State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1600

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Harold Leroy Fenstra, Jr.,
Respondent.

Filed June 28, 2021
Reversed and remanded
Cochran, Judge

Kandiyohi County District Court
File No. 34-CR-20-608

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Shane D. Baker, Kandiyohi County Attorney, Willmar, Minnesota (for appellant)

Theresa Patock, Jones & Patock, Willmar, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Frisch, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
In this sentencing appeal, the state argues that the district court erred by ordering a
stay of adjudication over the state’s objection. Because the district court did not identify
any clear abuse of the prosec utorial charging function th at would allow it to stay
adjudication over the state’s objection, we reverse and remand for resentencing.

2
FACTS
The state charged respondent Harold Fenstra with fifth-degree assault and
disorderly conduct in August 2020. The complaint alleged that Fenstra struck the victim,
who was 17 years old, in the face. Fenstra agreed to plead guilty to fifth-degree assault in
exchange for the state dismissing the disorderly-conduct charge.
At the plea hearing, Fenstra pleaded guilty to the assault charge and provided the
district court with his version of events. According to Fenstra, he lived in the same
neighborhood as the victim. Fenstra had known the victim’s family for many years.
Fenstra explained that the victim had “been giving [him] the bird on a regular basis,”
including three times on the day of the incident.1 On that day, Fenstra was in his yard when
the victim drove past. Fenstra thought the victim was speeding, and Fenstra signaled to
him to slow down. After the victim drove by, Fenstra went to talk to him. The victim was
parked in his vehicle at the time. Fenstra asked him “to quit givin[g] [him] the bird.”
According to Fenstra, the victim began screaming, said that he did not speed, and accused
Fenstra of reporting him to the police. Fenstra said that he then “lost [his] cool,” reached
in the window of the victim’s vehicle, and sl apped the victim on both sides of his face.
Fenstra admitted that he did not act in self-defense and was not afraid of being assaulted.
After hearing from Fenstra, the district court heard victim-impact statements from
the victim and his mother. Their statements described the assault incident somewhat

1 To give someone the “bird” refers to the “obscene gesture of anger, defiance, or derision
made by pointing or jabbing the middle finger upward.” The American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language 185 (5th ed. 2018).

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differently than Fenstra. The victim cl aimed that he was “driving through the
neighborhood peacefully” when Fenstra followed him home. Fenstra then “verbally and
physically assault[ed] [him] in [his] truck on [his] parents’ driveway.” The victim’s mother
said that Fenstra came up to the victim while the victim was s till in his vehicle. Fenstra
“started screaming at him.” According to her, Fenstra then slapped the victim twice with
the back of his hand and tried to choke the victim.
Following the victim-impact statements, Fenstra’ s attorney read three letters of
support for Fenstra written by Fens tra’s neighbors. They deta iled the victim’s history of
speeding in the neighborhood and responding rudely when asked to slow down. The
district court then proceeded to sentencing.
The district court discussed Fenstra’s sentence and announced that it would stay
adjudication. The district court explained its reason for staying adjudication:
I’m going to find that there are particular circumstances in this
matter that would justify trea ting this differently from a
standard sentence. Quite frankly it appears that there has been
an issue in the neighborhood with regards to some traffic
behavior and it caused essentially Mr. Fenstra to boil over. I’m
not condoning that fact that you used physical actions to deal
with this problem; we don’t do that. I think you’ve recognized
that . . . .

Along with the stay of adjudication, the district court imposed several conditions to which
Fenstra had agreed in his plea petition. Those conditions included that he undergo an anger
evaluation and follow its recommendations, write a letter of apology, remain law-abiding,
have no same or similar offenses, and pay a $100 fine. The district court told Fenstra that
the length of the stay was one year. The dist rict court also explained that, if Fenstra

4
complied with the conditions, the matter woul d be dismissed and a conviction would not
be entered. The district court said that this would give Fenstra “a chance to clean [his]
record.”
The state objected to the district court’s sentence, saying that the state never offered
a stay of adjudication as part of the plea deal. The district court noted the state’s objection
but ordered the stay. The stay of adjudi cation was reflected on Fenstra’s warrant of
commitment. This appeal follows.2
DECISION
The state challenges the district court’s se ntencing decision. The state argues that
the district court erred by stay ing adjudication of Fenstra’s c onviction over its objection.
We review a district court’s decision not to adjudicate a defendant’s guilt de novo.
State v. Martin, 849 N.W.2d 99, 105 (Minn. App. 2014), review denied (Minn. Sept. 24,
2014). We agree with the state that the district court erred by staying adjudication.
Prosecutors generally have “broad disc retion in the exercise of the charging
function,” and, under separation-of-powers prin ciples, courts should not interfere with
prosecutors’ exercise of that discretion. State v. Foss, 556 N.W.2d 540, 540 (Minn. 1996).
When a district court orders a stay of adju dication, it does not adjudicate the defendant’s
guilt but instead imposes conditions of probation, thereby allowing the defendant to avoid
a criminal conviction if he successfully completes probation. Martin, 849 N.W.2d at 102.

2 Because Fenstra did not file a brief, we or dered this appeal to proceed under Minn. R.
Civ. App. P. 142.03 (providing th at if a respondent fails to file a brief, the case is to be
determined on the merits).

5
A district court may order a stay of adjudi cation of guilt over the prosecutor’s objection
only in very limited circumstances. Id. at 102-03. The legislature has provided
that: “Except [under particular statutes not applicable here], or upon agreement of the
parties, a court may not refuse to adjudicate the guilt of a defendant who tenders a guilty
plea . . . or who has been found guilty by a court or jury following a trial.” Minn.
Stat. § 609.095(b) (Supp. 2019). In addition, the supreme court has held that a “clear abuse
of the prosecutorial charging function must be found by the court before it may order a stay
of adjudication over the prosecutor’s objection.” State v. Lee , 706 N.W.2d 491, 496
(Minn. 2005) (reaffirming the standard announced in Foss). A district court’s “mere
disagreement” with the prosecutor’s decision to charge is not a sufficient reason for a stay
of adjudication. Foss, 556 N.W.2d at 541.
Here, the district court, in staying adju dication, did not find any prosecutorial abuse
of discretion in the charging function. Instea d, the district court said that there were
“particular circumstances in this matter that would justify treating this differently from a
standard sentence,” and explained that “it a ppears that there has be en an issue in the
neighborhood with regards to some traffic be havior and it caused essentially Mr. Fenstra
to boil over.” The district court also stated that it was “giving [Fenstra] a chance to clean
[his] record.” The district court’s explanation suggests that it ordered a stay of adjudication
because it believed that mitigating circumstances made Fenstra’s offense less serious than
a typical fifth-degree-assault offense, and pe rhaps that it wanted to give Fenstra the
opportunity to keep his record clean.

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Neither of these circumstances is a suffi cient reason for staying adjudication. The
district court’s finding that the defendant’s offense is less serious than a typical offense
does not permit the district court to stay adjudication, even if it might support a downward
departure. See id. (reversing a stay of adjudication but noting that, “[t]o the extent that the
assault was less serious than the typical cas e of misdemeanor assault, the trial court
was free to be lenient in sentencing the defendant” on remand); State v. Thoma ,
569 N.W.2d 205, 208-09 (Minn. App. 1997) (stating that the presence of mitigating
factors did not justify a stay of adjudication), aff’d mem., 571 N.W.2d 773 (Minn. 1997).
And this court has held on multiple occasions that the desire to allow the defendant to keep
a clean record does not support a stay of adjudication. State v. Ohrt, 619 N.W.2d 790, 792
(Minn. App. 2000) (noting that “the benefits of avoiding a criminal record” and preventing
collateral consequences of a conviction do not support a stay of adjudication); Thoma,
569 N.W.2d at 209 (holding that the district court’s “desire to relieve an offender of the
collateral consequences of her conviction,” such as the loss of her driver’s license, does
not warrant a stay of adjudication). Much lik e the circumstances for which this court has
reversed stays of adjudication in the past, the circumstances that the district court identified
do not amount to a clear abuse of prosecutorial discretion in the exercise of the charging
function that would allow for a stay of adjudication.
In the absence of a finding of a clear abuse of the prosecutorial charging function,
we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by staying adjudication of Fenstra’s
conviction. We therefore reverse and remand fo r the district court to resentence Fenstra.

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While the district court may not impose a stay of adjudication, we leave the appropriate
sentence to the district court’s discretion.
Reversed and remanded.