In re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1577

In re the Marriage of:

County of Isanti,
Respondent,

Olivia Cecile Margaret Voss, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Christopher James Grecula,
Appellant.

Filed September 7, 2021
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Isanti County District Court
File No. 30-FA-20-68

Jeff Edblad, Isanti County Attorney, David Kraemer, A ssistant County Attorney,
Cambridge, Minnesota (for respondent county)

John T. Barragry, Miller & St evens, P.A., Forest Lake, Minnesota (for respondent Olivia
Voss)

Carrie A. Doom, McKinnis & Doom, P.A., Cambridge, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ro ss, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Gaïtas, Judge.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant-father challenges the district court’s denial of his request for
redetermination of his basic child-support obligation. Specifically, he argues that a portion
of his parenting time should ha ve been treated as an overni ght equivalent for purposes of
calculating the parenting-time expense adjustme nt for his child-support obligation. We
affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Christopher James Grecula (fa ther) and respondent Olivia Cecile
Margaret Voss (mother) are the parents of two minor children, ages 6 and 9. Mother and
father’s marriage was dissolved in July 2020 by a stipulat ed judgment and decree, which
awarded mother and father join t legal custody and mother so le physical custody of the
children. The judgment and decree adopted the parents’ agreed-upon parenting schedule.
During the school year, father has parenting time “[e]very Tuesday at 3:00 p.m. until
Wednesday at 7:30 p.m. and every other weeken d from Friday at 3:00 p.m. to school or
8:00 a.m. on Monday.” His parenting time during the summer occurs “[e]very Tuesday at
3:00 p.m. until Wednesday at 7:30 p.m. and every other weekend from Friday at 3:00 p.m.
to Monday morning to daycare or 8:00 a.m. unless [father] does not work on Monday then
until 3:00 p.m.”
Also in July 2020, the pa rties appeared before a child-support magistrate (CSM)
pursuant to a summons and complaint to establish child support filed by Isanti County. At
the hearing, father asked the CSM to consider his Wednesday parenting time an “overnight
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equivalent” for the purpose of calculating child support. He testified that on Wednesdays,
he tends to all of the children’s needs, incl uding meals and activities, until they return to
mother at 7:30 p.m. The children then soon go to bed, typically around 8:30 or 9:00 p.m.
The CSM rejected father’s request a nd used father’s “scheduled, overnight
parenting time” from the judgment and decree, which amounted to 130.5 overnights per
year, to calculate his parenting-time expense adjustment. (Emphasis omitted.) The CSM’s
order noted that “[t]he court was not provided with any testimony or evidence that would
indicate an alternate method should be utilized in dete rmining the parenting time
adjustment.” Based on father’s income a nd the parenting-time expense adjustment, the
CSM determined that father’s basic child-support obligati on under the Minnesota Child
Support Guidelines is $756 per month.
Father moved the district court for revi ew of the CSM’s decision, arguing, among
other things, that his parenting time on We dnesdays ought to have been considered “an
overnight equivalent” for the purposes of calculating his parenting-time expense
adjustment. He advised that, with an overnight equivalent added to his scheduled overnight
parenting time, the annual number of overni ghts would be equally split (182.5 for each
parent), making his basic mont hly support obligation $140, ra ther than $ 756. Mother
argued in response that father does not provi de all of the care for the children on
Wednesdays, and specifically asserted that father’s parents provide dinner for the children
and mother provides the clothes for their stay.
The district court affirmed the CSM’s decision, noting that Minnesota Statutes
section 518A.36, subdivision 1(a) (2020), permits the court to use “overnights or overnight
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equivalents” to determine th e parenting-time expense adjustment. The district court
reasoned that “[g]iven the testimony provided at the hearing, the facts in this case are not
such that the law would require the [CSM] to use a method other than scheduled overnights
to calculate [father’s] basic support obligati on.” Moreover, the district court explained,
“[t]he fact that evidence was received re garding the characteriz ation of Wednesday
overnights, in the context of the Parties’ ove rall situation, is not evidence supporting or
requiring use of overnight equivalents to determine the parenting expense adjustment.”
Father appeals.
DECISION
The district court reviews the decision of a CSM de novo, and we examine the
district court’s decision to affirm the CSM for an abuse of discretion. Davis v. Davis, 631
N.W.2d 822, 825-26 (Minn. App. 2001). The district court has broad discretion to provide
for the support of the parties’ children. Rutten v. Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1984).
A district court abuses its discretion when it sets support in a manner that is against logic
and the facts on record, or when it misapplies the law. Id.; see also Rose v. Rose , 765
N.W.2d 142, 145 (Minn. App. 2009) (“A court abuses its discretion if it improperly applies
the law.”). Interpretation of the child-support statutes pres ents a question of law that
appellate courts review de novo. Haefele v. Haefele, 837 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn. 2013);
Hesse v. Hesse, 778 N.W.2d 98, 102 (Minn. App. 2009) (interpreting a prior version of the
parenting-expense-adjustment statute de novo).
Child support is an amount of money that a parent must pay “for basic support, child
care support, and medical support” of their mi nor child. Minn. Stat. § 518A.26, subd. 20
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(2020); see also Minn. Stat. § 256.87, subd. 1 (2020 ) (discussing how the state or county
may initiate an action against a parent for assistance furnished for their child). “The child-
support statute reflects a presumption that du ring parenting time a parent incurs expenses
associated with the costs of raising a child.” Jones v. Jarvinen, 814 N.W.2d 45, 48 (Minn.
App. 2012) (citing Minn. Stat. § 518A.36, subd. 1(a) (2010)). A parent is accordingly
allowed a parenting-time expense adjustment of their basic support obligation. The amount
of that parenting-time expense adjustment “may be” based on the number of overnights or
overnight equivalents the child sp ends in each parent’s care. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.36,
subds. 1, 2 (2020) (addressing overnights and overnight equi valents, and the formula for
calculating a parenting-time expense adjustment, respectively). “[O]vernight equivalents
are calculated by using a method other than ove rnights if the parent has significant time
periods on separate days where the child is in the parent’s physical custody and under the
direct care of the parent but does not stay overnight.” Id., subd. 1(a).
Here, father argues that the district court erred by declining to recognize his
Wednesday parenting time as “an overnight equivalent” under section 518A.36,
subdivision 1(a). He contends that the district court lacked discretion to use only scheduled
overnights in calculating the parenting-time expense adjustment for his child-support
obligation because he provides most of the care for the children during the day on
Wednesdays. Father also argues that the di strict court erred as a matter of law by
interpreting section 518A.36, subdivision 1(a), to allow a parenting-time calculation based
on either overnights or overnight equivalents, but not a combination of the two.
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We begin by disagreeing with father that the district court erroneously interpreted
section 518A.36, subdivision 1(a). The distri ct court’s order does not state that the CSM
could use only overnights or only overnight equivalents. Instead, the district court correctly
observed, consistent with the plain language of the statut e, that a CSM may calculate
parenting time by using court-ordered overnights or overnight equivalents. “[T]he statute
plainly permits the district court to use either the overnight method of calculating parenting
time or an alternative method.” Jones, 814 N.W.2d at 48-49. The district court went on to
reason that, “Given the testimony provided at the hearing, the facts in this case are not such
that the law would require the [CSM] to use a method other than scheduled overnights to
calculate [father’s] basic support obligation.” Because the district court ruled that the
record did not support the use of overnight equivalents, it did not consider whether the
statute authorizes a court to use both overni ghts and overnight equivalents in calculating
the parenting-time expense adjustment. Therefore, that question is not properly before this
court. See Thiele v. Stich , 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating that, generally,
appellate court address only th ose questions presented to a nd considered by the district
court). We also discern no error in the distri ct court’s summary of the law it did apply.
Thus, we reject the parties’ invitation to e ngage in statutory interpretation to address
whether section 518A.36, subdivision 1(a), allows a district court to use a combination of
overnights and overnight equivalents. Cf. Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn.
1988) (“The function of the court of appeals is limited to identifyi ng errors and then
correcting them.”).
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We next turn to the district court’s appli cation of the law. Initially, we observe that
the legislature used a discretionary term in directing that the amount of parenting time a
parent spends with a child “may be determined by calculating the number of overnights or
overnight equivalents that a parent spends with a child pursuant to a court order.” Minn.
Stat. § 518A.36, subd. 1(a) (emphasis added). Generally, a statute’s use of “may” confers
discretion on the court regarding the matter addressed by the statute. Kemp v. Kemp, 608
N.W.2d 916, 920 (Minn. App. 2000) (making this observa tion in the context of a child-
support appeal); see Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 15 (2020) (stating that “‘[m]ay’ is
permissive”).
Father argues that the district court’ s decision not to include his Wednesday
parenting time as an overnight equivalent is ag ainst logic and the facts in the record. He
asserts that the record shows that “the children are in his direct care beginning at 12:00
a.m. on Wednesdays until they return to [mother] at 7:30 p.m.,” before going to bed a few
hours later. According to fath er, mother incurs no “costs for raising the children” on
Wednesdays, and it is contrary to the purpos e of the child-support statute to not count
Wednesday as an overnight equivalent.
After considering the reco rd and examining the parties’ agreed-upon parenting
schedule, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its broad discretion in affirming
the CSM’s use of scheduled overnights to calculate father’s parenting-time percentage. See
Rutten, 347 N.W.2d at 50 (explaining that the district court has broad discretion in matters
of child support). While father emphasiz es that he has the children for 19.5 hours on
Wednesdays, much of that time is already accounted for by his Tuesday overnight, which
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extends into the morning.1 Father essentially requested that his time on “Tuesday at 3:00
p.m. until Wednesday at 7: 30 p.m.” be counted as two overnights. He does not explain
why the district court was bound to credit his time in this expansive fashion.
This court considered a similar argument in Jones, where a parent claimed he was
entitled to credit for parenting time beyond sc heduled overnights because “he care[d] for
the children for a significant amount of non- overnight parenting time, including one day
per week after school.” 814 N.W.2d at 48. We rejected that argument, explaining that
section 518A.36, subdivision 1(a ), “plainly permits the distri ct court to use either the
overnight method of calculating parenting tim e or an alternative method,” and thus
concluded that “[t]he CSM, affirmed by the district court, did no t abuse its discretion by
using the overnight method of calculating parenting time, which conformed to the parties’
parenting time as stated in the judgment.” Id. at 49.
Similarly, we conclude that the distri ct court was not required to include an
additional overnight in calculating father’s pa renting time here. Ag ain, section 518A.36,
subdivision 1(a), gives the district court di scretion to calculate parenting time using
scheduled overnights or overnight equivalents. Father has not demonstrated that it was an
abuse of discretion to rely on the overnight method here. Likewise, the district court acted

1 We do not base our analysis on mother’s ar gument that father’s Wednesday parenting
time is not an overnight equivalent because father’s parents, and not father, provide dinner
for the children. Mother did not present this argument to th e CSM, and the district court
did not indicate that it relied on this argument in affirming the CSM’s decision. Our review
here is limited to considering whether father’s time with the children on Wednesdays was
properly accounted for under section 518A.36, and the dinner arrangements during this
time do not factor into our decision. See Davis, 631 N.W.2d at 825-26.
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within its discretion to reject father’s request to include his additional time with the children
on Wednesdays as an overnight equivalent. We therefore dec line to reverse the district
court’s exercise of its discretion on these matters.
Affirmed.