In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: S. A. K., Parent.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1489

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: S. A. K., Parent.

Filed May 10, 2021
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Koochiching County District Court
File No. 36-JV-20-442

Kimberly A. Wimmer, Wimmer Law Office, PLLC, Littlefork, Minnesota (for appellant-
mother S.A.K.)

Jeffrey Naglosky, Koochiching County Attorn ey, Molly J. French , Assistant County
Attorney, International Falls, Minnesota (for respondent Koochiching County Public
Health and Human Services)

Alexis Peterson, Marcell, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Pres iding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant-mother challenges the involuntar y termination of her parental rights,
arguing that the county failed to make reasonabl e reunification efforts, that the evidence
was insufficient to support any of the statutory bases for termination, that termination was
not in the child’s best interests, and that the district court vi olated her due-process rights.
The county’s efforts to reunite the family were reasonable, at least one statutory basis for

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termination was present, and termination was in the child’s best interests. Additionally, the
process to which mother was due was provided. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant-mother S.A.K. is the parent of the child, who was born in 2016.
Koochiching County first received reports of improper treatment in 2016, including reports
that mother had been using THC while breastfeeding and did not have stable housing. The
county became formally involved with the family in September 2018, when mother
returned to Minnesota after spending seve ral months “camping” with the child across
several states and the county received a report that the child tested positive for THC. Upon
their return to Minnesota, it was reported that the child was not receiving proper care. The
county filed a petition alleging the child to be a child in need of protection or services
(CHIPS), pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6 (2020), and the district court signed
an emergency ex parte order removing the child from mother’s custody on September 11,
2018. The child was re turned to mother’s care on Oct ober 31, 2018, following mother’s
admission to the CHIPS petition and agreement to follow a court-ordered case plan.
However, the child was again removed from mother’s care on February 14, 2019, after the
district court found that mother did not have stable housing. The motel at which she and
the child had been residing ha d filed an eviction action agains t mother as a result of non-
payment of rent.
On June 26, 2019, following limited complia nce by mother with her case plan and
receiving multiple criminal charges including vehicle safety infractions, failure to register
her vehicle, and contempt, the county filed the first of two termination of parental rights

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(TPR) petitions. Following a th ree-day court trial in August 2019, the district court
dismissed the first TPR petition, concluding that mother had “begun to comply with parts
of the case plan . . . including beginning to treat her mental health and finding suitable and
sustainable housing.” The district court found that the child was still in need of protection
or services, but that “further efforts may co rrect” the existing issues. The district court
ordered that a trial home visit could begin after mother had successfully begun supervised
visitation, had “at least 2 additional therapy sessions with her treating counselor(s),” and
after “a short visit of the . . . mother’s home by the child and others chosen by the [county].”
The child was returned to mother’s care in December 2019.
The child was again removed from mother’s care on April 2, 2020, after the social
worker was made aware of a number of new incidents involving mother and law
enforcement, some of which resulted in new criminal charges. The second termination
petition was filed July 21, 2020. Mother denied this termination petition, which proceeded
to trial.
During the second TPR trial, the distri ct court heard testimony from numerous
individuals, including the county so cial worker, the child’s guardian ad litem (GAL),
mother’s therapist, and mother. The district court terminated mother’s parental rights to
the child, finding the ag ency made reasonable efforts to reunify mother and the child,
termination was justified under all three statutory bases set forth in the termination petition,
and termination was in the best interests of the child. Mother appeals.

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DECISION
Appellate courts affirm a di strict court’s termination of parental rights if (1) the
county made reasonable efforts to reunite the family, (2) one or more statutory basis for
termination is supported by clear and convinci ng evidence, and (3) te rmination is in the
child’s best interests. See In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn.
2008). We defer to the district court’s decision to terminate parental rights if all the above
statutory requirements for termination are met. See In re Welfare of Child of A.M.C., 920
N.W.2d 648, 662 (Minn. App. 2018).
In reviewing a district court’s decision to terminate parental rights, we apply a two-
part standard of review under which we revi ew a district court’s “findings of basic or
underlying fact[s] . . . for clear error,” but review “‘ultimate facts’ and ‘mixed questions of
law and fact’ (both often stated in ‘the trial court’s conclusions of law’) . . . for an abuse of
discretion.” In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011)
(quoting Rubey v. Vannett, 714 N.W.2d 417, 423-24 (Minn. 2006), review denied (Minn.
Jan. 6, 2012). A district court abuses its discretion if it resolves the discretionary question
in a manner “that is against logic and the facts on record.” Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d
199, 202 (Minn. 1997).
Mother does not clearly artic ulate whether she appeals because of the district court’s
findings of fact being clearly erroneous or because the district court’s findings as to
“ultimate facts” and its conclusion s are the result of an abuse of discretion. As to either
basis, we have reviewed the record to determ ine that the factual findings of the district

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court are not clearly erroneous and its findings as to “ultimat e facts” and its conclusions
are not an abuse of discretion.
I. The district court did not clearly err by finding that the county made
reasonable efforts to reunify mother and the child.

When a child is removed from the family home, the responsible social services
agency must make “reasonable efforts” to reunify the pare nt(s) and child. Minn. Stat.
§ 260.012(a) (2020).
When determining whether reasonable efforts have been made,
the court shall consider whether services to the child and family
were:
(1) relevant to the safety and protection of the child;
(2) adequate to meet th e needs of the child and
family;
(3) culturally appropriate;
(4) available and accessible;
(5) consistent and timely; and
(6) realistic under the circumstances.

Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (1)-(6) (2 020). “The county’s efforts must assist in alleviating
the conditions that gave rise to the dependency adjudication.” In re Welfare of H.K., 455
N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn. App. 1990), review denied (Minn. July 6, 1990). “Whether the
county has met its duty of reas onable efforts requires consid eration of the length of the
time the county was in volved and the quality of effort given.” Id. A district court’s
decision that the county made reasonable effort s to reunite the family is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. See In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D. , 865 N.W.2d 315, 323 (Minn.
App. 2015), review denied (Minn. July 20, 2015).
Mother argues that such efforts “simpl y did not happen.” The record belies this
claim. The court-ordered case plan required mother to meet, among all other requirements,

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three key components: (1) rema in law-abiding; (2) mainta in stable and appropriate
housing; and (3) address her mental health, sp ecifically directing mother to participate in
“dialectical behavior therapy” (DBT). Mo ther complied with the second component but
not the other two. The district court’s find ings reflect that mother’s underlying mental-
health condition was primarily responsible for the issues pr eventing mother from
reunifying with her child.
The district court found that “the [c ounty] ha[d] expended reasonable efforts
towards reunification with mother, even though mother ha[d] repeatedly made it clear that
she did not intend to work cooperatively with the [county].” (emphasis added). The record
supports this finding. This court must c onsider “the quality of effort given.” H.K., 455
N.W.2d at 532. In this case, the quality of effort was both sufficient and reasonable. The
GAL had been in contact with mother’s ther apist to coordinate therapy and the social
worker had communicated and coordinated with mo ther’s Adult Reha bilitative Mental
Health Services (ARMHS) workers. The AR MHS workers assisted mother to assure
payment of her bills, assure she had tran sportation (including pa ying for car fuel),
facilitated zoom visits between mother and child, and assisted mother with developing
necessary daily skills. Additi onally, when allegations of ongoing shoplifting by mother
became known to the social work er, she offered to provide mother with assistance to
purchase food and other necessities.
The record supports the district court’s fi nding that mother failed to address the main
concern—her mental health—in spite of the county’s reasonable efforts. As found by the
district court, mother’s failure to rehabilita te her underlying mental-health issues resulted

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from mother’s inability to rec ognize her need for treatment, wh ich led to her failure to
begin DBT treatment. Though it is undisputed that mother was regularly meeting with a
therapist, she did not enroll in a DBT program and her therapist was—by his own
admission—“not a DBT therapist.” The entirety of mother’s DBT effort consisted of DBT-
related “worksheets,” which were completed by mother but not reviewed by the therapist.
The social worker and GAL testified th at they had seen very little progress in
mother’s mental-health therapy. The district court found the social worker and GAL to be
credible, concluding that “nothing appeared to suggest in any way that mother’s pattern of
parenting conduct (and general lifestyle) will not continue . . . . Despite what [mother’s
therapist] may think, [mother]’s lack of meaningful progress [in therapy] will remain
detrimental to the welfare of the child.” Co nversely, the district court found that the
therapist “could not identify any concrete progress that [mother] ha[d] made.” (emphasis
in original).
Finally, as more evidence of the county’s reasonable efforts towards reunification,
the district court found that the child had been subject to child-protection proceedings “for
568 days of his short life. That is almost double Minnesota’s established timelines for the
need for permanency for a child who is only four.” (emphasis in original). As noted above,
“[w]hether the county has met its duty of re asonable efforts requires consideration of the
length of the time the county was involved.” H.K., 455 N.W.2d at 532. The record amply
supports the district court’s findings and conclusion that the county made reasonable efforts
to reunify mother and child. The district court did not clearly err in so finding.

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II. The district court’s finding that the mother was palpably unfit to parent was
not clearly erroneous and its final conclusion as to that statutory factor was not
an abuse of discretion.

Involuntary termination of parental rights requires the existence of one or more of a
number of statutorily delineated bases. Mi nn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b) (2020). The
district court found mother to be palpably unfit to parent , section 260C.301, subdivision
1(b)(4), and concluded that termination was justified pursuant to that statutory basis.1
A district court may terminate parental rights if it finds
that a parent is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and
child relationship because of a c onsistent pattern of specific
conduct before the child or of specific conditions directly
relating to the parent and child relationship either of which are
determined by the court to be of a duration or nature that
renders the parent unable, fo r the reasonably foreseeable
future, to care appropriately for the ongoing physical, mental,
or emotional needs of the child.

Id., subd. 1(b)(4). The party se eking termination must “prove a consistent pattern of
specific conduct or specific conditions existing at the time of the hearing that, it appears,
will continue for a prolonged, indefinite period and that are permanently detrimental to the
welfare of the child.” In re Welfare of Children of T.R. , 750 N.W.2d 656, 661 (Minn.
2008). In line with these requirements, cond itions relating solely to the parent—such as
mental illness, substance abuse, or se xual misconduct—do not result in “palpable
unfitness.” Id. at 661-62. Rather, there must be a “causal connection” between the

1 The district court also concluded that termin ation was justified on the basis of failure of
reasonable efforts to correct the conditio ns leading to out-of-home placement, id.,
subd. 1(b)(5), and mother’s failure to comply with her parent-child duties, id. ,
subd. 1(b)(2). However, because only one statutory basis ne ed be found to justify a
termination of parental rights, id., subd. 1(b), we do not review these conclusions.

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condition “and the parent’s inabil ity to care fo r the child.” Id. at 662. We “review the
district court’s findings of the underlying or basic facts for clear error, but we review its
determination of whether a particular statutory basis for involuntarily terminating parental
rights is present for an abuse of discretion.” J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 901.
The district court based its finding of palpable unfitness on mother’s unresolved
mental-health issues, as evidenced by mother’s inability to interact appropriately with the
social worker, foster parents, or the public. The district court expressed specific concern
with mother’s hostile relationship with the foster parents and social worker, which included
both an inability to communicat e effectively and truthfu lly (including mother’s
concealment of pending criminal charges). The record supports these district court
findings, as well as the district court’s final conclusion that this statutory factor had been
satisfied.
The record includes exampl es of multiple online posts in which mother angrily
accused the foster parents and child-protection workers of attempting to steal the child from
her. In one post, mother, referencing a photo of the foster parents, indicated that they were
“the sick f---s who [were] hurting [her] [child].” In another post, mother indicated that she
had “decided to put hexes” on the social workers, GAL, foster parents, and others involved
in the child-protection proceedings, and, following an au tomobile accident involving the
social worker, claimed that th e “hex” she had previously pu t on the social worker had
caused the accident. This record supports the district court’ s finding that this ongoing
“dangerous and threatening behavior” stemme d from mother’s “refus[al] to accept the

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recommendations of the professionals” regardin g her need for DBT and mother’s overall
lack of “insight into her untreated mental illnesses or dangerous behaviors.”
The district court also found as further indication of mother’s failure to address her
mental health mother’s recent and numerous interactions with law enforcement involving
instances of shoplifting, trespass, assault, and DWI, several of wh ich led to criminal
charges. The district court found that mother “ha[d] continued shoplifting in the presence
of the child,” and, in one inst ance was “arrested in front of the child,” and in a separate
incident “assaulted a security officer by dragging him with her vehicle in front of the child.”
The district court also found that, during a DWI arrest at 2:45 a.m., mother—who had the
11-year-old child of her friend in the car—informed the officers that she had been drinking
at a nearby bar and was taking “numerous medications,” including a muscle relaxer which
made her feel “messed up,” and failed a field sobriety test.
The district court found that the abov e-described behaviors demonstrated an
“inability to consistently place her son’s needs ahead of her own” and “teach her son safe
and healthy behaviors.” The court found that the “mother’s manic and paranoid behaviors
have worsened,” and that mother was unable to provide the ch ild with a safe and stable
environment. The district court noted th at the negative consequences of mother’s
inappropriate actions had already resulted in detriment to the child, and that the child was
“sad and withdrawn” following visits with mother and wo uld lash out and not act like
himself following visits.
Finally, the district court found that th e above-described behavior was likely to
continue for a prolonged period without foreseeable end. T.R., 750 N.W.2d at 661 (stating

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conditions leading to palpable unfitness must “continue fo r a prolonged, indefinite
period”). As noted by the GAL, mother ha d been given ample a ssistance and numerous
opportunities to correct her detrimental beha vior throughout the en tirety of the child-
protection proceedings, and had t hus far failed to do so. Th e district court found that
mother had failed to make progress but also re sisted attempts at necessary treatment by
claiming that she did not require treatment and did not pose a risk to the child. The district
court found that mother’s resistance to necessary and court-ordered treatment was harmful
to the child and in direct conflict with the possibility of any future attempts at rehabilitation
or reunification.
These findings are supported by the record and clearly, directly connect to mother’s
fitness as a parent, and support the district court’s conclusion that the conditions were likely
to continue for a prolonged peri od. The district court did no t clearly err in finding that
mother is palpably un fit to parent and did not abuse its discretion in concluding this
statutory basis was met by clear and convincing evidence.
III. The district court did not abuse its dis cretion in concluding that termination of
mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests.

The child’s best interests is “the para mount consideration” in all termination
proceedings. J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 902. “The ‘bes t interests of the child’ means all
relevant factors to be consid ered and evaluated.” Minn. St at. § 260C.511(a) (2020). We
review a district court’s determinations regarding best interests for an abuse of discretion,
and grant “considerable deference” to such determinations in doing so. In re Welfare of
Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 92 (Minn. App. 2012).

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In analyzing the best interests of the child , the district court must consider “(1) the
child’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest in
preserving the parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing interest of the child.” In
re Welfare of R.T.B. , 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992); Minn. R. Juv. Prot.
P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii). The district court did not specifically identify these three factors in
conducting its best-interests analysis. The district court did specifically conclude that “[i]t
is in the best interests of this child . . . that the parental rights of [mother] be . . . terminated.”
Though specific reference to the three best-i nterest factors is help ful in analyzing the
sufficiency of a district court’s findings, the record reveals that the district court did weigh
all three factors, thereby supporting its conclusion that termination was in the best interests
of the child. See In re Welfare of Child of J.R.R. , 943 N.W.2d 661, 66 7-68 (Minn. App.
2020) (noting that while district courts must make “a specific finding that termination is in
the best interests of the child ,” they need only “analyze” the three best-interests factors,
with the primary concern being whether th e factual basis for the district court’s
determination address those factors).
We will assume, without so deciding, th at the first two factors weigh against
termination. Even so, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that those
two factors were overcome by the weight of the third factor.
The district court found that mother “love s her son intensely,” and that this weighed
in favor of maintaining the parent-child relationship. However, the district court also found
that “simply loving a child emotionally does not provide the child with all the needs that a
four-year-old has. The rest of the basic re sponsibilities that are required of a parent must

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be present, and not just for a few hours or on some days.” The district court compared the
love shared between mother and child with the child’s interest in “stability,” including the
need for a parent who can “meet [the] child’s needs on a consistent and routine basis.” The
district court found that, despite numerous individuals encouraging mother to obtain
mental-health treatment, mother failed to make any progress in resolving the mental-health
issues, which prevented her fulfilling the rest of her “basic responsibilities.” As noted
above, the district court noted that this lack of insight and mother’s placing of the child in
dangerous and compromising situations (including situations involving law enforcement)
had resulted in mother being “unable to provi de the child with the stable, safe, secure
environment in which he thrives.” The court found that mother’s inability to appropriately
care for the child posed a risk of harm. Weighing this agai nst the factors in favor of
maintaining the parent-child relationship— including the loving relationship between
mother and the child—the district court concluded that termination was in the child’s best
interests.
The district court did not abuse its disc retion in concluding that termination of
parental rights was in the child’s best interests.
IV. The district court did not vi olate mother’s due-process rights.
Finally, mother argues that her due-process ri ghts were violated in two ways. First,
she argues that the district court erred by faili ng to grant a continuance of the TPR trial.
Second, she argues that the district court erred by relying on criminal charges rather than
convictions in making its findings.

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We review a parent’s due-process claims in the context of a TPR proceeding de
novo. In re Welfare of Children of D.F., 752 N.W.2d 88, 97 (Minn. App. 2008). “Although
the amount of process due in a particular case varies with the unique circumstances of that
case, prejudice as a result of the alleged viol ation is an essential component of the due
process analysis.” In re Welfare of Child of B.J.-M. , 744 N.W.2d 669, 673 (Minn. 2008)
(citations omitted).
A. Denial of Continuance
Mother argues that because of schedulin g confusion she had “approximately a 1
week notice of the trial date in this matter.” The record indicates otherwise. The TPR trial
date of September 28, 2020, was first determ ined and provided to the parties during an
admit/deny hearing held on July 29, 2020. It is true that, on September 17, 2020, due to a
judge-removal motion, the September 28 trial date was initially cancelled. However, the
same trial date was placed back on the co urt’s calendar once a substitute judge was
available to preside. The district court denied mother’s continuance request. Mother fails
to explain how the continuance denial on these facts resulted in an inability to adequately
prepare for trial. Prejudice is an “essentia l component of the due process analysis.” Id.
No due-process violation occurred related to this issue.
B. Reliance on Criminal Charges
Mother argues that the district court e rred in considering her criminal charges.
Mother argues that “[t]here is a fundamental problem with punishing a parent and depriving
her of parental rights permanently over an issue such as this where there were no criminal
convictions at the time of the TPR tria l.” However, the district court made no

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determinations regarding the criminality of mother’s actions, noting it “still presume[d] the
mother innocent of any pending charges agains t her when sitting in criminal court.”
(emphasis in original). Rather, the district court simply took notice of the pending charges,
viewed them in light of th e testimony given by the social worker, GAL, and mother
(including mother’s own testimony that shoplifting was an issue for her, and that for her it
“brings relief”), and found the testimony regardin g the charges to be sufficiently credible
so as to be “enlighteni ng for the court in this civil proceeding.” (emphasis added). The
district court’s consideration of these criminal charges and the facts surrounding them was
not error. No violation of mother’s due-process rights occurred on this issue.
Affirmed.