Sarah Anne Trisko, and o/b/o Minor Children, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1524

Sarah Anne Trisko, and o/b/o Minor Children,
Respondent,

vs.

Karen Mary Hartung,
Appellant.

Filed September 20, 2021
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CV-20-7186

Sarah Anne Trisko, Sauk Centre, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

John A. Abress, Franz Hultgren Evenson, P.A., St. Cloud, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s order granting a harassment restraining
order (HRO) against her and on behalf of her next-door neighbor and her neighbor’s minor
children. Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by (1) admitting
hearsay evidence and crediting that evidence in its findings, and (2) granting the HRO with
insufficient evidence to support its findings . We conclude sufficient record evidence
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sustains the HRO even after we set aside the challenged hearsay evidence from our review.
Thus, we affirm and need not decide the hearsay issue.
FACTS
In October 2020, respondent Sarah Anne Trisko petitioned for a two-year
harassment restraining order (HRO) against her neighbor, appellant Karen Mary Hartung.
Trisko and Hartung live on adjacent lots on the shores of Sylvia Lake. The Triskos moved
into their lake home in July 2020. The district court held an evidentiary hearing on Trisko’s
petition in November 2020, during which it received testimony from Trisko, her husband
Josh, Hartung, and another neighbor. 1 The district court received three exhibits into
evidence, all photographs.
At the end of the testimony, the district court discussed the evidence Trisko offered
in support of her claim.
1. Photographs by Hartung
The district court first discussed Trisko’s testimony that, when they had friends over
for a bonfire in August 2020, Hartung took many photos of the Trisko family. A month
later, the Trisko’s son photographed Hartung taking photos of a boulder wall being built
on the Trisko property. Hartung denied her photos were of the Trisko property and said she
was photographing the moon on the night of the bonfire.
The district court found, first, Trisko and Hartung have an “ongoing boundary
issue,” and this issue “seems to be a legitimate purpose for why those photographs may be

1 To avoid confusion, this opinion refers to Sarah Trisko by her last name and Josh Trisko
by his first name.
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being taken.” Next, the district court considered whether the photographs invaded Trisko’s
privacy and it determined that they did not because Hartung was “simply taking
photographs of an adjoining neighbor[’s] property” that was “out in the open.”
2. Hartung’s comments about Trisko’s husband
The district court next considered Hartung’s comments to Trisko about her husband.
Trisko testified Hartung made sexual comments about her husband— that Hartung enjoyed
watching Josh jump off the dock “in his underwear” and that she wanted to “wrap her
arms” around Josh while riding on a jet ski with him. Hartung denied making these
comments. The district court first noted Josh had not sought protection, but also found that
Hartung’s sexual comments were relevant to Trisko’s testimony that Hartung invaded her
privacy.
3. Hartung’s comments about the cleaning lady and her questions to the
Triskos’ child

Trisko testified Hartung made a series of intrusive and harassing comments when
the family moved into their lake home. The district court specifically credited Trisko’s
testimony that “as soon as they moved into the property essentially, they were approached”
by Hartung, who “knew a whole wealth of information about them: other houses they
looked at when they were looking to buy this property, who their cleaning lady was, what
faith their cleaning lady was, the fact that their cleaning lady left the Amish community.”
The district court found it “is bizarre that a neighbor would have that level of detail about
a neighbor that just moved in.” The district court also found Hartung was “prying too far
into the details of other people’s private lives and not staying in [her] lane.”
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The district court also considered evidence of Hartung questioning the Triskos’
daughter. Trisko testified her nine-year-old daughter reported that Hartung asked whether
the Trisko family goes to church and whether they pray every day. Hartung denied speaking
with the Triskos’ daughter. The district court found Trisko’s testimony credible and had
“no reason to doubt [Hartung’s] comments were made to the child.” The district court also
found Hartung’s questions to the daughter w ere “prying into the family’s personal life
about religious faith and different things of that nature. That is an invasion.”
4. Hartung and the Trisko garage
The district court discussed evidence that Hartung had entered the Trisko property,
specifically their detached garage and the loft above their garage, without their permission.
After purchasing the property, the Triskos began working on the property, involving some
tasks in their garage and installing a boulder wall. Trisko and her husband testified Hartung
entered their property several times, but they also acknowledged they invited Hartung onto
their property on occasion such as for a boat ride and to water the trees in their absence.
Hartung testified the Triskos never told her to stay off their property, and every time she
entered their property or garage, it was because the Triskos had invited her.
The district court credited both parties’ testimony: it accepted evidence of instances
when the Triskos permitted Hartung to enter their property, and found “there is also
testimony that some of [Hartung’s] intrusions have been uninvited. And I do believe that
to be credible.” The district court found Hartung “venture[d] into a garage uninvited. And
I find that troubling.”
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Finally, the district court found the Triskos erected a fence a nd installed a
clothesline, which they used to “put[] up a clothing barrier to prevent prying eyes from
peering into their property.” The district court concluded Trisko was substantially
adversely affected by Hartung’s repeated harassment. The district court, therefore, found
Trisko had prevailed on her claim for an HRO to protect herself and the minor children.
The district court granted the HRO for one year to give the parties a “cooling-off period to
sort out the property disputes and to resolve to be[] adults once again.”
Hartung appeals.
DECISION
Hartung raises two issues on appeal. First, Hartung argues the district court
improperly admitted hearsay evidence when it allowed Trisko to testify to her
nine-year-old daughter’s statements about her conversation with Hartung. The district
court received this evidence over Hartung’s hearsay objection. Second, Hartung argues the
district court erred by granting the HRO because Hartung did not engage in harassment as
a matter of law and there was insufficient evidence to support granting the HRO. We
understand Hartung’s second argument as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
because her brief does not articulate an issue relating to the interpretation of the HRO
statute. We consider the second issue first.
This court review s the district court’s decision to grant an HRO for an abuse of
discretion. Peterson v. Johnson, 755 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. App. 2008). In doing so, we
review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and give due regard for its
opportunity to judge witness credibility. Id.
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We begin our review of Hartung’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence by
considering what the law requires before an HRO petition may be granted. The district
court may issue an HRO if it finds there are reasonable grounds to believe a person has
engaged in harassment. Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 5(b)(3) (2020). Harassment is defined,
in part, as “repeated incidents of intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that have a
substantial adverse effect or are intended to have a substantial adverse effect on the safety,
security, or privacy of another.” Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 1(a)(1) (2020). This court has
stated, “whether certain conduct constitutes harassment may be judged from both an
objective standard, when assessing the effect the conduct has on the typical victim, and a
subjective standard, to the extent the court may determine the harasser’s intent.” Kush v.
Mathison, 683 N.W.2d 841, 845 (Minn. App. 2004), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2004)
(emphasis added). Also, objectively unreasonable conduct “goes beyond an acceptable
expression of outrage and civilized conduct.” Id. at 846.
Finally, the HRO statute generally requires “repeated incidents,” which is two or
more instances of harassing conduct. Id. at 844; see also Peterson, 755 N.W.2d at 766
(stating one incident is not enough to establish harassment absent infliction of bodily harm
or attempt to inflict bodily harm). The preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applies to
the district court’s decision to grant an HRO. See Minn. Stat. § 609.748 (2020) (not
identifying standard of proof for HROs); State by Humphrey v. Alpine Air Prods., Inc.,
500 N.W.2d 788, 790 (Minn. 1993) (stating statutory silence on a standard of proof “is
regarded as a signal that the legislature intended the preponderance of the evidence
standard” to apply).
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To address Hartung’s arguments, we first analyze the district court’s findings about
Hartung’s intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures and then determine whether
record evidence supports the district court’s findings. Because we determine that Hartung’s
repeated prying into Trisko’s private affairs and Hartung’s entry into the Trisko garage are
supported by record evidence, we finally consider whether the district court’s findings of
a substantial adverse effect are supported by the evidence.
A. Repeated instances of Hartung’s prying
The district court credited Trisko’s testimony that, before they moved into the home,
Hartung stated she knew their cleaning lady’s name, where she lived, and that she was
Amish and had left the Amish—information the Triskos did not know. Hartung also told
Trisko she knew the other properties they had viewed before they bought their new home
on Sylvia Lake.
The district court found Trisko’ s testimony credible and found “as soon as [the
Triskos] moved into the property essentially, they were approached by” Hartung, who
“knew a whole wealth of information about them.” And the district court found Hartung
“is a neighbor that is prying too far into the details of other people’s private lives and not
staying in [her] lane. And that would be a great discomfort to anybody who just moved
into the area to find out that they have been researched to such a degree.” The district court
reasoned the purpose of this HRO “is to ensure that further prying doesn’t happen, and I
believe [an HRO] to be appropriate.”
The district court also carefully analyzed Trisko’s testimony that Hartung said she
“enjoys watching [Josh] jump off the dock in his underwear and would love to go on a jet
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ski ride with [Josh] so she can wrap her arms around him.” Josh testified similarly. Hartung
denied she made these comments. The district court noted Josh was not seeking protection
and found that Trisko ’s testimony was not “overly credible,” but the district court also
found “that these comments were made and people parted ways.” While the district court
appears to have rejected the comments about Trisko’s husband as harassment toward Josh,
the district court’s findings suggest it considered the same comments as evidence of
Hartung invading “the privacy of [Trisko’s] home.”
For statements to rise to the level of harassment, the statements must be “intrusive
or . . . were intended to adversely affect the safety, security, or privacy” of the person who
heard them. Witchell v. Witchell, 606 N.W.2d 730, 732 (Minn. App. 2000). Hartung’s
statements about Trisko’s husband are relevant to her claim that Hartung invaded her
privacy and are like Hartung’s comments about the cleaning lady. A reasonable person
would feel that this behavior would have a substantial impact on the person’s privacy and
“goes beyond an acceptable expression of outrage and civilized conduct.” Kush,
683 N.W.2d at 846.
Hartung argues the district court found both Triskos not credible. This argument is
not supported by the record. There is no indication the district court rejected Josh’s
testimony. The district court, in explaining its reasons for finding that Hartung’s comments
to Trisko about Josh did not amount to harassment of Josh, stated Trisko did not call law
enforcement, and therefore the district court did not “necessarily find that overly credible
here in this circumstance.” But the district court otherwise credited Trisko ’s testimony
about Hartung’s prying comments and found Trisko credible.
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Further, because Hartung denied most of the harassing instances testified to by the
Triskos, and the district court found otherwise, we conclude the district court implicitly
found Hartung was not credible. On appeal, we may consider the district court’s implicit
findings of fact as well as its explicit findings. See Pechovnik v. Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d
94, 99 (Minn. App. 2009) (considering implicit credibility findings on appeal from the
district court’s grant of an order for protection). Thus, record evidence supports the district
court’s finding that Hartung’s repeated comments pried into Trisko’s private affairs.
B. Hartung’s entry into the Trisko garage
The district court weighed the evidence about Hartung entering the Trisko property
without permission. Although Josh testified the Triskos sometimes invited Hartung onto
their property, he also testified he once saw Hartung go into the detached garage on the
Trisko property and into the loft above the garage without invitation or permission. Josh
could not remember the specific date of the incident. The district court acknowledged it
was hard to discern when Hartung was or was not invited onto the Trisko property. But the
district court also found “testimony that some of her intrusions have been uninvited. And I
do believe that to be credible.”
Josh’s lack of specificity about when Hartung entered the Trisko garage is not
necessarily fatal to the district court’s findings. See Davidson v. Webb, 535 N.W.2d 822,
823-24 (Minn. App. 1995) (affirming the district court’s finding of harassment even though
the witness could not remember specific dates or conversations). A reasonable person
would feel that a neighbor entering their garage and the loft above it would substantially
adversely impact the person’s safety, security, and privacy. See Kush, 683 N.W.2d at 845.
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Thus, record evidence supports the district court’s finding that Hartung entered the Trisko
garage without permission.
C. Substantial adverse effect
Record evidence also supports the district court’s finding of a substantial adverse
effect on Trisko. Trisko testified her family installed a video surveillance system for the
inside of their home in August 2020 and installed the exterior surveillance system in
October 2020. She also testified they installed a four-foot chain -link fence between their
properties to contain their dogs and because of Hartung’s intrusions. Trisko testified they
put up a clothesline that “is blocking [Hartung’s] view from the window that she sits at
every single day.”
The district court found these mitigation efforts showed Hartung’s harassing
conduct had a substantial adverse effect on Trisko’s safety, security, or privacy because the
Triskos “would not have done those acts if there was not some fee ling of intrusion by
them,” which was “substantial.” Trisko also testified about her feelings of being intruded
upon by Hartung. Tris ko testified she understood Hartung’s prying statements aimed to
obtain private information about them, for example, about their cleaning lady. Trisko
testified she felt like Hartung is “always curious as to what we’re doing.”
Because our review sustains the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the HRO
without considering the challenged hearsay evidence, we need not determine the hearsay
issue because any error would be harmless. Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring that harmless
error be ignored); see also In re Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 835 N.W.2d 487, 493
(Minn. App. 2013) (refusing to consider district court’s error o n the standard of proof
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because “to the extent that the district court erred in failing to apply the preponderance of
the evidence standard, that error was harmless”).
In sum, even after we exclude the challenged hearsay evidence from our analysis,
other record evidence sufficiently supports the district court’s HRO against Trisko.
Because record evidence supports the district court’s factual findings, and its
determinations follow applicable law, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by issuing the HRO.
Affirmed.