Peter Stalland, et al., Appellants,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1557

Peter Stalland, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

City of Scandia,
Respondent.

Filed August 16, 2021
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CV-19-3916

Matthew Anderson, Anderson Law Group PLLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellants)

Paul A. Merwin, League of Minnesota Cities, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Pres iding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Johnson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
In this action for judicial review of a municipal zoning decision, appellants—the
developer and individual residents of Tii Gavo, a housing development—appeal the district
court’s grant of summary judgment to respondent City of Scandia. They contend that the
city council improperly denied their application to increase the number of boat slips in Tii
2
Gavo’s marina and that the district court erred in affirming the city’s decision on summary
judgment. We affirm.
FACTS
Tii Gavo is a planned unit development (PUD) approved by the City of Scandia. A
PUD is a type of development that allows fo r “flexibility from the strict application of
zoning standards in exchange for an improve d design benefiting the public.” Scandia,
Minn., Dev. Code, Ch. 2, § 5.1(6) (2021). The city authorizes PUDs by issuing a
conditional use permit (CUP). Scandia, Minn., Dev. Code, Ch. 2, § 7.2 (2021). The city
issued a CUP for Tii Gavo and executed a corresponding development agreement1 with its
developer in 2007.
The Tii Gavo development currently has 29 lots for homes, although the CUP
permits up to 37 residential lots. Residents of Tii Gavo have access to nearby Big Marine
Lake. The Tii Gavo Community Association owns a waterfront lot with shoreline along
Painted Turtle Bay. As part of the Tii Gavo development project, a 900-foot channel was
dredged to connect this bay to Big Marine Lake, a venture that required the approval of the
Department of Natural Resources (DNR). Cu rrently, the waterfront lot on Painted Turtle
Bay has a communal dock with 19 boat slips for Tii Gavo residents. This is the maximum
number of boat slips allowed under the development agreement and the CUP.

1 Development agreements are contract s between municipalities and developers
“embodying the terms and conditions of [a city’s] approval” of a request to subdivide land
for development, and cities can “enforce such agreements and cond itions by appropriate
legal and equitable remedies.” Minn. Stat. § 462.358, subd. 2(a) (2020).
3
In April 2019, several homeowners in th e Tii Gavo development sought to amend
the development agreement and CUP to allow 10 more boat slips.2 They submitted a two-
page application form along with a few attachments, including a diagram of the proposed
dock expansion and a report prepared by an environmental consultant. Their
environmental consultant, who provides aquatic-weed-control services to Tii Gavo, opined
that expanding the dock to add additional boat slips would not affect the high-quality
natural state of the bay and would not increase watercraft use to any significant level.
Upon receiving the homeowners’ applic ation, the city’s planning commission
visited the site of the proposed dock expans ion, and then scheduled a meeting for May
2019. Before the meeting, the commission received several written submissions, including
comments from the DNR and the Carnelian-Marine-St. Croix Watershed District (the
watershed district), along with a detailed report from the city planner.
The DNR’s submission recommended deny ing the homeowners’ application for
additional boat slips. According to the DNR, the number of boat slips was limited during
the PUD approval process as a condition for the developer’s proposed channel between the
bay and the lake. The agreed-upon restriction on boat slips was intended “to protect, in the
long term, the ecological resources in the ba y from overuse,” as the bay contains “high
value aquatic plants that provide fish and wildlife habitat.”
Similarly, the watershed district’s submi ssion emphasized the original negotiations
that resulted in the PUD’s approval, and reco mmended denial of the expansion request.

2 The Tii Gavo parties also submitted an appl ication for additional boat slips in 2018 but
withdrew it before any decision was issued.
4
The watershed district relayed that “[a] key factor in these negotiations was the agreement
to lower the impact of individual docks on the main body of the Lake while balancing the
potential for ecological damage.”
Likewise, the city planner’s report reco mmended denying the request for additional
boat slips. The city planner’s submission discussed the applicable regulations and
standards in effect when the city council issued the CUP in 2007 and when the homeowners
applied to amend the CUP to add more boat slips. According to the city planner, in 2007,
shoreland regulations limited the number of docking facilities in a PUD to the number of
permissible riparian lots in the development. Tii Gavo had 19 permissible riparian lots and
9 nonriparian lots under trad itional zoning regulations, for a total of 28 lots. Tii Gavo’s
CUP allowed for 37 lots, though, as Tii Gavo’ s cluster-development approach called for
smaller lots but left land op en for communal space and c onservation, including a buffer
zone along the shoreline.
The city planner explained that after Tii Gavo’s CUP was issued, the city had
adopted a new shoreland ordi nance governing watercraft storage in PUDs, which was
similar to the one in effect in 2007. See Scandia, Minn., Dev. Code, Ch. 5 § 10.6 (2018).
Under the new ordi nance, “shore recreation facilities” in PUDs must be centralized and
located in suitable areas, and “[t]he number of spaces provided for continuous beaching,
mooring, or docking of watercraft must not exceed one for each allowable dwelling unit or
site in the first tier.” Id., § 10.61(E)(2). “First tier” sites are lots w ithin 267 feet of the
ordinary high water level of the lake. See Scandia, Minn., Dev. Code, Ch. 5, § 10.51
5
(2018). The city planner’s report stated that only 17 lots in Tii Gavo qualify as “first tier”
lots.
At the city planning commission’s public meeting, the commission heard comments
from several Tii Gavo homeowners, a repr esentative of the developer, Tii Gavo’s
environmental consultant, a watershed-distri ct manager, and the city planner. The
commission then voted to recommend that the city council approve the request for
additional boat slips, determining that the proposal seemed in line with the “spirit” of the
shoreland ordinances.
A few weeks later, the city council held a public hearing on the matter. The city
council received a packet of written materi als concerning the proposed CUP amendment,
including the application form, the planning commission minutes, an updated report from
the city planner, the submissions provided to the planning commission by the DNR and
watershed district, and several records from th e original CUP approval. Many interested
parties spoke at the public hearing, includi ng the city planner, Tii Gavo’s environmental
consultant, watershed-district representatives, several Tii Gavo residents, a representative
of the developer, and a homeowner on the lake . City councilmembers asked numerous
questions and engaged in significant discussion and deliberation on the record.
During the public hearing, Councilmember Steve Kronmiller explained that he was
quite familiar with the original negotiations around the Tii Gavo development, as he was a
watershed district manager at the time. Kronmiller objected to the proposed CUP
amendment, in part, based on the DNR’s and watershed district’s opposition to it. He noted
that these two entities were h eavily involved in the original development agreement and
6
CUP, including the express limitation on boat slips. Kronmiller was also concerned about
setting a precedent that would allow Tii Gavo re sidents to request further increases in the
number of boat slips as more residential lots were deve loped in the future. Other
councilmembers similarly expressed conc ern about not “honor[i ng]” the original,
negotiated agreement for 19 boat slips and establishing a precedent that conceivably would
encourage dock applications by owners of no nriparian properties. At the close of
deliberations, the city council voted unanimously to deny the amendment application.
In August 2019, the homeowners, along with the Tii Gavo developer—who,
collectively, are now appellants—filed a comp laint in district court under Minnesota
Statutes section 462.361 (2020),3 alleging first, that the city’s denial of the application for
more boat slips was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and se cond, that the city
violated their constitutional right to procedural due process. The district court permitted
limited discovery beyond the municipal record, allowing appellants to depose a former city
administrator, a former city pl anner, and the current city plan ner in pursuit of their due-
process claim.
Following the close of discovery, appella nts moved for partial summary judgment,
asserting that the city’s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious as a matter of
law. The city moved for summary-judgment dismissal of both claims. After a hearing on

3 Minnesota Statutes section 462.361 prov ides that “[a]ny person aggrieved by an
ordinance, rule, regulation, decision, or or der of a governing body . . . may have such
ordinance, rule, regulation, d ecision or order, reviewed by an appropriate remedy in the
district court.”
7
the motions, the district court issued an order denying appellants’ motion for summary
judgment and granting the city’s motion for summary judgment.
Appellants appeal the summary-judg ment dismissal of their claims.
DECISION
Summary judgment “is appropriate when th ere is no genuine issue of material fact
and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Senogles v. Carlson, 902 N.W.2d
38, 42 (Minn. 2017). Appellate courts review a grant of summary judgment de novo.
Commerce Bank v. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co. , 870 N.W.2d 770, 773 (Minn. 2015). “In
conducting this review, [appellate courts] view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party and resolv e all doubts and factual infe rences against the moving
parties.” Fenrich v. Blake Sch., 920 N.W.2d 195, 201 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted).
Appellants challenge the district court’s summary-judgment dismissal of their claim
brought under section 46 2.361, subdivision 1.4 They first argue that summary judgment
was improper because the city applied the incorrect shoreland ordinance to evaluate their
application. They further contend that the city’s decision should be reversed due to
“procedural unfairness,” or at minimum, that “technical defects” create genuine issues of
material fact requiring a trial. We address each argument in turn.

4 The Tii Gavo parties do not challenge the di strict court’s summary-judgment dismissal
of their constitutional due-process claim.
8
I. The city council’s denial of appellant s’ application to amend the CUP and
development agreement was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.

A “person aggrieved” by a city council’s land-use decision is entitled to appropriate
judicial review in district court. Minn. Stat. § 462.361, subd. 1. The district court examines
the municipal record and may allow the parties to supplement it with additional evidence,
as was the case here. See Swanson v. City of Bloomington , 421 N.W.2d 307, 313 (Minn.
1988). The question before the reviewing cour t is “whether the zoning authority’s action
was reasonable.” Honn v. City of Coon Rapids , 313 N.W.2d 409, 416-17 (Minn. 1981);
see also Goerke Fam. P’ship v. Lac qui Parle-Yellow Bank Watershed Dist., 857 N.W.2d
50, 55 (Minn. App. 2014). “[T]he nature of the matter under review has a bearing on what
is reasonable.” Honn, 313 N.W.2d at 417. “[I]n special use permit cases, ‘reasonableness’
is measured by the standards set out in the local ordinance.” White Bear Docking &
Storage, Inc. v. City of White Bear Lake, 324 N.W.2d 174, 176 (Minn. 1982).
On appeal, the reviewing court considers the supplemented record and conducts an
independent review of the zoning authority’s decision. St. Croix Dev., Inc. v. City of Apple
Valley, 446 N.W.2d 392, 397 (Minn. App. 1989), review denied (Minn. Dec. 1, 1989); see
also VanLandschoot v. City of Mendota Heights, 336 N.W.2d 503, 509 (Minn. 1983). The
appellate court does not give “any special de ference to the same review conducted by the
[district] court.” Nw. Coll. v. City of Arden Hills, 281 N.W.2d 865, 868 (Minn. 1979)
(quotation omitted).
Appellate courts reverse the zoning author ity’s decision only if it is unreasonable,
arbitrary, or capricious. RDNT, LLC v. City of Bloomington , 861 N.W.2d 71, 75 (Minn.
9
2015). “There are two steps in determining whether a city’s denial was unreasonable,
arbitrary, or capricious.” Id. First, the court determines whether “the reasons given by the
city were legally sufficient.” Id. at 75-76. Second, “if the reasons given are legally
sufficient, we must determine if the reas ons had a factual basis in the record.” Id. at 76.
The party challenging the zoni ng decision bears the burden of proving it was legally
insufficient or factually unsupported. Sagstetter v. City of St. Paul, 529 N.W.2d 488, 492
(Minn. App. 1995). Appellate courts will “a ffirm a city’s decision to deny a conditional
use permit if any one stated reason is sufficient.” Roselawn Cemetery v. City of Roseville,
689 N.W.2d 254, 260 (Minn. App. 2004).
Having established our sta ndard of review, we next consider the city council’s
decision to deny appellants’ application for m o r e b o a t s l i p s . T echnically, appellants’
application was a request to amend the 2007 CUP establishing the Tii Gavo development.
Scandia ordinances allow a conditional use pe rmit holder to “propose amendments to the
permit at any time, following the procedures for a new permit.” Scandia, Minn., Dev.
Code, Ch. 1, § 8.7 (2021). The city pl anning commission re views the amendment
application and recommends approval or denial to the city c ouncil, which issues the final
decision. See id.
In assessing a CUP request, the city council must consider several criteria. Id., Ch.
1, §§ 8.1, .4 (2021). One criterion requires that “[t]he conditional use shall conform to the
applicable regulations of the district in which it is located.” Id., Ch. 1, § 8.4. Here, where
the application involved a waterbody and the surrounding area, the parties agree that the
city was required to evaluate applicable shoreland regulations and standards.
10
In its resolution denying the request for addi tional boat slips, the city council gave
four specific reasons for its decision:
1. The expansion does not pres erve natural resources as
identified in the Comprehensiv e Plan, includin g Big Marine
Lake and its natural habitats.

2. The expansion does not comply with the regulations of
the Shoreland Management Di strict and the Development
Code.

3. The expansion does not comp ly with the performance
standards for shore recreationa l facilities in the Shoreland
Ordinance, a part of the Development Code.

4. The expansion has the potential to negatively impact
natural habitats and vegetation communities in Big Marine
Lake.

Appellants challenge the second and third reasons as legally insufficient, arguing that the
city council applied the incorrect shoreland ordinance within the development code.
The city council’s resolution reflects that it applied chapter 5, section 10.61, of the
Scandia Development Code, which specifica lly governs shore recreation facilities in
PUDs. “Shore recreation facilities” are define d as “[s]wimming areas, docks, watercraft
mooring areas and launching ramps and other water recreation facilities.” Scandia, Minn.,
Dev. Code, Ch. 5, § 2.6(40) (2018). Sec tion 10.61(E) requires th at shore recreation
facilities in PUDs be “centra lized” and that “[t]he number of spaces for continuous
beaching, mooring, or docking of watercraft must not exceed one for each allowable
dwelling unit or site in the first tier.” Id., § 10.61(E)(2). Section 10.61(E) goes on to
provide that “[l]aunching ramp facilities, including a small dock for loading and unloading
equipment, may be provided for use by occupants of dwelling units or sites located in other
11
tiers.” Again, the city planner estimated in her report that only 17 lots in the Tii Gavo
development qualified as first tier, and the Tii Gavo parties did no t provide a competing
number of first-tier lots or otherwise provide a calculation under the first-tier ordinance.
Appellants do not dispute that Tii Gavo is a PUD, and that the first-tier ordinance
accordingly applies to their application. Instead, they argue that the first-tier ordinance “is
not a boat slip limit at all, but a limit on the amount of spaces that can be designated for
docking multiple watercraft.” They then argue that, because the first-tier ordinance does
not limit the number of boat slips they can have , the city council should have applied the
“controlled access lot formula” in Scandia, Minn., Dev. Code, Ch. 5, § 6.33(B) (2018),5 as
they had urged it to do. Appellants assert that under the controlled access lot formula, they
are entitled to 134 boat slips.
In considering appellants’ argument, we must first interpret the first-tier ordinance.
“The interpretation and applica tion of a city ordinance is a question of law, which we
review de novo.” Staeheli v. City of St. Paul , 732 N.W.2d 298, 30 7 (Minn. App. 2007).
The rules governing statutory interpretation also apply to the interpretation of city
ordinances. Cannon v. Minneapolis Police Dep’t , 783 N.W.2d 182, 192-93 (Minn. App.
2010). Therefore, to interpret an ordinance, we first look at its plain language to determine
whether it is ambiguous. Id. at 193. We give an ordinance’s words and phrases their plain
and ordinary meaning. Christianson v. Henke , 831 N.W.2d 532, 536-37 (Minn. 2013)

5 A controlled access lot is a “lot used to a ccess public waters or as a recreation area for
owners of nonriparian lots within the same subdivision containing th e controlled access
lot.” Scandia, Minn., Dev. Code, Ch. 5, § 2.6(11) (2018).
12
(quotation omitted). An ordinance is ambiguous only if it is susceptible to more than one
reasonable interpretation. See id. “Multiple parts of [an ordinance] may be read together
so as to ascertain whether th e [ordinance] is ambiguous,” id., and “[e]very law shall be
construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions,” Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2020).
As explained, the first-tier ordinan ce limits “[t]he number of spaces for
continuous . . . docking of watercraft” in a PUD’s shore recreation facility to one space per
first-tier dwelling unit. Scandia, Minn., Dev. Code, Ch. 5, § 10.61(E)(2). Appellants argue
that because the terms “spaces” and “watercraft” are undefi ned in the ordinance, these
terms are necessarily ambiguous. They then propose that “w atercraft” should be read in
the plural form. They also propose that “space” should be interpreted to mean “a
continuous area or expanse which is free, available, or unoccupied.” Oxford Dictionary
(online ed. 2021), https://www.le xico.com/en/definition/space. Under this reading, they
argue, the first-tier ordinance allows a ce rtain number of areas—unlimited in size—for
docking multiple watercraft, and accordingly do es not limit the number of boat slips in a
PUD.
We disagree that the first-tier ordinanc e is ambiguous, and we reject appellants’
strained interpretation of its terms. An ordinance is not ambiguous simply because it does
not define every term used; an ordinance is ambiguous when, read as a whole, it is subject
to multiple reasonable interpretations. See Christianson, 831 N.W.2d at 536-37. “The
meaning of a statutory phrase is dependent upon context.” State v. Overweg, 922 N.W.2d
179, 183 (Minn. 2019). And we “may look to dictionary definitions to determine the plain
and ordinary meaning of a phrase.” Id.
13
Here, within the context of the first-tier ordi nance, it is clear that a “space” refers to
a docking, mooring, or beachin g space for one watercraft. See Merriam-Webster’s
Collegiate Dictionary 1194 (11th ed. 2014) (defining “space” in reference to a parking
space: “an extent set apart or available <parking>”); The American Heritage Dictionary
of the English Language 1676-77 (5th ed. 2018 ) (defining space to include “[a]n area
provided for a particular purpose: a parking space ”). The alternative interpretation
proposed by appellants is not reasonable, as it essentially renders the ordinance
meaningless. Moreover, appellants’ interpretation of section 10.61(E)(2) appears to ignore
the preceding ordinance provisi on, section 10.61(E)(1), whic h provides that the shore
recreation facilities—including docks— in PUDs must be “centralized.” Appellants would
interpret “space” to give each first-tier unit its own expansive area for storage of multiple
watercraft, which is inconsis tent with the centralized doc king arrangement called for in
section 10.61(E)(1). Reading the prov isions of the ordinance together, see Christianson,
831 N.W.2d at 536-37, “space,” in this context, cannot mean anything other than a docking
space for one watercraft.
Ultimately, appellants have not shown, th rough their interpretation of the first-tier
ordinance, that the city council based its deci sion on an error of law and thereby made an
arbitrary and capricious decision. See Krummenacher v. City of Minnetonka, 783 N.W.2d
721, 727, 732-33 (Minn. 2010) (explaining that a city’s decision is arbitrary and capricious
if based on a mistake as to th e applicable law). The first-tier ordinance expressly applies
to shore recreation facilities in PUDs, and appellants did not submit any information to the
city council suggesting that the first-tier ordinance allows boat slips beyond the 19 that the
14
development already has. See Roselawn Cemetery, 689 N.W.2d at 259-60 (explaining that
it is the responsibility of the applicant to show that th e applicable standards and criteria
stated in the ordinance are satisfied). And we note that even if the c ity council did err as
to the boat-slip calculation under shoreland ordinances, appellants have not, on appeal,
argued that the city council’s other reas ons for denying the CUP amendment were
insufficient. See id. Our review satisfies us that the city’s reas ons for its decision were
legally sufficient and supported by the reco rd, and that the decision was accordingly
reasonable. See RDNT , 861 N.W.2d at 75. The distri ct court did not err in granting
summary judgment in favor of the city.
II. The district court did not err in reject ing appellants’ claims of procedural
unfairness.

Appellants next argue that “technical defect s” in the city council’s consideration of
their application to amend the CUP created procedural unfairness that requires reversal of
the city’s decision. They do not, however, challenge the district court’s summary-judgment
dismissal of their constitutional due-process cl aim; they instead assert that the alleged
technical defects rendered the council’s decision unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious.
Appellants provide no caselaw that direct ly supports their procedural-unfairness
argument. They instead cite a line of cases that address the doc trine of substantial
compliance. The doctrine of substa ntial compliance, as explained in City of Minneapolis
v. Wurtele in the context of an eminent-domain decision, provides that “[t]echnical defects
in compliance [with statutory requirements] which do not reflect bad faith, undermine the
purpose of the procedures, or prejudice the rights of those intended to be protected by the
15
procedures will not suffi ce to overturn governmental action, particularly
where . . . substantial commitments have been made.” 291 N.W.2d 386, 391 (Minn. 1980);
see also City of Duluth v. State, 390 N.W.2d 757, 772 (Minn. 1986) (explaining, also in an
eminent-domain case, that procedural defects will not invalidate the city’s decision if they
are insubstantial). This doctrine addresses whether a decision was “statutorily,” as opposed
to “constitutionally,” sufficient. See Wurtele, 291 N.W.2d at 393. We “ha[ve] applied the
doctrine of substantial compliance to acti ons where the government has acted on CUP
applications and other zoning issues under directory st atutes or ordinances.” Manco of
Fairmont, Inc. v. Town Bd. of Rock Dell Twp. , 583 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Minn. App. 1998),
review denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 1998); see Chandler v. Kroiss, 190 N.W.2d 472, 476-77
(Minn. 1971) (applying substantial-compliance doctrine to uphold village council’s actions
regarding a special-use permit even though council failed to make required written findings
and keep a record of its reasons for its decision as required by ordinance and caselaw).
Appellants argue that, based on this casel aw, we must reverse the city council’s
decision if the city council failed to substantially comply with mandated procedures to the
prejudice of appellants’ application for more boat slips. Assuming w ithout deciding that
this proposed interpretation of the substantial-compliance caselaw is correct, we conclude
that the record nonetheless fails to support any of appellants’ alleged technical defects.
Appellants allege four specific technical defects:
1. Scandia staff told Plai ntiffs to apply under the
Controlled Access Lot formula, then recommended denial and
ultimately denied the applicatio n pursuant to the First-Tier
formula.

16
2. Scandia staff helped draft letters of opposition from the
DNR and Watershed.

3. Scandia City Councilmembe rs mobilized opposition to
the hearing.

4. Scandia City Councilmembers allowed their decisions
to be affected by their conflicts of interest.

We address each alleged deficiency in turn.
1. City staff advice as to applicable boat-slip formula
Appellants first point to evidence in the record that former city staff members,
specifically, a former city ad ministrator and a former cont racted city planner, initially
believed that the controlled access lot formula governed the amount of boat slips in Tii
Gavo. They assert that communications wi th these former staff members—which appear
to have been made in the context of an earlier application that was withdrawn—resulted in
a prejudicial “misdirection” as to which ordinance applied.
This argument—that information about app licable ordinances from former city staff
created a “procedural defect”—fails as a matter of law. Minnesota Statutes
section 462.3595, subdivision 1 (2020), provide s that CUP applicants are responsible for
showing that they meet the standards and criteria for approval. The statute “unambiguously
places the burden on the applicant to prove the proposed use will conform to a city’s stated
standards and criteria for the issu ance of a conditional use permit.” Roselawn Cemetery,
689 N.W.2d at 259. And a “municipality cannot be estopped from correctly enforcing [an]
ordinance even if the property owner relied to his detriment on prior city action.” Frank’s
Nursery Sales, Inc. v. City of Roseville, 295 N.W.2d 604, 607 (Minn. 1980).
17
Appellants do not cite any st atute, ordinance, or caselaw to support their position
that misinformation from city staff—who, no tably, are not the final decision-makers on
CUP applications—can constitute a substantial procedural defect that serves as a basis to
overturn a land-use decision. An d appellate courts have reject ed the argument that cities
should be estopped from enforc ing ordinances where permit ap plicants relied to their
detriment on mistakes by city employees. See N. Oaks v. Sarpal, 797 N.W.2d 18, 22, 25-
26 (Minn. 2011); Mohler v. City of St. Louis Park , 643 N.W.2d 623, 638 (Minn. App.
2002). We accordingly conclude that appella nts’ procedural-unfairness argument based
on the alleged misrepresentations fails as a matter of law.
Appellants separately argue that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding
the representations of city st aff, which should have precluded the district court’s grant of
summary judgment. But because we have c oncluded that the staff members’ alleged
misrepresentations cannot, as a matter of la w, support appellants’ claim, there are no
material fact questions regarding what th e staff members told appellants about the
applicable ordinances. The district court accordingly did not err by granting summary
judgment. See Senogles, 902 N.W.2d at 42.
2. City staff correspondence with the DNR and watershed district
Appellants next argue that the current city planner engaged in unauthorized “ex
parte communications” with the DNR and wa tershed district about the CUP amendment
application. To support their position, they reference an email from a DNR representative
to the city planner, which attach ed a draft comment letter and st ated: “I’d like to discuss
this with you, to make sure I’m correct in what I’ve said in the letter.” The city planner
18
testified in her deposition that she believed she had a follow-up conversation with the DNR
representative, though she did not remember the content of any conversation. She also
replied to the email, expressing concern about a sentence in the DNR’s draft letter, which
stated that the Tii Gavo deve lopment agreement—and not the city’s controlled access lot
ordinance—presently regulated the number of allowable slips. In spite of the city planner’s
concern, however, the DNR retained the sentence in the letter that was ultimately submitted
to the commission and council and emphasized that the developmen t agreement should
control.
Appellants do not point to a ny ordinance or statute that prohibits the communication
that occurred between the city planner and DNR staff. They assert that the city ordinance
“does not authorize communica tions beyond notice,” but the ordinance they reference
merely provides that, “All notices of public hearings to consider . . . conditional uses under
shoreland management c ontrols must be sent to the [DNR] commissioner . . .” Scandia
Dev. Code, Ch. 5, § 3.81 (2018). That th e ordinance requires notice to the DNR under
certain circumstances does not suggest that it forbids additional communication. And as
the city asserts, “[i]t is entirely reasonable, as happened in this case, for the DNR to consult
with city planners to make sure they u nderstand and have correctly referenced city
ordinances.”
Moreover, while appellants contend that the city planner “asked [the DNR
representative] to change her letter so that it was consistent with the reasons for denial in
her staff report,” the evidence in the record shows that the DNR did no t change the letter
or otherwise alter its recommendation. In su m, the record does not support a claim that
19
there was anything untoward or irregular about the city planner’s communication with the
DNR representative. And appellants have not shown any genuine issue of material fact
relating to their claim of improper ex parte communications.
3. City councilmembers “mobilizing opposition”
Appellants next argue that the record shows procedural unfairness because City
Councilmember Kronmiller and Mayor Maefs ky formed an opinion on the boat-slip
application before the public hearing and at tempted to solicit suppor t for their position.
They point to an ema il in the record in which Kronmiller tells Maefsky that he is
“attempting to get as many of the Watershe d Managers who served at the time the
development agreement was approved to attend [the public hearing.]” The city responds
that a request for watershed managers to attend and give input at a public hearing is entirely
appropriate and does not create any technical defect.
Again, appellants point to no ordinan ce or statute allegedly violated by the
communication. Instead, they analogize this case to an unpublishe d opinion where this
court held that the improper conduct of a councilmember—which included organizing and
mobilizing community opposition to a proposed project and e fforts to sway the opinions
of other councilmembers before the council considered the project—showed that the
council’s decision relied on impermissible factors. See Cont’l Prop. Grp., Inc. v. City of
Minneapolis, No. A10-1072, 2011 WL 1642510 (Minn. App. May 3, 2011).
But the case cited by appellants is not only nonprecedential, it is also
distinguishable. See Dynamic Air, Inc. v. Bloch, 502 N.W.2d 796, 800 (Minn. App. 1993)
(providing that unpublished opin ions are not binding precedent). The facts in the record
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do not suggest that Kronmiller and Maefsky tr ied to sway other councilmembers before
the public hearing, or that th ey took on an activ ist role. While Kronmiller came to the
hearing with his previous knowledge of th e Tii Gavo developmen t approval, which was
based on his experience as a watershed manager, his involvement did not create a technical
defect. Ultimately, appellants have not o ffered sufficient facts to show that city
councilmembers relied on impermissible factors, and summary judgment was proper.
4. City councilmembers’ “conflicts of interest”
Lastly, appellants assert th at two councilmembers “had conflicts of interest that
affected their decision-making.” Specifically , they assert that two councilmembers own
shoreline along Big Marine Lake, and that their shoreline ownership surely impacted their
opinions that nonriparian lot owners should not receive docking spaces. Appellants cite no
authority to support their position.
The Minnesota Supreme Court addressed a similar argument in Lenz v. Cook Creek
Watershed Dist., 153 N.W.2d 209, 219-20 (Minn. 1967). There, several watershed district
members who issued the decision in question owned “a considerable amount of real estate
in the district which [would] be substantially benefitted by the proposed [project].” Lenz,
153 N.W.2d at 219. The supreme court noted th at “[t]here is no settled general rule as to
whether such an interest will disqualify an official” and went on to consider five factors it
determined were relevant. Id. The court concluded that the officials were not disqualified
from participating in the decision, noting th at there was an adequate procedure for
reviewing any decision of the managers and that, when a large project proposal is before a
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governing body, “there is a very good chance that . . . [the project] would necessarily
benefit land owned by some or all of the Managers.” Id.
Here, as in Lenz, the councilmembers who live on the lake are not automatically
disqualified from participating in any decision implicating the lake. Appellants offer no
more than speculation to support their claim of an impermissible conflict, and “mere
speculation is not enough to survive a summary judgment motion.” Osborne v. Twin Town
Bowl, Inc. , 749 N.W.2d 367, 376 (Minn. 2008) (q uotation omitted). Accordingly,
summary judgment was proper regarding this claim of procedural unfairness.
In sum, appellants have not pointed to legal standards and record evidence to
support their contention that, due to substantial technical defects, the city council’s decision
was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. See Wurtele , 291 N.W.2d at 391. We
accordingly conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor
of the city.6
Affirmed.

6 Appellants include a section in their brief, after their argument on procedural unfairness,
where they argue that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment. They
assert, in general terms, that the following material-fact issues exist: whether city officials
“came to a consensus that the Controlled Acce ss Lot formula did not apply,” whether the
city council relied on the DNR’s letter to make its decision, whether Kronmiller and
Maefsky “were trying to sway other councilmembers,” and whether impermissible ex parte
communications occurred. We have already addressed these alleged fact issues within the
discussion of procedural unfairness, and we will not repeat our conclusions here.
Ultimately, appellants have not shown how any of the alleged fact issues are material, and
summary judgment was accordingly proper. See Senogles, 902 N.W.2d at 42.