A20-1499

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1498
A20-1499

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Sonya Faye Olson,
Appellant.

Filed November 15, 2021
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Stearns County District Court
File Nos. 73-CR-19-2574, 73-CR-19-4508.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney , Ole Tvedten, Assist ant County Attorney,
St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Charles F. Clippert, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Trac y M., Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge;
and Hooten, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
After pleading guilty to promotion of pros titution and threats of violence, appellant
Sonya Faye Olson moved to withdraw her plea before sentencing. The district court denied
the motion and sentenced Olson to the maxi mum presumptive sentence pursuant to her
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plea agreement. In these consolidated direct appeals, Olson argues that her convictions
should be reversed and the case remanded fo r trial because the district court erred by
denying her motion to withdraw her plea. In the alternative, Olson contends that her
sentence should be reduced. Because the district court did not abuse its direction in denying
Olson’s motion to withdraw her plea or by imposing a bargained-for sentence that was
within the presumptive guidelines range, we affirm.
FACTS
After respondent State of Minnesota charge d Olson with several counts related to
sex trafficking, property dama ge, and threats of violence, Olson pleaded guilty, pursuant
to a plea agreement, to one count of promo tion of prostitution for three victims and one
count of threats of violence. In exchange, the state did not pursue charges in other pending
matters.
The plea agreement included two different sentencing scenarios. If Olson abided by
certain conditions of release pe nding sentencing, the state would argue for (1) a sentence
of 201 months’ imprisonment for the promo tion count—the middle of the presumptive
range under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines given the severity level of the offense,
Olson’s criminal history, and the presence of an aggravating factor—and (2) a concurrent
sentence of 30 months’ imprisonment for the threats-of-violence count, as provided by the
guidelines. However, if Olson failed to abide by the conditio ns of release, she would
receive (1) the maximum presumptive sentence of 228 months for the promotion count and
(2) a permissive consecutive sentence of 12 mo nths and a day for the threats-of-violence
count, also provided by the guidelines.
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During the plea hearing, Olson affirmed that she had a clear mind, that she was not
pleading guilty just to get out of jail, and that she was not acting as a prostitute at the time
of the promotion-of-p rostitution offense. The district court accepted Olson’s plea and
found her guilty on both counts. Following the plea proceedings, Olson violated conditions
of her release by voluntarily departing fro m treatment and failing to appear at her
sentencing hearing. Olson then moved to withdraw her guilty plea.
At her plea-withdrawal hearing, Olson testif ied contrary to her testimony at the plea
hearing. She testified that, when she pleaded gu ilty, she was not cl earheaded due to
consumption of methamphetamine; that she only pleaded guilty to get out of jail; and that
she in fact was acting as a prostitute at the time of the promotion-of-prostitution offense.
The district court denied Olson’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea because it found that
Olson’s plea-withdrawal-hearing testimony was not credible. The district court further
found the state would be prejudiced if Olson were permitted to withdraw her plea.
The district court sentenced Olson to th e maximum presumptive executed sentence
of 228 months for the promotion offense and a consecutive 12 months and a day for the
threats-of-violence offense.
Olson appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Olson’s motion to
withdraw her plea before sentencing.

Olson argues that the distri ct court should have allowe d her to withdraw her plea
before sentencing because, not withstanding her plea- hearing testimony to the contrary,
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(1) she was under the influence of methampheta mine at the time of her plea; (2) she only
pleaded guilty to get out of jail; and (3) she was acting as a prostitute at the time of the
promotion-of-prostitution offense, an offense that does not apply to persons who are acting
as prostitutes. See Minn. Stat. § 609.322, subd. 1a(2) (2016).
We review the denial of a motion to wit hdraw plea for an abuse of discretion. See
State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 97 (Minn. 2010). In general, a district court must allow a
defendant to withdraw their plea at any time if it is “necessary to correct a manifest
injustice.” Id. at 93. However, if a defendant moves to withdraw their plea before
sentencing, a district court may allow plea withdrawal if it would be “fair and just,” a less
demanding standard. See id.; State v. Lopez, 794 N.W.2d 379, 382 (Minn. App. 2011).
A manifest injustice exists when a guilty plea is not valid. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at
94. To be valid, a guilty plea must be “accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” Id. A plea is
accurate when it is supported by a proper factual basis. Id. A plea is voluntary when it is
free of “improper pressure or coercion.” Id. at 96. A plea is intelligent when the defendant
understands the conseque nces of their plea. Id. Before sentencing, a court may allow a
defendant to withdraw a valid guilty plea if it would be fair and just to do so. State v.
Crump, 826 N.W.2d 838, 841 (Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied (Minn. May 21, 2013).
Under the fair-and-just standard, the di strict court considers “the reasons a
defendant advances to support withdrawal” and any prejudice that granting the motion
would cause the state. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 97. The defe ndant bears the burden of
advancing reasons to support withdrawal; the state bears the burden of showing prejudice.
Id. Even if the state fails to show prejudice, a court may still deny a motion to withdraw a
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plea if the defendant fails to show why granting the motion would be fair and just. State v.
Cubas, 838 N.W.2d 220, 224 (Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 31, 2013).
As to Olson’s first argument—that, at the plea hearing, she was under the influence
of methamphetamine and did not understand the proceedings —the district court found
Olson’s testimony at the plea-withdrawal heari ng not credible. The district court is in the
best position to make findings on credibility, see State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 843
(Minn. 1992), and nothing in th e record shows that the district court abused its discretion
when it found Olson’s testimony at the plea-withdrawal hearing not credible. Because the
district court rejected Olson’s plea-withdrawal-hearing testimony and continued to find her
plea-hearing testimony credible, Olson’s first argument is unpersuasive.
Olson’s remaining arguments––that she pleaded guilty to get out of jail and that she
was acting as a prostitute at the time of th e offense—are also unpersuasive. Olson argues
that plea withdrawal must be granted because the district court failed to specifically address
these two arguments in its ruling. It is true that, in its order de nying Olson’s motion to
withdraw her plea, the district court focused mostly on Olson’s claim that she was under
the influence of drugs at the plea hearing. Bu t the district court also stated that Olson’s
testimony at the plea-withdrawal hearing “was not credible.” And, given that all of Olson’s
arguments for plea withdrawal hinged on the district court finding her plea-withdrawal-
hearing testimony credible, it is evident from the district court’s denial of plea withdrawal
that its statement regarding cr edibility applied to all of Olson’s testimony at the plea-
withdrawal hearing. Because the district court found that Olson’s plea-withdrawal-hearing
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testimony lacked credibility, it did not abuse its discretion by denyi ng Olson’s motion to
withdraw her plea.1
II. The district court did not abuse its di scretion by imposing a bargained-for
sentence that was within the sentencing guidelines.

Olson alternatively argues that her se ntence should be reduced because it was
disproportionate to the severity of her offe nses and her criminal history and was instead
based on her failure to complete treatment.
District courts have broa d discretion in sentencing, and appellate courts do not
reverse sentencing decisions absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303,
307-08 (Minn. 2014). “This court will not generally review a district court’s exercise of its
discretion to sentence a defendant when the se ntence is imposed w ithin the presumptive
guidelines range.” State v. Delk , 781 N.W.2d 426, 4 28 (Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied
(Minn. July 20, 2010).
The district court did not abuse its di scretion when it sentenced Olson to the
maximum presumptive sentence. First, Olson does not dispute that the sentences imposed
are within the presumptive gu idelines range. After calcula ting Olson’s criminal-history
score and determining the severity level of the promotion-of-pro stitution offense, the
district court added 48 months to the presumptive range because of the aggravating factor
of multiple victims, resulting in a range of 179 to 228 months. See Minn. Stat. § 609.322,
subd. 1(b)(4) (2016); Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.G.9, 4.B & 5.A (Supp. 2017). And the

1 Because we conclude that the district cour t did not abuse its disc retion by rejecting the
reasons advanced by Olson for plea withdrawal , we need not review the district court’s
determination regarding prejudice to the state. See Cubas, 838 N.W.2d at 224.
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consecutive 12-months-and-one-day sentence for the threat-of-vio lence offense is
permissive under the guidelines. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 6 (Supp. 2017).
Second, the district court imposed a barg ained-for sentence. As part of the plea
agreement, Olson agreed that the state would argue for less than the maximum presumptive
sentence if she abided by cert ain conditions of release but that she would be given the
maximum presumptive sentence if she violated the conditions. Olson does not dispute that
she violated conditions of release. While Ols on therefore did not recei ve the benefit of a
lower presumptive sentence, the imposition of a higher presum ptive sentence for her two
offenses was not an abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.