State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1641

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Thomas Eric Walbridge,
Appellant.

Filed November 22, 2021
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Mille Lacs County District Court
File No. 48-CR-18-1802

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Joseph J. Walsh, Mille Lacs County Attorney, Brian D. Wold, Erica L. Madore, Assistant
County Attorneys, Milaca, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Grant S. Gibeau, Special Assistant Public Defender, Taft, Stettinius & Hollister LLP,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction for first -degree possession of a controlled
substance, arguing that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress
methamphetamine that was seized during the search of a veh icle he was driving. We
affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Thomas Eric Walbridge with
first-degree possession and sale of a controlled substance. Walbridge moved to suppress
the controlled-substance evidence, arguing that it was obtained during an unconstitutional
search and seizure.
Evidence presented at a contested hearing on Walbridge’s motion indicates that on
August 2, 2018, at approximately 2:10 a.m., a Mille Lacs County deputy sheriff stopped a
vehicle Walbridge was driving for traveling 61 miles per hour in a 55-mile-per-hour zone.
When the deputy approached Walbridge, he noticed that Walbridge was “profusely
sweating” despite the 50 - to 55-degree temperature, his pupils were constricted, his eyes
were bloodshot, and his body and hands were shaking. He also observed that Walbridge
was more nervous than a typical driver during a traffic stop. Based on the deputy’s training
and experience, he suspected that Walbridge was under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
Walbridge told the deputy that he was coming from his cousin’s house. The deputy
testified that Walbridge’s cousin and his residence were “known to law enforcement for
various criminal activities,” including drug activity.
The deputy asked Walbridge about his physical appearance. Walbridge said that he
was sweating because he had been cleaning at his cousin’s house and that he was shaking
because he was nervous. At the deputy’s request, Walbridge held out his hands, and the
deputy observed that his hands were “visibly rapidly shaking.” Walbridge stuttered when
answering a few questions. Additionally, the deputy noticed numerous air fresheners
inside the vehicle. In the deputy’s experience, people use large amounts of air fresheners
to mask odors from controlled substances.
The deputy conducted field tests to determine if Walbridge was impaired. The tests
indicated impairment. For example, Walbridge’s pupils were slow to react to light; he
estimated that 30 seconds had passed in only 20 seconds; he had “eyelid flutter”; and he
had raised bumps on the back side of his tongue, which are common when a person uses a
pipe to ingest a controlled substance. The deputy asked Walbridge if there were particular
substances in the vehicle. Walbridge answer ed “no” when asked whether the vehicle
contained alcohol, marijuana, or heroin, but he responded “negative” when asked whether
he had methamphetamine. Also, Walbridge initially denied that he had ever used
methamphetamine, but then he admitted that he had used it in the past.
The deputy requested consent to search the vehicle. Walbridge refused. The deputy
told him that he could either consent and “be on his way” if no controlled substances were
found or the deputy would arrange for a canine trained in narcotics detection to come to
the scene. Walbridge again denied consent to search the vehicle. The deputy contacted a
canine officer, who arrived at the scene approximately 20 minutes later.
The canine officer walked the canine around the outside of Walbridge’s vehicle on
a retractable leash. The driver’s door was closed, but the window was down. The canine’s
behavior changed when it reached the driver’s door. At that point, the canine’s breathing
became “more intense” and the canine began to sniff heavily, which indicated that it had
detected an odor. The canine then jumped into the vehicle through the open window. It
searched for the source of the odor inside the vehicle and gave a “final response” on a
backpack located on the floor of the back passenger side. The backpack contained
methamphetamine and other drug paraphernalia.
The district court denied Walbridge’s motion to suppress, concluding that the
deputy had probable cause to search Walbridge’s vehicle. Walbridge waived his right to a
jury trial and stipulated to the prosecution’s case to obtain review of that pretrial ruling,
pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. The district court found Walbridge guilty of
first-degree possession of a controlled substance. It entered judgme nt of conviction and
sentenced Walbridge to serve 75 months in prison. Walbridge appeals.
DECISION
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect “[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. Evidence obtained by the
police as the result of an unconstitutional seizure must be suppressed. State v. Diede, 795
N.W.2d 836, 842 (Minn. 2011). Similarly, evidence obtained during an unconstitutional
search must be suppressed. State v. Rohde, 852 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Minn. 2014).
“When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may
independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court
erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.” State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90,
98 (Minn. 1999). We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal
determinations de novo. State v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145, 149 (Minn. 2009).

I.
Under principles established by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), a police officer may “stop and temporarily seize a person to investigate
that person for criminal wrongdoing if the officer reasonably suspects that person of
criminal activity.” Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 842 (quotation omitted). “Reasonable suspicion
must be based on specific, articulable facts that allow the officer to be able to articulate . . .
that he or she had a particularized and objective basis for sus pecting the seized person of
criminal activity.” Id. at 842-43 (quotations omitted). The reasonable-suspicion standard
is met “when an officer observes unusual conduct that leads the officer to reasonably
conclude in light of his or her experience that c riminal activity may be afoot.” State v.
Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). The standard is not
high, but it requires more than an unparticularized hunch. Id.
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently described the reasonable-suspicion standard
in State v. Taylor, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2021 WL 4765700, at *3 (Minn. Oct. 13, 2021).
The supreme court noted that reasonable suspicion is a “low hurdle.” Id. at *7. The court
also reiterated that a judicial determination of reasonable suspicion is based on an objective
standard, and not on the investigating officer’s subjective beliefs. Id. at *5 n.5. “[W]e
evaluate each case on a totality of the circumstances and the rational inferences that can be
drawn from those particular fac ts.” Id. at *8; see also State v. Lee, 585 N.W.2d 378, 382
(Minn. 1998) (explaining that probable cause and reasonable suspicion are “not finely -
tuned standards,” but are rather “fluid concepts that take their substantive content from the
particular contexts in which the standards are being assessed” (quotation omitted)).
“[E]ach incremental intrusion during a stop must be strictly tied to and justified by
the circumstances which rendered the initiation of the stop permissible.” State v.
Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 364 (Minn. 2004) (quotations omitted). Under the Minnesota
Constitution, an intrusion not strictly tied to the circumstances that made the initial stop
permissible must be supported by “at least a reasonable suspicion of additional illegal
activity.” State v. Smith, 814 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2012).
Here, the de puty stopped Walbridge for driving over the speed limit. Walbridge
does not challenge that initial stop. Instead, he contends that the police lacked reasonable
suspicion to expand the scope of the traffic stop to conduct a dog sniff of his vehicle. The
police may conduct a dog sniff around the exterior of a motor vehicle if they have
“reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity.” State v. Wiegand, 645
N.W.2d 125, 137 (Minn. 2002).
To support reasonable suspicion that Walbridge was engaged in drug -related
criminal activity, the state points to Walbridge’s behavior that suggested he was impaired,
such as his profuse sweating despite the mild temperature, constricted pupils, bloodshot
eyes, rapid shaking, and abnormal nervousness. The state also notes that Walbridge was
coming from a known drug house, had numerous air fresheners in his vehicle, exhibited
signs of impairment during the field tests, admitted he had used methamphetamine in the
past, and responded differently when aske d whether he had methamphetamine in the
vehicle.
Walbridge asserts that some of the circumstances on which the state relies cannot
establish reasonable suspicion of drug -related activity. According to Walbridge,
reasonable suspicion cannot be based on t he fact that he was coming from his cousin’s
house, which the police knew to be associated with drug activity. “Mere proximity to, or
association with, a person who may have previously engaged in criminal activity is not
enough to support reasonable suspi cion of possession of a controlled substance.” Diede,
795 N.W.2d at 844. Nevertheless, “[p]resence in a known drug house is a relevant, but not
conclusive, factor for an officer to consider.” State v. Lugo, 887 N.W.2d 476, 487 (Minn.
2016). For example, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the police had
reasonable suspicion to stop a person who had just left a building with a history of drug
activity because the person made eye contact with the police as he was leaving and abruptly
changed the direction he was walking. State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 842-43 (Minn.
1992), aff’d sub nom. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993). In sum, Walbridge’s
presence at his cousin’s house immediately before the traffic stop alone does not establish
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, but it can be considered with the other
circumstances.
Walbridge also asserts that reasonable suspicion cannot be based on his nervousness
during the traffic stop. The supreme court has been reluctant to rely on a defendant’s
nervous behavior to support reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. State v. Burbach ,
706 N.W.2d 484, 490 (Minn. 2005). Indeed, “ordinary drivers may become nervous during
a routine traffic stop.” Smith, 814 N.W.2d at 353. Nonetheless, the supreme court has held
that nervousness support ed reasonable suspicion where it was manifested in a “severe
physical manner.” Id. at 353-54. Thus, consideration of Walb ridge’s physical signs of
abnormal nervousness, along with the other present circumstances, is appropriate.
Walbridge further argues that his signs of impairment did not establish reasonable
suspicion to believe there were controlled substances in the vehicle . Specifically,
Walbridge argues that those facts may have caused reasonable suspicion to believe he was
driving while impaired, but not that he was transporting drugs in his vehicle. That
argument assumes that evidence that a driver is impaired cannot contribute to reasonable
suspicion that his vehicle contains drugs and therefore cannot support a dog sniff of the
vehicle’s exterior.
In Wiegand, the supreme court held that , to conduct a dog sniff of a vehicle’s
exterior, the police must have reasonable, articulable suspicion of “drug-related criminal
activity.” 645 N.W.2d at 137. In determining that the police lacked reasonable suspicion
to conduct a dog sniff of the vehicle in Wiegand, the supreme court stressed that the police
officer “did not suspect [the defendants] were under the influence of anything, nor did h e
have any indication that they were transporting drugs.” Id. at 136-37. The supreme court
also noted that, even though the driver was “evasive, nervous and had glossy eyes,” the
police never suspected that he was under the influence of any controlled substances. Id. at
137. That language indicates that driving under the influence of a controlled substance is
a relevant circumstance when assessing whether there is reasonable suspicion justifying a
dog sniff of a vehicle’s exterior.
Based on Wiegand, we conclude that Walbridge’s signs of impairment are properly
considered—along with all the other circumstances —when determ ining whether
reasonable suspicion justified the dog sniff in this case. See State v. Martinson, 581
N.W.2d 846, 852 (Minn. 1998) (requiring consideration of the totality of the
circumstances). Here, the deputy observed several signs of impairment, and Walbridge’s
field tests suggested that he was impaired. Walbridge had been at a residence known for
drug activity shortly before the traffic stop. The deputy observed numerous air fresheners
inside the vehicle, which, in his training a nd experience, were likely used to mask odors
from controlled-substance use. We conclude that, under the totality of those circumstances,
the police had reasonable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity and that the dog sniff
of Walbridge’s vehicle was lawful.
II.
Walbridge contends that, even if reasonable suspicion supported the expansion of
the traffic stop, the canine’s search of the inside of his vehicle was unconstitutional.
Generally, a search is unreasonable when it is conducted without a wa rrant issued upon
probable cause. State v. Flowers , 734 N.W.2d 239, 248 (Minn. 2007). However, under
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, the police may search a vehicle
without a warrant when they have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains
contraband. Id. “Probable cause exists when there are facts and circumstances sufficient
to warrant a reasonably prudent person to believe that the vehicle contains contraband.”
State v. Lester, 874 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). Probable cause is
an objective inquiry that depends on the totality of the circumstances. Id.
The state argues that the deputy had probable cause to search Walbridge’s vehicle
for controlled substances because there was probable cause to believe that he had been
driving while impaired. The state does not cite, and we are not aware of, authority
supporting the state’s proposition that probable cause to believe an individual has been
driving while impaired automatically gives rise to probable cause to search the person’s
vehicle. In fact, that proposition is inconsistent with caselaw. For example, in State v.
Charley, the supreme court held that an officer had probable cause to search a vehicle for
drugs based on “the t otality of the circumstances.” 278 N.W.2d 517 , 519 (Minn. 1979).
Those circumstances included not only the defendant’s impairment, but also the officer’s
observation of the defendant exchanging something with a teenager in a parking lot
immediately before the traffic stop, his observation of the defendant placing something
under the seat when he stopped the vehicle, and his observation of a bag protruding from
under the seat. Id. at 518-19. We reject the state’s contention that there was probable cause
to search Walbridge’s vehicle based solely on probable cause to believe he had been driving
while impaired.
However, the United States Supreme Court has held that a dog’s alert to the presence
of controlled substances provides probable cause to search if the dog has successfully
completed a certification or training program. Florida v. Harris , 568 U.S. 237, 246 -47
(2013). Here, the canine officer testified that the canine was trained and certified to locate
narcotics, and Walbridge did not contest that evidence. Furthermore, this court has held
that a dog’s alert to the presence of controlled substances after sniffing the exterior of a
vehicle established probable cause to search the vehicle. State v. Pederson-Maxwell, 619
N.W.2d 777, 781 (Minn. App. 2000). We therefore conclude that the canine’s alert to the
presence of drugs outside the vehicle provided probable cause to believe that the vehicle
contained controlled substances. Thus, it was lawful for the police to search inside the
vehicle for drugs under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
Walbridge argues that the search was unlawful because the canine entered his
vehicle during the dog sniff. He claims that the canine officer “facilitated” the canine’s
entry into the vehicle by opening the driver’s-side door before the canine displayed a final
response indicating the presence of narcotics. Walbridge notes that Minnesota courts have
not addressed the constitutionality of a dog sniff of a vehicle’s interior when the officer
facilitates the canine’s entry into the vehicle.
The state responds that this court need not determine whether the canine officer
facilitated the canine’s entry into the vehicle because there was probable cause to search
the vehicle once the canine signaled the presence of an odor of drugs from outside the
driver’s door. We agree. The canine’s detection of that odor was evident through its heavy
sniffing and more intense breathing. At the contested hearing, the canine officer explained
the significance of that behavior: “[T]he dog breathing in that way and his body language
that I testified to is an indication to me that he is in odor, which is an alert to the presence
of odor. It’s not a final response, but it is an alert to the presence of odor.”
Walbridge argues that a dog sniff cannot provide probable cause of drug -related
activity unless and until the canine provides a “final” response. The canine officer’s
testimony in this case establishes that the canine’s behavior outside the vehicle was an
“alert” to the presence of drugs , but not a final response . Caselaw generally does not
distinguish between a dog’s initial alert outside of a vehicle and its “final response. ”
Instead, cases typically refer to a dog’s “alert” without mentioning the precise timing and
location of a “final” alert. See id. Because caselaw supports a conclusion that the canine’s
initial alert outside of Walbridge’s vehicle provided probable cause to search the vehicle,
Walbridge’s argument regarding the constitutionality of the canine’s subsequent entry into
the vehicle is immaterial, and we decline to address it.
Affirmed.