Emmett Albert Ted Knouse, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1553

Emmett Albert Ted Knouse,
Appellant,

vs.

Cory Aukes, Hubbard County Sheriff,
Respondent.

Filed July 26, 2021
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Hubbard County District Court
File No. 29-CV-20-68

B. Joseph Majors, II, Park Rapids, Minnesota (for appellant)

Jonathan Frieden, Hubbard County Attorney, Park Rapids, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Pres iding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
Following the district court’s order suppressing evidence obtained from the
unlawful search of appellant Emmett Albert Ted Knouse’s residence and its curtilage,
which had resulted in the seizure of appellan t’s truck, appellant brought an action for
declaratory judgment in district court to recover possession of the truck. The district court
granted respondent summary-judgment dismissal of appellant’s complaint, concluding that
2
it lacked jurisdiction over the proceeding because appellant had not timely sought judicial
review of the seizure and forfeiture pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 8(e) (2020).
Because Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 8(f) (2020), precludes any other “action for the return
of a vehicle seized under this section . . . unless the person complies with [subdivision 8]”
and appellant did not timely seek judicial review of the forfeiture pursuant to subdivision 8,
the district court’s dismissal of appellant’s declaratory-judgment action was proper, and
we therefore affirm.
FACTS
Pursuant to an investigation of a suspected hit-and-run involving appellant’s truck,
a Hubbard County sheriff’s deput y arrived at appellant’s resi dence. Upon observing the
involved truck, the sheriff’s deputy arrested appellant for second-degree driving under the
influence of alcohol. Law en forcement served appellant w ith a “Notice of Seizure and
Intent to Forfeit Vehicle,” indicating appellan t’s Ford F-150 truck “was seized” and that
appellant “will automatically lose the [vehicle] and the right to be heard in court if [he did]
not file a lawsuit and serve the prosecuting authority within 60 days .” This notice was
served on January 8, 2019, and law enforcement seized the vehicle the same day.
In June 2019, the district court in the cr iminal proceeding ruled that the search of
appellant’s home and curtilage was unlawful and granted appellant’s motion to suppress
evidence, including appellant’s truck, obtained in the search. Followi ng the dismissal of
two counts of driving under the influence, appellant pleaded guilty to one count of driving
after cancellation as inimical to public safety in December 2019.
3
In January 2020—approximately one year after receiving notice of the county’s
intent to seize and forfeit the vehicle—appella nt filed a civil complaint in district court
seeking a declaratory judgment declaring that, due to its illegal seizure, he was the owner
of the truck. The district court granted respondent’s motion for summary judgment. This
appeal follows.
DECISION
“[Appellate courts] review a district cour t’s summary judgment decision de novo.
In doing so, [appellate courts] determine whether the district court properly applied the law
and whether there are genuine i ssues of material fact that preclude summary judgment.”
See Riverview Muir Doran, LLC v. JADT Dev. Grp., LLC , 790 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Minn.
2010) (citation omitted).
The district court concluded that “no genuine issue of material fact exists” because
appellant did not “strictly comply” with Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 8(e), which requires
that “a demand for a judicial determination of the forfeiture” be filed in district court
“[w]ithin 60 days following se rvice of a notice of seizure and forfeiture.” The district
court, citing Garde v. One 1992 Ford Explorer XLT, 662 N.W.2d 165 (Minn. App. 2003),
determined that appellant’s “action [was ] time barred” and therefore it “lack[ed]
jurisdiction to hear [appellant’s] claim.” Id. at 167. For reasons described below, we
conclude that the district court properly dismissed the complaint.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has rec ognized that Minn. Stat. § 169A.63,
subd. 8(e), “unambiguously requires th e timely filing of a petition for judicial
determination to challenge the forfeiture of a vehicle.” Briles v. 2013 GMC Terrain ,
4
907 N.W.2d 628, 632 (Minn. 2018). Failure to file a complaint challenging the forfeiture
within the 60-day period set forth in the statute renders a complaint untimely. Id.
Appellant argues that, because he brough t a declaratory-judgment action seeking
the return of his vehicle and not a judicial determination of forfeitu re pursuant to Minn.
Stat. § 169A.63 (2020), the district court erre d in dismissing his complaint. Appellant
argues that decisions of the supreme court and this court requiring a timely petition for
judicial determination of forfeiture do not foreclose his declaratory-judgment action
because, unlike the facts in those cases, his tr uck was determined to have been illegally
seized pursuant to Minn. Stat . § 169A.63, subd. 2(b)(1). See Briles, 907 N.W.2d at 632;
Garde, 662 N.W.2d at 167. We are not persuaded.
It is true that the “appropriate agency” may only seize a vehicle if “incident to a
lawful arrest or a lawful search.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 2(b)(1); Mycka v. 2003
GMC Envoy, 783 N.W.2d 234, 239 (Minn. App. 2010) (reversing district court’s order of
forfeiture when seizure of vehicle was not incident to lawful arrest). And the district court
in appellant’s criminal case determined that the seizure was not incident to a lawful search.
These facts, however, do not change th e unambiguous language of the vehicle-
forfeiture statute, which states, “[n]otwithstanding any law to the contrary , an action for
the return of a vehicle seized under this sec tion may not be maintained by or on behalf of
any person who has been served with a notice of seizure and forfeiture unless the person
has complied with this subdivision.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 8(f) (emphasis added).
Appellant’s exclusive remedy for the review of the seizure and forfeiture of his truck was
Minn. Stat. § 169A.63. There is no dispute that appellant had been served with a notice of
5
seizure and forfeiture, and that appellant did not seek judicial review of the forfeiture within
the period specified by Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 8(e). Appellant therefore did not
comply with the statute and the court properly granted summary judgment.
Affirmed.