City of Hutchinson, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1519

City of Hutchinson,
Respondent,

vs.

Mohammed Shahidullah, AKA Sam Ulland,
Appellant,

RE: The Hazardous Building located at
430 Waters St. N.W., Hutchinson, MN 55350.

Filed September 27, 2021
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

McLeod County District Court
File No. 43-CV-16-646

Marc A. Sebora, Hutchinson City Attorney, Hutchinson, Minnesota; and

Kenneth H. Bayliss, Quinlivan & Hughes, P.A., St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Mohammed Shahidullah, Winsted, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presidi ng Judge; Ross, Judge; and Gaïtas, Judge.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Respondent City of Hutchinson remove d a hazardous building on property owned
by appellant Mohammed Shahidullah, also known as Sam Ulland, 1 using the procedures
provided by the Minnesota hazardous or substandard buildings act (MHSBA). See Minn.
Stat. §§ 463.15-.261 (2020). Three years after the building was razed, the city moved the
district court to award the expenses, includi ng attorney fees, incu rred by the city in
removing the building. The district court granted the city’s request, certifying a deficiency
judgment in the amount of $42,124.98 agai nst Ulland pursuant to the MHSBA. Ulland,
who is self-represented on appeal, argues that (1) the city’s application for expenses was
untimely under the Minnesota Rules of Civ il Procedure; (2) the application lacked
sufficient detail; and (3) in a separate but related matter, he should have been served with
the city’s application for expe nses and allowed to participat e in the proceedings. We
affirm.
FACTS
Ulland owns property located at 430 Water St. N.W., in Hutchinson. The property
previously contained a single-fa mily home that Ulland used for rental inco me. In 2011,
after a prospective tenant reported safety concerns about the property to the city, the city’s
building inspector examined the home and decl ared it uninhabitable. Over the next few

1 Appellant indicated that he prefers to go by Ulland and the district court record refers to
him as such, so we use that name here.
3
years, the home was not repaired and the city discovered individuals living there on several
occasions.
In 2013, a city building o fficial conducted a thorough inspection of the property and
documented a multitude of hazards and code violations. Among the most serious, the
home’s siding had been improperly installed, leading to extensive mold, mildew, and rot;
the home’s roof had many holes; a shower house connect ed to the home was in disrepair
and full of garbage; the home’s electrical sy stem was wholly inadequate, with several
components creating fire hazards; and the home’s furnace was improperly installed and
missing a key component, creating a risk of carbon-monoxide buildup. Following the
inspection, the city instructed Ulland to prepare a comprehensive plan to repair the property
and advised him that the home and appurtenant structures would otherwise be condemned
and razed.
Ulland failed to present a plan or reme dy the hazards and code violations. On
March 22, 2016, the city council passed a re solution determining th at the property was
hazardous under state law and should be razed. The city issued a corresponding abatement
order that instructed Ulland to raze and re move the home and ot her structures on the
property within 20 days.
4
Ulland filed an answer contes ting the abatement order in district court, initiating this
action.2 The district court held a bench trial in March 2017. 3 On March 16, 2017, the
district court issued an order and en tered judgment in favor of the city. 4 The order
instructed Ulland to raze the property within 20 days and, if he did not comply, authorized
the city to summarily enforce the abatement by removing all structures from the property.
It also specified that Ulland would be responsible for abatement and removal costs, along
with “the payment of all costs that the [c]ity has incurred or shall incur in the summary
enforcement of [the abatement order], including reasonable attorney’s fees, filing fees, and
expenses as allowed by Minn . Stat. § 463.22.” Ulland filed posttrial motions for
reconsideration, and the district court denied the motions.
The city removed the structures on Ulland’s property in July 2017. In August 2020,
the city filed an application for allowance of expenses under sections 463.21 and 463.22,
seeking a judgment in the amount of $42,124 .98 against Ulland to recover the costs it
incurred enforcing the abatement order. The co sts included $26,285.10 in attorney fees.
A city administrator submitted an affidavit with the application, which itemized the

2 Under the MHSBA, when a property owner files an answer specifically denying the facts
in a municipality’s abatement order, the matter proceeds to district court for a ruling on the
abatement order. See Minn. Stat. §§ 463.18, .20.

3 The trial was initially scheduled for June 2016, bu t the district court summarily granted
judgment in favor of the city as a sanction against Ulland for failing to attend his deposition
and for violating the scheduling order. The district court later granted Ulland’s motion for
reconsideration and reset the matter for trial.

4 The district court noted that the evidence presented at trial revealed that the case “was not
a close call,” and that “[t]he [p]roperty overw helmingly [met] the st atutory definition of
‘hazardous’” and needed to be razed “as soon as possible.”
5
expenses and attached 80 pages of documentation, including invoices, contractor estimates,
and breakdowns of the attorney fees.
At a hearing on the city’s expense applic ation, Ulland argued that the application
was untimely because, under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(b), the city should
have moved for expenses within 45 days of the district court’s March 16, 2017 judgment.
The district court questioned whether rule 54.04(b) applied, noting that the MHSBA should
control. The city asserted in response that the 45-day rule Ulland referenced was “totally
inapplicable” because the MHSBA itself contemplates automatic costs and disbursements.
On September 29, 2020, the district cour t entered judgment and an order approving
the city’s report and applicatio n for allowance of expenses and certified judgment in the
amount of $42,124.98 against U lland. The order states that the requested expenses are
statutorily permitted and that Ulland provided no legal basis to support his objections.
Furthermore, the order authorizes the municipal clerk to specially assess the judgment as a
lien against the property if the expenses are not paid.
Ulland appeals.
DECISION
The proceedings in this matter occurre d under the MHSBA, Minnesota Statutes
sections 463.15 through 463.261. Under the MHSBA, municipalities can “order the owner
of any hazardous building or pr operty within the municipality to correct or remove the
hazardous condition of the building or property or to raze or remove the building.” Minn.
Stat. § 463.16. The municipality’s abatem ent order must cite the grounds for the
municipality’s decision, specify any necessa ry repairs, provide a reasonable time for
6
compliance, and state that, unless the prop erty owner takes corrective action, the
municipality will move the district court for summary enforcement of its order. Minn. Stat.
§ 463.17, subd. 1. If the property owner serv es and files an answer specifically denying
the facts in the abatement order, the action proceeds in district court under the rules of civil
procedure subject to an exception not applicable here. Minn. Stat. §§ 463.18, .20.
The district court may sustain, modify, or annul and set aside the abatement order
following a trial. See Minn. Stat. § 463.20; City of Litchfield v. Schwanke , 530 N.W.2d
580, 582 (Minn. App. 1995). If the district c ourt sustains the abatement order, “the court
shall enter judgment and shall fix a time af ter which the building must be destroyed or
repaired or the hazardous cond ition removed or corrected.” Minn. Stat. § 463.20. If the
property owner does not comply with the judgment in the time prescribed, the municipality
“may cause the building to be repaired, razed, or removed or the hazardous condition to be
removed or corrected as set forth in the judgment.” Minn. Stat. § 463.21.
The MHSBA also allows the municipality to file an app lication with the district
court for allowance of the expe nses it incurs in carrying ou t an abatement order. Minn.
Stat. § 463.22. After the municipality provides its account of expenses to the district court,
the court must consider, correct if appropriate, and grant the application. Id.
Ulland challenges the district court’s allowa nce of expenses that the city incurred in
enforcing the abatement order against his prope rty. He primarily argues that the city’s
application for expenses was untimely under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(b).
Ulland’s brief to this court al so asserts that the city’s a pplication for expenses lacked
sufficient detail and that, in a separate, relate d matter, he ought to ha ve been served with
7
the city’s application for expenses and a llowed to participate in the proceedings. 5 W e
address each argument in turn.
I. The city’s application for expenses was not untimely.

Ulland first argues that the city was requi red to comply with the Minnesota Rules
of Civil Procedure in moving for expenses because the MHSBA specifically provides that
contested proceedings are governed by these rules. He contends that the city’s application
for expenses—filed approximately three years after the district court’s March 16, 2017
judgment sustaining the ab atement order—was untimely under rule 54.04(b), which
requires a litigant to move for costs and disbursements within 45 days of a judgment.
Ulland accordingly asks us to reverse the district court’s allowance of expenses.
To address this argument, we must inte rpret the MHSBA and rule 54.04(b). “The
interpretation of a statute is a question of law that [appellate courts] review de novo.”
Cocchiarella v. Driggs , 884 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. 2016); see also Swenson v.
Nickaboine, 793 N.W.2d 738, 741 (Min n. 2011). Likewise, “[t] he interpretation of the
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure is a questi on of law that [appellate courts] review de
novo.” Gams v. Houghton, 884 N.W.2d 611, 616 (Minn. 2016).

5 Ulland lists a fourth issue in his brief that he does not analyze or otherwise explain. He
merely states that an issue ex ists as to whether he “is entitled to file Notice of Appeal to
[the] [C]ourt of [A]ppeals against the trial court’s [judgment] and order on the ground that
it is now convenient for him to do so,” even though he “failed to file Notice of Appeal . . .
within 60 days after the ju dgment.” We are unsure what he means, but he may be
suggesting that he could still challenge the district court’s March 16, 2017 order sustaining
the city’s abatement order. We do not reach that issue, th ough, because Ulland did not
provide any analysis to support his contention and because inadequately briefed issues are
not properly before an appellate court. Melina v. Chaplin , 327 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn.
1982).
8
As noted, the MHSBA expressly allows a municipality to enforce a judgment
sustaining an abatement order by razing a building or by taking other action to remove the
hazard. Minn. Stat. § 463.21. The MHSBA al so provides a specific procedure that a
municipality must follow to recover resulting expenses, which include “expenses incurred
in carrying out the order” and “all other expenses theretofore incurred in connection with
its enforcement,” including attorn ey fees, court costs, witness fees, and travel expenses.
Minn. Stat. § 463.22. This procedure requires a municipality to “keep an accurate account
of the expenses incurred in carrying out the order.” Id. Then, the municipality “shall report
its action under the order, with a statement of moneys recei ved and expenses incurred to
the court for approval and allowance.” Id. The MHSBA also outlin es the obligations of
the court upon receipt of a municipality’s application for allowance of expenses. The court
shall examine, correct, if nece ssary, and allow the expense
account, and, if the amount re ceived from the sale of the
salvage, or of the building or structure, does not equal or
exceed the amount of expenses as allowed, the court shall by
its judgment certify the deficiency in the amount so allowed to
the municipal clerk for collection.

Id. The MHSBA addresses the duty of the owner or other party in interest once a municipal
clerk initiates collection. An owner or other party in interest “shall pay the same, without
penalty added thereon.” Id. And the MHSBA provides a timeline for payment of expenses.
If the owner or other party in interest is “in default of payment by October 1,” the municipal
clerk “shall certify the amount of the expense to the county auditor for entry on the tax lists
of the county as a special charge against the real estate on which the building or hazardous
condition is or was situated.” Id.
9
Rule 54.04 provides the pr ocedures that parties must follow to recover costs and
disbursements that are allowed “as provided by law” in civil actions. Minn. R. Civ. P.
54.04(a). Under rule 54.04(b), “[a] party seeking to recover costs and disbursements must
serve and file a detailed application for taxation of costs and disbursements with the court
administrator.” The application “must be served and filed not later than 45 days after entry
of a final judgment as to the part y seeking costs and disbursements.” Id. A “judgment,”
within the meaning of rule 54, is “the final de termination of the rights of the parties in an
action or proceeding.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 54.01.
Ulland asserts that the city’s applicati on for expenses was barred by rule 54.04(b)
because it was filed years after the district c ourt sustained the city’s abatement order and
entered judgment. According to Ulland, the city was required under rule 54.04(b) to file
its application within 45 days of the district court’s March 16, 2017 order—which would
have been April 30, 2017.
The city responds that rule 54.04(b) does not apply because its request for expenses
was not made as a motion following a final judgment, but instead was made as part of the
proceedings under the MHSBA. See Minn. Stat. §§ 463.21-.22. Noting that the MHSBA
provides no deadlines for the demolition or repair of a hazardous structure, and that a
municipality cannot apply for expe nses before they are incurre d, the city argues that it
makes no practical sense to apply rule 54.04(b) to expenses under the MHSBA. Moreover,
the city argues, the expenses that it sought “were not ordinary costs and disbursements as
10
allowed in an ordinary civil action, but instea d the specific expenses related to removing
or remedying the hazardous building.”6
We begin our analysis with some general principles of statutory interpretation. The
object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the
intention of the legislature. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2020). If the legislature’s intent is clear
from the unambiguous statutory language, a c ourt applies the statute’s plain meaning.
Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud, 853 N.W.2d 713, 716-17 (Minn. 2014). On the other hand,
if a statute is susceptible to more than just one reasonable in terpretation, it is ambiguous.
Id. at 717. When a statute is ambiguous, a court may consider other factors to ascertain the
legislature’s intent. Id.
Neither Ulland nor the city address wh ether the plain language of the MHSBA
requires a municipality to comply with rule 54.04 in applying for expenses. Based on our
review of the MHSBA, we note that it does not explicitly impose such a requirement. Thus,
arguably, the plain language of the MHSBA does not support the interpretation that Ulland
proposes.
As Ulland points out, however, the MHSBA does provide that the rules of civil
procedure apply in contested cases. See Minn. Stat. §§ 463.18, .20. This provision
reasonably could be interpreted to require a party to comply with rule 54.04 in seeking
costs following a judgment. Thus, we conc lude that the MHSBA is ambiguous as to

6 The city also argues, in the alternative, that even if rule 54.04(b) does apply to these
proceedings, the 45-day time limit was not triggered by the March 16, 2017 order because
that order was not a “final judgment.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 54.04(b). We do not reach that
argument, though, as we conclude that the rule 54.04(b) time limit does not apply here.
11
whether the timing requirements in rule 54 .04 apply to a municipality’s request for
expenses in a contested case under the MHSBA.
“When a statutory provision is ambiguous, it is appropriate to turn to the canons of
statutory construction to ascertain a statute’s meaning.” State v. Leathers , 799 N.W.2d
606, 611 (Minn. 2011). Additionally, in as certaining legislative intent, a court may
consider legislative history, the subject matter as a whole, and the purpose of the
legislation. Staab, 853 N.W.2d at 718 (quotation omitted); see also Minn. Stat. § 645.17
(2020).
Applying these concepts, we conclude that rule 54.04 do es not apply to a
municipality’s application for a llowance of expenses when a district court sustains an
abatement order in a contested case brought under the MHSBA. Several factors support
this conclusion.
First, construing the MHSBA so as to give effect to all of its provisions—as we are
required to do, see Am. Family Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn. 2000)—
we note that the “expenses” contemplated by the MHSBA go well beyond the litigation
costs and disbursements addressed in ru le 54.04. Although the MHSBA allows a
municipality to recover litigation expenses, it also covers othe r expenses associated with
enforcing an abatement order. Those costs in clude a municipality’s costs for repairing,
demolishing, or selling a building. Minn. Stat. § 463.22. More over, abatement-order
enforcement expenses are calculated from the time that a municipality issues an abatement
order—before any litigation occurs on the abatement order. Id. Indeed, a municipality that
issues an abatement order incurs expenses even in an uncontested matter. Cf. Minn. Stat.
12
§ 463.20 (stating that the civil-procedure rules apply in contested cases). And the MHSBA
does not differentiate between expenses sought after uncontested matters and those sought
after contested matters. Thus, to ensure that “the entire statute [is] effective and certain,”
Minn. Stat. § 645.17(2), we interpret th e MHSBA to provide municipalities with a
procedure wholly separate from rule 54.04 for recovering expenses in all abatement-order
cases.
Second, the procedure provided by the MHSBA for recovering abatement-order
enforcement expenses conflicts with the pr ocess set forth by rule 54.04. Without
differentiating between contested or default cases, the MHSBA requires the district court
to “examine, correct, if necessary, and allow the expense account” submitted by a
municipality. Minn. Stat. § 463.22. But rule 54.04(b) allows either the court administrator
or a district court judge to tax costs. Minn. R. Civ. P. 54.04(d). Under rule 54.04, there is
a specific process for the losing party to challenge the taxed costs and disbursements. See
Minn. R. Civ. P. 54.04(c)-(e). The MHSBA provides no such process. See Minn. Stat.
§ 463.22. Once ordered by the district court, the property owner is required to pay expenses
by October 1 to avoid a special charge against the real estate. Id. Moreover, the prevailing
party requesting costs under the MHSBA is always the municipality. See id. The canons
of statutory interpretation require us to presume that the legislature “does not intend a result
that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable.” Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1). And
specific statutory provisions control general provisions when the two are in conflict. Minn.
Stat. § 645.26, subd. 1. Because the legisl ature provided a distinct procedure for a
municipality to recover expenses under the MHSBA, we assume that the legislature
13
intended for this procedure— and not a conflicting procedur e found elsewhere—to apply
to all matters brought under the MHSBA, whether contested or uncontested.
Finally, the timing requirement of rule 54.04 is inconsistent with the procedures set
forth by the MHSBA, which are flexible and c ontain no express timing constraints. The
MHSBA contemplates that before a muni cipality corrects the condition caused by a
hazardous building, the property owner or party in interest w ill be afforded some time to
personally arrange for the repair or removal of the structure. See Minn. Stat. § 463.20
(requiring district court to “fix a time after which the building must be destroyed or repaired
or the hazardous condition removed or corrected ”). Here, for example, the district court
fixed that time at 20 days from the issuance of its order. If the property owner or party in
interest does not repair or raze the structure, a municipality has authority to do so. Minn.
Stat. § 463.21 (“If a judgment is not complied with in the time pres cribed, the governing
body may cause the building to be repaired, razed, or removed . . . .”). As noted, however,
the MHSBA does not provide any deadline for the city’s action. See Minn. Stat. §§ 463.20-
.22. And for good reason. The scope of the corrective action required will depend on the
nature of the problem, which, in turn, will affect the timing of the corrective action. Tearing
down a high rise, for example, is a very different project than fixing a roof and some siding.
But if the 45-day time limit provided by rule 54.04(b) applied, a city would be required to
act swiftly in every case, rega rdless of the circumstances, or forfeit the opportunity to
recover expenses. Again, we must presume th at the legislature “does not intend a result
that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable ,” Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1).
Applying this canon of constr uction, we conclude that the legislature did not intend the
14
timeline provided by rule 54.0 4 to govern a municipality’s a pplication for allowance of
expenses under the MHSBA.
In sum, we conclude that the legislat ure intended the expense provisions of the
MHSBA and not rule 54.04 to govern a municipality’s app lication for allowance of
expenses under the MHSBA. The city’s application for allowance of expenses, which was
brought to recover expenses for enforcin g an abatement order under the MHSBA, was
accordingly not subject to the 45-day time limita tion in rule 54.04(b). Thus, the district
court did not err in rejecting Ulland’s argume nt that the city’s application was untimely
and allowing the city’s requested expenses.
II. Ulland has not demonstrated that the di strict court abused its discretion in
allowing the city’s requested expenses.

Ulland also asserts that the district cour t’s order allowing the expenses should be
reversed because “[the city] did not provide detailed account, [but] instead summarized it.”
Ulland does not provide additional argument on this point.
Appellate courts “generally review a district court’s award of costs and
disbursements for an abuse of discretion.” Dukowitz v. Hannon Sec. Servs. , 841 N.W.2d
147, 155 (Minn. 2014). Alt hough we have concluded th at a municipality requesting
expenses under the MHBSA is not required to follow the civil proc edure rule governing
costs and disbursements, we elect to apply the same abuse-of-discretion standard of review
to consider the district court’s allowance of expenses. The reasonableness of an award of
attorney fees is also reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State by Comm’r of Transp. v.
Krause, 925 N.W.2d 30, 32-33 (Minn. 2019).
15
The city attached an affida vit by a city administrator to its expense application, and
the city administrator stated that he had care fully examined the city’s costs and expenses
for enforcing the abatement order. He categorized the expenses, which included filing fees,
service fees, attorney fees, witness fees, and abatement expenses, and attached 80 pages of
supporting documentation. The documentation included invoices, contractor estimates,
and itemization of attorney time spent on the matter.
The district court determin ed that the city had “submitted sufficient documentation”
under the MHSBA, and that the submitted costs were a “reasonable, necessary, and
accurate accounting of the expenses incurred by the [c]ity” in carry ing out the abatement
order. Its order noted that “[w]hile the attorn eys’ fees are significant, they are consistent
with the amount of work nece ssary in this matter, in part due to [Ulland’s] repeated and
baseless arguments.”
Ulland has not shown that the district court abused its discretion by granting the
city’s application for expenses. He did not ob ject to any of the specific items or amounts
in the affidavit in district court, and he cites no authority to support his proposition on
appeal that the city’s application lacked sufficient detail. While he asks us to “review the
totality of his case,” appellate courts do not determine issues of fact on appeal, Fontaine v.
Steen, 759 N.W.2d 672, 679 (Minn. App. 2009), and “the burden of showing error rests
upon the one who relies upon it,” Loth v. Loth , 35 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1949)
(quotation omitted). An assignment of error in a brief ba sed on “mere assertion” and not
supported by argument or authority is waived unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere
inspection. Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn.
16
1971). We accordingly conclude that Ulland has not demonstrated any error by the district
court regarding the sufficiency of the city’s application for expenses.
III. Ulland has not properly raised his argu ments about the separate case file
involving the same property.

Ulland’s final argument is that he shou ld have been served with a notice of
application for costs and disbursements and allo wed to participate in a separate case file
regarding the same property.
The city brought the related action that U lland references against Beverly Scheurer,
concerning the same hazardous property. Scheurer sold Ulland the property decades before
this proceeding commenced, but the two did not record the deed evidencing the sale. The
city therefore initiated an action regarding the property against Scheurer before it then
commenced a separate action against Ulland.
Immediately before the hearing in this ma tter on the city’s application for expenses,
the district court called and brie fly addressed the Scheurer matter. 7 Ulland attempted to
speak during the Scheurer matter, and the dist rict court would not allow him to do so,
explaining: “I’m not going to address your – any arguments from you in the [Scheurer] file
because you’re not a party to that case.”
On appeal, Ulland does not provide any an alysis or legal argu ment as to why he
should have been permitted to participate in the related matter, where Scheurer is the only
defendant. Again, “mere assertion,” without more, cannot support an assignment of error.
Schoepke, 187 N.W.2d at 135. And inadequately briefed issues are not properly before an

7 The transcript for Ulland’s hearing also contains the brief hearing on the Scheurer matter.
17
appellate court. Melina, 327 N.W.2d at 20. Moreover, Ulland has not shown that it is
procedurally permissible for him to challenge the district court’s decision in a separate file
through an appeal in this file. We accordingly decline to consider Ulland’s assertions about
notice and an opportunity to participate in the related matter.
Affirmed.