In re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1603

In re the Marriage of:

Teresa Corinne MacNabb, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

John Michael Kysylyczyn,
Appellant.

Filed September 27, 2021
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-FA-08-2020

Teresa Corinne MacNabb, Little Canada, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Carl A. Blondin, Oakdale, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Pres iding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Kirk, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this appeal of the district court’s denial of his motion to modify the allocation of
the tax dependency exemption for one of the pa rties’ children, appellant argues that the
district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion. We affirm.
FACTS
This is the latest appeal in a contentious marital dissolution between appellant John
Michael Kysylyczyn (father) and respondent Teresa Corrine MacNabb (mother). The
parties married in 1999, and their marriage was dissolved by a judgment and decree (J&D)
in 2010. The parties have two children: a daughter, born in 2003, and a son, born in 2005.
In the J&D, the district court granted th e parties joint legal and joint physical
custody of the minor children and granted each party parenting time. The district court also
allocated income tax exemptions for the children: starting with tax year 2010 mother would
have the right to daughter’s income tax exemption and father would have the right to son’s
income tax exception. When only one exception remained, the parties would alternate the
right to son’s income tax exception.
In 2019, father moved to reassign daught er’s income tax exemption for tax year
2019 from wife to him, arguing that there was a substantial change in circumstances since
the district court allocated the exceptions in 2010. The district court denied father’s motion.
Father appeals.1

1 Mother did not file a brief in this appeal, and we ordered that th e appeal proceed under
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.
3
DECISION
The only issue before us is whether the district court abused its discretion by denying
father’s motion to modify th e allocation of daughter’s in come tax exemption. “The
allocation of the federal-tax exemptions is within the [d istrict] court’s discretion.”
Ludwigson v. Ludwigson, 642 N.W.2d 441, 449 (Minn. App. 2002). A district court abuses
its discretion when its decision is against logic and the facts in the record or misapplies the
law.2 See Rutten v. Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1984).
A district court may modify an orde r allocating an income tax dependency
exemption provided there has been a substantia l change in the four statutory factors that
are to be considered in allocating the exemption. Minn. Stat. § 518A.38, subd. 7(e) (2020).
The four statutory factors are:
(1) the financial resources of each party;
(2) if not awarding the dependency exemption
negatively impacts a parent’s ab ility to provid e for the needs
of the child;
(3) if only one party or both parties would receive a tax
benefit from the dependency exemption; and
(4) the impact of the dependent exemption on either
party’s ability to claim a pr emium tax credit or a premium
subsidy under the federal Patie nt Protection and Affordable
Care Act . . . including the federal Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010 . . . and any amendments to, and
any federal guidance or regulations issued under, these acts.

Id. at subd. 7(b) (2020).

2 Father argues that the standard of review should be de novo because he appeals the district
court’s application of undisputed facts to the law. But because father challenges the district
court’s weighing of statutory factors, the pr oper standard of review is for an abuse of
discretion. Ludwigson, 642 N.W.2d at 449.
4
The district court analyzed each of the statutory factors and concluded that father
failed to meet his burden of showing a substantial change with respect to any of them. The
district court further determined that, even if there were a substantial change in the fourth
factor, modification of the J&D still would not be warranted. We turn to the district court’s
determinations regarding each statutory factor.
The Financial Resources of Each Party
The district court first found that father failed to show a substa ntial change in the
parties’ financial resources. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.38, subd. 7(b)(1). Father argues that
the district court’s analysis is flawed because mother is a high-income earner while he earns
less than she does each year.
The district court determined that mother’s annual income grew from $68,548.98 in
2010 to $101,143 in 2019, and that Father’s annual income grew from $25,650 in 2010 to
$39,499 in 2019. The district court calculated the percent increase in both parties’ income
and found that mother’s income increased by 47.5% over that time period, while father’s
income increased by 53.9%. The district court found that, given father’s larger percentage
increase in income, father had not shown a substantial change in financial resources. That
determination is supported by the record. The district court di d not abuse its discretion in
determining that the first statutory factor weighs against modification.
Impact on the Parent’s Ability to Provide for the Needs of the Children
The district court next found that father did not meet his burden of showing that the
allocation of the tax exemption impacts his ability to provide for the needs of the children.
See Minn. Stat. § 518A.38, subd. 7(b)(2).
5
Father contends that the district court’ s analysis does not properly address this
statutory factor because it focuses too much on how reallocating the tax exemptions would
impact the parties’ tax burdens. But, in the district court, father argued that not claiming a
tax dependency exemption for his daughter wo uld increase his tax burden and negatively
affect his ability to provide fo r his children’s needs. The district court therefore reviewed
both parties’ draft federal and state tax returns and determined the impact that reallocating
daughter’s tax exemption would have on father’s and mother’s income tax obligations for
2019. The district court determ ined that the differences be tween mother’s and father’s
income tax obligations were present at the time of the J&D and did not significantly change
in the intervening decade. That determination is supported by the record.
Father also asserts that “over the past five to ten years” he has become 100%
responsible for the children’s educational and extracurricular expenses, rather than 25% as
required under the J&D. First, father provides no citation to the record to support this claim.
See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 128.02, subd. 1(c) (s tating that each statement of material fact
in an appellant’s brief “shall” be accompanied by a referenc e to the record). Second, the
district court made no such finding. Third, even if father is correct in his assertion that he
has assumed the children’s educational and extracurricular expenses, according to the J&D,
father need not pay these expenses. Thus, if he voluntarily assumes these expenses, it does
not constitute a change in circumstances. Cf. Hesse v. Hesse, 778 N.W.2d 98, 100 (Minn.
App. 2009) (stating, in the context of a dispute about a parenting-time expense adjustment,
that the relevant amount of parenting time is “the percentage of parenting time scheduled
6
under an existing court order, regardless of whether the parent exercises the full amount of
court-ordered parenting time”).
The district court’s determination that father failed to show how the current
allocation of daughter’s tax exemption impacts his ability to provide for the children is
supported by the record. The district court di d not abuse its discretion in determining that
the second statutory factor weighs against modification.
If One or Both Parties Receive a Tax Benefit from the Exemption
The district court determined that a reallocation of daughter’s tax exemption would
only benefit father. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.38, subd. 7(b)(3). The district court determined
that this factor weighed against reallo cating daughter’s tax exemption because the
detriment to mother caused by the reallocation outweighs the benefits for father.
The district court found that, if the tax exemption were reassigned to father, mother
would have an additional tax burden of over $4,000 plus underpayment penalties and that
she would also lose her ability to claim head of househol d, which would decrease the
amount of her standard deduction and put her into a higher income tax bracket. The district
court’s findings are drawn from the tax documents submitted to the district court and are
supported by the record. The district court’s determination that the third factor weighs
against modification is not an abuse of discretion.
Impact of the Exemption on the Ability to Claim an Affordable Care Act (ACA) Tax
Credit or Subsidy

Finally, father argues that the ACA taki ng effect after the 2010 J&D constitutes a
per se substantial change in circumstances warranting rea llocation of daughter’s tax
7
exemption. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.38, subd. 7(b)(4). The district court determined that the
enactment of the ACA “in and of itself” does not show a substantial change of
circumstances but that, even if the factor di d favor father, that single factor would not
warrant reallocating daughter’s tax exemption.
While father’s brief does not identify the cost difference for father to obtain health
insurance for himself pre- and post-ACA, in response to questioning during oral argument,
father did point to an affidavit he filed in July 2020. In that affidavit, father states that,
without daughter’s tax exemption, his health insurance premiums would be between $279
and $372 a month and that with the daught er’s tax exemption, his premium would be
reduced to $77 a month. While that difference could perhaps constitute a substantial change
with respect to the fourth statutory factor, the district court found that this factor alone did
not support modification. Because we do not reweigh the statutory factors, see Sefkow v.
Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988) (sta ting the appellate courts do not reweigh
the evidence), we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that
change in this factor alone does not warrant reallocating daughter’s tax exemption.
Finally, father also argues that the district court erred as a matter of law by focusing
on the best interests of the children rather than on the benefit to the parent, as required by
the fourth statutory factor. The fourth factor addresses the impact of an exemption “on
either party’s ability to claim a premium tax credit or a premium subsidy under the federal
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.38, subd. 7(b)(4). Father
argues that the district court applied Rogers v. Rogers, where the supreme court allowed a
noncustodial parent to claim the child’s tax exemption provid ed that doing so was in the
8
child’s best interests. 622 N.W.2d 813, 823 (M inn. 2001). He contends that, by applying
Rogers, the district court improperly shifted its analysis away from the effect of the tax
exemption on the parents and looked instead at the children’s best interests.
To the extent that father’s argument would elevate the interests of parents over the
interests of their children, we have grave doubts about the viabilit y of that analysis. See
Doll v. Barnell, 693 N.W.2d 455, 461 (Minn. App. 20 05) (noting “the child’s paramount
right to support and the public protec tion of the child’s best interests”); see also Putz v.
Putz, 645 N.W.2d 343, 352 (Minn. 2002) (no ting strong state policy of assuring that
children have adequate and timely economic support of their parents). Even ignoring these
doubts, however, father’s argument is unpersua sive. Although the district court’s order
cites to Rogers in discussing the discretion of the district courts to allocate tax exemptions,
it does not apply Rogers in the way that father contends. The district court’s order does not
simply apply a children’s-best-interests analysis; rather, it explicitly and carefully analyzes
each of the statutory factors, in cluding the fourth factor. Fath er’s assertion of legal error
therefore fails.
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying father’s motion to
modify the allocation of the tax dependency exemption for daughter.
Affirmed.