In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Jesse Nikolas Rowland.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1546

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of:
Jesse Nikolas Rowland.

Filed July 26, 2021
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Mille Lacs County District Court
File No. 48-PR-10-2629

Jesse Nikolas Rowland, Moorhead, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Joe Walsh, Mille Lacs County Attorney, Erica Madore, Assistant County Attorney, Milaca,
Minnesota (for respondent Mille Lacs County Family Services)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for relief from his civil
commitment under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 on grounds that newly discovered evidence and
ineffective assistance of counsel undermine the basis for his initial commitment. Because
rule 60.02 relief is unavailable for persons seeking discharge from indeterminate civil
commitment, and appellant’s motion fails on its merits, we affirm.

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FACTS
Appellant Jesse Nikolas Rowland was indeterminately committed as what was then
known as mentally ill and dangerous (MI&D) on February 15, 2011. He suffers from
schizophrenia, which causes delusions and auditory hallucinations . These hallucinations
have commanded him to harm himself and his family members.
The events leading to his MI&D commitment began in late 2010, when Rowland
stopped taking his prescribed psychotropic medications. At the time, Rowland was living
with his father, brother, and his brother’s girlfriend. On November 17, h e experienced
auditory hallucinations in the form of his brother’s and the girlfriend’s voices. He entered
their bedroom and they woke to see him “standing right next to them holding a large knife.”
Rowland said “he would kill them if they didn’t make the voices stop,” and he “held the
knife towards [the girlfriend’s] chest area.” He later told a doctor that he “held the knife
to his brother’s neck.” Rowland was charged with multiple assault offenses and with
making threats of violence.1
Mille Lacs County petitioned the district court to commit Rowland as MI&D in late
November. The district court preliminarily ordered that Rowland be civilly committed.
Following a review hearing in February 2011, the district court indeterminately committed
Rowland as MI&D. Since that time, Rowland has petitioned the Special Review Board
(SRB) for provisional or full discharge from commitment five times. The SRB denied his

1 The prosecuting attorney dismissed these charges in September 2011 pursuant to Minn.
R. Crim. P. 30.01.
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most recent petition in 2019 due to Rowland’s “recent relapse, medication noncompliance,
and alleged illegal behaviors,” and revoked his prior provisional discharge.
In October 2020, Rowland sent a letter t o the district court seeking a hearing date
for a rule 60.02 motion challenging the basis for his commitment . He later submitted
another document asserting that he had discovered new evidence that undermined the
factual allegations that led to his commitm ent, and that he received ine ffective assistance
of counsel. The district court denied the motion as barred by the commitment statutes ,
untimely, and lacking merit. Rowland appeals.
DECISION
We review a district court’s denial of a rule 60.02 motion for an abuse of discretion.
In re Civil Commitment of Johnson , 931 N.W.2d 649, 655 (Minn. App. 2019) , review
denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2019) . A district court abuses its discretion if it misapplies the
law. In re Guardianship of O’Brien, 847 N.W.2d 710, 714 (Minn. App. 2014). We review
a district court’s interpretation of statutes and caselaw de novo. In re Civil Commitment of
Poole, 921 N.W.2d 62, 66 (Minn. App. 2018), review denied (Minn. Jan. 15, 2019).
Rowland contends that the district court erred by determining that the exclusive
transfer-or-discharge remedies of the Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act, Minn.
Stat. §§ 253B.01-.24 (2020) (commitment act), bar his rule 60.02 claim and that his motion
otherwise fails on its merits. We address each argument in turn.

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I. The district court did not err by concluding the relief Rowland seeks is not
available under rule 60.02.

Rule 60.02 permits a court to relieve a party from “a final judgment . . . , order, or
proceeding” on the following grounds:
(a) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect;
(b) Newly discovered evidence which by due diligence
could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
pursuant to Rule 59.03;
(c) Fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an
adverse party;
(d) The judgment is void;
(e) The judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or
(f) Any other reason justifying relief from the operation
of the judgment.

Minn. R. Civ . P. 60.02. A party seeking relief on the first three grounds must bring a
motion within one year of the challenged order. Id. And a party seeking relief under the
other grounds must do so within a “reasonable time.” Id.
In In re Civil Commitment of L onergan, our supreme court considered whether a
person indeterminately committed as a sexually dangerous person or as a sexual
psychopathic personality may obtain relief under rule 60.02. 811 N.W.2d 635, 639 (Minn.
2012). The Lonergan court noted that the commitment act creates discharge procedures
and expressly provides “that patients indeterminately committed ‘shall be transferred,
provisionally discharged or discharged, only as provided in this section .’” Id. at 642
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(quoting Minn. Stat. § 253B.185, subd. 1(e) (2010)).2 Because the commitment act is “the
exclusive remedy for patients . . . seeking a transfer or discharge,” the supreme court
reasoned that other procedures—including rule 60.02—“through which a patient . . . seeks
transfer or discharge” are not available as they “distinctly conflict[]” with the commitment
act. Id. But because the commitment act does not provide procedures for “rais[ing]
nontransfer, nondischarge claims such as ineffective assistance of counsel and lack of
subject matter jurisdiction,” there is no distinct conflict with rule 60. 02 motions asserting
such claims. Id.; see also In re Civil Commitment of Moen, 837 N.W.2d 40, 45-46 (Minn.
App. 2013), review denied (Minn. Oct. 15, 2013).3
Rowland argues that the commitment act does not bar his rule 60.02 motion because
he challenges the grounds for his commitment based on newly discovered evidence and
ineffective assistance of counsel. Although Rowland asserts that his commitment was void
in the first instance, he does not seek a new commitment hearing. He asked the district
court to “remand” the case, “initiate a . . . motion for dismissal,” or grant “[o]ther relief to
vacate the commitment.” On appeal, he seeks “a fair discharge” after an evidentiary
hearing or a remand for the district court to consider “ a substitute mentally ill

2 Although the statutory framework has been amended, the current MI&D commitment
statute contains similar language to that at issue in Lonergan: “After a final determination
that a patient is a person who has a mental illness and is dangerous to the public, the patient
shall be transferred, provisionally discharged or discharged, only as provided in this
section.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 3.

3 Even when there is no distinct conflict, a rule 60.02 motion may be barred when
application of the rule would frustrate the purpose of the commitment act. See Moen, 837
N.W.2d at 46 (noting the “two -fold purpose of the Commitment Act” is to protect the
public and rehabilitate the patient).
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commitment.” Rowland is plainly seeking to be discharged from his MI&D commitment.
Indeed, he has sought precisely this relief from the SRB five times. Because the relief
Rowland seeks implicates remedies that are only available under the commitment act, the
district court did not err by denying his motion. Lonergan, 811 N.W.2d at 642; Moen, 837
N.W.2d at 46.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Rowland’s motion as
untimely and lacking merit.

As previously noted, a party seek ing relief under rule 60.02 must bring a motion
“within a reasonable time.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 . And if the motion is premised on
mistake, newly discovered evidence, or fraud, it must be brought “not more than one year
after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.” Id. Rowland does not
identify which of the rule 60 .02 bases support his motion. The district court determined
that Rowland’s motion was untimely and lacks merit. We agree in both respects.
First, we see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that the
motion was untimely. See Palladium Holdings, LLC v. Zuni Loan Trust 2006 -OA1, 775
N.W.2d 168, 177 (Minn. App. 2009) (“Gen erally, what constitutes a reasonable time for
seeking rule 60.02 relief varies based on the facts of each case.”) , review denied (Minn.
Jan. 27, 2010). To the extent Rowland seeks relief under subparts (a) (mistake), (b) (newly
discovered evidence), and (c) (fraud), his motion is time-barred because he did not bring it
within one year after filing of the commitment order. To the extent Rowland seeks relief
under subparts (d) (void judgment), (e) (satisfied or released judgment), and (f) (any other
grounds), we are not persuaded that his nine-year delay is reasonable. As the district court
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observed, nine years is “a significant time frame.” Even now, Rowland o ffers no
compelling reason for waiting until 2020 to bring a motion based on facts he reasonably
was aware of at the time of his commitment hearing.
Second, the record persuades us that Rowland’s motion fails on its merits. He
asserts that “new evidence” calls into question whether (1) he held a knife to his brother’s
neck during the November 2010 incident , (2) he was under the influence of prescription
drugs at the time of the assault, and (3) his lawyer was ineffective for failing to uncov er
and present this evidence to the district court. Rowland argues that this new evidence
undermines the district court’s finding that he committed an overt act causing or attempting
to cause serious harm—a prerequisite to MI&D commitment. See Minn. Stat. § 253B.02,
subd. 17(2). And he contends an effective attorney would have pursued areas of inquiry
that may have revealed these facts in time to prevent his commitment. The record does not
support either contention.
To obtain relief based on newly discovered evidence, the moving party must show
“that the new evidence was not discovered until after trial, and could not have been
discovered before trial by the exercise of reasonable diligence.” Frazier v. Burlington N.
Santa Fe Corp. , 811 N.W.2d 618, 631 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). Rowland has
made neither showing. Rowland personally addressed the district court during the
February 2011 hearing, stating, “I didn’t hold a knife to [ my brother’s] throat.” A report
from a court-appointed examiner submitted prior to the hearing likewise notes Rowland’s
denial, but states it “is inconsistent with other records documenting the incident.” Rowland
also points to a pharmacy record as new evidence that he was impaired —and thus co uld
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not form the requisite intent—at the time of the inciden t. But the prescriptions he asserts
impaired his actions were filled on November 15, 2010—two days before the incident took
place—demonstrating he was aware of the medication and its potential ef fects at the time
of the incident. In short, Rowland was aware of the “newly discovered” facts at the time
of his c ommitment hearing. They cannot form the b asis for relief under Minn. R. Civ.
P. 60.02(b).
Rowland’s allegations that his attorney was ineffective fail on the merits because
they relate to trial strategy or lack evidentiary support. To prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance in the civil -commitment context , Rowland must show that “counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standa rd of reasonableness . . . and that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Johnson, 931 N.W.2d at 657 (quotations omitted).
“General assertions of error wi thout evidentiary support are inadequate to establish
ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. And “reviewing court[s] generally will not review
attacks on counsel’s trial strategy.” Id. (quotation omitted). We review ineffective -
assistance-of-counsel claims de novo. Id.
Rowland alleges ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney : (1) did not
take a “statement from the victim that attests the defendant’s innocence,” or call Rowland’s
brother as a witness; (2) failed to inform Rowland that he faced a second -degree-assault
charge because he placed a knife to his brother’s neck; (3) should have raised the issue of
“the fictional assault, intoxication, and drug use”; (4) did not communicate with him “for
more than a minute”; (5) did not present evidence that Rowland did not commit an overt
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act of harm; (6) did not present evidence that Rowland did not pose a risk of future harm;
(7) failed to present a less -restrictive alternative than indeterminate commitment; (8) did
not adequately inform him of the consequences of being designated MI&D, and that
Rowland “would have contested the trut h otherwise”; and (9) did not advise him that he
“can and should appeal.” Most of these contentions implicate matters of trial strategy that
we do not review. As such, they cannot support an ineffective-assistance claim.
As to his other allegations, Rowland does not identify —and the record does not
reveal—evidence that his attorney did not communicate with him, and did not inform him
of the consequences of MI&D designation or his appeal options. See id. at 658 (“A party
claiming ineffective assistance o f counsel must provide adequate evidentiary and factual
support for the claim.”). And, as noted above, the record shows Rowland was, at the time
of the commitment hearing, aware of evidence he now claims his attorney failed to
uncover.
In sum , we see no error or abuse of discretion by the district court in denying
Rowland’s motion as untimely, lacking merit, and conflicting with the commitment act.
Affirmed.