State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1528

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Terrell Theo Payne,
Appellant.

Filed September 7, 2021
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-19-1994

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathryn M. Keena, Dakota C ounty Attorney, Anna Light, Assistant County Attorney,
Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jason R. Steffen, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Pres iding Judge; Worke, Ju dge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges the validity of his guilty plea, arguing that it was not accurate
or intelligent. We affirm.
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FACTS
On July 9, 2019, Nathan Mc Donald killed L.T.R. by sh ooting him five times in a
West St. Paul apartment. The apartment was leased to McDonald’s sister who lived with
L.T.R. until days before the shooting wh en she decided to take a break from the
relationship.
Police obtained surveillance video of the apartment building from July 9 and saw a
gray Chevrolet Malibu driving around the bui lding around 3:45 a.m. with its headlights
off. McDonald had a 2008 Malibu registered in his name. Two men wearing dark clothing,
hooded sweatshirts, and gloves were seen walking toward the outside of L.T.R.’s ground-
floor apartment. The police executed a search warrant on McDonald’s cell phone, which
showed that McDonald was texting appellant Terrell Theo Payne on July 9 between 3:51
and 4:09 a.m.
Payne pleaded guilty to aiding-and-abetting second-degree murder. At the plea
hearing, Payne admitted that he agreed to go with McDonald to the apartment because they
knew that L.T.R. was there. L.T.R. had been threaten ing their family, and Payne
considered L.T.R.to be a “dangerous dude.” Payne believed that things “could have been
way worse if something wasn’t done.” Payne knew that McDonald had a gun, and he was
there “to make sure things di d not go south.” But the plan was to “cause some form of
bodily harm” to L.T.R. Payne and McDona ld entered the apartm ent through a broken
window, and McDonald shot L.T.R. five times. Payne admitted that it was foreseeable that
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McDonald was going to shoot L.T.R. and that, “from a broader perspective, [he] aided and
abetted an intentional murder.”
The district court sentenced Payne to 306 months in prison. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Payne argues that his guilty plea is invalid because it was not accurate or intelligent.
He did not make these arguments to the district court. But an appellant may challenge the
validity of his plea for the first time on appeal if the record provides a sufficient basis for
meaningful review. State v. Anyanwu , 681 N.W.2d 411, 413 & n.1 (Minn. App. 2004),
overruled on other grounds by Wheeler v. State, 909 N.W.2d 558 (Minn. 2018). The record
here, including the transcript from the plea hearing, provides an adequate basis for appellate
review.
“To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accura te, voluntary, and
intelligent.” Id. It is the appellant’s burden to show that his plea is invalid. Id. We review
the validity of a guilty plea de novo. Id.
Accuracy
Payne argues that his guilty plea is not accurate because there was no evidence that
he intentionally aided McDonald “in committing the act of intentionally bringing about the
death of [L.T.R.]”
“The accuracy requirement protects a de fendant from pleading guilty to a more
serious offense than that for which he could be convicted if he insisted on his right to trial.”
Id. A plea is accurate if it is suppor ted by a proper factual basis. Id. This requirement is
satisfied when the record show s that there is credible evid ence that would support a jury
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verdict that the defendant is guilty of at least the crime to which he pleaded guilty. Nelson
v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 859 (Minn. 2016).
Payne pleaded guilty to aiding-and-ab etting second-degree murder. Whoever
“causes the death of a human being with intent to effect the death of that person or another,
but without premeditation,” is guilty of second-degree murder. Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd.
1(1) (2018). “A person is criminally liable for a crime committed by another if the person
intentionally aids, advises, hi res, counsels, or conspires w ith or otherwise procures the
other to commit the crime.” Minn. Stat. § 609. 05, subd. 1 (2018). In other words, “the
[s]tate must prove that the defendant knew his alleged accomplice was going to commit a
crime and the defendant intended his presence or actions to further the commission of that
crime.” State v. Huber, 877 N.W.2d 519, 524 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). “A person
liable under subdivision 1 is also liable for any other crime committed in pursuance of the
intended crime if reasonably foreseeable by the person as a probable consequence of
committing or attempting to commit the crime in tended.” Minn. Stat . § 609.05, subd. 2
(2018).
Payne admitted that McDonald asked him to go to the apartment where L.T.R. was
living. Payne knew that McDonald had a gun, and Payne went along to make sure things
“did not go south.” Payne thought that the plan was to go and beat up L.T.R. He agreed
that his intention was “to supp ort in what [McDonald] was doi ng at that apartment.”
Payne agreed that part of the plan was “to cause some form of bodily harm upon [L.T.R.]”
Payne believed that L.T.R. wa s dangerous and a threat to the family. McDonald shot
L.T.R. five times, and Payne di d not attempt to intervene. Payne also admitted that the
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murder was reasonably foreseeable as a result of the intended plan. And during his plea
colloquy, Payne answered in the affirmative to, “Given all of that, is it true, from a broader
perspective, that you aided and abetted an intentional murder?”
The factual basis Payne provide d sufficiently demonstrates that he is guilty of the
crime to which he pleaded guilty; thus, his guilty plea is accurate.
Intelligent
Payne next argues that his guilty plea was not intelligent because the plea colloquy
included mostly leading questions, which was improper given Payne’s cognitive deficits.
“To be intelligent, a guilty plea must represent[] a k nowing and intelligent choice
[among] the alternative courses of action available.” Dikken v. State, 896 N.W.2d 873, 877
(Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). This factor considers whether the defendant, at the time
of the plea, “understood the ch arges against him, understood the rights he was waiving,
and understood the consequences of his plea.” Nelson, 880 N.W.2d at 858.
Most of Payne’s argument is about the lead ing questions in the plea colloquy. But,
as the state points out, the use of leading questions is usually contested under the accuracy
requirement. District courts and attorneys frequently use leading questions when going
over the waiver of legal rights and explaining the consequences of a guilty plea. See, e.g.,
id. (holding that appellant made an intelligent pl ea after he answered “y es” to the district
court’s questions about the consequences of his plea).
Nothing in the record suggests that Payne made an uninte lligent plea. Payne
answered “yes” to all of the district court’s questions about understanding the charges, the
plea, and the consequences of the plea. He also answered affirmatively that he went
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through the guilty plea petition paragraph-by-paragraph with his attorney and initialed
every page and signed the last page. In tota l, there are eight transcribed pages from the
plea hearing covering Payne’s understanding of the plea, and he answered every question
without indicating any confusion.
Finally, Payne argues that his cognitive deficits prevented him from making an
intelligent plea. But his atto rney asked Payne whether he had any mental illness that
impairs his ability to think clearly, and he resp onded, “No, I do not.” Further, the district
court had previously ordered a competency evaluation, and a psychologist found that Payne
was competent to proceed with the criminal trial. The psychologist reached this conclusion
despite noting two low IQ tests that Payne had in high school. The psychologist also noted
that Payne demonstrated a ba sic understanding of the court and courtroom personnel as
well as his plea options. Payne has failed to show that his plea was not intelligent.
Affirmed.