State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1606

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Alexander Taylor,
Appellant.

Filed November 1, 2021
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CR-19-2984

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Peter Magnuson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Workman Jesness,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant).

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M. , Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge;
and Hooten, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HOOTEN, Judge
Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction s for unlawful possession of firearms,
arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence because
police officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights in their execution of a search warrant.
Alternatively, appellant argues that the state’s evidence was insufficient to support the
convictions because it failed to prove his actual or constructive possession of the firearms.
We affirm.
FACTS
On July 28, 2019, Duluth police officers responded to a domestic violence
complaint in which the victim alleged that appellant Alexander Taylor was extremely
violent and threatened to shoot her. The victim maintained that Taylor po ssessed at least
two firearms. The officers reviewed Taylor’s criminal history, discovered several
convictions for crimes which made Taylor ineligible to possess a firearm, and then applied
for a no-knock warrant to search Taylor’s residence. The officer s cited Taylor’s criminal
history, the domestic violence complaint, his reported illegal possession of firearms, and
police safety as reasons justifying the no -knock warrant. On these grounds, the district
court issued a no -knock warrant, which permitted the officers to search the side of the
duplex in which Taylor lived with his girlfriend, C.T. ; his girlfriend’s three sons ; and
another woman, A.B.
The officers executed the warrant in the afternoon on August 13, 2019. When they
arrived at the residence, they observed two males and a female exit the residence and get
into a passenger vehicle parked behind the residence. The officers blocked the vehicle
from leaving the alleyway adjacent to the residence. One of the vehicle’s occupants, a
male, exited the vehicle and fled on foot, while the other male passenger, later identified
as Taylor, went back inside the duplex. A police tactical team safely entered Taylor’s
residence and removed two women and the children. One of the women, C.T., denied that
Taylor was in the home. As the police continued to yell that Taylor should surrender,
Taylor entered his neighbor’s side of the duplex through a shared basement. He was later
arrested as he exited his neighbor’s entrance.
During the search of Taylor’s port ion of the duplex, officers found a revolver
located in the ceiling of an upstairs bedroom with a container of live ammunition and a
rifle located underneath the shared basement stairs of the duplex. DNA testing of the rifle
and revolver revealed a mixtur e of three or more samples with one sample serving as the
“major contributor.”1 Further testing revealed that the major contributor’s DNA matched
Taylor’s DNA sample, while the remaining samples were too insignificant for a
determination regarding identification.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Taylor with two counts of unlawful
possession of a firearm. Taylor moved to suppress the firearms on the grounds that they
had been recovered during an unreasonable search. Taylor did not challenge the validity
of the search warrant but argued that the police unreasonably executed the warrant. The
district court denied the motion and a jury found Taylor guilty on both counts. The district
court entered judgments of conviction and imposed one sentence of 60 months ’
imprisonment. He now appeals.

1 The term “contributor” refers to the number of distinct DNA profiles found on an item.
A “major contributor” refers to a person whose DNA matches the DNA found on an item
at significant levels.
DECISION
I. The district court did not err by concluding that the officers acted reasonably
during the execution of the search warrant.

Taylor challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence
related to the firearm and revolver police discovered in his home. “When reviewing pretrial
orders on a motion to suppress evidence, we independently review the facts and determine,
as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in its ruling.” State v. Bourke , 718
N.W.2d 922, 927 (Minn. 2006) (citation omitted). The district court’s factual findings are
reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, but we review the district court’s legal
determinations de novo. State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008).
Taylor argues that the methods police undertook when executing the search of his
home were unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. To address this argument, we must
analyze whether the officers’ actions were reasonable u nder the circumstances present at
the time of search. State v. Fay , 488 N.W.2d 322, 324 (Minn. App. 1992).
“Reasonableness depends upon a balance between public interest, and the individual’s right
to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.” Id. (quotation
omitted). Even when officers have a warrant, a search may be unreasonable if, under the
totality of the circumstances, the officers’ conduct evinces a deliberate disregard of a
criminal defendant’s constitutional rights. See id.
In Fay, we concluded that the conduct of officers executing a search warrant was
unreasonable when an “entry team” of five or more officers arrived at the defendant’s home
and broke down the door using a battering ram. Id. The officers approached the defendant
with guns drawn, threw him on the floor, and then, without the benefit of a Miranda
warning, questioned him while he was handcuffed and blindfolded. Id. We concluded that
this violent and unannounced entry, coupled with the officers’ refusal to produce a search
warrant, “evinced a deliberate disregard of [the defendant’s] constitutional rights” and
showed more than just a harmless error or a “relatively minor irregularit[y]” on the part of
the officers. Id.
Taylor relies on our decision in Fay in support of his argument that the conduct of
the officers who executed the no -knock warrant was unreasonable. He points to the fact
that the officers wore bulle tproof vests and used a battering ram to enter his home while
also yelling at the home’s occupants to support his argument that the officers’ conduct was
unjustified. He also relies on a police report that suggested that an officer yelled at C.T.
when she exited Taylor’s residence and told her that it would be her fault if Taylor was
hurt after she denied that Taylor was in the home.
The district court recognized the similarities between the circumstances present in
Fay and the circumstances present in T aylor’s case, but concluded that the evidence
establishing Taylor’s violent and threatening nature permitted the use of more force than
was authorized in Fay. We agree.
Unlike the circumstances present in Fay, the police had evidence to suggest that
Taylor was violent and had access to weapons. The record before us indicates that Duluth
police officers received a complaint of domestic violence days before they executed the
search warrant at his home. The complainant alleged that Taylor had previously threatened
her and had a history of violence. Police confirmed this by conducting a records search of
Taylor’s criminal history. The complainant also alleged that Taylor had at least two
weapons in his home. The officers relied on this information and det ermined that the
appropriate level of force to use when entering Taylor’s home was the use of a tactical
team, bullet proof vests, and a battering ram. We cannot say that this decision was
unreasonable.
The record supports the officers’ reasonable belie f that a swift and forceful entry
was justified because there was evidence that Taylor was armed and dangerous. Although
the officers yelled at C.T., their conduct was justified because they reasonably believed
that she was lying to them when she stated t hat Taylor was not in the home despite other
officers seeing him enter and exit the home —a belief that was substantiated after Taylor
surrendered to the officers. Further, unlike Fay, the officers did not use blindfolds on
Taylor, throw him to the ground, question him without a Miranda warning, or otherwise
use unreasonable force when apprehending him at the duplex. We therefore cannot
conclude that the officers conduct “evinced a deliberate disregard of [Taylor’s]
constitutional rights”; rather, the officers used the amount of force necessary to execute the
search warrant keeping in mind Taylor’s violent criminal history and his alleged possession
of firearms. See id.
Taylor does not seem to dispute these distinctions in his appellate brief, but rather
argues that the police should not have relied on the domestic violence complaint to provide
the basis for the level of force used, maintaining that “[t]he information . . . was old and
outdated.” But the record confirms, and Taylor concedes, that the vic tim made the
domestic violence complaint approximately two weeks before police executed the search
warrant at Taylor’s residence. Taylor points us to no caselaw, and we are unable to find
any, that suggests the passage of two weeks makes the information f rom the complaint
“outdated.” We therefore reject the argument.
Because we conclude that the officers acted reasonably in their execution of the
search warrant of Taylor’s home and the district court therefore did not erroneously deny
Taylor’s motion to suppress the evidence from the search, we need not reach the argument
in Taylor’s appellate brief concerning the exclusionary rule.
II. The state presented sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that Taylor
constructively possessed the firearms.

Taylor alternatively argues that his conviction s must be reversed because the state
presented insufficient evidence to prove that he committed the charged crimes.
When evaluating a claim concerning the sufficiency of the evidence, “we carefully
examine the record to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from
them would permit the [factfinder] to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” State v. Waiters ,
929 N.W.2d 895, 900 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). We review the evidence “in the
light most favorable to the conviction . . . . [and] assume the jury believed the [s]tate ’s
witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86,
100 (Minn. 2012) (quotation and citation omitted).
The state may prove a conviction by either direct or circumstantial evidence . State
v. Silvernail , 831 N.W.2d 594 , 598 (Minn. 2013). Direct evidence is evidence that, if
believed, directly proves the existence of a fact without requiring any inferences by the
factfinder. State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 40 (Minn. 2016). Circumstantial evidence, on
the other hand, is “evidence from which the factfinder can infer whether the facts in dispute
existed or did not exist” and “always requires an inferential step to prove a fact that is not
required with direct evidence.” State v. Harris , 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017)
(quotation omitted). Both parties agree that the state presented circumstantial evidence to
obtain Taylor’s conviction, so we will address whether that circumstantial evidence is
sufficient to sustain the conviction.
When analyzing a claim under the circumstantial evidence standard, we apply a two-
step standard of review. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 598. First, we “identify the
circumstances proved.” State v. Moore , 846 N.W.2d 83, 88 (Minn. 2014). In doing so,
“we construe conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and assume that
the jury believed the State’s witnesses and disbelieved the defense witnesses.” Id.
(quotation omitted). Second, we “determine whether the circumstances proved are
consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id.
(quotation omitted). We independently examine “the reasonableness of [the] inferences
that might be drawn from the circumstances proved” and “give no deference to the fact
finder’s choice between reasonable inferences.” Id. (quotation omitted).
The state charged Taylor with two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm
pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2018). To prove a violation of that statute,
the state must show that (1) the defendant was previously convicted of a crime of violence;
and (2) the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm. Taylor does not dispute that he was
previously convicted of a crime of violence, so our analysis focuses on whether the state’s
evidence proves he knowingly possessed a firearm.
The state may establish a defendant’s possession of a firearm through either actual
or constructive possession. State v. Smith, 619 N.W.2d 766, 770 (Minn. App. 2000), rev.
denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 2001). Actual possession “r equire[s] proof that [the defendant]
physically had the [firearm] on his person.” Id. Construction possession, on the other
hand, exists if “the police found the [firearm] in a place under [the] defendant’s exclusive
control to which other people did not normally have access” or if the firearm is found “in
a place to which others had access, there is a strong probability (inferable from other
evidence) that [the] defendant was at the time consciously exercising dominion and control
over” the firearm. State v. Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609, 611 (Minn. 1975). The state concedes
in its appellate brief that the firearms police found in Taylor’s home “were found in areas
in which other people had access,” so our analysis is limited to whether the state’s evidence
proves Taylor was exercising dominion or control over the firearms.
We begin first by identifying the circumstances proved at trial, which are as follows:
(1) Taylor lived in a duplex with C.T., a second woman, A.B., and C.T.’s children; (2)
during the sea rch of Taylor’s home, officers found a rifle underneath the stairs in the
basement that Taylor shared with the residents of the other side of the duplex; (3) Taylor
considered the shared basement his room in the home; (4) Taylor passed through the
basement area and used the shared stairs to exit the duplex through the front door of his
neighbor’s side of the duplex; (5) the rifle did not belong to Taylor’s neighbor in the other
side of the duplex; (6) officers also found a revolver and ammunition in the ceiling tiles of
one of the bedrooms located in the portion of the home where Taylor lived; (7) Taylor had
access to the bedroom; and (8) DNA testing showed that Taylor’s DNA was the major
sample present on both firearms.
The only reasonable inference f rom the circumstances proved is that Taylor had
dominion or control over the firearms police found. The rifle was found underneath the
basement stairs of the duplex, adjacent to Taylor’s bedroom. Taylor walked through that
area prior to his arrest by pol ice, and his neighbor testified the rifle did not belong to her.
Police found the revolver and ammunition in a bedroom of the home that he had access to.
And Taylor’s DNA was found on both guns.
While Taylor concedes that one rational hypothesis from this evidence is that he
possessed the firearms and that his DNA was transferred to them through possession , he
argues that an alternate hypothesis is that there was a secondary transfer of his DNA to the
firearms by someone who previously had contact with him and then touched the firearms,
thereby distributing his DNA to the firearms. Taylor made this argument to the jury but
presented no evidence to the jury that a secondary transfer occurred. Because the jury as
evidenced by its guilty verdict rejected this argument at trial, and there is nothing in the
record supporting how and when such a secondary transfer of Taylor’s DNA to the two
firearms occurred, we conclude that the circumstances presented to the jury were
inconsistent with the alternative hypothesis that Taylor’s DNA ended up on the firearms
through a secondary transfer and consistent with the conclusion that Taylor possessed the
firearms.
In addition to arguing that secondary transfer provides a rea sonable inference
inconsistent with guilt, Taylor relies on two cases to support his conclusion that the state
failed to prove h e constructively possessed the firearms: Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 592 and
State v. Sam, 859 N.W.2d 825 (Minn. App. 2015). In Harris, the state charged Harris with
possession of a firearm by an ineligible person after officers pulled over Harris, who was
driving his brother’s car with two passengers, and discovered a firearm behind the driver’s
seat wedged between the headliner and the roof of the car. 895 N.W.2d at 596 –97. DNA
testing revealed a mixture of male and female DNA from five or more people and that
approximately 25% of the general population could not be excluded as contributors to the
DNA mixture, including the car’s two passengers. Id. at 597. The Minnesota Supreme
Court concluded that this evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction because the
circumstances, viewed as a whole, did not preclude a reasonable inference that Harris may
not have known about the firearm in the car. Id. at 603.
Similarly, in Sam, the state charged Sam with controlled substance possession after
a trooper found drugs in the center console of a borrowed car driven by Sam. 859 N.W.2d
at 828–29. The police also observed Sam’s front seat passenger making a lot of movement
toward the center of the car but did not observe Sam making any such movements. Id. at
834. An open beer bottle was found between where Sam’s passenger sat in the front seat
and the center console. Id. On appeal, u tilizing the heightened circumstantial evidence
standard of review, we concluded that the evidence was insufficient to sustain Sam’s
conviction because there was no evidence tying him directly to the illegal item. Id. at 835.
But unlike the facts presented in Harris or Sam, Taylor concedes that his DNA was
on the firearms, effectively tying him to the illegal items. And although he argues that the
firearms could have belonged to a third party, including his neighbor, testimony from the
neighbor and the DNA testing negate that conclusion and provide sufficient circumstances
to eliminate all reasonable inferences inconsistent with his guilt. We therefore reject
Taylor’s reliance on these cases.
We conclude that the circumstance s presented to the jury proved Taylor’s
possession of the firearms and eliminated all reasonable inferences inconsistent with guilt.
We therefore conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions.
Affirmed.