In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: S. D., Mother

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1559

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
S. D., Mother

Filed June 28, 2021
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-JV-19-606

Lucas J.M. Dawson, Halberg Criminal Defens e, Bloomington, Minnesota (for appellants
M.K. and R.K.)

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Kayla M. Rodriguez, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Ramsey County Human Services Department)

Tiffany Halligan, St. Paul, Minnesota (self-represented respondent and guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellants M.K. and R.K. (grandparents) appeal from the district court’s dismissal
of their motion for adoptive placement without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
FACTS
S.D. is the mother of two daughters. S.D. had L.T.D. (child 1) with father L.T. in
2010, when she was 13 years old. She had L.D.K. (child 2) with father C.K. in 2017. After
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child 2’s birth, grandparents—who are C.K .’s parents and biologically unrelated to
child 1—cared for both children. The children were placed with grandparents in February
2018 and weeks later were adjudicated children in need of protection or services.
Grandparents communicated to responde nt Ramsey County Human Services
Department (the county) that they wanted to adopt both children. The county considered
grandparents as a permanent placement option for the children.
In fall 2018, however, grandparents grew increasingly worried about then eight-
year-old child 1’s behavior towards child 2, who was a toddler. Grandparents shared with
the county that child 1 admitted to shaking a nd poking child 2 to scar e her; child 1 told
child 2 that she hated her; child 1 tripped chil d 2 to make her fall; child 1 prevented child
2 from sleeping by “fake coughing”; and chil d 1 “knew” when the baby monitor camera
was on and off in the children’s shared bedroom, and would tailor her behavior
accordingly. Grandparents also told the count y that child 1 admitted that she “left items
on the floor with the intention that [child 2] would find the items, place them in her mouth,
and choke.”1
The county offered safety planning to ma ke the home safe fo r the children. But
grandparents declined. They believed that child 1 required intensive in-home mental- and
behavioral-health interventions, which were not offered. Because the county did not
address the concerns about child 1 to their satisfaction, gr andparents asked the county to

1 Grandparents were particularly concerned about child 1’s admission because their infant
grandson had recently passed away following a tragic accident while in the care of his
parents.
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remove child 1 from their home. The county warned grandparents that the removal of child
1 would also require the removal of child 2. Grandparents did not want child 2 removed
from their care.
In early December 2018, grandp arent M.K. wrote to child 1’s therapist that she was
“very concerned for the safety of [child 2] when it comes to [child 1].” M.K. stated that
she and grandparent R.K. were at “the point that we cannot tr ust her to be alone with her
for a minute in fear that she will hurt her in some way. She has completely lost our trust.”
In a letter to a district court judge, M.K. called child 1 a “monster” because of her behavior
towards child 2. M.K.’s letter stated that sh e wanted to separate the children to protect
child 2.
Shortly after M.K.’s communications to the therapist and the judge, the county
removed child 1 from grandparents ’ home. Child 1 was initially placed in a shelter. In
July 2018, child 1 was placed in foster care with a non- relative adult she knew—a coach
from school. Grandparents believe child 1 was placed in this home because she could not
be around other children.
After child 1 was removed from grandparen ts’ home, she continued to have visits
with grandparents, including two overnight visits. During the second overnight visit, child
1’s mother S.D. called. Although S.D’s pare ntal rights had been recently terminated,
grandparents allowed child 1 to speak with her. Gran dparents also told child 1 that they
were interested in adopting her. Based on these incidents, the county suspended
grandparents’ visits with child 1.
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While the children were separated, the county searched for a placement that would
accept both siblings. The county eventually identified a suitable non-relative foster home.
In September 2019, the county removed child 2 from grandparents’ home and placed both
children in this foster home.
After child 2 was removed from their home, grandparents and child 2 had regular
visits. Eventually, th e county reduced grandparents’ vis its with child 2 to one day per
week. According to grandparents, child 2 protests returning to the foster home at the end
of these visits; she cries, cli ngs to grandparents, and resists getting ready. Grandparents
also allege that she tells the foster parents that she wants to stay with grandparents.
In June 2019, S.D.’s parental rights to both children were terminated by default.
L.T., father of child 1, executed a consent of parent to adoption by the non-relative foster
parents in December 2019; his parental rights were terminated that same month. The
district court terminated the parental rights of child 2’s father, C.K., by default in June
2020.
The foster parents signed an adoption placement agreement to adopt both children.
The guardian ad litem (GAL) recommended to the district court that the children continue
their placement in the foster home and be adopted by the foster parents. According to the
GAL, the children were doing well and the placement was “a great fit.”
Grandparents filed a motion for adoptive placement in the district court in
September 2020. In support of their motion, they submitte d a lengthy affidavit detailing
the history of their involvemen t with the children, their de cision to remove child 1 from
their home, failings by the county in handling th e removal of child 1, the suspension of
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visits with the children after their removal, their close bond with child 2 and love for child
1, and their commitment to adopting both child 1 and child 2. They also submitted letters
that M.K. had sent to the district court abou t child 1’s behavior, notes M.K. had prepared
for child 1’s therapist, and certificates fro m numerous courses th ey had completed on
adoption and child trauma. Grandparents requested an evidentiary hearing on their motion,
asserting that their submissions made a prima facie showing of the county’s
unreasonableness in rejecting them as the adoptive placement for both children. See Minn.
Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 6(b) (2020).
The county opposed grandparents’ mo tion for adoptive placement, asking the
district court to dismiss it without an evidentiary hearing. According to the county,
grandparents did not satisfy their preliminary burden of showing that the county had acted
unreasonably.
The district court dismissed grandparen ts’ motion for adoptiv e placement without
an evidentiary hearing. The district court determined that grandparents had failed to make
a prima facie showing that the county acted unreasonably in not placing the children for
adoption with them.
Grandparents appeal.
DECISION
Grandparents argue that the district court erred in dismissing their motion for
adoptive placement withou t an evidentiary hearing. They contend that their motion and
submissions satisfied their minimal burden u nder Minnesota law to obtain an evidentiary
hearing—making a prima facie showing that the county was unreasonable in failing to
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place the children with them. Gr andparents ask us to reverse and remand to the district
court for an evidentiary hearing on their motion.
The county has a contrasting view of the a llegations in grandparents’ submissions.
The county asserts that, even if grandparents’ allegations are taken as true, they do not
show that the county acted unreasonably in not placing the children for adoption with
grandparents. The county therefore contends th at it was appropriate for the district court
to dismiss grandparents’ motion outright without an evidentiary hearing.
Before turning to these arguments, we pr ovide a brief overview of the law governing
adoption proceedings in Minnesot a. “Adoption is a creation of statute and therefore the
[district] court’s authority in matters relating to adoption is limited to the authority set forth
by statute.” In re Adoption of C.H., 554 N.W.2d 737, 740 (Minn. 1996); see Juvenile Court
Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 260C.001-.637 (2020).
When a child has been plac ed under the guardianship of the commissioner of human
services after the parents’ rights have been te rminated, an agency ac ting on behalf of the
commissioner must make “reasonable efforts” to finalize an adoption. Minn. Stat.
§§ 260C.601, subd. 2, .605, subd. 1. Reasonable efforts include identifying an appropriate
prospective adoptive parent in accord with the child’s best interests, performing an up-to-
date relative search, and ultimately finalizing the adoption. Minn. Stat. § 260C.605, subd.
1(d). To determine the needs and best interests of the child , the agency must consider
various factors:
(1) the child’s current functioning and behaviors;
(2) the medical needs of the child;
(3) the educational needs of the child;
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(4) the developmental needs of the child;
(5) the child’s history and past experience;
(6) the child’s religious and cultural needs;
(7) the child’s connection with a community, school,
and faith community;
(8) the child’s interests and talents;
(9) the child’s relationship to current caretakers,
parents, siblings, and relatives;
(10) the reasonable preference of the child, if the court,
or the child-placing agency in the case of a voluntary
placement, deems the child to be of sufficient age to express
preferences[.]

Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(b). After c onsidering these factors when a prospective
adoptive parent has been esta blished, the agency may ex ecute an adoptive placement
agreement. Minn. Stat. § 260C.613, subd. 1.
A relative or foster parent with a comp eting interest in ad opting the child may,
within the statutory time period, move the dist rict court for an adop tive placement of the
child. Minn. Stat. § 260C.607 , subd. 6(a). “The motion an d supporting documents must
make a prima facie showing that the agency has been unreasonable in failing to make the
requested adoptive placement.” Id., subd. 6(b). If the district court determines that the
movant’s motion and supporting documents fail to make that prima facie showing, “the
court shall dismiss the motion.” Id., subd. 6(c) (emphasis added). If, however, the district
court determines that a “prima facie basis is made,” then “the court shall set the matter for
evidentiary hearing.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, whether the district court must set an
evidentiary hearing on the movant’s motion hinges on whether the movant’s motion and
supporting documents make a prima facie show ing that the agency acted unreasonably in
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failing to make the adoptive placement requested by the movant. See Minn. Stat. § 645.44,
subd. 16 (2020) (stating that “‘[s]hall’ is mandatory”).
At an evidentiary hearing on the movant’s motion, the agency presents evidence to
support its decision not to make the adoptiv e placement with the movant. Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.607, subd. 6(d). Thereafter, “[t]he moving party has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the agency has been unr easonable in failing to make
the adoptive placement.” Id. The district court “may” order the agency to make an adoptive
placement of the child with the movant if, at the end of the hearing, the district court “finds”
both that (1) “the agency has been unreasonable in failing to make the adoptive placement”
sought by the movant and (2 ) the movant provides “the most suitable adoptive home to
meet the child’s needs using the factors in section 260C.212, subdivision 2, paragraph (b).”
Id., subd. 6(e) (emphasis added); see Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd . 15 (2020) (stating that
“‘[m]ay’ is permissive”).
A district court’s dismissal of an adoptiv e-placement motion is an appealable order.
In re Welfare of L.L.P., 836 N.W.2d 563, 570 (Minn. App. 2013). We review the dismissal
of an adoptive-placement moti on without an evidentiary hearing in three parts. See id.
First, we apply de novo review in examining whether the district court treated the parties’
supporting documents “properly.” Id. (citing Boland v. Murtha , 800 N.W.2d 179, 185
(Minn. App. 2011)). Second, we consider whet her the district court abused its discretion
in determining that the movant failed to make a prima facie showing that the county was
unreasonable in failing to make the requested adoptive placement. Id. And third, we apply
de novo review in considering the district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing. Id.
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(noting that the failure to make a prima facie showing resolves the need for an evidentiary
hearing).
Applying these standards of review, we conc lude that the district court did not err
in its dismissal, without an evidentiary hearing, of gr andparents’ motion for adoptive
placement. We address each part of the analysis in turn.
A. The district court did not err in its treatment of grandparents’ submissions.
As noted, the first step in reviewing the district court’s decision requires us to
determine, applying de novo review, whethe r the district court treated grandparents’
motion and supporting documents “properly.” See id. A district court treats an adoptive-
placement motion and supporting documents “properly” by accepting the facts alleged by
the movant as true, disregarding any cont rary allegations, and only considering the
respondent’s allegations and th e procedural history to the extent either “explain[s] or
provide[s] context.” Id. Grandparents argue that the district court erred in its treatment of
their motion and submissions.
First, grandparents contend that the distri ct court failed to accept the facts they
alleged as true and improperly considered the county’s contrary allegations. We disagree.
The district court accurately cited the law rega rding its obligation to assume the truth of
grandparents’ allegations. And the district c ourt’s order reveals that the district court
followed the law. All of the facts included in th e district court’s order are based on
grandparents’ own submissions. While some of those facts are not favorable to
grandparents, they are taken directly from the materials that grandparents presented to the
district court, including grandparents’ affidav it, M.K.’s letters to another district court
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judge, and notes for child 1’s th erapist. Grandparents do no t identify any contrary facts
included in the district court’s order. Mo reover, although grandparents argue that the
district court did not accept the truth of thei r allegations, they do not point to specific
instances where the district cour t erred in this regard, and in our review of the district
court’s order we found no such errors.
Second, grandparents argue that the di strict court improperly weighed the
procedural history of the case against them—i n particular, their request to have child 1
removed from their home. Again, we disagree. We initia lly question whether
grandparents’ request to remove child 1 was merely “procedural history” in this case.
Grandparents’ request, and the county’s subsequent removal of child 1 based on
grandparents’ insistence, was the focus of gr andparents’ own submissions in support of
their motions. But even if grandparents’ request to remove child 1 was simply part of the
procedural history, it provided critical context for the distri ct court in deciding whether
grandparents made a prima facie showing of the county’s unreasonableness. Grandparents
were the initial permanency option for the children until they asked the county to remove
child 1. Their motion alleged that the county was unreasonable in subsequently failing to
support them as the adoptive placement. In determining whether grandparents made a
prima facie showing of unreasonableness, th e district court certainly was entitled to
consider this history—placed in issue by grandparents—for context.
Third, grandparents allege that Minnesota Statutes section 260C.221(b)(2)—which
states that a “decision by a relative not to be identified as a potential placement resource or
participate in planning for the child at the beginning of the case shall not affect whether the
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relative is considered for placement of the child with that relative later”—barred the district
court from considering their request to remove child 1. But this statute, which governs the
search for relatives that an agency must conduct before placing a child, does not apply here.
When grandparents sought removal of child 1, not only had the county already identified
grandparents as a permanency option, but the county had already placed the children with
grandparents. Moreover, when grandparents sought the removal of child 1, the county
specifically warned grandparents that removing child 1 would ultimately result in removal
of child 2. Thus, on this record, we cannot say that grandparents’ request to remove child 1
occurred at “the beginning of the case,” whic h is the relevant time period under section
260C.221(b)(2). The district court accordingly did not c ontravene this statute in
considering grandparents’ request to remove child 1.
Finally, grandparents argue that two of the district court’s comments in its order—
which characterized grandparents’ judgment as “limited” and “poor”—reveal that, instead
of accepting grandparents’ allegations as true, the district court improperly weighed the
evidence in considering their mo tion. Again, we disagree. We initially observe that the
district court’s remarks related to undis puted facts alleged in grandparents’ own
submissions—specifically, grandparents’ assertions that they told child 1 they wanted to
adopt her and allowed child 1 to speak with S.D. on the phone after S.D.’s parental rights
had been terminated. Furthermore, the di strict court only made these comments in
explaining its legal conclusion that grandparents had failed to make a prima facie showing
that the county acted unreasonably in not placing the children for adoption with them. The
district court concluded that grandparents’ “decision to have the children removed and
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subsequent lapses in judgment in how they interacted with Child 1 during overnight visits
demonstrate that [the county] was not unreasonable, irrational or capricious in its decision
to find an adoptive placement fo r the children other than [gra ndparents].” Because the
district court’s remarks were based on grandparents’ own allegations, and the remarks were
included simply to explain the court’s legal conclusion that grandparents had failed to make
a prima facie showing of the county’s unreasonableness, they were not improper.
Based on our de novo review of the dist rict court’s treatment of grandparents’
motion papers, we see no error. The distri ct court treated grandparents’ motion and
submissions properly.
B. The district court did no t abuse its discretion in determining that grandparents
failed to make a prima facie showing of unreasonableness.

We next consider whether the district court abused its discretion in determining that
grandparents failed to make a prima facie showing that the county was unreasonable in
failing to make their requested adoptive placement of the children. See L.L.P., 836 N.W.2d
at 570. Generally, a district court abuses its discretion if it makes findings of fact that are
unsupported by the record, it improperly applie s the law, or it otherwise resolves the
discretionary question in a manner that is contrary to logic and facts on the record. See In
re Adoption of T.A.M. , 791 N.W.2d 573, 578 (Minn. App. 2010); Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569
N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997). In determining whether a movant has made a prima facie
case, however, the district court accepts the m ovant’s assertions as true and disregards
contrary assertions of the nonmoving party. L.L.P., 836 N.W.2d at 571. Therefore, at the
prima facie case stage of the proceeding, the di strict court does not find facts. And the
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“facts” relevant to the district court’s as sessment of whether the movant’s motion and
supporting documents make a prima facie case are those alleged by the movant. See id.
To obtain an evidentiary hearing on their motion for adoptive placement,
grandparents were required to “make a prima facie showing that the agency has been
unreasonable in failing to make the requ ested adoptive placement.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.607, subd. 6(b). Section 260C.607, subdivision 6(b), does not define the term
“unreasonable.” In considering grandparents’ motion, the district court used a dictionary
definition of the term—defini ng it as “not guided by reason; irrational, or capricious.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 1851 (11th ed. 2019). Both parties agree with the district court’s
definition.
We must also delineate the “prima facie showing” standard. “A motion for adoptive
placement is analogous to a mo tion to modify custody.” L.L.P., 836 N.W.2d at 570. In
the analogous context of a motion to modify custody, we have stated: “At the prima-facie-
case stage of the proceeding, [the movant] need not establish anything. [The movant] need
only make allegations which, if true, would allow the district court to grant the relief [the
movant] seeks.” Amarreh v. Amarreh, 918 N.W.2d 228, 231 (Minn. App. 2018), review
denied (Minn. Oct. 24, 2018); see Tousignant v. St. Louis County , 615 N.W.2d 53, 59
(Minn. 2000) (stating that a prima facie case is “one that prevails in the absence of evidence
invalidating it” (quotation omitted)). Thus, he re, the district court was charged with
determining whether grandparents’ motion and supporting documents set forth allegations
that, if true, could show that the county was not guided by reason, or was irrational or
capricious, in failing to place the children with grandparents for adoption.
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The district court concluded that grandparents failed to make a prima facie showing
that the county was unreasonable. According to the district court, the county was not
unreasonable in failing to make the adoptive placement requested by grandparents because
grandparents sought removal of child 1 from their home knowing that child 2 would also
be removed, declined the county’s offer to help avoid child 1’s removal, and demonstrated
lapses of judgment when interacting with child 1.
Grandparents argue that this was an abuse of discretion for several reasons. First,
they allege that both children have a significant attachment to them—particularly child 2,
who spent her first few years in grandparents’ home. They argue that severing those
attachments would cause trauma for the children. Second, grandparents allege that it was
unreasonable for the county to resume discussions with them about becoming a
permanency option for th e children in May 2 019, only to reverse course and ultimately
place the children for adop tion by the foster parents. Fi nally, grandparents argue that it
was unreasonable for the county “to remove both girls and shuffle them around through
the system before dropping them into a non-relative foster home—all while [grandparents]
fought for placement in their own home.”
Grandparents love the children and have devoted substantial time and resources to
caring for them; indeed, as noted, the county initially planned to pl ace the children with
grandparents for adoption. However, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its
discretion here. Grandparents’ submissions to the district court certainly show a strong
bond with the children, particularly with child 2, the daughter of their biological son. But
those submissions also show that they asked the county to remove child 1 from their home
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and declined the county’s offer to assist them in safely k eeping child 1 in their care.
Although grandparents st ate that they intended for child 1 to be returned to their home
eventually, their other submissions to the district court show that they also considered child
1 to be a “monster” who had “completely lost [their] trust.” Furthermore, grandparents
sought removal of child 1 notwithstanding the warning that this would lead to removal of
child 2 to preserve the sibli ng relationship. Given these ci rcumstances—all set forth in
grandparents’ own submissions in support of their motion—the district court did not abuse
its discretion by determining th at grandparents failed to m eet their burden of making a
prima facie showing that the county was unreasonable. Although this burden was minimal,
we are convinced that the district court was well within its discretion to conclude that
grandparents’ allegations, even if all true, were insufficient to show that the county acted
unreasonably in failing to place the children for adoption with grandparents.
C. Because grandparents did not satisfy their threshold burd en, no evidentiary
hearing was required and the district court properly dismissed their motion.

Based on its determination that grandparents failed to make a prima facie showing
of the county’s unreasonablene ss, the district court denied grandparents’ request for an
evidentiary hearing and dismissed their motion for adoptive pl acement. Because
grandparents did not make the threshold showing necessary for an evidentiary hearing, the
district court correctly denied an evidentiary hearing. Likewise, the district court properly
dismissed grandparents’ motion for adoptive placement. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd.
6(c).
Affirmed.