In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: D. M. A., Parent.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1619

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: D. M. A., Parent.

Filed June 7, 2021
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Becker County District Court
File No. 03-JV-20-1102

Elizabeth Walker, E. Walker Law, PLLC, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (for appellant D.M.A.)

Brian W. McDonald, Becker County Attorney , Lisa Tufts Frederick, Assistant County
Attorney, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (for respondent Becker County Human Services)

Monica Felt, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Pres iding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
After a termination of parental rights tria l, the district court found that Becker
County Human Services proved by clear and conv incing evidence two statutory grounds
for terminating appellant-mother’s parental rights. The district court also determined that
the best interests of the children required te rmination of mother’s parental rights and
entered an order doing that. On appeal, mother argues that termination was inappropriate
under the circumstances. We affirm.

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FACTS
Appellant-mother has three children: Child A, born in 2005; Child 1, born in 2011;
and Child 2, born in 2015. In October 2018, after receiving a child protection maltreatment
report, Becker County Human Services (BCHS) placed Child 1 and Child 2 in emergency
protective care and filed a Child in Need of Protection or Services (CHIPS) petition. The
CHIPS petition did not include Child A because mother’s custodial rights to Child A had
previously been terminated.
The CHIPS petition alleged that the father of Child 1 and Child 2 sexually and
physically abused them, domestic violence between mother and father occurred around the
children, and mother and father were unable to provide the children w ith necessary care.
There were no allegations that mother directly physically or sexually abused Child 1 or
Child 2. There were allegati ons, however, that mother knew that father was abusing the
children and did not protect them. Child pr otection investigated the allegations and
interviewed Child A and Child 1. Because Child 2 appe ared to be nonverbal, the
investigator observed her.
Child A reported that father had sexually abused both her and Child 1 while she was
in the home. Child A said that father would “touch them under their clothes,” it “happened
a lot,” and father “would make them noodles in the middle of the night and wake them up
so he could touch them.” Child A stated that father would rub her genital area with his
foot, place her hand on his “junk,” 1 touch her vagina with his fingers, and put his fingers

1 Child A clarified that “junk” means male genitalia.

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inside her vagina which “hurt a lot.” Child A reported that one night she went to bed with
clothing on and woke up naked. When the interviewer asked Child A why she did not
remember how she ended up naked, Child A stated that father forced her to take shots of
alcohol and to drink beer. Child A also reported that one night she heard Child 1 screaming
shortly after father went into Child 1’s bedr oom and that Child 1 to ld her “Daddy put his
fingers and his dick inside” of her and “it hur t really bad.” Afterwards, Child 1 started
sleeping with Child A. Besides the sexual abuse, Child A reported that father often hit all
three girls so hard that they fell over and he threatened to kill them all one day.
Child A stated that mother “knows about everything b ecause [Child A] told her
about what had happened.” After BCHS re moved Child 1 and Child 2 from the home,
investigators recorded a phone conversation between Child A and mother. On the phone,
mother told Child A that Child 1 and Child 2 had been removed, admitted to knowing what
father had done to the childre n, and asked Child A to lie if anyone asked Child A what
happened to her because mother “need[ed] [Child A’s] siblings home.”
Child 1 similarly reported that father “touched” her and that mother knew about it,
“told [father] not to do it again, and told Child 1 not to talk to any one about it.” Child 1
also stated that father “touc hed” Child 2. When the interviewer as ked Child 1 how she
knew father “touched” Child 2, Child 1 said that she “could hear it happening upstairs,”
because Child 2 was “crying like death,” and father was hitting Child 2. Child 1 declared
that father “hits really loud.”
In July 2018, father assaulted mother in their home while mother and Child 2 were
lying on the bed. Father first choked mother and then dragged her around by her hair “like

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a ragdoll.” All three children witnessed the assault. Child A tried to help mother but father
threw Child A over a stair railing, breaking two of her ribs. To get away from father,
mother ran across the street with Child 2, leaving Child A and Child 1 alone with father in
the home. This was not the first time that father assaulted mother.
Child 1 reported that on another occasion “mom and dad were fighting and dad was
hitting mom” and it “scared” Child 1 so she tr ied to help mother but Child 1’s hand was
hurt in the process. Child A and Child 2 also witnessed this assault. A friend of mother’s
reported that father is very violent while in toxicated and he has held machetes against
mother’s neck and stated, “no one would mi ss you anyway,” while threatening to slit her
throat in front of all three children. Mother stated that after she saw father spanking Child
1 and intervened, father assaulted her for protecting Child 1. Mother continued to live with
father until she received an order for protection against father and he was ordered to leave
the home in December 2018.
That same month, BCHS filed a termin ation of parental rights (TPR) petition
seeking to terminate both parents’ parental rights to Child 1 and Child 2. The district court
held a TPR trial in December 2019. In January 2020, the district court issued an order that
terminated father’s parental rights by defau lt, but permitted mother to continue to work
towards reunification with Child 1 and Child 2.2
In June 2020, BCHS filed a second TPR petition alleging that mother’s parental
rights should be terminated under Minn. Stat . § 260C.301, subd. 1 (2020). The district

2 Father does not challenge the termination of his parental rights on appeal.

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court held mother’s one-day TP R trial in November 2020. Th e district court limited the
evidence to the issue of reun ification efforts between January 2020 and the time of the
second TPR trial. BCHS called four witnesses: an investig ator with the Becker County
Sheriff’s Office, mother, a BCHS child protec tion social worker (social worker), and a
capacity-to-parent evaluator. Mother called th ree witnesses: mother’s friend, mother’s
boyfriend, and mother’s brother. The guardian ad lite m (GAL) also testified. Trial
testimony established these facts.
During the CHIPS proceeding and again in August 2020, mother signed case plans
for both Child 1 and Child 2 designed to help her reunify with the children. The case plans
stated that because of mothe r’s “failure to protect her ch ildren and her lack of support
regarding their allegations of sexual abuse,” before she could be reunified with Child 1 and
Child 2, she must “demonstrate that she will protect her children from harm and prioritize
their needs for safety and well-being, as well as attend to their psychological and emotional
needs.” The case plans thus mandated that moth er have no contact with father and stated
that any of mother’s future partners must be screened by BCHS. The case plans also
required mother not to allow people with a “c riminal history, child protection history, or
unmet chemical dependency needs” around her children and to “not form relationships with
them or allow them in her home.”
Following the first TPR trial in late January 2020, the GAL and social worker went
to meet with mother in the home where she had recently moved. The purpose of the
meeting was to prepare to reunify the children with mother on a trial home visit. The social
worker and GAL inspected the home to make sure it was appropriate for the children and

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noticed a picture of father placed above the children’s bed. After the social worker
discussed her concerns about the picture with mother, she removed it.
On February 10, 2020, mother called the social worker to report that she received a
phone call from father la te Friday night or early Saturd ay morning and she answered the
call because she did not recognize the number. Mother stated that this phone call was the
first contact she had with father. Because a domestic abuse no contact order was in place
between mother and father, the Becker County Sheriff’s Office investigated the allegation
that father had contacted mother. An inve stigator obtained a search warrant for the
telephone records of mother and father from January 2019 to February 2020. The
telephone records showed that mother and father had communicated extensively through
text messages, beginning on February 5, 2020, five days earlier than mother reported.3 And
at trial, mother testified th at she had been communicating with father for roughly a week
before they began exchanging text messages.
In May 2020, mother started dating a new partner (boyfriend). Shortly after, in June
or July 2020, boyfriend moved into mother’s home. Mother did not get approval from
BCHS before allowing boyfriend to move in. She testified that she did not seek BCHS’s
approval because “that is my ho me, that is my decision.” After dating for four months,
mother and boyfriend became enga ged in September 2020. At tr ial, mother testified that
she plans to marry boyfriend.

3 Between February 5, 2020, an d February 8, 2020, mother and father exchanged nearly
800 text messages.

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When BCHS became aware th at mother was dating a ne w partner, both the social
worker and GAL asked to do a background check on boyfriend. Mother refused to comply.
Mother testified that before allowing boyfriend to move into her home, she ran a “Google”
background check on him and no ticed that boyfriend had crimin al history which, in part,
involved domestic abuse. Boyfriend’s crim inal record did not bother mother because it
was “old” and she believed he had changed.
BCHS’s review of boyfriend’s court reco rds revealed these convictions: a first-
degree burglary and assault in 2011, a gross misdemeanor domestic assault in 2012, and a
violation of a domestic abuse order for protection in 2013. And in August 2019, less than
a year before mother started dating him, boyfriend was convicted of felony domestic
assault. At the time of trial, boyfriend was still on probation. Additionally, in 2013, the
district court involuntarily terminated boyfriend’s parental rights.
At trial, a capacity-to-parent evaluator testified that mother has a personality
disorder with mixed features including obsessi ve-compulsive traits, schizoid traits, and
histrionic traits. The capacity-to-parent evaluator testified that mother’s type of personality
disorder is one that typically cannot be ov ercome and “really does impact her judgment
and . . . the type of partners that she pick s.” Mother also has a “borderline range of
intellectual functioning” which makes it difficu lt for her to choose appropriate partners.
And given mother’s low intellectual functioning and personality disorder, regardless of the
services that mother receives, she may be unable to overcome the concern that she cannot
protect her children from harm. Mother’s pending marriage to a person with domestic

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abuse convictions led the capacity -to-parent evaluator to belie ve that mother still lacks
insight and concern for her children.
At the end of trial, the district c ourt found that BCHS proved by clear and
convincing evidence two statutory grounds for te rmination. The district court found that
mother is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent-child relationship under Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4), and that mother faile d to correct the conditions that led to the
children’s out-of-home placement under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5). After
finding that the best interests of Child 1 and Child 2 required termination, the district court
terminated mother’s parental rights. Mother appeals from the order of termination.
DECISION
Mother challenges the district court’s order terminating her parental rights to Child
1 and Child 2 and argues we must reverse the order because termination was inappropriate
when “she had a bonded relationship with her children, had never ha rmed or injured the
children and was engaged in her case plan.” On appeal from a district court’s termination-
of-parental-rights order, we “review the district court’s findings of the underlying or basic
facts for clear error, but we review its determination of whether a particular statutory basis
for involuntarily terminating parental rights is present for an abuse of discretion.” In re
Welfare of Children of J.R.B. , 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied
(Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). A finding is clearly er roneous if it is “manifestly contrary to the
weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evid ence as a whole.” In re
Welfare of Children of T.R. , 750 N.W.2d 656, 660-61 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).
And a district court abuses its discretion if it acts against logic, enters factual findings

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unsupported by the record, or misapplies the law. In re Adoption of T.A.M., 791 N.W.2d
573, 578 (Minn. App. 2010).
We will affirm a district court’s termination of parental rights when (1) the county
made reasonable efforts to reunify the family, (2) clear and convincing evidence supports
one or more statutory bases for termination, and (3) termination is in the children’s best
interests. See In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P. , 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008).
Here, the district court found that BCHS made reasonable efforts to reunify mother with
Child 1 and Child 2, clear and convincing evidence supported statutory bases for
termination, and termination was in the best interests of Child 1 and Child 2. We agree.
A. The district court did not abuse its disc retion by determinin g that BCHS made
reasonable efforts to reunify mother with Child 1 and Child 2.

During oral arguments, mother asserted that she is challenging the district court’s
determination that BCHS made reasonable efforts to reunify mother with Child 1 and Child
2. Based on mother’s briefi ng, however, it is not clear th at mother challenged this
determination. In her sole paragraph in her brief discussing reasonable efforts, mother does
not cite anything in the record or point to any erroneous conclusion. Because mother
inadequately briefed any challenge to the district court’s reasonable efforts determination,
we conclude that this issue is not properly before this court. State, Dep’t of Labor & Indus.
v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997) (declining to address an
issue absent adequate briefing); In re Welfare of Children of J.B. , 698 N.W.2d 160, 166
(Minn. App. 2005) (applying this aspect of Wintz in a TPR appeal), review dismissed
(Minn. May 3, 2005). Although we conclude that mother forfeited this issue, we may

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review a TPR order “as the interest of justice” requires and thus we briefly discuss mother’s
argument for the sake of completeness. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04.
During a TPR proceeding, the district court must determine whether a county made
reasonable efforts to reunite the parent with their children. T.R., 750 N.W.2d at 664.
“Whether the county has met its duty of reas onable efforts requires consideration of the
length of the time the county was involved and the quality of effort given.” In re Welfare
of H.K., 455 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn. App. 1990), review denied (Minn. July 6, 1990). We
review a district court’s ultimate determination of whether the efforts the county provided
were reasonable for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d
315, 322-23 (Minn. App. 2015), review denied (Minn. July 20, 2015).
Here, the district court determined that BCHS made reasonable efforts to reunify
mother with Child 1 and Child 2. We agree. The county removed Child 1 and Child 2
from mother’s care in October 2018, and the district court terminated her parental rights in
December 2020. For those two full years, BCHS provided mo ther with various services
including: individual therapy, family therapy, domestic violence classes, parenting classes,
a parenting evaluation, and visitation. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by determining that BCHS made reasonable efforts to reunify mother with Child
1 and Child 2.
B. The district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that clear and convincing
evidence supports a statutory ground for termination.

A statutory ground to terminate parental rights exists when a parent is palpably unfit
to be a party to the parent-child relationshi p. Minn. Stat. § 260C .301, subd. 1(b)(4). A

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parent is “palpably unfit” when “a consistent pattern of specific conduct” is of “a duration
or nature that renders the parent unable, fo r the reasonably foreseeable future, to care
appropriately for the ongoing physical, mental, or emotional needs of the child.” Id. Here,
the district court found that “despite being gi ven an opportunity to work on her case plan
[mother] continues to revert to and cultivate unsafe relationships that place her children in
the path of harm.” We agree.
Throughout this case, moth er displayed a consistent pattern of forming and
maintaining relationships with unsafe individuals. After father’s parental rights were
terminated and despite mother’s case pl an and a domestic a buse no contact order
prohibiting contact, mother continued to communi cate with father. Mo ther testified that
she contacted father about a vehi cle that they shared and argu es that the nearly 800 text
messages the two exchanged do not show that they had an ongoing relationship. We
disagree. The text messages support the district court’s finding that mother and father had
an ongoing relationship.
Similarly, while working towards reunifi cation, mother began a new relationship
with a man who has both criminal and child protection history. After dating him for only
two months, mother allowed him to move in. When BCHS tried to conduct a background
check on live-in boyfriend, mother refused to comply. And after dating for four months,
mother and boyfriend became engaged and plan to marry—all despite mother’s knowledge
of boyfriend’s criminal and child protection history.
Mother’s own testimony supports the dist rict court’s findings that she has not
learned to adequately protect her children from harm or to prioritize their needs, safety, or

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well-being. At trial, mother agreed that a person—exactly like boyfriend—“with a felony
burglary that assaulted a person on the day of the burglary during the commission of that
crime” was not a safe person to be in her home. But when BCHS asked mother how she
thought it would work having a dangerous fe lon in her home with her children, mother
testified that she “thought it would work out well.”
Furthermore, the capacity-to-parent evalua tor testified that mother’s type of
personality disorder typically cannot be overcome and impacts both her judgment and the
type of partners she picks. Given mothe r’s low intellectual func tioning and personality
disorder, mother has not been able to adequately learn to identify, and to protect her
children from, unsafe individuals. And her relationship with boyfriend—an individual with
domestic violence and child prot ection history—shows that mother still lacks insight and
concern for her children despite two years of counseling and services.
Mother’s pattern of allowing unsafe individuals into her life and inability to identify
unsafe individuals renders mother unable, for the reasonably fore seeable future, to
appropriately care for the needs of Child 1 and Child 2. We conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion by finding that moth er is palpably unfit to be a party to the
parent-child relationship.4

4 Because “[t]ermination of parental rights will be affirmed as long as at least one statutory
ground for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence,” we need not reach
the issue of whether the district court abused its discretion by finding that mother has failed
to correct the conditions leading to the children’s out-of-home placement. In re Welfare of
Children of R.W., 678 N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn. 2004).

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C. The district court did not abuse its disc retion by finding that termination of
mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of Child 1 and Child 2.

When a statutory ground for termination ex ists, the district court must determine
whether termination is in the be st interests of the children. R.W., 678 N.W.2d at 57. In
analyzing what is in the best interests of th e child, the district court must balance three
factors: “(1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s
interest in preserving the pare nt-child relationship; and (3) any competing interest of the
child.” In re Welfare of R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992). We review a district
court’s best-interests analysis for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Child of J.R.R.,
943 N.W.2d 661, 669 (Minn. App. 2020).
In her briefing, mother argues that termination was inappropriate because “she had
a bonded relationship with her children,” but mother identifies no e rror in the district
court’s weighing of the three best interests f actors. As before, we conclude that mother
has forfeited this issue. Wintz, 558 N.W.2d at 480; J.B., 698 N.W.2d at 166. Even if we
were to assume that mother in tended to appeal the district court’s implicit determination
that the third best interests factor outweighs any evidence against termination, we would
affirm.
Here, the record lacks any evidence—other than mother’s own statement—showing
that mother had a bonded relationship with Child 1 or Child 2. And the record contains no
evidence that either child was bonded with mother. But the record does contain evidence
that termination is in the best interests of th e children. The district court found that both
children experienced trauma while in mother’s care that con tinues to impact them. The

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district court acknowledged that Child 1 has been able to verba lize the trauma she
experienced. Yet, even though Child 2 ha s been unable to verb alize the trauma she
endured, which has impacted her nervous system and has led her to self-harm in the form
of prematurely pulling out her own baby teeth. In fact, Child 2 began this self-injurious
behavior after a joint therapy session with mother.
The mental health of both Child 1 and Child 2 and their ability to process trauma is
“fragile” and exposure to further violence would harm their health. Thus, the district court
found that it was in the best interests of both Child 1 and Ch ild 2 that mother’s parental
rights be terminated. We agree and discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
finding that the best interest s of Child 1 and Child 2 requi re termination of mother’s
parental rights.
Affirmed.