Emmanuel Jentzen, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1490

Emmanuel Jentzen, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed June 21, 2021
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-01-054850

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chelsie M. Willett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith M. Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jonathan P. Schmidt, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

James J. Thomson, Brooklyn Park City Attorney, Kennedy & Graven, Chartered,
Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Ellen A.C. LaVigne, Assistant City Atto rney, Colich & Asso ciates, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Pres iding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’ s denial of his petition for postconviction
relief. Because the district court correctly determined that appellant was not entitled to
relief on his petition, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Emmanuel Jentzen petitioned fo r postconviction relie f in June 2020,
seeking review of multiple convictions betw een 2001 and 2006. Jentzen sought relief in
eight cases in which he had entered a guilty plea: misdemeanor violating an order for
protection on July 5, 2001; gross misdem eanor violating an or der for protection on
January 22, 2003; misdemeanor theft on Se ptember 19, 2003; misdemeanor disorderly
conduct on September 8, 2004; a continuan ce for dismissal on misd emeanor disorderly
conduct on September 8, 2004; disorderly co nduct on December 22, 2004; driving while
impaired—test refusal on August 26, 2005; and two counts of driving while impaired on
December 5, 2006.
Jentzen alleged these facts in his postconviction petition. He is a native of Liberia
and came to the United States in September 1993. He became a lawful permanent resident
one year later. In April 2020, the United States Department of Homeland Security initiated
removal proceedings against Jentzen because of his convictions.
In his petition, Jentzen asked to withdraw his guilty plea s for his convictions. He
argued that, under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559
U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), his attorneys provided ineffective assistance of counsel

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by failing to advise him of the possible immi gration consequences of his convictions.
Jentzen maintained that he would not have pleaded guilty and “would have insisted on trial,
had he been properly a dvi[sed] of the immigration conse quences.” He argued that his
petition was “timely because it is not frivolous, because it is in the interest of justice and it
was filed within 3 months of learning that there were immigration consequences to the
plea.”
The district court denied Jentzen’s pos tconviction petition in a September 2020
order. The district court determined that Je ntzen’s postconviction claims were statutorily
time-barred because the petition was filed more than two years after the entry of judgments
of conviction. It likewise determined that no exceptions to the two-year time bar applied.
The district court also rejected Jentzen’s argument that he should be permitted to withdraw
his guilty pleas based on Padilla, noting that the Minnesota Su preme Court has held that
Padilla does not apply retroactively, and Jentzen’s convictions all occurred before Padilla
was decided. Thus, the district court de termined that Jentzen was not entitled to
postconviction relief.1 This appeal follows.
DECISION
Jentzen challenges the district court’s de nial of his postconv iction petition. We
review a district court’s decision denying postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion.

1 According to the parties’ agreement, the district court also vacated Jentzen’s August 26,
2005 conviction for driving while impaired —test refusal, based on the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Birchfield v. North Dakota , 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016), which
held that the state may not criminalize a person’s refusal to submit to a blood or urine test
without a search warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement. For that reason, that
conviction is not at issue in this appeal.

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Matakis v. State, 862 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn. 2015). But we review legal questions de novo.
Id. We will reverse only if the district cour t acted arbitrarily or capriciously, based its
decision on an erroneous view of the law, or clearly erred in its factual findings. Id.
The district court correctly determined th at Jentzen’s postconviction claims were
statutorily time-barred. A petition for postconviction relief must be filed within two years
of either “the entry of judgment of conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed” or
“an appellate court’s disposition of petitioner’s direct appeal.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01,
subd. 4(a)(1)-(2) (2018). Jentze n did not file a direct appe al in any of his challenged
convictions. All of Jentzen’s convictions took place between 2001 and 2006, with the most
recent occurring on December 5, 2006. Jentzen filed his postconviction petition more than
a decade later, on June 4, 2020. The district court properly found that Jentzen filed his
petition well outside the two-year time limitation and that he therefore was not entitled to
relief on his claims.
Despite the two-year time bar, the district court may hear a postconviction petition
if it satisfies one of five statutory exceptions. Id., subd. 4(b)(1)-(5) (2018). Jentzen’s
petition raises the interests-of-justice excepti on. To satisfy that exception, the petitioner
must show “that the petition is not frivolous and is in the interests of justice.” Id.,
subd. 4(b)(5). The in terests-of-justice exception app lies “only in exceptional and
extraordinary situations.” Carlton v. State, 816 N.W.2d 590, 607 (Minn. 2012). A petition
is frivolous “if it is perfectly apparent, wit hout argument, that the claims in the petition
lack an objective, good-faith basis in law or fact.” Wallace v. State, 820 N.W.2d 843, 850
(Minn. 2012). And a claim lacks an objective, good-faith basis in law if it rests on “an

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indisputably meritless legal theory” or is “contrary to directly controlling legal authority.”
Id. (quotation omitted).
Here, the district court did not err by determining that Jentzen’s claims contradicted
directly controlling legal author ity. Jentzen sought to wit hdraw his guilty pleas because
his attorneys provided ineffec tive assistance of counsel by failing to inform him of the
immigration consequences of his pleas. He relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in
Padilla. In Padilla, the Supreme Court held that, to guarantee a criminal defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, defense counsel “must inform [a] clie nt whether his plea
carries a risk of deportation.” 559 U.S. at 374, 130 S. Ct. at 1 486. But the Minnesota
Supreme Court has held that the rule in Padilla does not apply retroactively to convictions
that became final before Padilla was decided. Campos v. State , 816 N.W.2d 480, 499
(Minn. 2012).2 The holding in Campos controls our analysis here. Jentzen’s convictions
all date from between 2001 and 2006, which wa s several years before the United States
Supreme Court decided Padilla in 2010. As a result, the rule in Padilla does not apply to
Jentzen’s convictions. Jentzen cannot make the requisite showing for the interests-of-
justice exception.
Jentzen also argues that the allegations in his petition “at the very least . . . entitled
him to an evidentiary hearing where he would have the opportunity to present additional
evidence.” But the district court need not hold an evidentiary hearing if “the petition and

2 The United States Supreme Court has held the same. Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S.
342, 358, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1113 (2013) (holding that Padilla announced a new rule and
that “defendants whose convictions became final prior to Padilla therefore cannot benefit
from its holding”).

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the files and records of the proceeding conclu sively show that the petitioner is entitled to
no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2018); see also Francis v. State , 781 N.W.2d
892, 896 (Minn. 2010) (recognizing that an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary “if the
petitioner fails to allege facts that are suffici ent to entitle him to the relief requested”).
Jentzen’s arguments in his petition hinge on Padilla, and, as explained above, the rule in
Padilla does not apply to his convictions. For that reason, Jentzen is not entitled to his
requested relief.
Finally, at the end of his brief, Jent zen directly addresses the holding in Campos,
saying that he “acknowledges the Minn esota Supreme Court’s decision in Campos;
however, he asks this Court to reconsider and apply Padilla to his case in the interests of
justice.” But Minnesota Supreme Co urt precedent binds this court. State v. Curtis , 921
N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 2018). “[W]e are an error-correc ting court and it is not the role
of this court to abolish established judicial precedent.” State v. Adkins, 706 N.W.2d 59, 63
(Minn. App. 2005). Because the Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding in Campos dictates
that Padilla is not retroactive, we are bound by that decision.
We add that, in denying Jentzen’s postco nviction petition, the district court seems
to have treated Jentzen as favorably as it co uld have within the bou nds of the law. The
district court received letters of support from Jentzen’s friends, and it relied on the letters
to note that Jentzen appears to have reformed his lifestyle since his last conviction in 2006.
The district court also agreed to vacate Jentzen’s conviction for driving while impaired—
test refusal, based on the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Birchfield, 136 S. Ct.
2160, to ensure that Jentzen did not retain a conviction for an act that the law did not make

7
criminal. We agree with the district court’s consideration of these matters. But the law is
clear that Jentzen has no right to relief on his postconviction claims. For this reason, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Jentzen’s petition.
Affirmed.