State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1591

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Braxton Monte Anderson,
Appellant.

Filed November 1, 2021
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Segal, Chief Judge

Chippewa County District Court
File No. 12-CR-20-8

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Peter Magnuson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Matthew Haugen, Chippewa County Attorney, Montevideo, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SEGAL, Chief Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for criminal vehicular
homicide, appellant argue s (1) the district court erred in determining that the state could
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impeach him with a prior felony controlled-substance-crime conviction if he were to
testify, (2) the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a downward
durational departure because his crime is less serious than the typical criminal -vehicular-
homicide offense, and (3) the district court erred in calculating his criminal -history score.
Because we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s ruling to allow
impeachment with a prior felony conviction or in the court’s denial of appellant’s motion
for a downward departure, we affirm those rulings . But we reverse and remand in part to
correct appellant’s sentence because the district court erred in calculating appellant’s
criminal-history score.
FACTS
On August 7, 2019, J .K. was driving southbound on Highway 7 near Watson. It
was a clear day, there was no construction, and that stretch of the highway was straight.
J.K. caught up to the vehicle ahead of him and observed that it was a green two-door car.
He also noted a Cadillac Escalade SUV approaching in the northbound lane. As the SUV
neared, the driver of the green car made a sudden left turn without signaling or braking.
The SUV struck the gre en car on the passenger side and the car was pushed over to the
shoulder. Multiple bystanders called 911 to report the accident, and emergency personnel
responded to the scene.
When law enforcement arrived, they discovered two people inside the green c ar.
Appellant Braxton Monte Anderson was the driver and there was a female, later identified
as B.S., in the front passenger seat. Anderson could open his eyes but not respond to any
questions. B.S. was moaning very loudly and indicating that she could not breathe.
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Anderson was removed from the car because he was agitated and thrashing. An emergency
medical technician (EMT) could not open the passenger door to free B.S. due to damage
caused by the collision. The EMT determined that B.S. was not gettin g full breaths and
appeared to have multiple broken bones. A medic took over administering care to B.S. and
the EMT went around to the driver’s side to try to reach B.S. When the EMT opened the
driver-side door she discovered a glass pipe. The glass pipe had residue that field -tested
positive for methamphetamine, and a blood sample taken from Anderson confirmed the
presence of methamphetamine and amphetamine in his system.
It took emergency personnel between 45 minutes and an hour to remove B .S. from
the car. By that time , a helicopter had arrived to trans port her to the hospital for more
intensive medical care. As B.S. was being trans ferred to the helicopter, she stopped
breathing. Emergency personnel performed CPR but could not resuscitate B.S. and she
died. A forensic pathologist performed a medical examination and determined that the
cause of B.S.’s death “was multiple blunt force injuries due to motor vehicle collision. ”
The major cause of the crash was determined to be Anderson’s fai lure to yield to the
oncoming SUV.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Anderson with one count of criminal
vehicular homicide and one count of fourth -degree driving while impaired. Before trial,
the state filed a notice of its intent to impeach Anderson with evidence of three prior
criminal convictions should he choose to testify at trial. Following a pretrial hearing, the
district court determined that one of the prior convictions, a gross misdemeanor conviction
for providing a false name to a peace officer, could be admitted for impeachment because
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it was a crime of dishonesty committed within the last ten years .1 The court denied the
state’s request with regard to a second conviction because it was too old, and took under
advisement the question of whether the state could use the conviction of fifth-degree
controlled-substance crime for impeachment . The district court later issued an order
determining that the controlled-substance conviction was admissible, but only as an
“unspecified” prior felony conviction, meaning that the state could only refer to the offense
as a felony conviction without identifying the type of crime committed.
The district court held a jury trial and the jury found Anderson guilty on both counts.
Anderson did not testify. Anderson moved for a downward dur ational departure in his
sentence, arguing that he was less culpable because the driver of the SUV was speeding
and thus bore some responsibility for the crash. The district court denied the motion and
sentenced Anderson to a presumptive 68 -month executed sentence on the criminal -
vehicular-homicide conviction. Anderson now appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Anderson
could be impeached with an unspecified prior felony conviction.

Anderson argues that the district court abused its discretion by determin ing that he
could be impeached with his prior conviction for fifth -degree controlled-substance crime.

1 Minn. R. Evid. 609(b) “includes a general presumpti on that ‘[e]vidence of a conviction
. . . is not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the
conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that
conviction, whichever is the later date.’” State v. Souder, 902 N.W.2d 86, 90 (Minn. App.
2017) (alterations in original) (quoting Minn. R. Evid. 609(b)), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 27,
2017).
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He acknowledges that the district court determined that the conviction could only come in
as an unspecified prior felony, but he argues that the sanitize d conviction would still be
unduly prejudicial because “it takes no great stretch of the imagination to see that a jury
would be tempted to consider a defendant’s prior conviction as evidence of careless or
reckless behavior, or to see him as deserving pun ishment, rather than for assessing
credibility.” He also argues that the district court performed an “incomplete analysis”
when determining whether the prior conviction was admissible for impeachment purposes.
A district court may admit evidence of a de fendant’s prior felony conviction for
impeachment if “the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial
effect.” Minn. R. Evid. 609(a)(1). We review the district court’s ruling on the admissibility
of prior convictions for impeac hment under a clear abuse-of-discretion standard. State v.
Swanson, 707 N.W.2d 645, 654 (Minn. 2006).
In determining whether the probative value of a conviction outweighs its prejudicial
effect, the district court must consider five factors, referred to as the “Jones factors”:
(1) the impeachment value of the prior crime, (2) the date of
the conviction and the defendant’s subsequent history, (3) the
similarity of the past crime with the charged crime (the greater
the similarity, the greater the reason for not permitting use of
the prior crime to impeach), (4) the importance of defendant’s
testimony, and (5) the centrality of the credibility issue.

State v. Jones, 271 N.W.2d 534, 538 (Minn. 1978). To reduce the risk of prejudice to the
defendant from allowing evidence of a prior crime , a district court may sanitize a
conviction by barring the prosecution from disclosing the nature of the prior conviction
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and allowing the state to refer to the conviction only as an unspecified felony conviction.
State v. Hill, 801 N.W.2d 646, 652-53 (Minn. 2011).
Here, the district court addressed each of the Jones factors and determined that the
prior conviction could be admitted , for impeachment purposes, as an unspecified prior
felony. The district court explained that the conviction was for a felony and was thus
probative of Anderson’s “general lack of respect for the law .” The court noted that the
offense was also “highly probative” of Anderson’s credibility, having occurred less than
two years before the current offense. The court commented that the importance of
Anderson’s testimony weighed against admissibility ; but the court noted that credibility
would be a central issue if Anderson were to testify and that this weighed in favor of
allowing the prior conviction to be used as impeachment evidence. The district court ,
however, determined that disclosing the nature of the prior offense would be too prejudicial
because of the similarities between them—the past conviction was for drug possession and
the current offense involved the allegation that Anderson had controlled substances in his
system at the time of the fatal collision. The court therefore ruled that the prior conviction
could only be admitted as an unspecified felony. We discern no abuse of discretion in the
district court’s ruling.
In Swanson, the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the rule that “a district court
should demonstrate on the record that it has considered and weighed the Jones factors.”
707 N.W.2d at 655. The supreme court explained that “absent an analysis on the record of
the Jones factors, an appellate court does not know the reasons for the district court’s
decision.” Id.
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Here, the district court offered a clear and concise analysis of eac h of the Jones
factors that is supported by the record . The analysis provides a reasoned basis for the
district court’s decision, and expressly notes that if Anderson were to testify then credibility
would be a central issue. See State v. Ihnot , 575 N.W.2d 581, 587 (Minn. 1998) ( stating
that when a defendant’s credibility is a central issue of the case, “a greater case can be
made for admitting the impeachment evidence, because the need for the evidence is
greater.” (quotation omitted)). We therefore reject Anderson’s argument that the district
court conducted an “incomplete analysis” in determining the conviction was admissible.
We therefore discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that
Anderson could be impeached with evidence of an unspecified prior felony conviction. 2
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Anderson’s motion
for a downward durational departure.

Anderson next argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
motion for a downward durational departure and imposing a presumptive sentence under
the sentencing guidelines . A guidelines sentence is presumed to be appropriate and the
district court must impose it unless “identifiable, substantial, and compelling
circumstances” justify a downward departure. State v. Johnso n, 831 N.W.2d 917, 925
(Minn. App. 2013) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013); see also Minn.

2 We also note that Anderson does not challenge the district court’s determination that he
could be impeac hed with his prior conviction of providing false information to a peace
officer. That conviction was for a crime involving “dishonesty or false statement,” which
is explicitly admissible for impeachment purposes under Minn. R. Evid. 609(a). Thus,
Anderson would have been impeached with evidence of a prior conviction even if the
district court had determined that evidence of the controlled -substance conviction was
inadmissible.
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Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1 (Supp. 2019). The sentencing court has “broad discretion” and an
appellate court will only reverse a sentencing court’s refusal to depart in a “rare case. ”
State v. Kindem , 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981). We generally will not disturb the
imposition of a presumptive sentence when “the record shows that the sentencing court
carefully evaluated all the testimony and information presented” before imposing a
sentence. Johnson, 831 N.W.2d at 925 (quotation omitted).
A district court may grant a downward durational departure “if the defendant’s
conduct is significantly less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the
offense.” State v. Mattson , 376 N.W.2d 413, 415 (Minn. 1985). When determining
whether an offense was less serious than a typical offense, the district court “must analyze
the act as compared with other acts constituting the same offense.” State v. Behl , 573
N.W.2d 711, 713 (Minn. App. 1998) (quotation omitted) , rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 19,
1998). We review the district court’s refusal to depart from the presumptive sentence for
an abuse of discretion. Id. at 714.
The district court explained its reasons for denying Anderson’s motion for a
downward departure as follows:
Well the statute in issue here that was violated only
requires that the death of a person results when a person
operates a motor vehicle in a negligent manner while having
an amount of controlled substance in their system and that was
well proven. I don’t find any facts here that make this less
serious than any other similar offense and my recollection of
the testimony is that Mr. Anderson’s car turned directly in front
of an oncoming vehicle and that caused the unfortunate death
in this case so I’m denying the motion for a departure.

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Anderson argues that he should have received a downward departure because the offense
for which he was convicted (subdivision 1(a)(6) of the criminal -vehicular-homicide
statute) is less serious than the other offenses in the criminal-vehicular-homicide statute.3
See Minn. Stat. § 609.2112, subd. 1(a)(1)-(8) (2018). Anderson p oints to the fact that
“[u]nlike other forms of this offense -type, the State did not have to prove [he] was
[actually] under the influence of drugs or alcohol or gross negligence .” We are not
persuaded.
As the state notes, the supreme court rejected a n analogous argument in State v.
Solberg. 882 N.W.2d 618, 626 -27 (Minn. 2017). In that case, the appellant argued that
“his offense [was] less serious than the typical crime of third -degree criminal sexual
conduct because he used coercion, not violence, to accomplish sexual penetration.” Id. at
626. The supreme court held that appellant’s use of coercion “to cause the victim to submit
to penetration against her will fits squarely within the statute’s prohibition of sexual assault
by coercion,” and dismissed appellant’s argument as “incorrect.” Id. at 626-27.
Here, the criminal-vehicular-homicide statute similarly covers a range of wrongful
acts. And as the district court observed, Anderson’s conduct falls within the statutory
provision under which he was convicted. Anderson’s assertion that other provisions of the
criminal-vehicular-homicide statute encom pass “more egregious” conduct erroneously

3 Anderson was convicted under Minn. Stat. § 609.2112, subd. 1(a)(6) (2018), which
provides that an individual commits the offense of criminal vehicular homicide “if the
person causes the death of a human being . . . as a result of operating a motor vehicle . . .
in a negligent manner while any amount of a controlled substance listed in Schedule I or II
. . . is present in the person’s body.”
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compares his conviction to convictions that require proof of different elements, rather than
the offenses of others convicted under the same provision. In addition, the sentencing
guidelines explicitly provide that any conviction under Minn. Stat. § 609.2112, subd. 1(a)
(2018), is a severity level 8 offense. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 5.A ( Supp. 2019 )
(assigning severity levels to offenses). Anderson’s assertion that Minn. Stat. § 609.2112,
subd. 1(a)(6), encompasses less “egregious” conduct than other provisions therefore goes
against the sentencing guidelines’ assignment of severity levels. On this record, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Anderson’s motion for a downward durational
departure.
III. Anderson has a right to be resentenced with a corrected criminal-history score.
Finally, Anderson argues that he has a right to be resentenced because the district
court improperly calculated his criminal -history score. The proper calculation of a
defendant’s criminal-history score is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. See
State v. Scovel, 916 N.W.2d 550, 554 (Minn. 2018). A defendant cannot waive appellate
review of his criminal -history score, which may be corrected at any time. State v.
Maurstad, 733 N.W.2d 141, 147 (Minn. 2007).
Anderson was sentenced based on a criminal-history score of two. He was assigned
one and one -half felony points and one -half of a custody -status point, which were
combined for a total of two criminal -history points. He argues, and the state agrees, that
the district court improperly calculated his criminal-history score.
The sentencing guidelines provide that in calculating the criminal-history points to
be assigned for prior felony convictions, “[t]he felony point total is the sum of the felony
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weights. If the sum of the weights results in a partial point, the point value must be rounded
down to the nearest whole number.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B.1.i (Supp. 2019). Here,
Anderson was assigned one and one -half felony points. Because this involves a partial
point, his felony-point total should have been rounded down to one before being added to
the one-half custody-status point, for a criminal -history score of 1.5, not 2. The district
court therefore erred in sentencing Anderson based on a criminal-history score of two, and
Anderson is entitled to be resentenced.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.