A20-1616 Nonprecedential Affirmed Processed

In re the Paternity of G. J. P., born March 2019, Evelio Sis Garcia, Respondent,

Minnesota Court of Appeals · Filed July 26, 2021

The holding in the court’s own words

We therefore conclude that t he district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that G.J.

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Opinion text

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1616

In re the Paternity of G. J. P., born March 2019, Evelio Sis Garcia,
Respondent,

vs.

Keodavanh Praxayamondkhoune,
Appellant.

Filed July 26, 2021
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-FA-19-9427

Evelio Sis Garcia, Faribault, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Richard L. Swanson, Chaska, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Hooten, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant-mother challenges the district court’s order granting respo ndent-father’s
petition to change the last name of the parties’ child, arguing that the district court abused

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its discretion in concluding that the name change served the child’s best interests. Because
we see no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
FACTS
In March 2019, G.J . was born t o his mother, appellant Keodava nh
Praxayamondkhovne.1 She denied that respondent Evelio Sis Garcia was G.J.’s father. In
June 2019, respondent filed a paternity complaint stating that: (1) he was the presumed
father of G.J., (2) he and appellant had never been married; (3) appellant was not married
to anyone at the time she conceived G.J.; (4) respondent and appellant had sexual
intercourse several times between February 2018 and February 2019; (5) respondent
wanted genetic testing of G.J.; and (6 ) if the testing established respondent’s paternity of
G.J., respondent wanted to be adjudicated G.J.’s father, to establish a relationship with him,
to have joint legal and joint physical custody and reasonable scheduled parenting time, and
to amend the birth record to add Sis to G.J.’s name. In July 2019, appellant married and
changed the last name of herself and G.J. to McIlvaine.
The genetic testing indicated a 99.9999998% probability that respondent was G.J.’s
father, and respondent was adjudicated his father. The parties agreed that they would share
joint legal custody; that respondent would have supervised parenting time until he
completed an Early Childhood Family Education course, then transition to unsupervised
parenting time; that they would work with and pay for a parenting consultant; that

1 We note that a ppellant’s birth surname is spelled both Praxayamondkhoune and
Praxayamondkhovne in the record and have adopted the latter spelling.

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respondent’s child-support obligation would be $611; and that the issue of G.J.’s last name
would be reserved until briefs had been submitted.
In his brief, respondent asked that G.J.’s last name be changed to Garcia-McIlvaine
to reflect his bi -racial, bi -cultural Latino -Asian heritage so that, although he is in
appellant’s Asian -Caucasian household, he can acquire and maintain a connection to
respondent’s race and culture. Appel lant asked that G.J.’s last name remain McIlvaine
because she is his primary custodial parent; her other child has the last name McIlvaine
and G.J. will feel more part of the family unit if he had the same last name; G.J. might
experience confusion or emba rrassment at school or in social settings when he is asked
why he has a different last name; and not having the same last name as respondent will not
affect G.J.’s ability to bond with respondent. The district court granted respondent’s
petition and issue d an order that G.J.’s last name be changed to Garcia -McIlvaine, and
judgment was entered accordingly.
Appellant challenges the judgment.2
DECISION
The decision on a motion to change a child’s surname is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. See, e.g., In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298, 301 (Minn. 1981) (“[T]he trial court
did not abuse its discretion by concluding the children’s best interests were served by
keeping their given surname.”).

2 Respondent’s attorney has withdrawn, and respondent has taken no part in this appeal.
This court issued an order directing that the matter be decided on the merits under Minn.
R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.

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In Saxton, a mother who had permanent custody of the parties’ chil dren following
her divorce from their father dropped the father’s surname, Dennis, and reverted to her
birth surname, Saxton. Id. at 300. She moved to have the surname of their children, then
nine and seven, changed to Saxton-Dennis. Id. Two expert witnesses testified that, while
“the name change would be beneficial for the children as it would enhance their self -
esteem,” the children were “happy and socially well-adjusted, suffering no ill effects from
bearing only their father’s surname.” Id. The district court determined that the children’s
best interests would be served by keeping their father’s surname. Id. at 301.
Saxton sets out the factors to be considered in deciding a motion for a name change.
[A] change in the child’s surname should be granted only when
the change promotes the child’s best interests. In determining
the child’s best interests, the trial court may consider, but its
consideration is not limited to, the following factors: [1] the
child’s preference, [2] the effect o f the change of the child’s
surname on the preservation and the development of the child’s
relationship with each parent, [3] the length of time the child
has borne a given name, [4] the degree of community respect
associated with the present a nd the propo sed surname, and
[5] the difficulties, harassment or embarrassment, that the child
may experience from bearing the present or the proposed
surname.

Id. (citation omitted). The district court here considered all five factors and concluded that
none of them supported not giving G.J. respondent’s last name as well as appellant’s new
last name.
The first factor is irrelevant: G.J. is only two and probably does not know what a
last name is, much less have a preference. As to the second factor, the distric t court found

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that the name change would have the positive effect of furthering the relationship between
G.J. and respondent. The district court stated:
For a great length of time, [appellant] denied that [respondent]
was the father of the child and prohibited any contact with the
child. This continued for a period of time even after the genetic
testing results had confirmed the great probability that
[respondent] was the father of the child. [Appellant] now
admits [that respondent] desires to have a relationship with the
child but faults him for not providing a home for the child and
for only hav[ing] limited, supervised visits. [It] is
inappropriate to blame [respondent] for these circumstances
because it has been [appellant] who has mandated [them]. It is
this type of attitude that leads the Court to believe [appellant]
will not go out of her way to foster, develop, or preserve any
relationship between [respondent] and the child. Giving the
child a hyphenated surname that includes both parents’
surnames would give the child the symbolic knowledge that he
is part of two families. The true relationship between
[respondent] and the child will need to be developed between
the two of them but with such a young child this is a continuing
process.

As to the third factor, G.J. has already had his last name changed from appellant’s
birth name, Praxayamondkhovne, to her married name, McIlvaine, and neither last name
has been used extensively on school records or legal documents. As to the fourth factor,
community respect for the name, and the fifth factor, the difficulties, harassment, or
embarrassment likely to result from the name change, the d istrict court found that Garcia-
McIlvaine is neither more nor less respectable than McIlvain e and that neither name is
likely to “result in much harassment or embarrassment to the child,” in part because
“[m]any children now live in blended families and have different last names than their
siblings.”

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We see no error in the district court’s application of the Saxton factors. We therefore
conclude that t he district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that G.J.’s best
interests will be served by the hyphenated surname that will promote his relationship with
his father and is unlikely to result in his harassment or embarrassment.
Affirmed.