003). Because our inquiry turns on the statutory meaning of the term
“firearm,” we f irst consider whether Reynolds’ shotgun and rifle are “firearms” under
Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.
State v. Haywood, 886 N.W.2d 485, 488 (Minn. 2016). We “interpret statutory language
to ‘ascertain and effectuate’ the Legislature’s intent.” State v. Bowen , 921 N.W.2d 763,
765 (Minn. 2019) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2018)). “If the Legislature’s intent is
clear from the statute’s plain and unambiguous language, then we interpret the statute
according to its plain meaning . . . .” State v. Rick, 835 N.W.2d 478, 482 (Minn. 2013).
“If a statute does not define a word or phrase,” we may “look to the dictionary definitions
of th[e] words and apply them in the context of the statute.” State v. Prigge, 907 N.W.2d
635, 638 (Minn. 2018).
In considering whether distress flare launchers are “firearms” under Minn. Stat.
§ 624.713, subd. 1, the supreme court in Glover referenced multiple dictionary definitions
to determine the statutory definition of “firearm.” Glover, 952 N.W.2d at 193. The court
ultimately held that a “firearm” as used in Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1, is a “weapon,
that is, an instrument designed for attack or defense, that expels a projectile by the action
or force of gunpowder, combustion, or some other explosive force.” Id. at 195.
To that end, the court held that a distress flare launcher was not a “weapon” because
the evidence established that the distress flare launcher’s purpose was for “signaling others
for assistance and ensuring that firefighters can ignite wildfires.” Id. at 194. Because the
distress flare launcher was not “designed for attack or defense,” the court held that it was
“not a weapon and, thus, cannot be a firearm under Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1.” Id.
To summarize, Glover articulates that, to be a “firearm” under Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd.
1, a device must meet two criteria. First, it is a weapon, that is, an “instrument designed
for attack or defense.” Id. Second, the device must “[expel] a projectile by the action or
force of gunpowder, combustion, or some other explosive force.” Id. at 195; see also
Haywood, 866 N.W.2d at 490 (holding that an “air -powered BB gun is not a firearm”
because it does not operate by an “explosive force”).
Reynolds relies on Glover to support his argument that the state failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that his shotgun and rifle were “weapons” and thus “firearms”
under Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1. Reynolds contends that the state’s evidence
supporting his convictions wa s insufficient because it did not include specific evidence
satisfying Glover’s definition of the term “weapon”: “an instrument designed for attack or
defense.” 952 N.W.2d at 194. Specifically, he argues that the “state did not present any
evidence from the manufacturers regarding the design or purpose of either device.” Thus,
Reynolds contends, the testimony from the state’s witnesses, Sergeant Axness and Agent
Erickson, was insufficient to prove that the guns found in his home constituted “firearms”
as defined by Glover.
In relying so completely on Glover, Reynolds ignores additional controlling
Minnesota caselaw, as Glover is not the first time that Minnesota courts have interpreted
the statutory definition of “firearm” for purposes of felon -in-possession statutes. In State
v. Dendy, we reviewed dictionary definitions of “firearm” and concluded that “it cannot
reasonably be disputed that a hunting shotgun is a firearm” under Minn. Stat. § 624.713,
subd. 1(b) (1998). 598 N.W.2d 4, 6–7 (Minn. App. 1999), review denied (Minn. Sep. 28,
1999). A few years later, in Knaeble, we held that inoperable guns meet the definition of
“firearms” under Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1b(a) (2000), which prohibits the possession
of “a firearm” by a person who has been convicted of a crime of violence unless ten years
have elapsed since the person’s restoration to civil rights. 652 N.W.2d at 554–55.
Under Knaeble, which controls our a nalysis in this case, Reynolds’ argument that
an inoperable gun does not meet the defin ition of “firearm” under Minn. Stat. § 624.713,
subd. 1, fails. Just as it cannot be disputed that a hunting shotgun is a “firearm,” Dendy,
598 N.W.2d at 7, we conclude that it cannot reasonably be disputed that a .22 caliber, bolt-
action rifle is a “fire arm,” as we have affirmed —albeit in nonprecedential cases —
convictions of felons in possession of a firearm when the felons possessed a hunting rifle.
See State v. Kruse, No. A04-2121, 2005 WL 2739324, at *1 (Minn. App. Oct. 18, 2005);
State v. Draack, No. A11-1305, 2012 WL 1658903, at *1–2 (Minn. App. May 14, 2012).
Because actual shotguns and rifles are “firearms” as a matter of law under subdivision 1,
we hold that when the evidence produced at trial proves that an item is a real shotgun, rifle,
or any other cartridge-firing gun—even if the gun is no longer operable —no additional
evidence is needed to prove that the item is a “weapon” and thus a “firearm” under
subdivision 1.
Here, the state offered evidence that Reynolds’ guns were a double-barrel shotgun
and a .22 caliber rifle, and that these guns were real. Viewing this evidence in the light
most favorable to the guilty verdict, the jury could have reasonably concluded that both
guns were firearms under subdivision 1 because real shotguns and rifle s are “firearms” as
a matter of law and because inoperable guns meet the definition of “firearm” under
subdivision 1. The evidence produced by the state is therefore sufficient to support
Reynolds’ convictions on two counts of being an ineligible person i n possession of a
firearm, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2).
Reynolds’ supplemental pro se brief raises two additional claims, neither of which
warrant relief. First, Reynolds claims his conviction violates the Second Amendment.
Reynolds failed to raise and preserve his arguments on this issue by presenting them to the
district court, and his arguments on appeal are therefore forfeited. Doe 175 ex rel. Doe 175
v. Columbia Heights Sch. Dist., ISD No. 13, 842 N.W.2d 38, 43 (Minn. App. 2014). Even
if we did consider the issue on its merits, however, the recognition of a person’s right to
bear arms does not “cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms
by felons,” as felon dispossession statutes are “presumptively lawful regulatory measures.”
District of Columbia v. Heller , 554 U.S. 570, 626, 627 n.26, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816, 2817
n.26 (2008). Second, Reynolds claims that the guns were found in his home during an
unlawful warrantless search, in violation of the Four th Amendment. Because Reynolds
also failed to raise this issue in district court, it is not properly before this court for review,
and we decline to address it. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988).
Affirmed.