In re the Custody of: S. E. R. R., DOB 08/07/2002, S. L. R. R., petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1541

In re the Custody of: S. E. R. R., DOB 08/07/2002, S. L. R. R., petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

F. R. L. and V. R. L.,
Respondents.

Filed April 26, 2021
Reversed and remanded
Connolly, Judge

Nobles County District Court
File No. 53-FA-20-349

Kimberly M. Woods, Khanh Nguyen law Office, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

F.R.L. and V.R.L., Department of San Marcos, Guatemala (pro se respondents)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M. , Presiding Judge ; Ross, Judge; and
Connolly, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant cha llenges the district court’s de nial of his petition for custody of his
foreign-born son, who is now 18 and residing with appellant in Minnesota , because the

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district court determined that it lacked subject -matter jurisdiction . Because the district
court erred in determini ng that it lacked jurisdiction , w e reverse and remand for
proceedings in accord with this opinion.
FACTS
Appellant S.L.R.R. is the father of S.E.R.R., who was born on August 7, 2002, in
Guatemala. In about 2006, h is mother, D.R.L., abandoned him, leaving him with his
maternal grandparents, respondents F.R.L. and V.R.L. She had no further contact with
him, and her whereabouts are unknown. Appellant , who moved to Minnesota, sent
financial support for S.E.R.R. to respondents and maintained telephone contact with him.
S.E.R.R. witnessed an armed robbery. He was chased and assaulted by the
perpetrators, and feared for his safety. In 2019, when S.E.R.R. was 16, respondents told
him they could no longer care for him. He travelled to the United States alone, entered as
an unaccompanied minor in May 2019, was apprehended, and was placed in removal
proceedings.
In July 2019, he was released into the cust ody of appellant, his father. S.E.R.R.
turned 17 in August and began attending school full -time. He enrolled in the tenth grade
because his educational qualifications in English and Spanish were minimal. He is still in
high school and is expected to be 20 or 21 when he graduates.
In April 2020, appellant fi led a petition to establish his custody of S.E.R.R. so
S.E.R.R. could pursue Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS) and become a lawful
permanent resident. By the time the petition was heard in October 2020, S.E.R.R. had

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turned 18. Respondents did not appear and were not represented at the hearing. 1 The
district court denied appellant’s petition on the ground of lack of subject -matter
jurisdiction.
DECISION
“The existence of subject-matter jurisdiction and a determination of the meaning of
statutes addressing subject -matter jurisdiction present legal questions, which this court
reviews de novo.” Christianson v. Henke, 812 N.W.2d 190, 192 (Minn. App. 2012), aff’d
831 N.W.2d 532 (Minn. May 31, 2013).
Jurisdiction over child -custody determinations is governed by the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, Minn. Stat. § 518D.101 -.317 (2020). Chapter
518D (2020). See Minn. Stat. § 518.155 (2020) (“[A] court in which a proceeding for . . .
child custody has been commenced shall not issue . . . any order . . . which affects the
custody of a minor child . . . unless the court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to
the provisions of chapter 518D.”) Chapter 518D begins with a list of definitions, thre e of
which are relevant here. See Minn. Stat. § 518D.102(a) (“The definitions in this section
apply to this chapter.”) First, “‘[c]ommencement’ means the filing of the first pleading in
a proceeding.” Id. (f). Second, “‘[h]ome state’ means the state in which a child lived with
a parent . . . for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of
a child custody proceeding.” Id. (h). Third, “‘[c]hild’ means an individual who has not

1 Although identified as respondents, they take no part in this appeal. It is at least arguable
that, like S.E.R.R.’s mother, they abandoned him by telling him they could no longer care
for him.

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attained 18 years of age.” Id. (c). Chapter 518A provides a more extensive definition of
“child”: “‘Child’ means an individual under 18 years of age, an individual under age 20
who is still attending secondary school, or an individual who, by reason of physical or
mental condition, is incapable of self-support.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.26, subd. 5 (2020).
The district court relied on the definition of “child” in Minn. Stat. § 518D.102(c) to
conclude that S.E.R.R. was not a ch ild and that it therefore lacked jurisdiction over his
custody. But chapter 518D also provides that:
(a) . . . [A] court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial
child custody determination only if:
(1) this state is the home state of the chi ld on the date of
the commencement of the proceeding . . . .;
(2) a court of another state does not have jurisdiction
under clause (1) . . . . and:
(i) . . . the child and at least one parent . . . have a
significant connection with this state other than mere physical
presence and
(ii) substantial evidence is available in this state
concerning the child’s care, protection training, and personal
relationships;
(3) all courts having jurisdiction under clause (1) or (2)
have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court
of this state is the more appropriate forum to determine the
custody of the child . . . ; or
(4) no court of any other state would have jurisdiction
under the criteria specified in clause (1), (2) or (3).

(b) Paragraph (a) is the exclusive jurisdictional basis for
making a child custody determination by a court of this state.

Minn. Stat. § 518D.201.
This proceeding was commenced on April 28, 2020, when appellant’s petition to
establish custody and parenting ti me was filed. On that date, S.E.R.R. was 17 years old
and had been living with appellant in Minnesota for about nine months. Minnesota was

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therefore “the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding,”
so the first criterion o f Minn. Stat. § 518D.201 was fulfilled. No court of any other state
had jurisdiction over his custody and he and appellant, his parent, had a significant
connection with the state: both of them resided here, appellant was employed here, and
S.E.R.R. was a full-time student here; moreover, substantial evidence about S.E.R.R. was
available here, so the second criterion was fulfilled. No other court had jurisdiction under
clause 1 or 2, so clause 3 was fulfilled, and no court of any other state would have
jurisdiction under clause 1, 2, or 3, so clause 4 was fulfilled. Thus, the district court, as “a
court of this state,” had jurisdiction to make th e initial child-custody determination under
Minn. Stat. § 518D.201.
Moreover, chapter 518D also provides that “a court of this state which has made a
child custody determination consistent with section 518D.201” has “exclusive, continuing
jurisdiction over the determination until: (1) a court of this state determines that the child
[and] the child’s parents . . . do not have a significant connectio n with this state, or . . .
(2) . . . do not presently reside in this state.” Minn. Stat. § 518D.202(a). There is no
statutory provision for cancelling jurisdiction when, or because, a child who was under 18
when the proceedings commenced later turns 18 when the matter is pending. The district
court effectively read that provision into the statute. But neither this court nor a district
court may “add[] words or meaning to a statute that are purposely omitted or inadvertently
overlooked.” Premier Bank v. Becker Dev., L.L.C. , 785 N.W.2d 753, 760 (Minn. 2010)
(quotation omitted).

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The district cour t provided no statutory or case law support for its decision that it
lacked jurisdiction because S.E.R.R., who was 17 when the proceedings commenced, had
turned 18 by the time of the hearing. Moreover, the view that a district court’s jurisdiction
is terminated the day a child turns 18 con flicts with the view that “a child” is also an
individual under age 20 who is still attending secondary school, or an individual who, by
reason of physical or mental condition, is incapable of self -support. See Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.26, subd. 5. It is undisputed that S.E.R.R. is still attending secondary school and
is incapable of self -support. Individuals over 18 meeting these conditions have been
deemed entitled to support. See e.g., Maki v. Hansen, 694 N.W.2d 78, 83 (reversing and
remanding for a determ ination of a 20 -year-old’s emancipation before refunding child
support); State ex rel. Jarvela v. Burke, 678 N.W.2d 68, 70, 72 (Minn. App. 2004) (holding
that parent retained legal custody of 18 -year-old child who was in secondary school and
incapable of self-support), review denied (Minn. July 20, 2004).
The district court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over S.E.R.R.’s
custody and denying appellant’s petition. We reverse and remand for further proceedings
in accord with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.