State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1531

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Gavin Patrick Meany,
Appellant.

Filed February 28, 2022
Reversed and remanded
Jesson, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-19-2414

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathryn M. Keena, Dakota County Attorney , Jessica Bierwerth, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Lauermann, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Reilly, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
Appellant Gavin Meany, a psychiatrist, pleaded guilty to and was convicted of four
counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct by a therapist. The district court imposed a
sentence of 90 months’ imprisonment to be followed by a lifetime conditional-release
2
period. Meany appealed from the final judgment, and we stayed the appeal to permit him
to pursue postconviction proceedings. After the district court denied postconviction relief,
we reinstated this appeal. Meany now argues that his guilty plea was invalid because he
entered it on the understanding that his sentence would include only a ten-year conditional-
release term. Because the record shows that Meany’s plea was based on the understanding
that his conditional-release term would be for a ten-year period—not for his lifetime—his
plea was unintelligent. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to permit Meany to withdraw
his plea.
FACTS
Meany was a board-certified psychiatrist. The following factual allegations are
based upon the amended criminal complaint in this matter.
According to the complaint, L.K. soug ht psychiatric treatment from Meany for
mental-health issues in August 2015. L.K. had an eating disorder, had previously been the
victim of sexual assault by a physician, and had suffered domestic violence from a former
partner. L.K.’s sessions with Meany starte d off “normally,” but after many sessions, he
began to ask her sexual questions. Then he began touching her, including rubbing her over
her underwear. By 2018, Meany’s alleged sexual acts became even more intense, including
digital penetration and touchi ng her under her clothing on th e couch in his office during
sessions. L.K. came to believe she was in love with Meany. They would meet outside of
her appointments. At one coffe e shop meeting, they discussed whether they should have
sex, but Meany explained it was illegal. Regardless, acc ording to the complaint, he took
3
her to his home in Apple Valley where they had sex. By the summer of 2019, Meany
allegedly would digitally penetrate L.K. at each of her psychiatric appointments.
Eventually L.K. confided in a new therapist about Mea ny, resulting in a report to
law enforcement. Re spondent State of Minnesota char ged Meany with six counts of
third-degree criminal sexual conduct by a th erapist during a session, and one count of
third-degree criminal sexual con duct by a therapist outside a session. 1 Meany and his
counsel prepared a plea petition, which they reviewed togeth er before a scheduled guilty
plea hearing.
On January 23, 2020, Mea ny appeared for a guilty-plea hearing. Meany pleaded
guilty to four counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct by a therapist during a session
in exchange for dismissal of the remaining three counts. During the hearing, Meany and
his counsel reviewed the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty to four counts. Prior
to offering the court the plea petition, Meany and his counsel discussed conditional release:
COUNSEL: Mr. Meany, you understand that a criminal
sexual conduct conviction in the third degree
carries with it a conditional release period;
correct?
MEANY: Correct.
COUNSEL: And you know that means if you are sent to
prison, there is a ten-year conditional release
period . . . after the expiration of parole; correct?
MEANY: Yes.
COUNSEL: And you would be un der the supervision of the
Department of Corrections during that ten-year
conditional release period; correct?
MEANY: Yes.
COUNSEL: And if you violated their terms and conditions,
you could be returned to prison for a portion or

1 Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(h)(i)-(ii) (2018).
4
the remainder of that ten-year conditional
release period; correct?
MEANY: Correct.

(Emphasis added.) Meany’s plea petition similarl y stated that there would be a ten-year
conditional release period.
Meany confirmed that he understood ther e was no agreement on the sentence, and
that the state would be pur suing the maximum possible pe nalty. Meany entered guilty
pleas to four counts. The di strict court deferred the acceptance of the plea until a later
sentencing hearing.
Before sentencing, a presentence inves tigation (PSI) and psychosexual evaluation
were conducted. The PSI included information about the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
and noted that both ten-year and lifetime conditional-releas e terms applied. The PSI
recommended executed sentences of 48, 76, 117, and 180 months, with a ten-year
conditional-release term for the first 48-mont h sentence, and lifetime conditional-release
terms for the 76-, 117-, and 180- month sentences. The sentencing worksheets showed the
same sentences and applicable conditional-release periods.
The state sought a statutory maximum sentence of 180 months. Meany opposed the
sentence and sought a dispositional departure. At se ntencing, the district court discussed
the facts of the record and the sentence stating:
[H]aving chosen the profession in the healing arts and using
that opportunity to cause harm to someone, it’s not something
that the law has ever allowed a nd certainly can’t allow . . . I
mean, violating that level of trus t is something that really is
quite extraordinary.

5
The district court added “this is one of the more egregious circumstances of these cases
that I have seen.” However, the district court thought the ultimat e sentence would be
disproportionate to other similar cases, and that a downward mitigated durational departure
was warranted.
The district court imposed a separate senten ce for each of the four convictions. For
the first conviction, the district court sent enced Meany to 48 months in prison and a
conditional-release period of ten years. Fo r the second conviction, the court sentenced
Meany to a concurrent sentence of 90 months in prison and a lifetime conditional-release
period. For the two remaining convictions, th e court imposed concurrent sentences of 90
months in prison—which were downward durational depart ures from the sentencing
guidelines—and lifetime co nditional-release periods.
2 After the district court reiterated
that Meany would be on conditiona l release for the rest of hi s life, neither Meany nor his
counsel objected.
Meany filed a direct appeal. He then moved—and we granted—to stay his appeal
to litigate issues th at were more appropriate to be raised in a pe tition for postconviction
relief. In his postconviction relief memorand um, Meany argued that his plea was not
intelligently entered, and that he received ineffective assist ance of counsel rendering his
plea involuntary. Meany also asked the postconviction court to reconsider his sentences.

2 Meany was also ordered to register as a predatory offender for life.
6
The postconviction court denied Meany’s petition with out holding an evidentiary
hearing.3 The court reasoned that Meany’s guilty plea was intelligent because he was
aware that lifetime conditional release was a possibility and never objected when it was
imposed at sentencing. And the postconvicti on court found that the “misadvice” that
Meany alleges he received from counsel was not on the record and noted that relief is not
warranted if the allegations are without f actual support. As for resentencing, the
postconviction court explained that the senten ces were appropriate and not exaggerated,
citing L.K.’s vulnerability and Meany’s conduct.
Meany appeals.
DECISION
A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea.
State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). But after sentencing, a defendant must
be allowed to withdraw a guilty plea if “withdrawal is nece ssary to correct a manifest
injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. A manifest inju stice occurs if a plea is not
valid; a plea is invalid if it is not accurate, intelligent, or voluntary. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d
at 94.
Meany argues that his plea was not intellig ent because he was not informed of the
lifetime conditional-release term at the time he pleaded guilty. In reviewing the denial of
a petition for postconviction relief, we review legal issues de novo and findings of fact for
clear error. Caldwell v. State, 886 N.W.2d 491, 499 (Minn. 2016).

3 Meany did not expressly request an evidentiary hearing on his petition for postconviction
relief.
7
A guilty plea is intelligent if a defendant “understands the charges against him, the
rights he is waiving, and the consequences of his plea.” Uselman v. State, 831 N.W.2d 690,
693 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotation omitted). In Uselman, we concluded that the
defendant’s plea was not intelligent because he reasonably believed that his sentence would
not include a term of conditional release. Id. at 694. Uselman’s plea petition “expressly
declared that conditional release was not applicable ‘[i]n this case.’” Id. at 694. Although
Uselman (after the plea and before sentenci ng) reviewed and agreed to a sentencing
worksheet which included a conditional-release period , we concluded that the
postconviction court erred when it inferred from this that Uselman knew of the
conditional-release period at the time of the plea. Id. at 694. Nor did Uselman’s failure to
object when the conditional-release period was imposed at sentencing alter our conclusion
that Uselman’s plea was unintelligent. Id.
Uselman drives the outcome of th is appeal. Here, as in Uselman, Meany pleaded
guilty with an incorrect unde rstanding of the conditional-re lease period that ultimately
would be imposed: lifetime conditional release. And not only the plea petition but the plea
colloquy itself referred to only a ten-year conditional-release period. While the state
reiterated that it would seek th e “statutory max,” at no point during the plea hearing did
anyone mention lifetime conditional release. Accordingly, the record established here
reflects that Meany was misinformed of the length of his term of conditional release before
he entered a guilty plea, making his plea unintelligent.
The state relies on State v. Rhodes , 675 N.W.2d 323 (Min n. 2004), to argue
otherwise. In that case, Rhodes pleaded guilty with an agreed-upon maximum sentence of
8
105 months, with no mention of a conditional-release term. Rhodes, 675 N.W.2d at 325.
Rhodes did not object to the PSI and sentencing sheet that included a five-year conditional
release. Nor did he object at sentencing af ter being informed of the conditional-release
period. Based upon the earlier silence as to conditional release, the supreme court held that
it was fair for the postconviction court to in fer that Rhodes understood all along that
conditional release was part of his plea agreement.4
Here, unlike Rhodes, we do not have silence as to conditional release at the time of
the guilty plea. We have express discussion of a ten-year conditional-release term. Twice.
As we explained when distinguishing Rhodes in Uselman, it is one thing to use
circumstantial evidence to fill in gaps created by silence—it is another to use circumstantial
evidence to contradict a defendant’s express un derstanding of the direct consequences of
his plea. Uselman, 831 N.W.2d at 694.
In sum, Meany’s guilty plea is unintellig ent because it arises from a plea petition
and plea hearing that err oneously indicated that a ten-year—not a lifetime—

4 The supreme court concluded that Rhodes’s guilty plea was intelligent because (1) he was
generally on notice that a mandatory, nonwaivable conditional-release term was part of his
sentence, (2) recent supreme court decisions had recognized the mandatory nature of these
conditional-release terms, and (3) the record at the plea hearing (including the plea petition)
was silent as to a conditional-release term. Id. at 327.
9
conditional-release period would follow Meany’s imprisonment.5 We reverse and remand
for the district court to allow Meany to withdraw his guilty plea.6
Reversed and remanded.

5 Meany supplied a pro se supplemental brief th at does not deny the charges, but instead
asks us to consider his character when determining this appeal. But he fails to cite to any
legal authority or articulate any legal argument. Therefore, the argument is forfeited. State
v. Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d 8, 22-23 (Minn. 2008).
6 Because we reverse and remand so that Meany may withdraw his guilty plea on this basis,
we do not address his additional arguments involving his sentencing or the involuntariness
of his plea, including the alleged error that Meany’s counsel informed him he would only
have to register as a predatory offender for ten years.