In the Matter of the Welfare of: D. A. Y., Jr., Child.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1477

In the Matter of the Welfare of: D. A. Y., Jr., Child.

Filed June 1, 2021
Affirmed
Frisch, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-JV-20-72

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorn ey, Nicole Cornale , Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Judge
On appeal from a final order for continuance without adjudication for possess ion of
a firearm by a person under 18 years old, appellant argues that the district court erred by
concluding that the search warrant for hi s residence was valid because the warrant did not
indicate that the residence was a multiple -unit dwelling and offic ers should have realized
the mistake during their search. We affirm.
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FACTS
On December 31, 2019, Minneapolis Police Officer Souphaphone Daoheuang
applied for a search warrant of appellant D.A.Y.’s residence, attesting that (1) an informant
had observed D .A.Y. in possession of a firearm at the residence, (2) D.A.Y. was younger
than 18 years old, and (3) D.A.Y. was “a known gang member affiliate” on probation for
a prior firearm -related offense. The warrant application identified the home only by its
address. Officer Daoheuang indicated her belief that officers would find firearms and
ammunition within the property. The district court signed and issued the search warrant.
On January 3, 2020, officers executed the search warrant and discovered D.A.Y . in
his bedroom with a loaded firearm on his bed. On January 7, the state charged D.A.Y. with
felony possession of a firearm by a person under 18 years of age in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 624.713, subd. 1(1) (2018).
D.A.Y. filed a motion to suppress the evidence against him, arguing that the warrant
was invalid because the warrant application failed to identify the property to be searched
as a multiple -unit building. Alternatively, D.A.Y. requested a Franks hearing,1 again
challenging Officer Daoheuang’s failure to identify the residence as a multiple -unit
building. D.A.Y. supported his motion with (1) a Minneapolis Rental Dwelling License
indicating that the property was licensed for two dwelling units, (2) paper ma ilings, some

1 See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674 (1978); see also State v. Andersen,
784 N.W.2d 320, 327 (Minn. 2010) (stating that defendant seeking to invalidate search
warrant must demonstrate that “(1) the affiant deliberately made a statement that was false
or in reckless disregard of the truth, and (2) the statemen t was material to the probable
cause determination.” (quotation omitted)).
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addressed to apartment/floor 1 and others addressed to apartment 2 , and (3) the search
warrant application.
The district court granted D.A.Y.’s request for a Franks hearing and reserved ruling
on the motion to suppress pending the results of t he evidentiary hearing. We summarize
the evidence presented at the hearing as follows.
Officer Daoheuang testified that D.A.Y.’s residence is a single-family home with a
single house number on the front. She used a combination of Google, Facebook,
Instagram, and Hennepin County property records to gather information about the
residence and to confirm the correct address. Officers surveilled the property and looked
for clues of multiple occupancy, such as multiple mailboxes, vehicle arrangements,
driveways, and alleyways. Officer Daoheuang observed that the property “looked like a
multilevel residence” and that the front of the property had only one entrance. She claimed
the property had a single mailbox, no intercom system, and no doorbell. During he r
surveillance, Officer Daoheuang observed only D.A.Y. entering and exiting the home
through the front door. She admitted that she did not consult the City of Minneapolis’s
records to determine what type of building the home was; she testified that she ne ver used
that system and instead relied on Hennepin County’s records, which indicated that the
property was a single-family home.
Officer Daoheuang also testified that she was present when officers executed the
search warrant. Upon entering the property , she walked onto the main floor and observed
“a bedroom across from the main door and a salon to the right and then a set of stairs
leading up to the second level.” She testified that she observed no unit numbers present
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within the residence. Officer Daoheuang acknowledged that there might have been a door
at the entrance of the second level, but that if there was, it was open by the time she arrived.
According to Officer Daoheuang, her department had a standard procedure to apply
for and obtain an add itional search warrant if the execution of an initial search warrant led
officers to conclude that a residence was a multiple-unit dwelling. But she claimed that, at
the time of the search (and at the time of the evidentiary hearing) , she believed that th e
home was a single-family residence.
D.A.Y.’s grandmother testified that she rented space in the dwelling. She claimed
that there were two units in the building and a salon area. She denied having access to, or
paying rent or utilities for, the first -floor unit, which was rented by her son (D.A.Y.’s
uncle). Grandmother testified that there was a mailbox and a mail slot on the front of the
property, but that the receptacles were used for mail for both units. She also testified that
she had her rental license taped outside the second-floor door on the date officers executed
the search warrant.
The district court found that Officer Daoheuang testified credibly regarding her
investigation and the officers’ observations, which included reviewing property r ecords;
searching Google Maps; conducting surveillance and observing a single house number, a
single mailbox, and a single front door; and observing only D.A.Y. entering and exiting
the property. The district court also emphasized that there was no indica tion inside the
dwelling that the building was subdivided and that officers had access to the entire property
upon their entry. The district court therefore found that “police officers acted reasonably
to determine whether the location to be searched was a multiple-occupancy dwelling” and
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that “[b]ased on the information obtained during the course of the investigation, it was
reasonable for the officers to conclude that this was, in fact, a single -family home. ”
The district court concluded that “the search warrant does not lack sufficient
particularity regarding the place to be searched” and that “police officers acted reasonably
to determine whether the place to be searched was a multiple -occupancy residence.” It
determined that the search warrant was valid and denied D.A.Y.’s motion to suppress.
The case proceeded to a stipulated -evidence trial. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01,
subd. 4; Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 13.03, subd. 3. The district court found D.A.Y. guilty as
charged, and on October 23, 2020, the district court entered an order continuing the matter
without adjudication until March 20, 2021. This appeal follows .
DECISION
D.A.Y. urges us to reverse the order denying his motion to suppress, arg uing that
the search warrant was invalid because reasonable investigation would have revealed that
the property was a multiple-unit dwelling and because officers should have realized at the
time of the search that the property was a multiple -unit dwelling. The state urges us to
affirm because the officers acted reasonably both before and during the search .
“Following a stipul ated-evidence trial, this court’s review is . . . limited to the
pretrial order that denied [the appellant’s] motion to suppress.” State v. Marsh , 931
N.W.2d 825, 829 (Minn. App. 2019) (quotation omitted). When reviewing a pretrial order
denying a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error
and its legal conclusions de novo. State v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145, 149 (Minn. 2009).
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The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and
require that search warrants describe the place to be searched with particularity. U.S.
Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. “A search that exceeds the scope of a warrant
is unconstitutional.” State v. Molnau, 904 N.W.2d 449, 452 (Minn. 2017). “ The test for
determining whether a search has exceeded the scope of the warrant is one of
reasonableness.” Marsh, 931 N.W.2d at 830 (quotati on omitted).
“The general rule [in Minnesota] is that a search warrant for a multiple occupancy
building is invalid unless it describes the particular unit to be searched with sufficient
definiteness.” State v. Lorenz , 368 N.W.2d 284, 286 (Minn. 1985) (qu otation omitted).
But under an exception to the rule, “such a warrant is valid . . . when police, acting
reasonably, do not learn until executing the warrant that the building is a multiple
occupancy building .” Id. If officers realize that a pro perty is a multiple -occupancy
dwelling during their search and thereby become aware of the error in the warrant, they are
obligated to limit their search. See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 88, 107 S. Ct. 1013,
1018 (1987) (identifying issue as being “whether the officers’ failure to realize the
overbreadth of the warrant was objectively understandable and reasonable”). Accordingly,
“the validity of the search of a rented [unit], pursuant to a warrant authorizing the search
of the entire house, depend s on whether officers reasonably knew or should have known
that it was a multiple-occupancy building at the time of the search. ” Marsh, 931 N.W.2d
at 831. In determining the reasonableness of the officers’ actions, we “must look at the
totality of the ci rcumstances.” Id. at 830. Although we review the district court’s factual
findings for clear error, see Ortega, 770 N.W.2d at 149, we independently review those
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facts to determine reasonableness under the totality of the circumstances, see State v.
Walker, 584 N.W.2d 763, 766 (Minn. 1998).
As a threshold matter, D.A.Y. contends that the district court applied the wrong
legal framework by determining that D.A.Y. failed to demonstrate any deliberate
falsification or reckless disregard of the truth by Officer Daoheuang. We disagree. The
district court addressed both the reasonableness of the officers’ conduct and D.A.Y.’s claim
that Officer Daoheuang deliberately made false statements or recklessly disregarded
information when ap plying for the search warrant. The district court did not conflate the
issues; it explained that the question before it was “whether the Officers acted reasonably
to ascertain that the residence was a single-family residence” and it cited and applied proper
authorities.
On the merits, D.A.Y. argues that the officers’ actions were not reaso nable because
adequate investigation would have revealed that the property was a multiple -unit dwelling
and “because officers should have realized there were multiple units while executing the
warrant.” He emphasizes that (1) the city’s licensing records indicated the dwelling was a
two-unit building, (2) the police department’s arrest records indicated that D.A.Y. lived in
Apartment 2, (3) “[c]hecking utility bills would have revealed there were two separate
accounts for the dwelling,” (4) court records s howed D.A.Y. lived in Apartment 2,
(5) officers should have observed two doors at the back of the property, and (6) “there was
a rental license posted outside the entrance to the second-floor unit specifically stating there
were two units at the address.”
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We assume that the officer’s failure to consult city licensing records and utility
records weighs in D.A.Y.’s favor. See In re Welfare of T.L.K., 487 N.W.2d 911, 914 (Minn.
App. 1992) (noting officers’ failure to contact utility companies). But other circumstances
cited by D.A.Y. contradict the district court’s findings or were assigned little weight by the
district court. Regarding the existence of arrest and court records indicating that D.A.Y.
lived in Unit 2, the district court credited Officer Dao heuang’s testimony that she lacked
access to juvenile court records. As for the rental license D.A.Y. claims was posted outside
the second-floor unit, the district court explicitly found that there “were no room or unit
numbers, and no signs indicating pr ivate residences.” (Emphasis added.) The district
court credited Officer Daoheuang’s testimony rather than crediting grandmother’s
testimony, and D.A.Y. fails to assert that the credibility determination and relevant findings
are clearly erroneous.
Regardless, the district court was aware of these circumstances and weighed them
against numerous other circumstances suggesting that the building was a single -family
home: the officer referred to county property records and viewed the home on Google
Maps, both of which indicated it was a single-family residence; officers saw a single house
number, a single mailbox, and a single front door; officers saw no intercom; officers saw
only D.A.Y. coming and going from the residence; upon entering, officers had access to
the entire home; and there were no room or unit numbers indicating multiple occupancies.
In reviewing the totality of the circumstances, we cannot say that the district court erred by
determining that it was reasonable for the officers to conclude that the property was a
single-family home rather than a multiple -unit dwelling .
9
Our conclusion is consistent with relevant caselaw. In Marsh, we considered
circumstances in which officers “ believed the house to be a single -family residence prior
to obtaining the warrant and conducting the search.” 931 N.W.2d at 830. We noted that
the house outwardly appeared to be a single-family residence and described the relevant
circumstances as follows:
There were two doors, front and back, and one mailbox. Upon
entering, an open staircase provided the only way to access the
second floor, which meant the agents had to go through the
main floor to the stairs. Once inside, law enforcement had
access to the entire house. The upstairs common space had a
mini fridge and doors leading to bedrooms and a bathroom, but
there were no room or unit numbers and no signs indicating
private residences. All of these would have indicated to the
agents that this was indeed a single -family home.
Id. at 831. We also noted the lack of separate doorbells. Id. D.A.Y.’s case is similar;
officers observed only one mailbox,2 saw no doorbells, had access to the entire house upon
entry, and observed no unit numbers or signs indicating private units.
D.A.Y.’s case is distinguishable from others in which suppression was proper. In
T.L.K., we concluded that police officers should have known that a home contained two
separate dwelling units. 487 N.W.2d at 914. We noted that officers failed to contact utility
or telephone companies, the home had multiple mailboxes, and access to the two units was
available “only through separate doors on separate floors.” Id. at 913. Here, Officer
Daoheuang did not investigate utility listings, but the home had only one visible mailbox
and the police could access the entire home upon entry. In United States v. Andrews , 713

2 Although grandmother testified that there was a second mail slot, she claimed the mail
was intermingled regardless.
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F. Supp. 1319, 1322 (D. Minn. 1989), a federal district court granted a motion to suppress
evidence because officers failed to adequately investigate whether the property to be
searched comprised multiple dwelling units. In that case, the district court noted that the
property resembled a sin gle-family dwelling with one visible main entrance and one
address. Id. at 1320-21. But the district court noted the house had “two voice boxes, under
separate names, by the front door” and that officers had found a letter prior to the search
indicating that an occupant of the house took mail on floor 2. Id. at 1321. Here, however,
there was no intercom system and the officers were unaware that occupants were receiving
mail at separate floor or apartment listings.
Because the district court’s findings a re not clearly erroneous and because the
district court did not err by determining that “it was reasonable for the officers to conclude
that [the residence] was, in fact, a single -family home ,” the exception to the multiple -
occupancy rule applied and the s earch warrant was valid .3 Accordingly, w e affirm the
district court’s denial of D.A.Y.’s motion to suppress.
Affirmed.

3 The district court also observed that “there is evidence indicating that the residence . . .
may fall under the community -occupation si tuation” and stated that “[t]he evidence tends
to confirm that the residence was similar to a community -occupation situation . . . rather
than a multiple-occupancy residence. ” As we explained in Marsh, the general multiple -
occupancy rule “does not apply in situations of ‘community occupation’ when two or more
people ‘occupy a single residence in common rather than individually, as where they share
common living quart ers but have separate bedrooms.’” 931 N.W.2d at 830 (quoting
Lorenz, 368 N.W.2d at 286). Here, it is unclear whether the district court actually applied
the community-occupation rule as an alternative ground to deny D.A.Y.’s motion. Because
we affirm based on the exception to the multiple -occupancy rule, we need not reach the
community-occupation issue.