In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: R. J. O., J. E. J., and J. S. O., Parents

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1564

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
R. J. O., J. E. J., and J. S. O., Parents

Filed May 24, 2021
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Becker County District Court
File No. 03-JV-20-868

Elizabeth A. Walker, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (for appellant-mother R.J.O.)

Brian McDonald, Becker County Attorney, Matthew D. Jorud, Assistant County Attorney,
Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (for respondent Becker County Social Services)

Misti Kern, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Worke, Pres iding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
On appeal from the district court’s order terminating her parental rights, appellant-
mother R.J.O. challenges the district court’s determinations that respondent Becker County
Human Services (BCHS) proved a statutory basis for termination, that termination is in the
children’s best interests, and that BCHS made reasonable efforts to reunite the family. We
affirm.
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FACTS
This appeal arises from a child-protection proceeding that resulted in termination of
mother’s parental rights to her children born in 2010 (child 1) and 2013 (child 2). The
district court also terminated the parental rights of J.E.J., the father of child 1, and J.S.O.,
the father of child 2. Neither father is participating in this appeal.
BCHS first became involved with mother in Februa ry 2017, when the county
received a maltreatment report alleging physical and emotional abuse of child 1 and child
2 (the children) by mother and concerns about mother’s history of drug use. BCHS
conducted an investigation during which it determined that J.S.O. was convicted of armed
robbery, possession of child pornography, and rape of a minor. Moth er and J.S.O. were
divorced at the time of the investigation, which was later closed without maltreatment
determinations.
From April to December 2018, Southwes t Health and Human Services (SWHHS)
received nine maltreatment reports concerni ng the children. These reports included
allegations that the children were exposed to domestic violence be tween mother and her
then-boyfriend and that the ch ildren had been physically and sexually abused by this
boyfriend. Rock County Human Services investigated these reports and provided mother
with services to help keep the children in the home. After the children witnessed a domestic
violence incident in which the police were called, SWHHS filed a child-in-need-of
protection-and/or-services (CHIPS) petition in Rock County and was granted protective
custody of the children. At a hearing a fe w days later, however, th e judge returned the
children to mother after she st ated she was moving to Beck er County. A BCHS social
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worker was assigned to mother’s case, and mother continued to receive services. The Rock
County CHIPS case was closed in April 2019.
The Becker County CHIPS case underlying this appeal began in the summer of
2019. On July 19, police stoppe d mother for a traffic offense and subsequently arrested
her after finding methamphetamine in her purse and vape pens in her car that tested positive
for THC. The children were present in the car. Also present in the car was mother’s former
boyfriend who had been accuse d of abusing the children in the maltreatment reports
received by SWHHS in 2018. At the time, there was an active domestic abuse no-contact
order (DANCO) prohibiting the former boyfri end from having cont act with mother.
Following her arrest, mother tested positive for methamphetamine and THC.
The next day, BCHS received a maltreat ment report regarding mother’s arrest,
which detailed concerns about the welfare of the children. The report included allegations
of neglect, threatened physical injury, and re peated exposure to domestic violence. On
August 1, 2019, BCHS filed a CHIPS petiti on requesting immediate custody of the
children. The district court issued an order on August 5 placing the children in BCHS’s
custody for an out-of-home placement. The children were adjudicated in need of protective
services at a hearing held eight days later.
BCHS created an out-of-home placement plan that was approved by the district
court. This plan was focused on ensuring that mother coul d provide a safe, stable home
free from domestic violence and put her children’s needs before her own. Mother reviewed
this case plan extensively with her caseworker and stated that she understood the plan.
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About five months later, after mother had substantially complied with the case plan,
BCHS arranged a trial home visit to begin at the end of February 2020. As part of the case
plan, mother agreed that BCHS would screen any individuals who spent time around the
children. However, during th e trial home visit, mother a llowed a man who had not been
vetted by BCHS to spend time around the children. She also allowed this man to care for
the children alone. Wh en mother’s caseworker learned that an unknown individual was
spending time with the children, mother claimed she did not know the man’s last name and
attempted to conceal his identity. The case worker later learned that this man was a
registered sex offender with whom child pr otection had extensive involvement, and who
had been accused of abusing his own grandchild ren. As a result, the trial home visit was
terminated in mid-March.
In May 2020, Becker County petitioned to terminate the parental rights of mother
and both fathers. In October 2020, the district court held a two-day trial on the termination-
of-parental-rights petition. On November 23, 2020, the district court filed an order
terminating the parents’ parental rights, co ncluding that BCHS had proved two alleged
statutory grounds for termination, that the te rmination was in the children’s best interest,
and that BCHS had made reasonable efforts to reunify the family.
Mother appeals.
DECISION
Mother urges us to reverse the district court’s order terminating her parental rights.
Parental rights should not be terminated “except for grave and weighty reasons.” In re
Welfare of HGB, 306 N.W.2d 821, 825 (Mi nn. 1981). An appellate court will affirm the
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district court’s termination of parental right s when (1) “at least one statutory ground for
termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence,” (2) “termination is in the best
interests of the child[ren],” and (3) “the county has made reasonable efforts to reunite the
family.” In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008).
I. The district court did not err in determining that clear and convincing evidence
established a statutory ground for termination—that mother failed to comply
with her parental duties.

Mother argues that BCHS failed to present sufficient evidence to support
termination of her parental rights. The district court found that BCHS proved two statutory
grounds for termination: (1) mother failed to satisfy her parental duties under Minnesota
Statutes section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(2) (2020); and (2) mother is “palpably unfit”
under section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(4) (2020).
A reviewing court may affirm the terminat ion of parental rights if one statutory
ground is supported by clear and convincing evidence, and the other requirements to
terminate parental rights are satisfied. In re Welfare of Children of R.W., 678 N.W.2d 49,
55 (Minn. 2004). On review, “[w]e give cons iderable deference to the district court’s
decision to terminate parental rights,” but “cl osely inquire into th e sufficiency of the
evidence to determine whether it was clear and convincing.” In re Welfare of Children of
J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 899 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn.
Jan. 6, 2012). “[W]e review the [district c ourt’s] factual findings for clear error and the
statutory basis for abuse of discretion.” In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T. , 814 N.W.2d 76,
87 (Minn. App. 2012). The district court’s findings are clearly erroneous if they are not
reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole or if the finding is “manifestly contrary
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to the weight of the evidence.” In re Children of T.R. , 750 N.W.2d 656, 660-61 (Minn.
2008) (quotation omitted).
We begin with section 260C .301, subdivision 1(b)(2), which provides a district
court with a statutory basis to terminate pa rental rights if it finds that a parent has
“substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties
imposed upon that parent by th e parent and child relationship.” So long as a parent is
physically and financially able, “the duties imposed upon that parent” include “providing
the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, education, and other care and control
necessary for the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health and development.” Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2). To grant a petition for termination on this ground, the
district court must find that, at the time of termination, the parent is not “presently able and
willing to assume [her] responsibilities” and that the parent’s neglect of these duties “will
continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period.” In re Welfare of J.K., 374 N.W.2d 463,
466-67 (Minn. App. 1985) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Nov. 25, 1985).
The district court determined that mother failed to comply with her parental duties
because she is currently incapable of keeping her children safe and will be unable to do so
in the foreseeable future. While noting that mother had complied with many of the
requirements of her case plan, the district c ourt nevertheless found th at “there is little
evidence that any skills she may have gained were able to help her make good decisions to
help her protect her children from harmful or dangerous adults.”
The district court made findings about mo ther’s history of dangerous romantic
partners and the children’s exposure to domestic violence and abuse. The court’s findings
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were supported by testimony from four case workers who had worked with mother in
Becker and Rock Counties. These caseworkers testified that mother had a long history of
domestic violence, which included multiple abusive partners, and that the children had
repeatedly witnessed incidents of domestic violence.
One caseworker testified that mother continued to be romantically involved with a
partner after the children alleged that this partner had physically and sexually abused them.
Though a DANCO was eventually issued prohibiting this partner from having contact with
mother, he was in the car with mother and the children during the traffic stop that initiated
the CHIPS case underlying the petition for term ination of mother’s parent rights.
Moreover, multiple caseworkers testified that mother “dow nplayed” the effect that
witnessing domestic violence had on the children and that she failed to take responsibility
for how her actions impacted the children.
The court’s findings are also supported by testimony from the psychologist who
conducted mother’s parental capacity assessment in 2019. The psychologist testified that
it was unlikely that mother would change her behavior because she has a personality
disorder, and such disorders are often permanent. She discussed concerns that mother
would be unable to keep her children safe a nd unable to meet her children’s emotional or
psychological needs as a result of the personality disorder. The guardian ad litem likewise
had concerns about mother’s ability to connect to her children’s emotional and
psychological needs.
While the district court noted that mother substantially complied with her case plan,
the district court also found th at mother failed to comply with it when she allowed a man
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she knew, or should have known, is a sex offender to care for her children alone during the
trial home visit. Mother’s most recent caseworker testified that mother had reviewed and
understood the terms of her case plan, includi ng that she not bring individuals around the
children without prior approval from BCHS. In fact, the caseworker recounted that mother
provided a list of persons who could watch the kids, which indicates that mother understood
this condition. However, during the trial home visit, mother vi olated the case plan when
she allowed a man who had not been approved (and who is in fact a sex offender) around
the children and, on occasion, sh e even left the child ren alone with him. Before the trial
home visit was terminated, mother falsely denied that she was continuing to allow the man
around her children, despite her caseworker having proof to the contrary. The district court
found that this incident and mother’s dishonesty showed that she “is not capable of keeping
her children safe.”
This record refutes mother’s argument that her decision to let this man care for her
children during the trial home visit was a singular mistake. Rather, the record supports the
district court’s findings that mother repeated ly failed to make responsible choices about
the people she brought into her children’s lives and is unable to keep them safe. The district
court therefore did not abuse its discretion in determining that mother is unable to comply
with the duties of the parent-child relationship. Because the record permits termination on
this one statutory ground alone , we do not address the other ground on which the district
court relied. See S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385 (explaining termination will be affirmed on
clearly convincing evidence of at least one statutory ground).
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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that termination is
in the children’s best interests.

Mother appears to challenge the district court’s best-interests determination by
emphasizing her understanding of the children’s needs and the bond they share. A district
court cannot terminate parental rights unless it is in the best interests of the children. J.R.B.,
805 N.W.2d at 905. In analyzing the children’s best interests, the district court balances
the interests of both the parent and children in preserving the parent-child relationship, as
well as any competing inte rests of the children. Id. “Competing interests include such
things as a stable environment, health considerations and the [children’s] preferences.” In
re Welfare of R.T.B. , 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992). If a statutory basis for
terminating parental rights is present and th e interests of the parent and the children
conflict, “the interests of the [children] ar e paramount.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7
(2020).
We review the district court’s determination that termination is in the children’s best
interests for an abuse of discretion. J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905. “Because the best-interests
analysis involves credibility determinations and is ‘generally not susceptible to an appellate
court’s global review of a record,’ we give c onsiderable deference to the district court’s
findings.” J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 93 (quoting In re Tanghe, 672 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Minn.
App. 2003)).
Here, the district court determined that term ination is in the children’s best interests,
reasoning that mother’s “continuous acts of putting the children into danger clearly show
she cannot safely care for her children,” and that “her dis honesty and refusal to take
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accountability for her actions putting the children in danger show she is not willing or
capable of safely caring for her children in the future.” The di strict court also found that
mother’s personality disorder would “lead[] to a lifetime of uncertainty, ups and downs,
and situations that would not be fair or safe for the children.”
Mother does not appear to challenge any of the district court’s specific findings as
clearly erroneous, but she seemingly contends that termination is not in the children’s best
interests because she has a strong bond with her children and because she has a “good
understanding [of] her children’s medical needs and [their] mental health needs.”
While a parent’s bond with a child do es weigh in favor of reunification, see In re
Welfare of A.J.C., 556 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn. App. 1996), we have stated that a parent’s
love and desire to regain cu stody will not be enough to pr event termination where these
interests of the parent are outweighed by other interests. See J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 92-93
(concluding that mother’s inability to ma nage her child’s complex medical needs
outweighed her love and desire to maintain the parent-child relationship); see also A.J.C.,
556 N.W.2d at 622 (concluding that despite the mother’s love for and bond with her
children, her inability to comply with parental duties due to alcoholism and drug addiction
warranted termination). In this case, the district court specifically noted mother’s love for
her children, but it nonetheless found that mother’s love did not outweigh her present and
future inability to care for her children and the children’s interest in stability. Additionally,
while mother may indeed have a good understanding of her children’s medical and mental
health needs, mother does not explain why this fact alone would demonstrate that the
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district abused its discretion in ruling that termination of her parental rights is in her
children’s best interests.
Above all, the district court’s findings were based on mother’s long history of
unsuccessful mental health treatment, tes timony from several social workers and a
guardian ad litem expressing concerns about mo ther’s unsafe romantic relationships, and
mother’s own testimony, which the district court found demonstrated her inability to take
responsibility for her actions. Based on this record and the centrality of credibility in a
best-interests analysis, the di strict court did not abuse its discretion by determining that
termination of mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests.
III. The district court did not err in de termining that BCHS made reasonable
efforts to reunify mother and the children.

Mother also challenges the district cour t’s finding that BCHS made reasonable
reunification efforts. The district court mu st make specific findings that BCHS made
reasonable efforts to reunify the children and the parent or that reasonable efforts for
reunification were not required as set out in Minnesota Statut es section 260.012 (2020).
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8 (2020). The district court must make “individualized and
explicit findings regarding the nature and exte nt of efforts made by the social services
agency to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.” Id., subd. 8(1).
In determining whether reasonable efforts ha ve been made, the district court must
consider whether the services provided to the child and family were “(1) relevant to the
safety and protection of the ch ild; (2) adequate to meet the needs of the child and family;
(3) culturally appropriate; (4 ) available and accessible; (5) consistent and timely; and
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(6) realistic under the circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2020). Reasonable
efforts “must go beyond mere matters of form so as to include real, genuine assistance.”
In re Welfare of H.K. , 455 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn. App. 1990), review denied (Minn.
July 6, 1990). We review a district court’s factual findings regarding reasonable efforts for
clear error and its ultimate determination as to those efforts for an abuse of discretion.
J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 87 (clear error); see In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D. , 865 N.W.2d
315, 323 (Minn. App. 2015) (abuse of discretion).
In determining that BCHS made reasonable efforts, the district court found that the
resources BCHS offered mother included mental health and chemical health evaluations
and services, parenting education, and help with housing and transportation. The district
court found that these services met mother’s identified needs and that they were “adequate,
accessible, consistent, and realistic, as eviden ced by the fact that a Trial Home Visit was
eventually implemented.”
Mother’s challenge to the district court’s reasonable-efforts determination is based
on two assertions. First, she contends that that her caseworker “thwarted reunification
efforts.” Second, mother argues that BCHS allowed her to have only minimal contact with
her children after the trial home visit and that these efforts were not genuine reunification
efforts.
Regarding her caseworker, mother contends that she had only limited contact with
the caseworker and that the caseworker did not provide enough notice for mother to prepare
for the trial home visit. Mother maintain s that she only allowe d the unapproved sex
offender to watch her children—the mistake that ended the trial home visit—because her
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caseworker failed to provide sufficient notice that the children would be coming home and
mother needed to ready the home environment.
At trial, mother’s caseworker testified that she had frequent contact with mother and
informed her that th e trial home visit could happen qui ckly. Moreover, the caseworker
testified that mother had been “really excited” about a trial home vis it. According to the
caseworker, when mother had agreed she would be ready for a trial home visit, mother was
provided notice that th e children would be brought to moth er’s home the next morning.
The caseworker testified that mother never co mmunicated that she was not ready for the
trial home visit. On the other hand, mother testified that she could not recall the caseworker
giving her notice of the trial home visit.
At best, there is conflicting evidence regarding the caseworker’s communication
with mother before the trial home visit. However, the district court is “in a superior position
to assess the credibility of witnesses.” In re Welfare of L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn.
1996). And here, the district court found moth er not credible, stating that she “lied and
continued to make excuses” concerning the ev ents surrounding the trial home visit.
Mother’s argument that her caseworker’s condu ct before the trial home visit “thwarted”
reunification thus lacks merit.
The second part of mother’s challenge to the reasonable-efforts determination
centers on mother’s assertion that she was allowed only minimal contact with the children
after the trial home visit. The district court found that BCHS “continued to offer the same
services and support” after the trial home vi sit, despite scheduling difficulties resulting
from the COVID-19 pandemic. Mother’s caseworker provided detailed testimony at trial
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about the children’s visits with mother after the trial home visit, which included video and
in-person visits. Mother asserts that this contact with her children was limited because she
was only allowed to see the children once or twice a week for two hours and her visits were
terminated two weeks before tr ial. While the visits may ha ve been inhib ited due to the
pandemic, the district court’s finding that BCHS continued to offer the same services and
support is not clearly erroneous.
Mother also contends that BCHS’s reunifi cation efforts were not genuine after the
trial home visit. She argues that the visits with the children were “orchestrated” to suggest
that reasonable efforts were being made, but that BCHS had already decided reunification
would not occur. Mother’s caseworker acknowledged at trial that she believed
reunification was not in the children’s best interests once the trial home visit was
terminated. However, the caseworker also testified that it is BCHS’s practice to continue
reunification efforts in most cases even after a permanency petition has been filed. Given
this testimony, the district court did not clear ly err in finding that BCHS’s reunification
efforts after the trial home visit were genuine. Mother has not established that the district
court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous or that the reasonable-efforts determination
is an abuse of discretion.
In sum, our careful review of the record co nvinces us that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in concluding that BCHS proved at least one statutory ground for
termination, that termination was in the children’s best inte rests, and that BCHS made
reasonable efforts to reunify mother and the children. Although mother clearly loves her
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children, we find no error in the district court’s ultimate de cision to terminate mother’s
parental rights.
Affirmed.