In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Charles Randal Ashman.

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1586

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Charles Randal Ashman.

Filed June 14, 2021
Reversed and remanded
Slieter, Judge

Commitment Appeal Panel
File No. AP20-9002

Jill Avery, Cheri Templeman, Templema n Law PLLC, Minneapo lis, Minnesota (for
appellant Charles Ashman)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Anthony R. Noss, Aaron E. Winter, Assistant Attorneys
General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Commissioner of Human Services)

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Annsara Lovejoy Elasky, Carolyn A.
Peterson, Assistant County Attorneys, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Hennepin
County)

Tony Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney, An ne Marie Zimmerman, Lisa Broos Jones,
Assistant County Attorneys, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent Anoka County)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Pres iding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Hooten,
Judge.
SYLLABUS
The commitment appeal panel is auth orized by the Minnesota Commitment and
Treatment Act: Sexually Dangerous Person and Sexual Psychopathic Personalities, Minn.
Stat. §§ 253D.01-.36 (2020), to review a revocation-of-transfer recommendation made by
the special review board.

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OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant Charles Randal Ashman challe nges the commitment appeal panel’s
(CAP’s)1 determination that it lacks authority to review the special review board’s (SRB)
recommendation regarding the revoc ation of Ashman’s transfer from a secure treatment
facility. Because the applicable statutes unambiguously authorize the CAP to review the
SRB’s recommendation regarding the revocation of a transfer from a secure treatment
facility, we reverse and remand for Ashman to receive a hearing before the CAP.
FACTS
On September 8, 2000, appellant Charle s Randal Ashman was indeterminately
committed as a sexually danger ous person and a sexual psych opathic personality to the
Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) in St. Peter. Ashman began committing sexual
assaults at approximately age 24 against females ranging from age 13 to adult, resulting in
both multiple convictions for criminal sexual conduct and associated incarcerations.
In August 2016, Ashman was granted a tr ansfer from the secured perimeter in St.
Peter to Community Prep aration Services (CPS). 2 In May 2019, Ashman voluntarily

1 We refer to the entity formerly known as the supreme court appeal panel, or statutorily as
the judicial appeal panel, as the commitment appeal panel or the “CAP.” See Minn. Stat.
§ 253D.28, subd. 1(a) (providing for review by “the judicial appeal panel established under
section 253B.19, subdivision 1”).
2 CPS is located outside of the secure perimeter at MSOP’s St. Peter location. In re Civil
Commitment of Fugelseth, 907 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. App. 2018), review denied (Minn.
Apr. 17, 2018). CPS is defined by statute as “specialized residential services or programs
operated or administered by [M SOP] outside of a secure treatment facility” and it is
designed to assist persons in treatment for “eventual successful reintegration into a

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agreed to return to the MSOP secure perimeter “as he continued to act aggressively towards
others, exhibit[ed] problems with his GPS monitor, and demonstrate[d] poor motivation
for treatment.” Ashman’s transfer to CPS was revoked by the executive director of MSOP
the following month.
Ashman timely appealed his transfer revocation to the SRB and simultaneously filed
a new petition for a transfer outside of th e MSOP perimeter. The SRB recommended
upholding the revocation of As hman’s transfer and denying his new transfer petition.
Ashman, age 63, sought a “rehearing and re consideration” by the CAP of the SRB’s
recommendations.
During the first-phase hearing, the CAP determined that Ashman failed to meet his
burden of proof that a new tr ansfer to CPS was appropria te and dismissed the petition
pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(b) and Minn. Stat. § 253D.28, subd. 2(d). See also
Larson v. Jesson , 847 N.W.2d 531, 535 (Minn. App. 2014) (describing the two-phase
hearing process before the CAP). Ashman doe s not contest that ru ling. The CAP next
declined to review SRB’s recommendation regarding the revocation of Ashman’s transfer
to CPS, determining that it lacked statutory authority to do so. Ashman appeals.
ISSUE
Does the CAP have statutory authority to review the SRB’s recommendation
regarding the revocation of Ashman’s transfer from a secure treatment facility?

community.” Minn. Stat. § 246B.01, subd. 2a (2020). A civilly committed person may
only be placed in CPS by order of the CAP. Id.

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ANALYSIS
The CAP has statutory authority to review the revocation of Ashman’s transfer
from a secure treatment facility.

A.
Proceedings involving the commitment of sexually dangerous persons and sexual
psychopathic personalities are currently go verned by the Minn esota Commitment and
Treatment Act: Sexually Dangerous Pers on and Sexual Psycho pathic Personalities
Minnesota Statutes chapter 253D. 3 The issue before us requi res an analysis of three
interrelated statutes within chapter 253D; namely, Minn. Stat. § 253D.27 (Petition for
Reduction in Custody ), Minn. Stat § 253D.28 (Judicial Appeal Panel), and Minn. Stat.
§ 253D.29 (Transfer).
Section 253D.27 outlines th e process through which a committed person may
petition for “transfer out of a secure treatment facility.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.27, subd. 1(b).
This petition triggers application of secti on 253D.29, which iden tifies factors to be
considered upon a committed person’s petition to transfer from a secure treatment facility,
and any subsequent transfer revocation. Minn. Stat. § 253D.29, subds. 1, 3. After a transfer
has been approved, it may later be revoked by the executive director of MSOP. Minn. Stat.
§ 253D.29, subd. 3. If the executive director revokes a committed person’s transfer, the

3 When Ashman was committed in 2000, all ci vil commitment types in Minnesota were
governed by the Minne sota Commitment and Treatment Act (MCTA). See Minn. Stat.
§§ 253B.01-.24 (2010 & Supp. 2011). The MCTA was amende d in 2013 to move many
of the provisions regarding persons committed as sexually dangerous persons and sexual
psychopathic personalities fro m chapter 253B to the newl y enacted chapter 253D. See
Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act: Sexually Dangerous Persons and Sexual
Psychopathic Personalities, 2013 Minn. Laws ch. 49, §§ 1-22, at 210-31.

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aggrieved person may simultaneously seek revi ew of the transfer revocation by the SRB
and re-petition the SRB for a new transfer pursuant to sec tion 253D.27. Minn. Stat.
§ 253D.29, subd. 3(d)-(e).
Following the petition by the aggrieved person and pursuant to section 253D.27, the
SRB “shall hold a hearing on each petition before issuing a recommendation.” Minn. Stat.
§ 253D.27, subd. 3(a). “Within 30 days of the hearing, the [SRB] shall issue a report with
written findings of fact and shall recommend denial or approval of the petition to the
[CAP].” Id., subd. 4. The CAP’s procedure for review of the SRB’s recommendations is
established in section 253D.28. Minn. Stat. § 253D.28.
Finally, we note that section 253D.30 (Provisional Discharge) is not at issue before
this court.4 However, this section involves nearly identical language to that here at issue
in section 253D.29. Compare Minn. Stat. § 253D.30, subd. 6 (describing petition for
review of provisional discharge revocation), with Minn. Stat. § 253D.29, subd. 3(e)
(describing petition for review of transfer revocation). Therefore, our conclusion that the
CAP has statutory authority to review th e SRB’s transfer revocation recommendation
applies equally to section 253D.30 regard ing revocation of provisional discharge
recommendations.

4 The CAP concluded that In re Dority, in which this court considered the revocation of a
provisional discharge pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 253D.30, wa s persuasive in reaching its
conclusion that it did not have authority to re view the revocation of a transfer. No. A18-
1212, 2019 WL 178563, at *4 (Minn. App. Jan. 14, 2019), review denied (Minn. Mar. 19,
2019).

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B.
We now construe these three statutes in response to the parties’ arguments. Ashman
and respondent Hennepin County 5 assert that the CAP possesse s authority to review the
SRB’s transfer revocation recommendation. They direct this court to the plain language of
section 253D.29, which requires the SRB to make a recommendation to the CAP on a
revocation review petition, as well as to the above-referenced related statutory provisions.
Respondent commissioner of human services (the commissioner), relying almost
exclusively on this court’s unpublished Dority opinion, asserts that the CAP has no such
authority. In Dority, this court analyzed nearly identical language in section 253D.30
regarding the revocation of a provisional discharge and concluded the CAP lacked
authority to review the SRB’s recommendation. 2019 WL 178563, at *4. Absent a specific
directive in section 253D.29, the commissione r argues, the CAP is without authority to
review the SRB’s transfer revocation recommendation.
We are not persuaded by the commissione r’s reliance on this court’s unpublished
Dority decision in support of her in terpretation of section 253D.29. 6 We instead rely on
our statutory analysis and conclude that, when these three statutory provisions are read

5 Respondent Anoka County, the county of financial responsibility, did not file a brief in
this matter and did not appear before the CAP at Ashman’s first-phase hearing. It did at
that time, however, “join[] w ith the recommendations of all assessments opining that
revocation of [Ashman’s] transfer to CPS remains appropriate.”
6 We note that Dority’s cha llenge to the CAP’s refusal to review the revocation of a
provisional discharge pursuant to section 253D.30 was raised for the first time during oral
argument to this court. Id.

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together, they unambiguousl y authorize the CAP to revi ew a transfer revocation
recommendation of the SRB.
Appellate courts review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. See, e.g., In re
Civil Commitment of Poole, 921 N.W.2d 62, 66 (Minn. App. 2018), review denied (Minn.
Jan. 15, 2019). The goal of st atutory interpretation is to “ascertain and effectuate the
intention of the legislature.” Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2020); see In re Schmalz, 945 N.W.2d
46, 50 (Minn. 2020) (applying Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2018)); In re Civil Commitment of
Moen, 837 N.W.2d 40, 50 (Minn. App. 2013) (applying this idea in a commitment appeal).
Statutory interpretation first requires an anal ysis of whether a statute is, on its face,
ambiguous. Christianson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532, 536 (Minn. 2013). In determining
ambiguity, words are given their “plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. If a statute is subject
to more than one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous. Id. at 537.
Appellate courts “construe statutes as a whole so that statutory language is
understood in context.” Greene v. Minn. Bureau of Mediation Servs. , 948 N.W.2d 675,
679 (Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted). Appellate courts “int erpret a statute to give effect
to all of its provisions; no word, phrase, or sentence should be deemed superfluous, void,
or insignificant.” T.G.G. v. H.E.S. , 946 N.W.2d 309, 318-319 (Minn. 2020) (quotation
omitted). When interpreting stat utes, one objective of appella te courts “is to harmonize
statutes if possible.” Vill. Lofts at St. Anthony Falls Ass’n v. Hous. Partners III-Lofts, LLC,
937 N.W.2d 430, 439 (Minn. 2020).
We begin first by analyzing the plain text of the statute guiding both the transfer
from a secure treatment facility and the revocation of such transfer.

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Section 253D.29—Transfer and Revocation of Transfer
A committed person may be transferred from a secure treatment facility to another
“treatment program[] under the commissioner’s control” when such “transfer is
appropriate.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.29, subd. 1(a).
A committed person’s transfer may be re voked by the executive director if the
transfer setting does not “provide a reasona ble degree of safety for the committed person
or others or [if] the committed person has regressed in clinical progress so that” the transfer
facility “is no longer sufficient to meet the committed person’s needs.” Id., at
subd. 3(a)(1)-(2). The executiv e director must issue a report documenting the “specific
reasons” for revocation within seven days of the transfer revocation. Id., at subd. 3(c).
Following a revocation, section 253D.29, subdivision 3(e) provides a mechanism
for re-petitioning for a new transfer and also to seek review of the revocation. See id.,
subd. 3(d)-(e). Aggrieved pers ons seeking a review of a re vocation of transfer “may
petition the [SRB] within seven days . . . for a review of the revocation. . . . The [SRB]
shall review the circumstances leading to the revocation and, after considering the factors
in subdivision 1, paragraph (b), shall recommend to the [CAP] whether or not the
revocation shall be upheld.” Id., subd. 3(e) (emphasis added).
This statutory langua ge directs the petition-review process to include the CAP’s
review of the SRB’s recommendations. First, it allows for a petitione r to seek review by
the SRB of a transfer revocation. Id. Second, and most importantly for the issue before
us, the statute directs that the SRB “shall recommend to the [CAP] whether or not the

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revocation shall be upheld.” Id.; see also Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 16 (2020) (“‘Shall’
is mandatory.”).
Therefore, section 253D.29 unambiguously directs the CAP’s authority to review
the SRB’s revocation-of-transfer recommendation. Interpreting this provision as urged by
the commissioner—to deny th e CAP authority to review the recommendation which the
SRB is obligated to make to the CAP—would render this provision superfluous. We reject
this interpretation. We interpret a statute to give effect to all its provisions: we do not
construe a statute in a manner that will render any of its “word[s], phrase[s], or sentence[s]
. . . superfluous . . . or insignificant.” T.G.G., 946 N.W.2d at 318-319 (quotation omitted);
see also State v. Wilson, 830 N.W.2d 849, 853 (Minn. 2013) (“[W]e interpret the statute in
a manner that renders no part of it meaningless. ”). As we note above, no initial transfer
from a secure facility is final absent CAP a pproval. Minn. Stat. § 246B.01, subd. 2(a).
Therefore, the CAP has authority to c onsider the SRB’s transfer revocation
recommendation.
The CAP’s authority to review is undersco red by statutory provisions adjacent to
section 253D.29, which we next consider.
Section 253D.27—Petition for Reduction in Custody
Section 253D.27 expressly authorizes th e CAP to review a petition seeking a
transfer from a secure treatment facility. See Minn. Stat. § 253D.27, subd. 1(b) (defining
a “reduction in custody” as the “transfer [from] [] a secure treatment facility”). Section
253D.27 unambiguously provides that the SRB’s transfer recommendation is not final until
reviewed by the CAP: “No reduction in custody or revers al of a revocation of provisional

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discharge recommended by the [SRB] is effective until it has been reviewed by the [CAP]
and until 15 days after an or der from the [CAP] affirming, modifying, or denying the
recommendation.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.27, subd. 4. These provisions confirm that the CAP
has authority to consider the SRB’s transfer revocation recommendation.
Section 253D.28—The CAP
Section 253D.28 provides that a person committed pursuant to chapter 253D “may
petition the [CAP] . . . for a rehearing and reconsideration of a recommendation of the
[SRB] under section 253D.27.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.28, subd. 1(a). This provision next
states that, even “[i]f no party petitions the [CAP] for a rehearing or reconsideration . . . [,]
the [CAP] shall either issue an order adopting the recommendations of the [SRB] or set the
matter on for a hearing.” Id., subd. 1(c) (emphasis added). This requires the CAP to either
adopt the SRB’s recommendations or set a hearing date for review of that recommendation,
even if neither party petitions for review. See id. The statutory authority for the CAP to
set a hearing, even in the absence of a spec ific request, would be superfluous but for the
clear authority in the CAP to review when, as here, a timely petition for a hearing was
made. See T.G.G., 946 N.W.2d at 318-319. This la nguage is a further indication of the
unambiguous direction this statute provides th at the CAP has authority to consider the
SRB’s transfer revocation recommendation.
Summary of the Three Statutes
We summarize our review of these three statutes as follows:
 If a committed person’s transfer is revoked pursuant to section 253D.29,
subdivision 3, that person may petition the SRB for a new transfer pursuant

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to section 253D.27, or seek review by the SRB of the transfer revocation
decision, or both.

 When the SRB reviews the revocation of a transfer, it is required to make a
recommendation to the CAP pursuant to section 253D.29, subdivision 3(e).

 The CAP shall hold the hearing pursuant to section 253D.28, subdivision 2,
and consider the petition for a review of the transfer revocation decision de
novo pursuant to section 253D.28, subdivision 3.

 Even if no party petitions the CAP for a hearing, the CAP is required to either
issue an order accepting the SRB’s re commendations, or hold a hearing on
the matter, pursuant to section 253D.28, subdivision 1(c).

In sum, once we interpret the relevant provisions in harmony they unambiguously
authorize the CAP to review the SRB’s r ecommendation regarding the revocation of a
transfer from a secure treatment facility.
C.

We now apply our interpretation of these three statutes to Ashman’s claim. Ashman
timely appealed to the SRB, se eking both a review of the transfer revocation and a new
transfer. The SRB recommended to the CAP to uphold the revocation of Ashman’s transfer
and to deny his new transfer petition. As hman timely initiated his petition to the CAP,
seeking review of the SRB’s revocation- of-transfer recommendation. The CAP had
authority and was required to review the SRB’s transfer revocation recommendation. It
did not do so. We therefore remand to the CAP for a hearing on the SRB’s revocation
recommendation.
The commissioner asserts that, even if we conclude that the CAP has authority to
review the SRB’s transfer revocation recommendation, no remand is warranted. The basis
for the commissioner’s assertion is that the CAP reviewed the statutory factors required to

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consider a new transfer pursuant to section 253D.29, subdivision 1( b), and they are the
same factors required by section 253D.29, subdivision 3(e), that govern review of a transfer
revocation. We disagree.
First, nothing in the CAP’s order or in th e record suggests th at the CAP reviewed
the facts which led the executive director to revoke Ashman’s transfer pursuant to the
factors identified in section 253D.29, subdivision 3(a) (1)-(2). When revoking a transfer,
the executive director must consider whethe r the “nonsecure setting . . . provide[s] a
reasonable degree of safety for the committed person or others[,] or [if] the committed
person has regressed in clinical progress,” so that the transfer facility is no longer meeting
the committed person’s needs. Minn. Stat. § 253D.29, subd. 3 (a)(1)-(2).
Second, although the CAP considered the five factors in section 253D.29,
subdivision 1(b), in relation to Ashman’s pe tition for a new transfer to CPS, it did not
consider those same factors in relatio n to Ashman’s petition for rehearing and
reconsideration of the revocation of transfer. Therefore, we conclude that a remand is
necessary.7

7 Ashman also raised a constitutional due-process claim. However, because we determine
that Ashman is entitled to relief on stat utory grounds, we decline to address his
constitutional arguments. See G.H. Holdings, LLC v. Minn. Dept. of Commerce , 840
N.W.2d 838, 843 (Minn. App. 2013) (deciding case on statutory grounds and declining to
address petitioner’s due-process claim) (citing Pietsch v. Minn. Bd . of Chiropractic
Exam’rs, 683 N.W.2d 303, 309 n. 8 (Minn. 2004) (declining to decide constitutional issues
presented when the case could be resolved on non-constitutional grounds)).

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DECISION
Because the CAP has statutory authority to review the revocation of a civilly
committed person’s transfer fro m a secure treatment facility , Ashman is entitled to a
hearing by the CAP to review the revocation of his transfer.
Reversed and remanded.