State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1571

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jeffrey Alan Mcraven,
Appellant.

Filed March 20, 2023
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-20-1792

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Adam E. Petras, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant filed a direct appeal of his second-degree murder conviction, which was
stayed to allow appellant to pursue postconviction relief. Appellant argues that the district
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court abused its discretion by denying postconviction relief because (1) the state failed to
disclose material evidence that was favorable to his defense, (2) the prosecutor committed
misconduct by opposing appointment of counsel for the state’s main witness, and (3) the
district court failed to grant him an evidentiary hearing on postconviction issues. Appellant
also argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting Spreigl evidence, and
raises several claims in his pro se supplemental brief. We affirm.
FACTS
In January 2020, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Jeffrey Alan
McRaven1 with the second-degree murder of Lemandre Ingram . McRaven raised an
alternative-perpetrator defense, claiming that J.N. committed the murder. J.N. was a
critical witness for the state because he was the sole witness to the circumstances
surrounding the murder.
At McRaven’s jury trial, J.N. testified that Ingram was his cousin and they had a
good relationship. Ingram was a successful rapper about to sign with a record label. J.N.
testified that McRaven was also his cousin. And like Ingram, McRaven was a rapper and
the two collaborated.
On January 19, 2020, J.N., Ingram, McRaven, and one of their friends went to a
casino. J.N. drove, Ingram sat in the front passenger seat, and McRaven sat behind Ingram.
After the men left the casino, J.N. dropped off their friend. After another brief stop, the
three men decided to buy cigarettes. The men did not have money, so J.N. was going to

1 AKA Jeffrey Alan Mcraven.
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sell “crack cocaine.” The men arrived at the sale location too late, and J.N. was unable to
sell the drugs. J.N. remembered that he had cigarettes at his mother’s house.
J.N. parked at his mother’s house and exited the vehicle. As he walked away, he
heard a gunshot. He walked back to the vehicle and saw that Ingram was deceased. J.N.
testified that he was shocked and scared and had no idea why Ingram had been shot. J.N.
walked back to the house. McRaven followed him inside.
J.N. testified that he feared for himself and his parents. J.N. found his cigarettes
and he and McRaven left. As J.N. drove away, McRaven told him: “don’t snitch.” J.N.
saw a black and chrome 9-millimeter gun and worried that McRaven would shoot him.
J.N. told McRaven to throw the gun out the window; McRaven complied. McRaven told
J.N. to drop him off at his sister’s house, which he did.
J.N. testified that he disposed of the body. He admitted that he initially told
detectives that he and McRaven dumped the body together. J.N. testified that after he
dumped the body, he sold crack cocaine, cleaned the vehicle, went home, and told his
parents what McRaven did. J.N.’s mother told him to contact his brother, J.D. J.D. told
J.N. to report the murder to the police, which he did.
Defense counsel’s cross-examination of J.N. was contentious. Defense counsel
returned to J.N.’s admissions on direct examination about his prior convictions. J.N.
testified that he has two drug and two felony gun-related convictions. Defense counsel
also readdressed J.N.’s admissions that he took ecstasy the night of the offense, attempted
to sell crack cocaine, sold crack cocaine, and lied to detectives about McRaven dumping
the body with him.
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J.N. stated: “Yes, I lied to law enforcement . . . . I’m a criminal. . . . I said I’m a
criminal. Look at my record. I’m not proud of it.” J.N. emphasized, however, that he tells
his family everything and his story never changed with his family. At one point, J.N.
admitted that he “wanted to make sure that [he] [wasn]’t going to spend the rest of [his]
life in jail.” And he stated that he would still “probably go to jail” for the admissions he
made during his testimony.
The state’s remaining evidence was intended to corroborate J.N.’s testimony. Such
evidence included: surveillance videos and phone records corroborating J.N.’s asserted
timeline, phone records showing that McRaven’s phone was off, J.N.’s parents’ testimonies
regarding J.N. and McRaven’s behavior inside their home, and forensic evidence showing
the gunshot angle being from behind (where McRaven was sitting in the vehicle).
McRaven did not testify.
The jury found McRaven guilty as charged. The district court sentenced McRaven
to 390 months in prison. McRaven filed a direct appeal but the appeal was stayed for him
to pursue postconviction relief.
In July 2021, McRaven filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming that he
was entitled to a new trial for several reasons. First, he claimed that the state suppressed
evidence that shortly before his trial began, J.N. had been stopped for fleeing a police
officer. He asserted that this evidence would have shown the jury that J.N. was dishonest
and biased to testify favorably for the state to avoid prosecution for that offense. Second,
he claimed that the prosecutor committed misconduct by opposing the appointment of
counsel to J.N. for potential criminal liability and gave him the equivalent of immunity.
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Next, he claimed that newly discovered evidence proved that J.N. committed the murder.
Finally, he claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
The district court granted a postconviction hearing on McRaven’s first two claims—
whether the state failed to disclose evidence and whether the prosecutor committed
misconduct.
At the postconviction hearing, the prosecutor who prosecuted McRaven’s case
testified that it was not until McRaven filed a postconviction petition that he learned that
J.N. was facing fleeing charges. He testified that had he known during trial, he would have
disclosed that information to the defense.
The prosecutor testified that J.N. had potential culpability in the murder case, but
he did not charge J.N. because the case would not have existed but for J.N. reporting it.
But the prosecutor testified that he never told J.N. that he was not going to charge him and
never offered him any favoritism. He testified that J.N. never asked for an attorney.
The district court denied McRaven’s petition. The district court ruled that McRaven
failed to establish a Brady violation because evidence of the fleeing charge would have
been impeaching, and J.N. had already been vigorously impeached making it “highly
improbable” that the jury’s perception of him would have been swayed. The district court
ruled that McRaven failed to show prosecutorial misconduct. The district court summarily
denied McRaven relief on his remaining claims without an evidentiary hearing. This
appeal followed.
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DECISION
Postconviction petition
McRaven argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his petition
for postconviction relief. See Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012) (stating
this court reviews the denial of postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion).
A postconviction court abuses its discretion when it has
exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner,
based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made
clearly erroneous factual findings. Legal issues are reviewed
de novo, but our review of factual issues is limited to whether
there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the
postconviction court’s findings.

Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017) (quotations omitted).
Brady violation
McRaven first argues that the district court erroneously concluded that the state did
not commit a Brady violation when it failed to disclose evidence that J.N. faced charges
for fleeing a police officer.
The state violates a defendant’s due- process rights when it suppresses “material
evidence favorable to the defendant.” Walen v. State, 777 N.W.2d 213, 216 (Minn. 2010)
(citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)). For a violation to exist, the evidence
must (1) be favorable to the defendant because it is exculpatory or impeaching; (2) have
been suppressed by the state, willfully or inadvertently; and (3) be material, that is, the
absence of the evidence must have prejudiced the defendant. Walen, 777 N.W.2d at 216.
The district court “assumed that the first two elements” were met. While the state
does not concede that McRaven satisfied the first two elements, it recognizes that caselaw
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supports the district court’s conclusion. Thus, as the district court did, we will focus on
the materiality element. This court reviews the district court’s materiality determination
de novo because the analysis involves issues of fact and law. Id.
A materiality determination requires consideration of “the effect the undisclosed
evidence would have had in the context of the whole trial record. ” Id. “Evidence is
material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” State v. Hunt, 615
N.W.2d 294, 299 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted). “A reasonable probability is one that
is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Pederson v. State, 692 N.W.2d 452,
460 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted).
McRaven claims that information that J.N. allegedly fled police in the weeks before
trial could have been used to impeach J.N. The district court determined that it was “highly
improbable” that evidence of “then-still allegations of [J.N.] fleeing a police officer” would
influence the jury’s perception of J.N.’s reliability because he was impeached at trial. We
agree.
On cross-examination, J.N. admitted that he is a criminal, has drug and gun-related
felony convictions, took ecstasy the night of the offense, sold crack cocaine, and lied to
authorities about disposing the body. While this evidence could have been more damaging,
defense counsel effectively used J.N.’s admissions in closing argument to attack his
credibility and show inconsistencies and changes in his stories. Thus, knowing what it did
about J.N., it seems highly unlikely that the jury would have reached a different result had
it also learned that he was accused of fleeing a police officer.
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Moreover, McRaven claims that the prosecutor did not disclose the fleeing
information because the defense could have used the information to show J.N.’s motivation
to testify favorably for the state in McRaven’s prosecution. But from the beginning, J.N.
told a story that favored the state’s prosecution of McRaven. J.N. identified McRaven as
the shooter well before the fleeing accusations; thus, McRaven cannot argue that J.N.
concocted the story that McRaven was the shooter only after the fleeing incident occurred.
J.N.’s only incentive to avoid potential prosecution for the fleeing charge would have been
to testify consistently with what he had already reported to detectives and prosecutors.
Because J.N.’s credibility was effectively attacked, we cannot say that disclosure of the
fleeing information would have changed the outcome. Accordingly, the district court did
not err by concluding that McRaven’s constitutional rights were not violated.
Prosecutorial misconduct
McRaven also argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by opposing the
appointment of counsel for J.N. and manipulating a de facto immunity deal that was hidden
from the jury. The record supports the district court’s determination that there is no
indication of a secret immunity deal and that McRaven failed to show that the outcome
would have been different had J.N. consulted with an attorney.
First, immediately before J.N. testified, defense counsel inquired whether J.N. had
an immunity agreement or if he had been advised of his Fifth Amendment rights. See U.S.
Const. amend. V (providing that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself”). The district court similarly questioned whether J.N. had an
attorney. The prosecutor replied that there was no immunity agreement with J.N. He also
9
replied that it was not necessary for J.N. to consult with an attorney about potential
prosecution for him disposing of the body because there was no “realistic risk of
prosecution” because he was the prosecutor responsible for charging and he was not
charging J.N. The district court stated: “[T]he state has stated on the record, as officers of
the court, there is no immunity granted, and we’ll see if [J.N.] gets nervous about testifying
to anything that he did that may be a law violation.”
At the postconviction hearing, the prosecutor reiterated that, because the case was
assigned to him, he exercised discretion in not charging J.N. with a crime. The prosecutor
testified that he did so because there would be no case without J.N. reporting the murder.
He also testified that J.N. was not offered immunity. And J.N. must have understood that
to be true because he testified at McRaven’s trial that he was likely going to jail because
of the admissions he made during his testimony.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying postconviction relief on
McRaven’s prosecutorial-misconduct claim because this record does not show that the
prosecutor objected to the appointment of counsel for J.N. or that a secret immunity deal
existed.
Evidentiary hearing
McRaven next argues that the district court erred by denying an evidentiary hearing
on the other claims in his petition. The postconviction court’s decision to deny an
evidentiary hearing is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Caldwell v. State, 853 N.W.2d
766, 770 (Minn. 2014). “A postconviction court abuses its discretion when its decision is
10
based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.”
Andersen v. State, 913 N.W.2d 417, 422 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted).
McRaven argues that the district court abused its discretion because its decision to
deny a hearing is based on an erroneous view of the law; that is, it misapplied the standard
for deciding whether a petitioner is entitled to a postconviction evidentiary hearing.
A postconviction court must hold an evidentiary hearing “[u]nless the petition and
the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to
no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2022). The allegations in the petition are to be
considered as true and construed in the light most favorable to the petitioner. Andersen,
913 N.W.2d at 422-23. “When a petitioner alleges facts that, if true, are legally insufficient
to entitle him to the requested relief, the postconviction court need not hold an evidentiary
hearing.” Greer v. State, 836 N.W.2d 520, 522 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted). The
burden rests with “the petitioner to allege facts that, if proven, would entitle him to the
requested relief.” Wilson v. State, 726 N.W.2d 103, 107 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted).
And the allegations must be m ore than argumentative assertions without factual support.
State v. Turnage, 729 N.W.2d 593, 599 (Minn. 2007).
The district court denied a postconviction hearing on McRaven’s claims of newly
discovered evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel. It concluded that “the facts
alleged, if proven, would not entitle [McRaven] to relief. Moreover, the allegations
surrounding these issues significantly lack factual support based on the record of this case.”
We agree.
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Newly discovered evidence
The district court determined that McRaven was not entitled to an evidentiary
hearing on his newly- discovered-evidence claim, which included evidence of posttrial
social-media posts, text messages, and J.N.’s purported motives for committing the murder.
McRaven is entitled to an evidentiary hearing for newly discovered evidence if the
facts asserted in the petition could satisfy the four-factor test set out in Rainer v. State ,
566 N.W.2d 692, 695 (Minn. 1997). Bobo v. State, 820 N.W.2d 511, 517- 18 (Minn.
2012). McRaven must show that the evidence (1) was not known to him at the time of the
trial; (2) could not have been discovered through due diligence before trial; (3) was not
cumulative, impeaching, or doubtful; and (4) would probably produce an acquittal or a
more favorable result. Id. at 518.
Facebook post
The allegations in the petition include:
Twelve days after the verdict, [J.N.] essentially
admitted he had duped everyone. He posted to his Facebook
account a message reading, “Now the whole world know how
it feel to be locked up for some sh-t you ain’t even do.” That
statement was accompanied by two “laughing so hard I’m
crying” emojis. Below the message, [J.N.] added the line
“Good morning to me.”
. . . .

An investigator working with McRaven’s defense team
later received a video of [J.N.] that might relate to the post. In
a video posted to his Facebook page, [J.N.] ranted in part: “I
should let you stupid motherf---ers see it. I hope they seen it.
I hope they seen it. And Jeffrey, yes, I am going to kill you’re
a-- when you get out n****r, I don’t give a f--k, what the f--k
you talking about.” [J.N.] appears to have since deleted his
Facebook account.
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Considering these allegations are true and construing them in the light most
favorable to McRaven, he has shown that the evidence was not known to him during trial
and that he could not have discovered it through due diligence during trial because J.N.
posted it after the verdict. But we cannot conclude that McRaven is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing because he fails to show that the evidence was anything more than
impeaching.
In a postconviction affidavit, an investigator for the defense stated that on
September 14, 2020, McRaven’s family members gave him a copy of the Facebook post
that appears to be from J.N.’s account. The investigator stated that it was posted in August
2020, after McRaven’s trial (the jury found McRaven guilty on August 6, 2020).
McRaven attempts to connect the Facebook post to him by means of an appellate
investigator’s affidavit. In the affidavit, the investigator stated that in May 2021,
McRaven’s family member sent him three videos that were supposedly posted on J.N.’s
Facebook page, one of which references “Jeffrey.” While the affidavit indicated when the
investigator received the videos, it said nothing about when the videos appeared on J.N.’s
page. Thus, there is no evidence connecting the videos and the August 2020 Facebook
post.
With no evidence connecting the videos to the Facebook post, the question is
whether the Facebook post alone required a hearing. The post, accompanied by two
“laughing so hard I’m crying” emojis, read: “Now the whole world know how it feel to be
locked up for some sh- t you ain’t even do.” A second post read: “Good morning to me.”
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McRaven has not provided information in his petition to show that, at an evidentiary
hearing, he could prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the evidence would be
anything other than impeaching. See Rainer, 566 N.W.2d at 695 (stating that to be entitled
to an evidentiary hearing on newly discovered evidence, petitioner must show that evidence
was not cumulative, impeaching, or doubtful).
Shooting of D.W.
The allegations in the petition include: “Sometime after Ingram was killed, [J.N.]
shot a man named [D.W.] in the leg. When he did so, [J.N.] told [D.W.] he was going to
kill him like he ki lled Ghost [(Ingram)].” The petition further alleges that D.W. sent text
messages about the shooting that included a statement that J.N. was “involved” in Ingram’s
murder, but D.W. could not do anything about it because J.N. is a “confidential informant.”
Considering these allegations are true and construing them in the light most
favorable to McRaven, he is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because he fails to show
that he could not have discovered the evidence through due diligence before trial. See id.
(stating that to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on newly discovered evidence,
petitioner must show that evidence could not have been discovered through due diligence
before trial).
The appellate investigator’s affidavit stated that he talked to C.W. in May 2021.
C.W. told the investigator that “she heard that [J.N.] told [D.W.] that he was going to do
him like he did “‘Ghost.’” The investigator talked to McRaven’s half-brother, A.D.,
around the same time. A.D. stated that “[D.W.] told him that [J.N.] shot [D.W.] in the leg,
and that [J.N.] said he was going to kill [D.W.] like he killed “‘Ghost.’”
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But the shooting of D.W. occurred before McRaven’s trial. And the defense knew
about it before McRaven’s trial. McRaven asserts that the defense attempted to talk to
D.W. but was unable to do so. McRaven provides no citations to the record to support this
assertion.
Before trial, the defense also talked to A.D. about the shooting. But McRaven
provides no information about what the defense learned in pretrial communications. He
also provides no information about when A.D. claims to have talked to D.W. about the
shooting or if A.D. heard about J.N.’s alleged confession from D.W. pretrial or posttrial.
Similarly, McRaven provides no information about when C.W. “heard” about the
alleged confession. Without more information regarding C.W.’s and A.D.’s knowledge of
the alleged confession and the defense’s diligence in discovering this information,
McRaven has not satisfied the due-diligence factor of the Rainer test.
Motive
In his petition, McRaven alleged that J.N. had motives to commit the murder. First,
J.N. and Ingram were “feuding over the affections” of a woman. Second, J.N.’s family
believed that Ingram was responsible for the death of one of J.N.’s brothers. McRaven
claims in the petition: “It is not clear how much if any of this information McRaven’s
defense attorney had at the time of trial.” With this statement, McRaven admits that this
information was available at the time of trial, though leaving open-ended what effort his
defense took to obtain this information. Thus, he has failed to meet the requirements of
the Rainer test.
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The district court appropriately determined that McRaven was not entitled to an
evidentiary hearing on his claim of newly discovered evidence.
Ineffective assistance of counsel
The district court determined that McRaven was not entitled to a n evidentiary
hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because he challenged trial
strategy, which generally is not reviewable.
To establish an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, the petitioner must show
that (1) counsel’s performance was not objectively reasonable, and (2) there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’ s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669 (1984). This court reviews an
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim de novo. State v. Mosley, 895 N.W.2d 585, 591
(Minn. 2017). When a petitioner fails to establish one Strickland prong, this court need
not review the other. Chavez-Nelson v. State, 948 N.W.2d 665, 671 (Minn. 2020).
In his postconviction petition, McRaven alleged that trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to call a witness whose testimony would have contradicted J.N.’s testimony and
“seriously undercut his credibility.” McRaven also claims that trial counsel fail ed to
“introduce any evidence of the informal immunity agreement between [J.N.] and [the
state].”
There is a strong presumption that an attorney acted competently, and matters of
trial strategy, “including which witnesses to call, what defenses to raise at trial, and
specifically how to proceed at trial,” do not support an ineffective-assistance-of -counsel
claim, unless the trial strategy was not reasonable. Ives v. State, 655 N.W.2d 633, 636
16
(Minn. 2003). Here, it was trial counsel’s decision whether to call certain witnesses. A s
the district court determined, McRaven failed to show that counsel was ineffective for
failing to call a witness, especially when it appears from the petition that the witness would
have been used to “undercut [J.N.’s] credibility.” We have already determined that J.N.’s
credibility was thoroughly attacked at trial. Finally, defense counsel did not introduce
evidence of an immunity agreement because, as already described, the record shows that
there was no immunity agreement. The district court appropriately determined that
McRaven was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim.
Spreigl evidence
McRaven also challenges the district court’s evidentiary rulings during trial, arguing
that he was deprived of a fair trial by the admission of irrelevant evidence of a prior bad
act. We review the admission of Spreigl evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 261 (Minn. 2016). McRaven has the burden to show that the
district court erred in admitting the Spreigl evidence and that error resulted in unfair
prejudice. See id.
Shortly before trial began, the state moved to admit Spreigl evidence. The state
asserted that less than a week before the murder, someone posted a social-media video of
McRaven, J.N., and Ingram in a maroon Chevy Tahoe (the vehicle in which the murder
occurred). McRaven sat in the backseat behind Ingram (as he did on the day of the murder).
McRaven took a silver and black handgun out of a bag and waved it around.
17
J.N.’s brother, J.D., turned this evidence over to police. The district court ruled that
J.D. could testify about what he watched in the video. The district court found that the
events were “close in time, location, and modus operandi.” It stated that the probative
value was not substantially outweighed by any prejudice to McRaven because he noticed
an alibi and alternative-perpetrator defense making “opportunity and identity” important.
To properly admit Spreigl evidence, a five-step procedure must be followed: (1) the
state must give notice of its intent to admit the evidence; (2) the state must indicate what
the evidence will prove; (3) there must be clear and convincing evidence that the defendant
committed the prior act; (4) the evidence must be relevant and material; and (5) the
probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its potential prejudice. State v.
Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 685-86 (Minn. 2006).
Notice
McRaven first argues that notice of the intended use of the evidence was untimely
because he did not receive it until four days before trial.
In a felony case, “notice must be given at or before the Omnibus Hearing under
Rule 11, or as soon after that hearing as the other crime, wrong, act, or specific instance of
conduct becomes known to the prosecutor.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 7.02, subd. 4(a). The notice
requirements are intended to avoid surprise to the defendant by giving him time to prepare
a defense. State v. Riddley, 776 N.W.2d 419, 427 (Minn. 2009). Defects do not require
reversal when the state substantially complied with the notice requirements and the
defendant is not prejudiced. State v. Bolte, 530 N.W.2d 191, 199 (Minn. 1995).
18
The state asserted that it provided the image in discovery on February 20, 2020. The
state did not learn about the importance of the context—that it was taken inside the vehicle,
and that the individuals involved in the case were seated in the same seats as the day of the
murder—until July 24, 2020. As soon as the state understood the context, it indicated that
the purpose of the evidence was to “prove opportunity and to show factual similarities
between the prior act and the offense.” Thus, the defense had possession of the evidence
since February 20, 2020. It could not have been surprised by the evidence and it had
sufficient time to prepare a defense. And the state provided notice of the intended use of
the evidence as soon as the state knew its importance. The sta te substantially complied
with the notice requirements.
Relevant and material
McRaven also argues that the evidence was improperly admitted because his
possession of a gun does not show his opportunity to commit murder or that possessing a
gun is similar to committing murder.
In assessing whether Spreigl evidence is relevant and material to the state’s case,
the district court must “identify the precise disputed fact to which the Spreigl evidence
would be relevant.” Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 686 (quotation omitted); Minn. R. Evid. 401
(defining “[r]elevant evidence” as evidence tending to make more or less probable the
existence of any consequential fact). There must be a “sufficiently close relationship
between the charged offense and the Spreigl [act] in time, place, or modus operandi.” Ture
v. State, 681 N.W.2d 9, 15 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted). “The closer the relationship
19
between the events, the greater the relevance of the evidence and the lesser the likelihood
it will be used for an improper purpose.” Id.
Here, as the district court determined, the two events were “close in time, location,
and modus operandi.” The video was recorded a week before the murder, the same
individuals were in the same vehicle sitting in the same locations, and the gun matched the
description of the gun that J.N. saw on McRaven. There is a sufficiently close relationship
between the murder and McRaven’s possession of the gun. And, because McRaven
claimed that J.N. committed the murder, the evidence is relevant and probative to the
identity of which individual in the vehicle committed the murder.
Prejudice
McRaven argues that the evidence was prejudicial because the jury heard that he
possessed a gun, but it did not hear that J.N. had assaulted someone with a gun. But this
argument is misplaced in a prejudice analysis.
In this context, prejudice does not mean the damage to a party’s case “from the
legitimate probative force of the evidence.” State v. Welle, 870 N.W.2d 360, 366 (Minn.
2015) (quotation omitted). “[I]t refers to the unfair advantage” resulting from the
evidence’s capacity “to persuade by illegitimate means.” Id. (quotation omitted).
The likelihood of prejudice was relatively low. The evidence involved McRaven
possessing a gun, not committing a murder; thus, it is unlikely it persuaded by illegitimate
means. The district court also instructed the jury that it could consider the Spreigl evidence
only to determine whether McRaven committed the charged act and not as proof of
character or that he acted in conformity with that character. This cautionary instruction
20
reduced the risk of unfair prejudice. See State v. Tomlinson, 938 N.W.2d 279, 287-88
(Minn. App. 2019) (noting that cautionary instructions reduce risk of unfair prejudice), rev.
denied (Minn. Feb. 26, 2020); State v. Fardan, 773 N.W.2d 303, 317 (Minn. 2009) (stating
that juries presumably follow instructions).
Finally, evidence regarding J.N. has nothing to do with whether the Spreigl evidence
was prejudicial. But even if it did, the district court did not allow evidence that J.N.
assaulted someone with a gun because McRaven failed to prove it. And it had no
connection to the murder. The entire context of the Spreigl incident—it occurred shortly
before the murder, in the same vehicle, and involved the same individuals sitting in the
same locations—was relevant, not just that McRaven possessed a gun. The district court
did not abuse its discretion by admitting the Spreigl evidence.
Pro se claims
McRaven filed a pro se supplemental brief raising several claims: (1) the state had
a vendetta against him because he had been acquitted of a different charge a year prior and
so conspired and entrapped him; (2) the state turned J.N. against him; (3) J.N. was an
informant who was not credible and extensively coached by the state ; (4) the prosecutors
committed misconduct by coaching testimony, failing to disclose evidence, offering
Spreigl evidence, and using contaminated evidence and noncredible witnesses; (5) his trial
attorney was ineffective for failing to investigate, disclose the identity of an informant,
suppress evidence (including a confession), advise him, prepare for trial, explore a plea
offer, object to evidence and inflammatory arguments, and effectively impeach witnesses;
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(6) his appellate attorney was ineffective for failing to give him his file; and (7) a juror was
biased for looking “angry” and giving him “the evil eye.”
McRaven’s pro se brief is lengthy and includes references to the record and citations
to caselaw. However, he failed to raise any claim that is supported by the record and he
failed to logically connect any claim to caselaw support. Thus, McRaven’s pro se claims
do not merit relief. See State v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 542 (Minn. 2015) (stating that
pro se argument was meritless because it was unsupported by the record and devoid of
legal authority); State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 741 (Minn. 2011) (stating that reviewing
court may decline to address pro se claims that lack argument and citation to legal authority
or the record unless prejudicial error is obvious).
Affirmed.