Minnesota Sporting Clays Association, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1556

Minnesota Sporting Clays Association,
Appellant,

vs.

National Casualty Company, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed July 19, 2021
Reversed and remanded
Segal, Chief Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-20-8871

Corie J. Anderson, Peters, Revnew, Kappenman & Anderson, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Theodore J. Waldeck, Allan M. Tritch, Waldeck Law Firm, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for respondents)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and
Larkin, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SEGAL, Chief Judge
Appellant-insured challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment
dismissing appellant’s breach-of-contract action against respondent-insurers for failure to
defend appellant against a counter claim in a separate lawsuit. Because the district court
committed an error of law in interpreting the insurance agreement, we reverse and remand.
2
FACTS
This suit involves a breach -of-contract claim brought by appellant Minnesota
Sporting Clays Association (MSC) against its insurers for failure to defend against
counterclaims in a lawsuit brought by MSC against Caribou Gun Club (CGC) to recover
certain fees allegedly owed by CGC to MSC . In August 2017, CGC hosted the National
Sporting Clays Association North Central Regional Championship. MSC sought payment
of daily/target fees from CGC that MSC claimed it was owed in connection with the
championship event. CGC disputed MSC’s claim an d MSC ultimately sued CGC to
recover the fees . CGC responded to the lawsuit with counterclaims against MSC (the
counterclaims) and a third -party complaint against the National Sporting Clays
Association.
The counterclaims included counts against MSC for intentional interference with
contractual relations, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, and a
violation of the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act , Minn. Stat. § 325D.44 (2020).
CGC asserted in its counterclaims that MSC a nd its board members made statements
falsely claiming that CGC owed MSC unpaid fees and as a result CGC had been placed
“not in good standing” by the National Sporting Clays Association . CGC alleged as an
element of damages that MSC’s actions caused CGC da mages for “[d]isparagement of its
reputation and credibility within shooting sports, not only nationally but across the
[w]orld.”
MSC tendered defense of the counterclaims to its insurers, respondents National
Casualty Company and K&K Insurance Group, I nc. (the insurers). MSC claimed that a
3
section of its commercial general-liability insurance policy titled “personal and advertising
injury” provided coverage of the counterclaims. Section H.14. of the policy defined
“personal and advertising injury” as
injury, including consequential “bodily injury,” arising out of
one or more of the following offen ses:
a. False arrest, detention or imprisonment;
b. Malicious prosecution or abuse of process;
c. The wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry into,
or invasion of the right of private occupancy of a room,
dwelling or premises that a person occupies, committed by or
on behalf of its owner, landlord or lessor;
d. Any publication of material including, but not
limited to oral, written, televised, videotap ed or electronically
transmitted publication of material that slanders or libels a
person or organization or disparages a person ’s or
organization’s goods, products or services;
e. Any publication of material, including but not
limited to oral, written, televised, videotaped or electronically
transmitted publication of material that viola tes a person ’s
right of privacy;
f. The use of another ’s advertising idea in your
“advertisement”; or
g. Infringing upon another ’s copyright, trade dress
or slogan in your “advertisement.”

The insurers declined co verage and MSC retained its own counsel to defend against the
counterclaims. The underlying lawsuit and the counterclaims were eventually resolved.
MSC then sued the insurers for reimbursement of the costs and attorney fees it incurred in
defending against the counterclaims in the amount of $57,430.93.
The parties brought cross -motions for summary judgment . The district c ourt
granted summary judgment in favor of the insurers and denied MSC’s motion, concluding
that the counterclaims did not assert an “advertising injury” and the insurers therefore had
4
no duty to provide a defense because the claims were not covered under MSC’s policy.
MSC now appeals the grant of the insurers’ motion for summary judgment.
DECISION
We review a grant of summary judgment “de novo to determine whether there are
genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in its application of the
law.” Montemayor v. Sebright Prods., Inc., 898 N.W.2d 623, 628 (Minn. 2017) (quotation
omitted). “On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the party against who m summary judgment was granted. ” Eng’g &
Constr. Innovations, Inc. v. L.H. Bolduc Co., 825 N.W.2d 695, 704 (Minn. 2013) (quotation
omitted). Interpretation of the coverage provisions of an insurance policy is a question of
law subject to de novo review. Depositors Ins. Co. v. Dollansky , 919 N.W.2d 684 , 687
(Minn. 2018).
“An insurer’s obligation to defend is contractual in nature .” Polaris Indus., L.P. v.
Cont’l Ins. Co. , 539 N.W.2d 619, 621 (Minn. App. 1995) , review denied (Minn. Jan. 25,
1996). We determine whether the insurer had a duty to defend by comparing “the
allegations in the complaint . . . in the underlying action with the relevant language in the
commercial general liability policy. ” Ross v. Briggs & Morgan , 540 N.W.2d 843, 847
(Minn. 1995). Under Minnesota law, “if any part” of a cause of action asserted against the
insured in the underlying case “arguably falls within the scope of [the policy’s] coverage,”
the insurer has a duty to defend. Id.
The “objective when interpreting insurance contracts is to ‘ascertain and give effect
to the intentions of the parties as reflected in the terms of the insuring contract. ’” Eng’g &
5
Constr. Innovations, 825 N.W.2d at 704 (quoting Jenoff, Inc. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 558 N.W.2d
260, 262 (Minn. 1997)). We read the terms within the context of the policy a s a whole, in
order to avoid neutralizing any provisions or creating absurd results. Id. at 705. If “the
language of an insurance policy is clear and unambiguous, we effectuate the intent of the
parties by interpret[ing] the policy according to plain, ordinary sense.” Id. at 704 (alteration
in original) (quotations omitted) . With this background in mind, we now turn to our
analysis of the issues.
MSC’s central argument is that the district court erred in its ruling because the
deceptive-trade-practices count of the counterclaims falls within the coverage of the
“personal and advertising injury” section of its insurance policy. Section H.14.d. of the
policy defines “personal and advertising injury” as including claims for injuries “arising
out of . . . [a]ny publication of material . . . that slanders or libels a person or organization
or disparages a person ’s or organization ’s goods, products or services.” The deceptive -
trade-practices count of the counterclaims alleges that MSC disparaged CGC’s business in
violation of the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act , Minn. Stat. § 325D.44, by
making false statements that CGC failed to pay fees to MSC and that it was “not in good
standing” with the National Sporting Clays Association . The Minnesota Deceptive Trade
Practices Act provides, in relevant part :
A person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in
the course of business, vocation, or occupation, the person:
. . . .
(8) disparages the goods, services, or business of
another by false or misleading representation of fact [.]

Minn. Stat. §§ 325D.44, subd. 1(8).
6
The insurers oppose MSC’s argument relying, as did the district court, on caselaw
interpreting “adver tising injury” provisions of commercial general -liability policies.
Specifically, the district court held, as the insurers argue here, that the test set out in the
Polaris case is the proper test to analyze coverage of MSC’s policy. The test in Polaris
includes three prongs: the injury must (1) arise out of th e insured’s advertising activity ,
(2) “fall within the policy’s definitional scope of advertising injury ,” and (3) not be within
a policy exclusion. 539 N.W.2d at 621-23. In granting summary judgment to the insurers,
the district court concluded that MSC failed to satisfy the first prong of the Polaris test—
that the public statements at issue in the counterclaims arose out of MSC’s “advertising
activities.”1
The district court’s analysis and the insurers’ arguments , however, misapply
Polaris. As set o ut in Polaris, the question of whether an insurer has an “obligation to
defend is contractual in nature.” Id. at 621. Polaris provides no authority that would justify
deviating from standard principles of contract construction in construing insurance -
coverage provisions. The district court was thus required to analyze the actual coverage
provisions in MSC’s insurance contract instead of simply applying the Polaris test and then
seeking to force the MSC policy language into that framework.

1 We note that the insurers based their motion for summary judgment on several grounds,
including arguments that coverage of the counterclaims were barred by the breach -of-
contract and intent ional-acts exclusions of the MSC policy. The district court addressed
only the question of whether the first prong of the Polaris test was satisfied. The district
court did not reach the insurers’ other arguments.
7
A review o f the coverage provision in the MSC policy reveals significant
differences from the coverage provision in the Polaris policy. For example, in Polaris, the
applicable coverage section is titled “advertising injury.” Id. In contrast, t he applicable
section of the MSC policy is titled “personal and advertising injury,” signaling an intent to
provide a broader scope of coverage than the policy in Polaris. (Emphasis added.)
In addition, the policy in Polaris, define d “advertising injury” as follows:
[A]dvertising injury whenever used herein means only such
injury as arises out of:
(1) libel, slander or defamation of character,
(2) infringement of copyright, title or slogan,
(3) piracy, unfair competition or idea
misappropriation,
(4) invasion of rights of privacy,
during the course of advertising activities of the Named
Insured.

Id. (alternation in original) (emphasis added) . The Polaris policy, as t his court hel d,
thereby expressly limited coverage to only those injuries that occurred “duri ng the course
of advertising activities of the . . . [i]nsured.” Id. The MSC policy has no such limitation.
The definition of “personal and advertising injury” in the MSC policy provides, in relevant
part, that the injury just has to “aris [e] out of . . . [a]ny publication of material . . . that
slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a person’s or organization’s goods,
products or services.” There is no requirement that the publication be connected to MSC’s
“advertising activities.” Indeed, the phrase “advertising activities” does not even appear
in the MSC policy. The only reference in the “personal and advertising injury” coverage
8
section of the policy related to advertising is set out in sub sections H.14.f. and g. , not in
the applicable subsection H.14.d. 2
The district court noted the absence in the MSC policy of the phrase “advertising
activities,” but nevertheless proceeded to interpret that phrase. The district court looked to
and applied the policy’s definition of “advertisement” to MSC’s claim, d espite the fact that
the word “advertisement” appears only in subsections H.14.f. and g., and not in subsection
H.14.d. Using the policy’s definition, which provides that an “advertisement” is “a notice
that is broadcast or published . . . about [the insured’s] goods, products or services for the
purpose of attracting customers or supporters,” the district court concluded that the
statements at issue in the counterclaims were not made in the context of advertising MSC’s
“goods, products or s ervices” and, therefore, were not covered under the policy. But, as
we stated above, Polaris provides no legal authority for reading into an insurance policy a
limitation that is not justified by the plain language of the policy.
For the above reasons, w e conclude that the district court erred in finding that the
MSC policy coverage was limited to injury arising out of MSC’s “advertising activities.”
We reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of the insurers and remand for further
proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.

2 Subsections H.14.f. and g. reference coverage for injury arising out of “[t]he use of
another’s adverti sing idea in your ‘advertisement’” and “[i]nfringing upon another’s
copyright, trade dress or slogan in your ‘advertisement.’”