Mary Jo Kattar, et al., Relators,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1633

Mary Jo Kattar, et al.,
Relators,

vs.

City of St. Paul,
Respondent.

Filed December 6, 2021
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

City of St. Paul
File No. RLH RR 19-30

Steve Anderson, Anderson Law Group PLLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for relators)

Lyndsey M. Olson, St. Paul City Attorney, Therese A. Skarda, Assistant City Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
Relators Mary and John Kattar contest respondent City of St. Paul’s order requiring
them to demolish their house, which was so filled with property th at a code-compliance
inspection was deemed im possible. The Kattars contend th at the city failed to consider
certain important aspects of the situation, including the disruption caused by COVID-19
2
and the difficulties posed by Mary Kattar’s hoa rding condition, and as a result claim the
city’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. We affirm.
FACTS
The city originally condemn ed the Kattar’s house as unfit for human habitation in
2007. Among other factors, the city declared that the home was a “material endangerment”
to the public because it was so full of property that it posed a fire hazard. The house was
and continued to be full of property, in la rge part, because of Mary Kattar’s hoarding
condition. The Kattars vacated the home in April 2007 and never returned, although they
continued to pay taxes on it. For twelve year s, the city took no further action concerning
the home.
Then, in September 2019, the city notifie d the Kattars that the home was a nuisance
property and could be subject to demolition if its code vi olations were not remedied. A
public hearing concerning th e house was set for November 2019, at which the Kattars
appeared. There, a legislative hearing o fficer explained that the Kattars had two
options: they could rehabilitate the home or demolish it. When the Kattars indicated that
they intended to rehabilitate th e house, the hearing officer explained that they had six
months to remedy all the code violations that led the city to declare the house a nuisance.
The hearing officer told the Ka ttars that the first step of the rehabilitation process was a
code-compliance inspection by the city. But the home was currently so full of property
that no inspection was possible.
To assist them in cleaning out the hous e enough for a code-compliance inspection
to occur, the hearing officer then encouraged the Kattars to reach out to a county program
3
that could offer services. The Kattars al so received information about a professional
organization that specialized in helping people with hoard ing conditions at the same
meeting. But by the next legislative heari ng, the home was still not clean enough for an
inspection.
The Kattars did not make much progress. In January 2020, the legislative hearing
officer gave the Kattars one more month to clean the home so that the city could inspect it.
But by February 2020, the house was still not clean. The Kattars had enlisted the assistance
of the county program, but a worker from that program testified that the house was still
very full, and that a bid to clean the house was rejected by the Kattars. The hearing officer
then gave the Kattars until the end of March 2020 to secure a contract to clean the house.
But in March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic complicated the Kattars’ efforts to get
a contract in place. They retained counsel, who obtained an additional extension because
both Kattars had underlying hea lth conditions that made them particularly vulnerable to
the virus. But at the continued hearing, wh ile some cleaning had been done, the Kattars
still had not entered into a contract to have the house cleaned.
Throughout the summer of 2020, Mary Kattar continued some cleaning efforts. In
a letter, she stated that she had made a lot of progress and requested more time to finish
cleaning the house. She hire d a project manager and starte d working with a different
service that also specialized in helping people with hoar ding conditions. On the basis of
Kattar’s representations of her cleaning effort s, the legislative hearing officer gave the
Kattars an extension until the middle of Augu st 2020, provided that they could bring
pictures documenting their progress.
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But the August hearing revealed little progre ss. At the hearing, a city employee
who reviewed the Kattar’s progress pictures te stified that the house was still so full of
property that no inspection was possible. Counsel maintained that progress was being
made, although he acknowledged that “the pace may be slower than what . . . would be
officially desired.” The legislative hearing officer granted the Kattars one final extension
to get the house clean enough for an inspection.
Ultimately, the Kattars never cleaned the house to a point where a code compliance
inspection could occur. Counsel admitted at the final hearing that the Kattars did not “stay
on plan,” and that “the house is still not cl eaned out.” The legislative hearing officer
recommended that the city council order the demolition of the home because it still posed
a fire hazard. The city c ouncil unanimously vot ed to amend its Se ptember 2019 order,
removing the option to rehabilitate and in stead requiring the Kattars to demolish the
property within 15 days, or else the city would demolish the home itself.
The Kattars, by writ of certiorari, seek review of the city’s decision.
DECISION
The Kattars argue that the city’s decisi on to order the demolition of their home was
arbitrary and capricious. We defer to a city’s decision and will reverse only if the decision
was arbitrary and capricious. Rostamkhani v. City of St. Paul, 645 N.W.2d 479, 483 (Minn.
App. 2002). A city’s decision is arbitrary and capricious if: (1) the city relied on factors
not intended by the ordinance, (2) the city fa iled to consider an important aspect of the
issue, (3) the decision conflicts with the evidence, or (4) the decision is so implausible that
it does not reflect a simple difference in judgment. Id. at 484.
5
With this standard in mind, we turn to the city ’s decision. Based on the
accumulation of property making the Kattar’s home a fire hazard, the city determined that
the house posed a “material endangerment.” A “material endangerment” exists when the
condition of a building violates a city code, a nd the violation is hazardous to the public.
St. Paul, MN, Legislative Code (SPLC) § 34.23(7) (2021). A dwelling that is a fire hazard
poses a material endangerment. Id. (7)(b). Yet, the city worked with the Kattars for almost
a year, and extended the original rehabilitation deadline four times, in an attempt to get the
house cleaned out enough so that it did not pose a material endangerment. Those efforts
failed. Finally, the city ordered that the Ka ttars demolish the property within 15 days, or
else the city would demolish the house itself. This action is in accord with a city’s authority
to take emergency abatement procedures when a nuisance property poses an immediate
danger to the public, including the “demolition of dangerous structures.” SPLC §§ 45.08,
.12 (2021). Because the city relied on the factors intended by the ordinances in concluding
that the house must be demo lished to abate the endangerme nt to the public, the city’s
decision was logical and based on the evidence, and thus was not arbitrary and capricious.
Rostamkhani, 645 N.W.2d at 484.
Still, the Kattars point us toward indications that the city’s decision to remove their
property was, in their view, arbitrary and capricious . They allege that these indications
demonstrate that the city failed to cons ider important aspects of the issue. See id.
(recognizing that a city’s decision may be arb itrary and capricious if the city failed to
consider an important aspect of the issue). First, the Kattars contend that the city ignored
Mary’s hoarding condition because the order itself does not reference hoarding. Second,
6
they argue the city failed to consider the extent to which COVID-19 prevented them from
cleaning the property. Third, the Kattars assert that the city ignore d all the progress that
they made in cleaning out the property. 1 Taken together, they argue that these factors
suggest that the city failed to consider important aspects of the problem, and thus its
decision was arbitrary and capricious.
The record refutes the Kattar’s claim. Firs t, that the order itself does not reference
hoarding does not mean that the city did no t consider Mary Kattar’s hoarding condition.
Not only was hoarding discussed extensively at the legislative hearings and council
meeting, but the city en couraged the Kattars to seek servic es that specialized in assisting
people with hoarding conditions to clean th eir homes. Second, the Kattars fail to
acknowledge that the city gave them the benefit of multiple extensions because of the
COVID-19 pandemic. And the legislative hearing officer testified at the council meeting
that the Kattars’ failure to make significant progress was due to their inability to delegate
work, not the pandemic. Third, rather than ignoring the progress that the Kattars made, the
city found that progress inadeq uate. And the record support s this determination. The
hearing officer informed the Kattars at the first hearing that the first step of the
rehabilitation process was a code -compliance inspection. The hearing officer originally
gave the Kattars six months to rehabilitate the property. But after almost a year of broken

1 Additionally, the Kattars argue that the city held them accountabl e for its own inaction
between 2007—when the city originally condemned the property—and the declaration that
the house was a nuisance property in 2019. But the Kattars could have corrected the
deficiencies in order to remove the condemna tion order and failed to do so. They do not
explain what further action the city was required to take, or why this alleged failure justifies
their inability to clean the house over a period of more than 12 years.
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deadlines and extensions, the Kattars never completed the first rehabilitation step because
the house was still too full for an inspection to occu r. Accordingly, the Kattars have not
established an important aspect of the problem that the city failed to consider, and thus the
city’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious.
Affirmed.