Jomari E. Alexander, Sr., Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1614

Jomari E. Alexander, Sr.,
Appellant,

vs.

Paul Strong, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed June 28, 2021
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-20-2481

Jomari E. Alexander, Sr., Minneapolis, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Timothy J. Carrigan, Jeffrey M. Markowitz, Bradley L. Idelkope, Arthur, Chapman,
Kettering, Smetak & Pikala, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Pr esiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant Jomari E. Alex ander, Sr., challenges the district court’s summary-
judgment dismissal of his defamation claims against respondents Parenting With Purpose
(PWP) and Paul Strong. Alexander contends that the district court erred by determining
2
that the alleged defamatory statements were nonactionable opinions or not supported by
admissible evidence. We affirm.
FACTS1
PWP is a non-profit organi zation that provides paren ting-education classes to
incarcerated parents. Strong is one of its founders. Alexander participated in a PWP class,
facilitated by Strong, while he was incarcerat ed in 2009. Alexan der was released from
prison a few years later, and he did not have contact with Strong again until they ran into
each other at a youth basketball game in 2018.
Alexander and Strong caught up at the game and discussed Alexander’s recent
endeavors and community involvement, and Strong suggested that Alexander should speak
at an upcoming PWP event. The two later discussed the speaking opportunity in more
detail, but Alexander ultimately declined the invitation. At the time he declined, Alexander
told Strong in a text message that he did so for a variety of reasons, including that he was
busy with other engagements an d that his limited connectio n with PWP did not justify
being a “poster child” for the organization.
From that point forward, the relationshi p between the parties soured. Alexander
alleges that Strong began a smear campaign against him as retaliation, making derogatory
remarks about him on numerous occasions.

1 For the purposes of summary-judgment review , we review the facts in the record in the
light most favorable to Alexan der as the nonmoving party. See Warren v. Dinter , 926
N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 2019).
3
In September 2019, Alexander and his wife took in a teenaged child from the
community due to the child’s difficult living situation with his mother. Alexander alleges
that while the child was staying with him, St rong and Strong’s wife contacted the child’s
mother and made disparaging remarks about Alexander and his ability to care for the child.
The child’s mother then reported her son “missing” to police, which Alexander contends
was done upon on Strong’s recommendation, and the police contacted Alexander and asked
him to bring the child back to the mother. Alexander brought th e child back. While
Alexander was still at the mother’s home, she called police to try to have her son arrested.2
When officers arrived, the mother told them that Alexander and his wife were “bad people,”
indicating that she had heard this from Strong. At some point, the mother also stated that
Strong and his wife told her that Alexander a nd his wife were a “danger” to the child and
would “have [her] child committing crimes for them.” After this incident, Alexander and
his wife sought and eventually obtained legal custody of the child.
Alexander also asserts that, at some point after the inci dent at the mother’s home,
Strong told certain school staff and the child’s mother, “we have to protect [the] child from
them,” referring to Alexander and his wife. Alexander did not he ar Strong make this
statement and does not know when or where it was made, but he heard about it from the
mother, a coach at the school, and the minor child’s girlfriend.

2 Alexander testified during his deposition that th e mother “tried to have her son arrested
to punish [her son] for basically putting th eir family business out – telling people outside
of their home about what was going on there.”
4
In February 2020, Alexander and Strong ha d a confrontation at a high school sports
game. At the game, Alexander’ s wife served Strong with paperwork fo r this lawsuit.
Strong became frustrated, and he approached Alexander while yelling, “you threatening
me? Are you threatening me. Yo u threatening me?” Alexande r laughed in reply. This
interaction occurred just outside the gymnas ium, and two law-enfo rcement officers were
nearby. The officers intervened, and Alexander told them that Strong was upset about the
lawsuit.
Also in February 2020, Alexander filed the complaint in this matter alleging, as
relevant here, defamation per se in connection with the remarks allegedly made by Strong.
The complaint also asserts that PWP had engaged in “donor fraud,” and that Alexander’s
accusations of donor fraud motivated Strong and PWP’s defamatory remarks about him.
Respondents filed an answ er, the parties engaged in discovery, and respondents
moved for summary judgment. Following a hearing, the dist rict court issued an order
granting summary judgment in favor of respondents and dismissing the claims. The district
court’s rationale for dismissing the defamation claims varied somewhat depending on the
specific statement at issue, but the primary reasons for dismi ssal were that the statements
were (1) nonactionable opinions, and/or (2 ) supported only by inadmissible hearsay.
Alexander submitted a request for reconsideration and the district court denied the request.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Summary judgment is appropriate when a moving party shows, by citing to
particular parts of the record, including depositions, documents, affidavits, admissions, and
5
interrogatory answers, that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01, 56.03(a). “[S]ummary
judgment is mandatory against a party who fail s to establish an esse ntial element of the
claim, if that party has the burden of proof, because this failure renders all other facts
immaterial.” Bebo v. Delander , 632 N.W.2d 732, 737 (Min n. App. 2001) (quotation
omitted), review denied (Minn. Oct. 16, 2001). Appellate courts review a district court’s
grant of summary judgment de novo. Montemayor v. Sebright Prods., Inc., 898 N.W.2d
623, 628 (Minn. 2017).
The appellate court must view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the party
against whom the summary judgment was granted.” McKee v. Laurion, 825 N.W.2d 725,
729 (Minn. 2013). “[I]n order to establish that there is a dis puted material fact, the party
against whom summary judgment was grante d must present specific admissible facts
showing a material fact issue.” Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul , 817 N.W.2d 150, 163
(Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted).
Where no privilege applies, a plaintiff pursuing a defamation claim must prove four
elements:
(1) the defamatory statement was communicated to someone
other than the plaintiff; (2) th e statement is false; (3) the
statement tends to harm the plaintiff’s reputation and to lower
the plaintiff in the estimation of the community; and (4) the
recipient of the false statemen t reasonably understands it to
refer to a specific individual.

Larson v. Gannett Co., Inc., 940 N.W.2d 120, 130-31 (Minn. 2020) (quoting McKee, 825
N.W.2d at 729-30). Whether a statement’ s language reasonably conveys a defamatory
6
meaning is a question of law to be determined by the court. McKee, 825 N.W.2d at 731-
32; Utecht v. Shopko Dep’t Store, 324 N.W.2d 652, 653 (Minn. 1982).
True statements are not defamatory. McKee, 825 N.W.2d at 730 (explaining that
“[t]he plaintiff has the burden of proving falsity in order to establish a successful
defamation claim”). Statements that ar e “substantially true ,” or “supportable
interpretations of ambiguous underlying s ituations,” are also not defamatory. Hunter v.
Hartman, 545 N.W.2d 699, 707 (Minn. Ap p. 1996) (quotations omitted), review denied
(Minn. June 19, 1996). Neither are statemen ts of pure opinion actionable as defamation,
as such statements are protected by the First Amendment. McKee, 825 N.W.2d at 733; see
Larson, 940 N.W.2d at 147. In determining whether a statement is one of fact or opinion,
courts consider “(1) a statement’s precision and specificity; (2) a statement’s verifiability;
(3) the social and literary context in which the statement was made; and (4) a statement’s
public context.” Fine v. Bernstein, 726 N.W.2d 137, 144 (Minn. App. 2007), review denied
(Minn. Apr. 17, 2007). Statements that are “ not ‘sufficiently factual to be susceptible of
being proved true or false’” are not actionable as defamation. Hunter, 545 N.W.2d at 706
(quoting Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21, 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2707(1990)).3

3 Alexander incorrectly asserts that “statements of opinion may be actionable if the plaintiff
is not a public figure.” For support, he relies on Wiessman v. Sri Lanka Curry House, Inc.,
where this court interpreted First Amendment caselaw and determined that private-plaintiff
defamation actions are analyzed under Minnesota common law, and “Minnesota common
law makes no distinction between ‘fact’ and ‘opinion.’” 469 N.W.2d 471, 473 (Minn. App.
1991). The Minnesota Supreme Court has explained in private-plaintiff cases that postdate
Wiessman, though, that “[t]he First Amendment protects statements of pure opinion from
defamation claims.” McKee, 825 N.W.2d at 733 (analyzing a defamation action brought
by private-plaintiff physician); see Bebo , 632 N.W.2d at 739 (analyzing a defamation
action brought by a private- plaintiff truck driver); see also Hunt v. Univ. of Minn. , 465
7
Additionally, statements that are mere “rhetorical hyperbole” cannot support a defamation
claim. Id.
To determine whether a genuin e issue of material fact exis ted for trial, the district
court individually analyzed each allegedly defamatory statement referenced in the
complaint and Alexander’s deposition testimony. The statements at issue, as identified by
the district court, are:
Statement 1: Alexander and his wife are “dangerous people”
or “bad people.”
Statement 2: “They will have your child committing crimes
for them.”
Statement 3: “You should report your child missing.”
Statement 4: “We have to protect th is child from them.”
Statement 5: “Are you threatening me. You threatening me?”

The district court determined that, as a matter of law, none of the statements were
defamatory, as they were either opinions, rhet orical hyperbole, or a prediction of future
events. Additionally, the district court dete rmined that the defamation claims regarding
statements 1, 2, 3, and 4 necessarily faile d because the record contained no admissible
evidence that respondents ma de the statements; Alexande r offered only inadmissible
hearsay.

N.W.2d 88, 93-94 (Minn. App. 1991) (decla ring that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21, 110 S. Ct. at 2707 , narrowed, but did not abolish, the
constitutional protection of opini ons). As explained above, if an opinion is not a “pure
opinion,” and instead implies a provably false statement, it may be actionable defamation
regardless of whether the plaintiff is a public figure. See McKee, 825 N.W.2d at 733; cf.
Hunt, 465 N.W.2d at 94 (“[S]tatements which cannot be reasonably interpreted as stating
actual facts, are absolutely protected by the First Amendment.”).
8
On appeal, Alexander argues that the statements are capable of conveying a
defamatory meaning and that a jury should decide “whether they were in fact so
understood.” He also argues that although the evidence he offered to show that respondents
made statements 1 through 4 was hearsay, cert ain exceptions to the rule against hearsay
apply.
For the following reasons, we conclude that the statements are not defamatory as a
matter of law, and we therefore do not de cide whether the supporting evidence is
admissible. We address each statement in turn.
Statement 1: Alexander and his wife are “dangerous people” or “bad people.”
Alexander’s complaint assert s that Strong and his wife contacted the mother of the
minor child in Alexander’s car e and told the moth er that her son was staying with
“dangerous people.” According to Alexander’s deposition testimony, however, the exact
statement may have been that the child was w ith “bad people,” or that the “child [was] in
danger.” The district court determined that the distinction is immaterial because, in either
event, the alleged statements are nonactionable opinions.
Alexander contends that the “dangerous people” or “bad people” statements
conveyed a defamatory meaning because they suggested the existence of a verifiable fact—
that he and his wife posed a risk of harm to the child. Responden ts counter that calling
someone “bad” or “dangerous” is an opinion, and they cite several nonbinding decisions
from other jurisdictions that conclude as much.
4

4 See, e.g. , Wolberg v. IAI N. Am., Inc. , 77 N.Y.S.3d 348, 351 (App. Div. 2018)
(determining that “[t]he alleged statemen ts that plaintiff was ‘dangerous’ and had
9
A statement is not defamatory if it “ca nnot be reasonably inte rpreted as stating a
fact and . . . cannot be proven true or false.” McKee, 825 N.W.2d at 733; see also Hunter,
545 N.W.2d at 706-07. Here, the characteriza tion of Alexander and hi s wife as “bad” or
“dangerous” is the sort of inherently subjective description that Minnesota courts have held
is incapable of being pr oven true or false. See McGrath v. TCF Bank Sav., FSB , 502
N.W.2d 801, 808 (Minn. App. 1993) (holding that the phrase “troublemaker” was too
ambiguous to infer underlying facts); Hunt, 465 N.W.2d at 94-95 (holding that a comment
concerning an individual’s “integrity” could not be proven true or false). Alexander does
not provide evidence about any other asserti ons surrounding these statements, as he
concedes that he was not there when they were made, does not know who was present, and
does not know over what medium they occurred. Without more, these vague, standalone
statements about the Alexande rs being “bad people” or “d angerous people” cannot be
proven true or false. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 cmt. c (1977) (explaining
that surrounding statements are relevant to the determination of whether a statement is one

‘chutzpah’ are expressions of opinion”); Krasner v. Arnold, No. W2011-00580-COA-R3-
CV, 2011 WL 6885349, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2011) (observing that a description
of the plaintiff as “dangerous” was a statement of opinion); Stetter v. Blackpool, LLC, No.
CV-09-1071-PHX-DGC, 2010 WL 1531082, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 15, 2010) (holding that
“calling someone a ‘bad man’ is not an actionable statement of fact that can be proven true
or false”); Donovan v. Whalen, No. Civ. 05-CV-211-SM, 2005 WL 2979322, at *3 (D.N.H.
Nov. 4, 2005) (concluding that a statemen t that plaintiff was “dangerous” was not
actionable when it constituted only a conclusion or inference ). As noted, these cases are
not binding on this court. See Citizens for a Bal anced City v. Plym outh Congregational
Church, 672 N.W.2d 13, 20 (Minn. App. 2003) (“ This court is bound by decision of the
Minnesota Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court.”); see also Mahowald v.
Minn. Gas Co. , 344 N.W.2d 856, 861 (Minn. 1984 ) (considering foreign caselaw for
persuasive value but not as binding authority).
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of pure opinion). The district court corr ectly concluded that the “bad people” or
“dangerous people” statements are expressions of opinion rather than verifiable facts and
are accordingly not defamatory. See McKee, 825 N.W.2d at 733.
Statement 2: “They will have your child committing crimes for them.”
Alexander alleges that Strong and his wi fe also told the ch ild’s mother that
Alexander and his wife would have the child commit crimes on their behalf. He argues
that this statement implied a provable falsity th at creates an issue of fact for the jury, and
summary judgment was therefore improper.
The district court concluded that this statement was not actionable because it is a
prediction of future events. We agree. A prediction of future events is not actionable in
defamation because it is not capable of being proven true or false. Bebo, 632 N.W.2d at
740 (holding that a “remark that [plaintiff] was going to ‘f--- [other drivers] over’ is a
prediction of a future event and is not a fact capable of verification”). Here, the alleged
statement about what Alexander and his wife would have the child do is not capable of
verification and is accordingly not actionable defamation. See id.
Statement 3: “You should report your child missing.”
Alexander next contends that Strong and his wife told the child’s mother, at the time
the child was staying with Alexander, that she should report the child missing.
This recommendation conveys no defamato ry meaning. To be defamatory, a
statement must refer to a specific individual, and this statement makes no such reference.
McKee, 825 N.W.2d at 729-30. The statement is merely the Strongs’ alleged opinion about
what the mother should do given the child’s prolonged absence from the home. Thus, the
11
district court correctly determined that it does not reasonably convey a defamatory
meaning.
Statement 4: “We have to protect this child from them.”
Alexander alleges that sometime after hi s encounter with the child’s mother and
police, Strong and his wife told the child’s mo ther and certain school staff that the child
needed protection from the Alexanders.
This statement, like the st atements about Alexander a nd his wife being “bad” or
“dangerous” people, “cannot be reasonably interp reted as stating a fact and . . . cannot be
proven true or false.” McKee, 825 N.W.2d at 733; see also Hunter, 545 N.W.2d at 706-
07. Again, Alexander testified he did not hear the statement made, and no one present for
it testified. The standalone statement expr esses an opinion, and the record lacks any
context or surrounding language th at could give rise to an imp lication of verifiable facts.
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 cmt. c (1977). The district court properly
determined that the statement is not defamatory as a matter of law.
Statement 5: “Are you threatening me? You threatening me.”
Lastly, Alexander alleges that after his wi fe served Strong with this lawsuit at a
basketball game, Strong approached Alexander outside the gymnasium and said “are you
threatening me? You threatening me.”
These words are not defamatory. As the di strict court concluded, Strong’s alleged
comments were expressions of a protected op inion—that Alexander was threatening him
with litigation. As the district court explained, “Mr. Strong (who denies Mr. Alexander’s
account but accepts it as fact fo r the purposes of this motio n) was opining on what he
12
thought Mr. Alexander was doing with the lawsuit—which was served on Mr. Strong
moments before.” In this context, wh ere Strong was asserting his perception of
Alexander’s actions, his statement was a protected opinion.
To the extent that the statement was not a pure opinion, though, it does not support
a defamation claim for another reason: the st atement appears to be substantially true.
“[T]he substantial truth test is broad: if any reasonable person could find the statements to
be supportable interpretations of their subjec ts, the statements are incapable of carrying a
defamatory meaning, even if a reasonable jury could find that the statements were
mischaracterizations.” Hunter, 545 N.W.2d at 707 (quotations omitted). Alexander had
just served Strong with a la wsuit, so to the extent th at Strong was commenting on
Alexander threatening him with litigation , that statement was a “supportable
interpretation[] of [an] ambiguous underlying situation[].” Id. (quotation omitted).
Moreover, as the district court concluded, the record does not establish that Strong
made the statement to anyon e other than Alexander. See McKee, 825 N.W.2d at 729-30
(explaining that to prove de famation, the plaintiff must show that the statement was
“communicated to someone othe r than the plaintiff”). While Alexander’s testimony
indicates that two law-enforcement officers approached them due to the tense interaction,
it does not establish that the officers heard a ny specific statements. The district court
therefore did not err by determining that no genuine issue of material fact exists to support
a defamation claim regarding this statement.
Affirmed.