In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: M.L.S., C.V.R., and P.H., Commissioner of Human Services, Legal Custodian.

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-1644

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
M.L.S., C.V.R., and P.H.,
Commissioner of Human Services, Legal Custodian.

Filed June 28, 2021
Reversed and remanded
Bratvold, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-JV-19-6526

Karen V. Bryan, Peter Basilious, KB Law PLLC, Minnetonka, Minnesota (for appellant
B. R.-H.)

Mark A. Ostrem, Olmsted County Attorney, Debra A. Groehler, Sr. Assistant County
Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent Olmsted County Health, Housing, and
Human Services)

Vicki Duncan, Rochester, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and
Connolly, Judge.
SYLLABUS
In deciding whether the best interests of the child favor granting a motion for
permissive intervention in adoption proceedings under Minn. Stat. §§ 260C.601-.637
(2020), which governs adopting a child under the guardianship of the Minnesota
Commissioner of Human Services, the district court weighs all relevant circumstances
including, among other things, whether the movant is a relative of the child, whether the
motion is timely, and whether any needs of the child bear on the child’s best interests in
granting the motion.
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OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
In this juvenile-protection matter, appellant B.R.-H. (aunt) challenges the district
court’s denial of her motion for permissive intervention in adoption proceedings involving
her six-year-old niece, X, who is under the guardianship of the commissioner of human
services. Aunt argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion to
intervene permissively, ruling her out as a placement option, and relieving the county of
relative-search efforts.
We first conclude that, because the district court erred in its analysis of the child’s
best interests in intervention, the district court abused its discretion by denying aunt’s
motion. Next, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by ruling out aunt,
determining that the county was not unreasonable in failing to place X with aunt, and
relieving the county of relative-search efforts. For these reasons, we reverse and remand
with instructions to allow aunt to intervene and for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. Our ruling is limited to whether the district court should have granted aunt’s
motion for permissive intervention. We express no opinion on whether aunt should seek
adoptive placement of X. Nor do we express any opinion regarding how the district court
should resolve the merits of any motion for an adoptive placement of X, should aunt choose
to so move.
FACTS

The following summarizes the record on aunt’s motion for permissive intervention,
which includes the district court’s order terminating parental rights as to X and appointing
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the commissioner of human services as her guardian. Because aunt’s motion pertained only
to X’s adoption proceedings, this opinion focuses on X, but we also refer to X’s siblings to
provide context.
Child-protection and termination proceedings

X’s family has a history with child protective services in four counties. Sometime
after Hennepin County filed a children in need of protection or services (CHIPS) petition
for the children of M.L.S. (mother), the family moved to Olmsted County, which received
referrals for protective services. In July 2019, respondent Olmsted County Health,
Housing, and Human Services (the county) filed a CHIPS petition for three children: D and
K, twins born in 2013; and X, born in 2014. The children have different fathers. P.H. is
the biological father of D and K; C.R. is X’s father and aunt’s brother. 1 At the same time
the CHIPS petition was filed, all three children were removed from mother’s home.
After the children were removed from mother’s home, they had several different
placements. At first, the county placed the children with P.H. and his mother. A county
social worker visited P.H.’s home, became concerned for the children’s safety, and moved
for an emergency protective order to remove the children and place them into a foster home.
The county next placed the children together in one foster home, but later sought to
separate the children because of behavioral issues. The district court approved the sibling

1 The county encountered many difficulties during these proceedings. First, paternity was
unclear at the outset, although it was eventually determined. Second, C.R. is a registered
sex offender and was in and out of jail at the beginning of the child-protection proceedings.
Third, the biological parents did not cooperate with the county’s efforts to reunite the
family and, ultimately, were precluded from contacting the children.
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separation as in the best interests of each child under Minn. Stat. § 260C.617. X had five
different foster-family placements before she was placed with her current foster family in
October 2019. X first met her current foster family in 2017 when they helped her family
through a volunteer organization that provides crisis care to vulnerable families. The
district court found that X has flourished during her foster placement.
After the county received reports from medical professionals of “trauma response
behaviors” in all three children, the county petitioned to terminate the parental rights of
mother and C.R.; the petition was later amended in October 2019 to also terminate the
parental rights of P.H.
In its amended termination petition, the county described its placement planning and
relative-search efforts. Regarding X’s placement, the county stated that it had sent letters
to “three maternal and eight paternal relatives” and noted that, during the child-protection
case, no relatives “have provided support to the children or family. This continues to be
explored.” The out-of-home placement plan for X, signed by the parents in fall 2020, stated
that the county has “started the process to coordinate [a] family group conference to see if
there is any family options for the children.”
In April 2020, the county filed an updated out-of-home placement plan for X and
stated: “The family conference has occurred and a family option was identified for [X] and
[the county] is making progress on this decision.”
After some delays because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the district court conducted
a termination trial in June 2020 that included mother and C.R.; P.H. did not appear and was
found in default. Later that month, the district court issued an order terminating the parental
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rights of mother, C.R., and P.H. in a detailed 69-page opinion. The district court noted that
it was “gravely concerned about the full extent of the trauma the children have
experienced.” Relevant to permanent-placement planning for X, the district court
determined that the county “is relieved of further relative search efforts as relatives were
not and should not be with the children. There have been no relatives that have provided
support to the children or family.” The district court also determined that the county had
“made appropriate efforts to identify relatives who may be appropriate placement options,
but there are no options at this time.” The court’s order made no mention of the “family
option” described in the out-of-home placement plan filed in April 2020. The termination
order also transferred custody of the children to the commissioner of human services. No
appeal was taken.
Post-termination placement for X
On September 8, 2020, the county adoption worker sent the district court a letter
stating, “We have recently been contacted by a paternal aunt to [X]. She did attend the
[family group conference] and expressed some interest in adopting [X].” The letter
explained that the county social worker, guardian ad litem (GAL), and adoption worker
met with aunt “ prior to the TPR.” The adoption worker added that because of X’s “high
level of needs,” moving her “would be detrimental” and “[w]e are also concerned with the
fact that this relative [may] not fully understand[] the implications of her brother being a
sex offender and how to monitor that situation.” The adoption worker also noted that X
feels that her current foster family “is her forever family.”
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Also on September 8, the county filed an updated out- of-home placement plan for
X and stated that the permanency plan was twofold—seeking adoption with a relative or
nonrelative. The relative-search summary stated that the county had identified and
informed relatives of their rights and “the Judge relieved the agency of relative search
efforts and made a strong recommendation that any relative placement for these kids would
not be in their best interests given their history.” The “permanency efforts” stated that X
“is being adopted by her foster family.” The GAL report that was filed one week later
stated, “a paternal family member . . . came forward as a possible permanency option” for
X. Following a hearing, the district court approved the updated out-of-home placement
plan.
Aunt’s letter to the county

Aunt sent a letter to the county, dated October 19, 2020, which the county filed with
the district court on November 2, 2020, asking for reconsideration of X’s adoption by the
foster family and summarizing her contacts with the county. In the letter, aunt recounts that
in October 2019 the county contacted her about X, and she replied that she “wanted to
foster [X] and if that did not work, [she] wanted to adopt [X].” The county held a family
group conference on December 6, 2019, where aunt stated that “if the parents’ rights are
terminated, [she] want[ed] to adopt [X].” The social worker told aunt that X should not be
moved again because X had been in five homes. Aunt asked to visit X, but the county did
not respond to her request. On December 15, 2019, the social worker contacted aunt and
asked if she was still interested in adopting X; aunt replied that she was. When the social
worker next contacted aunt, her “husband was not ready,” and they “wanted to ask more
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questions.” Soon after, still in December 2019, aunt and her husband contacted the county
and confirmed they wanted to adopt X.
Aunt’s letter states that she met with the county on March 13, 2020, where she again
confirmed that she wanted to adopt X and wanted to visit her. On April 13, 2020, the social
worker told aunt that the courts were “on hold” because of the COVID-19 pandemic, and
that adoptive placement would be decided once the courts opened again. After April 13,
2020, aunt did not hear from the county until July 2020 when she learned her brother’s
parental rights were terminated. Later, she learned the county preferred that X be adopted
by her current foster family.
Rule-out request and aunt’s motion to intervene

On October 28, 2020, the county social worker filed a letter with the district court
asking the court to “rule out [aunt] as a permanency option” because “it is in [X’s] best
interest to be adopted by her current foster family.” The social worker explained that X
“lived a life of unpredi ctability and inconsistency until being placed in her current foster
home. Another move will likely create an unnecessary attachment break and affect the
connections she made to date with her foster family.”
On November 6, 2020, aunt moved for permissive intervention in the adoption
phase of the juvenile-protection proceedings. She stated that she had tried to foster or adopt
X since October 2019 and that the county never allowed her to do either. Aunt stated that
she “is biologically related to [X], it is in [X’s] best interest that she be connected and
directly living with [aunt] to understand her background and feel a sense of identity, as
well as learn more about her ancestry.” Aunt explained that she has a “Master’s Degree in
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Mental Health, and has approximately twelve (12) years of experience in dealing with
children that have behavioral issues.”
On November 9, 2020, the district court issued a notice of judicial determination
with one comment: “[X] shall remain in her current placement and this shall be th e
permanency option, not [aunt].”
On December 3, 2020, the district court heard aunt’s motion for permissive
intervention. Aunt’s attorney argued that she has “a right to intervene” and “a right t o
potentially adopt” X. The county argued that the motion should be denied because the
county believed it is in X’s best interests “to remain with the foster parents.” In her remarks,
the GAL did not mention aunt’s motion to intervene permissively but noted that she had
met aunt and aunt’s family and they are “very great people.” Still, the GAL ended her
remarks with support for the county’s position that X should be adopted by her foster
family.
The district court acknowledged receiving aunt’s letter and expressed concern about
X’s contact with her biological family. The district court described aunt’s letter as
“thoughtful” and noted her professional background, among “some other things, suggest
that this is . . . a wonderful family that does care about this little girl. There’s no doubt in
my mind.” The district court also explained, “The case was kind of a jumbled mess because
we had multiple fathers and all kinds of things going on. So there was a lot of
static . . . . But [aunt’s family] seem[s] like wonderful people.” After hearing from the
parties, the district court suggested that it would deny the motion because “it’s not in this
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little girl’s best interest to have her placement disrupted or her life disrupted any further
than it is.”
Aunt, who was represented by counsel, asked to speak directly to the district court.
After receiving permission, aunt stated that she “was never given a fair chance to even see”
X and that she waited to intervene because the social workers said they would follow up
with her about the termination proceedings but never did. Aunt also explained that she was
“mislead” by the county when it delayed referring her for a home study for over a year,
and, as a result, she only recently completed the home study. She also confirmed that she
has had no contact with C.R., her brother. The district court responded that “probably”
there were “missteps along the way” but concluded that X is “in a safe, nurturing, healthy
environment. That’s where she’s been for over a year. And for me to disrupt that, in my
opinion, is not in [X’s] best interest. That’s not a reflection upon you or your family or
your sister’s family.”
In a December 15, 2020 order, the district court denied aunt’s motion for permissive
intervention. The district court first noted that X and her siblings “experienced significant
and chronic abuse, neglect and trauma at the hands of their parents and others which can
properly be characterized as a form of torture.” The court also recounted how the curr ent
foster parents “unhesitatingly stepped in” for X at a “critical juncture.” “With the passage
of time, [X] has developed a healthy attachment with skilled, caring and nurturing foster
parents who should adopt and raise this little girl.” The court concl uded that the county
“has not been unreasonable in declining to consider [aunt] as a permanency option.” The
court also granted the county’s request that X have no contact with her parents “or their
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family members ,” specifically ordering aunt and her husband to not contact X’s foster
family. The district court ordered the adoption of X “be finalized as soon as possible.”
Appeal

Later in December 2020, aunt appealed the denial of her motion to intervene and
moved the district court to stay its order pending this appeal. The district court denied the
motion for a stay pending appeal, and aunt sought review of that denial. This court
questioned whether the order denying aunt ’s motion to intervene permissively was
appealable and remanded the denial of the motion for a stay pending appeal. 2 After the
parties submitted informal memoranda, this court determined it had jurisdiction and
ordered the appeal to proceed. In re Welfare of Children of M.L.S., 956 N.W.2d 257, 260
(Minn. App. 2021).
ISSUES
I. Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying aunt’s motion for permissive
intervention in these adoption proceedings?

II. Did the district court abuse its discretion by ruling aunt out as a placement option,
determining the county was not unreasonable in failing to place X with aunt, and
relieving the county of relative-search efforts?

ANALYSIS
To frame the legal issues, we begin by discussing the relevant child-protection
statutes. “The paramount consideration in all juvenile protection proceedings is the health,
safety, and best interests of the child.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subd. 2(a) (2020); see also
Valentine v. Lutz, 512 N.W.2d 868, 871 (Minn. 1994) (emphasizing that courts must be

2 The county’s brief notes that X’s adoption is “on hold” pending this appeal.
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guided by the best interests of the child). When a child is adjudicated as in need of
protection or services, a two-tracked process begins. In re Welfare of Children of J.L.G.,
924 N.W.2d 9, 12 (Minn. App. 2018). One track involves efforts aimed at reunifying the
child with the parents. Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (2020). Simultaneously, a second track,
called concurrent permanency planning, identifies a potential permanent home for the child
in case the reunification efforts fail. Minn. Stat. § 260C.223, subd. 1(b) (2020); Minn. Stat.
§ 260.012(k) (2020).
When making permanency placement decisions for a child who is the subject of a
juvenile-protection proceeding, Minnesota law provides that the county “is to ensure that
the child’s best interests are met by requiring an individualized determination of the needs
of the child and of how the selected placement will serve the needs of the child being
placed.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(a) (2020). Minnesota law also directs that
placement efforts shall prioritize consideration of relatives as placement options by stating
that the county shall
consider[] placement with relatives and important friends in
the following order:
(1) with an individual who is related to the child by
blood, marriage, or adoption; or
(2) with an individual who is an important friend with
whom the child has resided or had significant contact.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(a) (regarding selection of family foster home).3 See S.G.,
828 N.W.2d at 125 (“[I]f both the relative and nonrelative petitioners are equally qualified

3 Important friends include foster families. In re S.G., 828 N.W.2d 118, 125 (Minn. 2013)
(affirming placement with foster family as “important friend” after analyzing identical
terminology in Minn. Stat. § 259.57, subd. 2(c) (2012)).
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to adopt and the best interests analysis renders an equivalent result as to each party, the
relative would benefit from being considered first.”).
To fulfill the legislature’s intent to prioritize consideration of relatives as placement
options, Minnesota law provides, “The responsible social services agency shall exercise
due diligence to identify and notify adult relatives prior to placement or within 30 days
after the child’s removal from the parent. The county agency shall consider placement with
a relative under this section without delay . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 260C.221(a) (2020). The
relative search must b e “comprehensive in scope” and the county “has the continuing
responsibility to appropriately involve relatives,” even after the district court finds that the
county has made reasonable relative-search efforts. Id. (emphasis added). The district court
“[a]t any time” may direct the county “to reopen its search for relatives when it is in the
child’s best interest to do so.” Id.
The county also has the duty to report its relative-search findings to the district court.
“Within three months of the child’s placement, the agency shall report to the court
regarding the agency’ s due diligence to identify and notify relatives under Minnesota
Statutes, section 260C.221.” Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 27.04, subd. 1(a). “The report shall
include information about identification and notice to relatives,” including the names of all
identified relatives and whether they “were considered for placement under [Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.212, subd. 2(a)-(b) (2020)] and the result of that consideration.” Id. subd. 2(a)(2),
(b)(1).
If, as happened here, parental rights are terminated, and the district court appoints
the commissioner of human services as the guardian of a child, then relatives who will
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commit to being a permanent placement for a non-Indian child continue to receive priority
consideration for placement. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.605, subd. 1(b) (2020) (providing that
reasonable efforts to finalize adoption include placement considerations under
section 260C.212, subd. 2 (2020)). Under Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 2(5) (2020),
relatives who have kept the court informed of their whereabouts and who have indicated
to the county a willingness to provide an adoptive home must be notified of review hearings
regarding adoption efforts, “unless the relative has been previously ruled out by the court
as a suitable foster parent or permanency resource for the child.” If a relative is ruled out
by the court, then th at relative simultaneously loses their right to notice of the hearings,
and is not required to participate in review hearings unless ordered by the court. See Minn.
Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 3 (2020); see also J.L.G., 924 N.W.2d at 11 (“A district court need
not provide a relative with notice, however, if the court ‘ruled out’ the relative as a suitable
adoptive placement.”).
In juvenile-protection matters, “any person entitled to notice of any adoption
proceeding involving the child” is considered a party. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 32.01,
subd. 3(b). Thus, any relative who has informed the court of their whereabouts and
willingness to adopt is a party unless they are ruled out. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 32.02(e)
(providing that parties have right to bring motions).
The right to move for permissive intervention, however, is broad: “Any person may
be permitted to intervene as a party if the court finds that such intervention is in the best
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interests of the child. ” Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 34.02 (emphasis added). 4 When the
juvenile-protection rules are read together, they suggest that, after a relative has been ruled
out, they may regain party status if the district court grants the ruled-out relative permission
to intervene. See generally In re Welfare of L.L.P., 836 N.W.2d 563, 572 n.3 (Minn. App.
2013) (noting section 250C.607 “does not address whether a relative or foster parent must
intervene to become a party in order to move to be considered an adoptive placement”).
With this background in mind, we turn to the procedural posture of this case and aunt’s
arguments.
Here, shortly after the county asked the district court to rule out aunt as a
permanent-placement option and stated its preference for the current foster family to adopt
X, aunt moved to intervene permissively as a party so she could pursue adopting X. Aunt
did not move for adoptive placement, but stated that she intended to do so. In its order
denying aunt’s motion, the district court explained that it “previously ordered that relatives
be excluded as placement options for all of the children” and incorporated its findings,
conclusions, and orders from the termination trial to the order denying aunt’s motion to
intervene. Also, the district court stated, “[The county] requested that the court rule out
[aunt] as a suitable permanency option and find that [the county] has not been unreasonable
in declining to consider [her] a permanency option, which this Court agrees.” (Emphasis
added.) The district court later concluded the county was not unreasonable in failing to

4 We note that aunt could not intervene as a matter of right because, under Minn. R. Juv.
Prot. P. 34.01, only the child, parents, grandparents, and social- services agency may
intervene as a matter of right.
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place X with aunt. Finally, the district court directed that X’s adoption by the foster parents
“be finalized as soon as possible as it is in [X ’s] best interest.” In taking jurisdiction over
aunt’s appeal, this court determined that the district court’s order “effectively bar[red]
[aunt] from being considered as an adoptive placement for the child.” M.L.S., 956 N.W.2d
at 260.
Aunt challenges the district court’s denial of her motion for permissive intervention,
arguing that the district court abused its discretion, first, by denying her motion, and
second, by ruling her out, determining the county was not unreasonable in failing to place
X with aunt and relieving the county of relative-search efforts. The county argues that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying aunt’s motion to intervene because
intervention was not in X’s best interests. We address aunt’s arguments in turn.
I. The district court abused its discretion by denying aunt’s motion for permissive
intervention.

“Any person may be permitted to intervene as a party if the [district] court finds that
such intervention is in the best interests of the child.” Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 34.02. We
review permissive-intervention rulings for abuse of discretion. Norman v. Refsland,
383 N.W.2d 673, 676 (Minn. 1986). A district court abuses its discretion by “making
findings unsupported by the evidence or by improperly applying the law.” In re Custody of
N.A.K., 649 N.W.2d 166, 174 (Minn. 2002). An appellate court will reverse the denial of a
request to permissively intervene only when a clear abuse of discretion is shown. State v.
Deal, 740 N.W.2d 755, 760 (Minn. 2007).
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Aunt argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied her motion
to intervene because it: (1) misapplied the best-interests-of-the-child analysis and focused
on X’s permanent placement instead of aunt’s motion to intervene; (2) lacked any support
in the record for its implicit determination that her motion was untimely; and (3) erred
when it determined that aunt equivocated about adopting X. We discuss each argument.
A. Best interests of the child

Aunt contends that the district court misapplied the law when, in addressing her
motion for permissive intervention , it focused its best-interests analysis on whether
permanent placement of X with aunt was in the child’s best interests, rather than whether
aunt’s participation in the adoption proceedings was in X’s best interests.5
Generally, the rules of civil procedure do not apply to juvenile-protection matters.
Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 3.01. Still, we note that, generally, civil practice favors permissive
intervention. Norman, 383 N.W.2d at 678 (“It is our policy to encourage intervention
wherever possible.”). We are unaware of any Minnesota appellate decision holding

5 Aunt also argues that although her “motion to intervene did not mention Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.515, it is clear that [aunt] could have moved for intervention pursuant to Minn.
Stat. § 260C.515, subd. 4, which extends relatives a ‘legal right’ to be considered for
custody in the dispositional phase of a district [court] proceeding.” First, we note that the
cited statute provides that a “court may order permanent legal and physical custody to a fit
and willing relative in the best interests of the child” according to a list of ten requirements.
Minn. Stat. § 260C.515, subd. 4 (emphasis added). Second, as aunt concedes in her brief,
she did not make this argument during district court proceedings. Appellate courts rarely
address issues not raised in the district court. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn.
1988); see In re Welfare of D.D.G., 558 N.W.2d 481, 485 (Minn. 1997) (applying this
aspect of Thiele in a juvenile-protection appeal). Because aunt did not argue Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.515, subd. 4, in support of her motion to intervene while in the district court, we
decline to address it.
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likewise as to permissive intervention in juvenile-protection proceedings. Because
rule 34.02 allows “any person” to permissively intervene when the district court finds that
“such intervention” is in the child’s best interests, we will approach our analysis with the
general view that permissive intervention should be granted liberally when doing so will
advance the best interests of the child.
Rule 34.02 does not specify what circumstances a district court should consider in
determining the best interests of the child in granting or denying intervention. The rule ,
however, provides that whatever is considered must be relevant to determining whether the
requested intervention is in the best interests of the child. Certainly, when a district court
considers a motion for permissive intervention in a juvenile- protection proceeding, the
district court should consider all relevant circumstances. In placement matters, Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.212, subd. 2(a)’s preference for placements with relatives makes relevant the fact
that the movant is a relative of the child. Thus, the best-interests test in rule 34.02 focuses
on the intervention motion and should consider whether the movant is a relative , among
other relevant circumstances.
In identifying the circumstances relevant to X’s best interests, these parties agreed
that the factors listed in Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(b), should guide the district court’s
analysis.6 While we agree that some of the factors in subdivision 2(b) are relevant in this

6 The parties apparently assume that the factors in Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(b) are
“the best interests factors.” This assumption is problematic for two reasons. First, it is state
policy “to ensure that the child’s best interests are met by requiring an individualized
determination of the needs of the child and of how the selected placement will serve the
needs of the child being place.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(a). As for a county’s
assessment of the needs of a child, Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(b), states that the
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case, we are not convinced that subdivision 2(b) fully illuminates the relevant best-interests
considerations in deciding a motion for permissive intervention under rule 34.02 for three
reasons.
First, rule 34.02 does not require the district court to address the factors listed in
Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(b). Similarly, subdivision 2(b) states neither that it applies
to rule 34.02, nor that the factors listed should be used to determine who should participate
in juvenile-protection proceedings. Second, the factors in subdivision 2(b) focus on
identifying the needs of a child for whom the county is seeking a placement, while a motion
for permissive intervention focuses on who the district court believes should participate in

factors listed are “[a]mong the factors the age ncy shall consider in determining the needs
of the child.” Thus, the factors that the parties agreed would guide the district court’s
analysis of X’s best interests are actually a nonexhaustive list of the factors the county is
to consider when it is determining the needs of a child for whom it is seeking a placement.
Second, if the parties’ use of the phrase “the best-interests factors” (emphasis added)
assumes that there is a single, definitive list of best-interests factors applicable to all
circumstances, that assumption is incorrect. Different authorities identify different best
interests for different circumstances. See, e.g. , Minn. Stat. §§ 260C.329 (2020) (petition
for reunification), .511 (distinguishing, for permanency proceedings, best interests of a
child from best interests of an Indian child); Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 5 (continuances), 50.02
(withholding adjudicating child in need of protection or services), 58.04 (termination of
parental rights); In re Welfare of Child. of J.C.L., 958 N.W.2d 653, 657 (Minn. App. 2021)
(distinguishing best interests under Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(b) for general permanency
purposes from best interests under Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii) for purposes of
termination of parental-rights matters), review denied (May 12, 2021); see also Minn. Stat.
§ 518.17, subd. 1 (2020) (custody and parenting time); In re Paternity of B.J.H.,
573 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn. App. 1998) (distinguishing best interests for purposes of
custody from best interests for purposes of resolving conflicting presumptions of
paternity). Because these authorities recognize that what is relevant to a child’s best
interests for one purpose may differ from what is relevant to a child’s best interests for
another purpose, we conclude that the best-interests factors a district court must consider
will vary with the decision it is making and the circumstances of the child.
19
the relevant portions of the case ; here, adoption proceedings under Minn. Stat.
§§ 260C.601-.637.
Third, while best-interests concerns pervade the statutes and rules related to juvenile
protection and permanent placement of a protected child, rigid application of the factors a
county uses to determine a child’s placement-related needs in Minn. Stat.§ 260C.212,
subd. 2(b), to motions for permissive intervention may p ut the movant at an unfair
disadvantage. Specifically, the movant may lack access to the child and thus to information
about the child relevant to the child’s needs that would be required to address the needs
factors in Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(b). Indeed, aunt made repeated requests to visit
X but was not allowed to do so.7
In short, the lack of specificity in rule 34.02 should not be read to allow a district
court to apply the needs factors in subdivision 2(b) in a manner that puts the movant at an
unfair disadvantage. Rather, as the plain language of rule 34.02 states, the district court
should be careful to evaluate the best interests of the child in the motion to intervene.
While we question the wisdom of using the needs factors of Minn. Stat. § 260C.212,
subd. 2(b), as a proxy for the a nalysis of a child’s best interests as required by rule 34.02,
we will, in the interest of completeness, address some of aunt’s challenges to the findings
the district court made on those statutory factors. These statutory-needs factors are:
(1) the child’s current functioning and behaviors;
(2) the medical needs of the child;

7 This court discussed these concerns in an unpublished opinion, which we find persuasive.
See In re Welfare of K.-A.M.C., No. A13-0512, 2013 WL 4404720, at *4 (Minn. App.
Aug. 19, 2013). While the rules of juvenile procedure have been renumbered since that
opinion was released, the substance of rule 34.02 remains the same.
20
(3) the educational needs of the child;
(4) the developmental needs of the child;
(5) the child’s history and past experience;
(6) the child’s religious and cultural needs;
(7) the child’s connection with a community, school, and faith
community;
(8) the child’s interests and talents;
(9) the child’s relationship to current caretakers, parents,
siblings, and relatives;
(10) the reasonable preference of the child, if the court, or the
child-placing agency in the case of a voluntary placement,
deems the child to be of sufficient age to express preferences;
and
(11) for an Indian child, the best interests of an Indian
child . . . .

Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(b).
While the district court did not explicitly cite the 11 subdivision 2(b) factors in its
order denying aunt’s motion to intervene, its analysis tracks many factors listed and
responded to the parties’ arguments, which were tied to these factors. The district court
identified three reasons to deny aunt’s motion, the first of which is reflected in the
subdivision 2(b) factors: (1) disruption of X’s care and safety concerns about X being in
contact with mother and C.R.; (2 ) timeliness of aunt’s motion; and (3) aunt’s early
equivocation about adopting X. We consider each of the district court’s reasons.
8

8 In her brief on appeal, aunt challenges each of the district court’s three reasons and argues
that “the district court did not analyze all the factors” in subdivision 2(b), particularly X’s
religious and cultural needs as a Black child (factor 6). The Minnesota Supreme Court has
explained that “the requirement to consider a child’s ‘cultural needs’ in the best-interests
analysis demonstrates that those aspects of one’s identity that are informed by racial and
ethnic heritage, cultural values, and traditions passed across generations are relevant factors
in determining the child’s best interests.” S.G., 828 N.W.2d at 127, n.7 (citation omitted).
Here, X, her parents, and aunt are Black. While not explicitly stated in the record, it can be
inferred that the foster parents are of a different race. The district court did not address X’s
cultural and religious needs in its order, but did so at the motion hearing, stating:
21
Disruption of X’s care and safety are valid concerns for placement decisions,
including adoption. Indeed, the district court may consider the child’s current functioning
and behaviors as well as the child’s history and experience, among other factors when
assessing a child’s needs related to stability. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(b)(1), (5);
see also Minn. Stat. § 260C.221(c) (2020) (providing an exception to the county’s
relative-search obligations when “a parent makes an explicit request that a specific relative
not be contacted or considered for placement due to safety reasons including past family
or domestic violence” or “when the juvenile court finds that contacting the specific relative
would endanger the parent, guardian, child, sibling, or any other family member”).
But, here, the district court was not deciding whether to alter X’s placement because
aunt’s motion was to intervene, not to alter X’s immediate placement or to adopt X.
Intervention in post-termination proceedings where the child is under the guardianship of
the commissioner raises a specific concern: whether it is in the child’s best interests for the
movant to participate in the permanent- placement decision. Thus, intervention in this

I think there’s cultural aspects, I think there’s family
aspects. It may be important for her to know who everybody is
because she may decide when she’s fifteen or sixteen she wants
something different. I don’t know.
But she’s in a safe, nurturing, healthy
environment. . . . And for me to disrupt that, in my opinion,
is not in her best interest. That’s not a reflection upon you
or your family[.] . . . I don’t think it’d be healthy for her.

Thus, the district court addressed factor 6 but determined that any benefit X would receive
from being placed with aunt would be outweighed by the disruption of changing X’s
placement. We need not resolve aunt’s challenge to the district court’s analysis of factor 6
because we remand for other reasons.
22
context precedes the final decision about where the child will be placed or whether the
child will be adopted. Here, the district court did not tie its concerns about disruption of
X’s care and safety to the child’s best interests in the motion to intervene.
Perhaps more importantly, the district court’s emphasis on disruption of X’s care
and safety at the stage of a motion to intervene in the adoption proceedings placed aunt at
an unfair disadvantage. At the time of the hearing on her motion to intervene, aunt had little
or no contact with X and no information about X’s care, despite aunt’s requests to visit X.
Aunt also had no opportunity to present evidence on the effects of altering X’s placement
or how to keep X safe by precluding contact with her biological parents. Thus, the district
court abused its discretion by relying on disruption of X’s care and safety without
considering those concerns in the context of X’s best interests in aunt’s motion to intervene
and by placing aunt at an unfair disadvantage.9
B. Implied finding that aunt’s motion was untimely
The district court’s second reason for denying aunt’s permissive-intervention
motion was its implicit determination that aunt’s motion was untimely. The district court

9 The county also argues that aunt presented no evidence of her relationship with X, and
this weighs against aunt’s motion based on factor 9. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.212,
subd. 2(b)(9) (the child’s relationship to current caretakers and relatives). The district court
did not mention or make any findings about aunt’s relationship with X, beyond noting their
blood relationship. The county is correct that aunt did not present evidence about the nature
of her relationship with X. But the county fails to acknowledge that aunt repeatedly
requested visits with X, and the county did not respond. Additionally, we note that aunt
asserted that she was estranged from X’s father while he has been in and out of prison,
which may explain aunt’s lack of contact with X. We conclude that while aunt’s
relationship with X is relevant to the court’s final decision on X’s adoption, the district
court’s decision to deny aunt’s intervention motion cannot be affirmed on this factor.
23
found that when the county placed X with the current foster parents on October 21, 2019,
“there were no family options for foster care even though relative notification letters had
been sent out,” and that it did not “hear from [aunt] until on or about October 26, 2020”
when it received aunt’s letter requesting reconsideration. These findings and the district
court’s reasoning imply that it determined that aunt’s motion, filed shortly after aunt’s
letter, was untimely. Aunt contends that she did not delay moving to intervene.
We initially note that, at least in time-sensitive juvenile-protection proceedings,
whether a movant unduly delayed in making a motion is distinct from whether the motion
is untimely; the former focuses exclusively on the movant’s conduct, while the latter must
consider the child’s best interests . Regardless of this distinction, neither rule 34.02 nor
associated caselaw expressly address how to evaluate the timeliness of a motion for
permissive intervention. The nature of the proceedings, however, means that timeliness is
a valid concern. See Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 1.02(b) (providing the rules are intended to
provide a “just, thorough, speedy, and efficient determination” (emphasis added)); In re
Welfare of Child of R.K., 901 N.W.2d 156, 162 (Minn. 2017) (“We require an expeditious
resolution of permanency because we will not allow children to linger in uncertainty.”); In
re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 134 (Minn. 2014) (citing multiple
authorities emphasizing the importance of prompt decisions in juvenile-protection
matters). The district court’s concern about the timeliness of aunt’s motion is supported by
both the law and its individualized findings about X’s need for stability and permanent
placement.
24
Having recognized the importance of timeliness in deciding an intervention motion,
we next consider the district court’s findings about aunt’s motion. We begin by noting that
the record supports the district court’s finding that aunt’s reconsideration letter was her
first contact with the court and was received in October 2020. For two reasons, however,
we conclude that the record does not support the district court’s determination that aunt’s
intervention motion was untimely.
First, aunt’s reconsideration letter details her repeated contacts with the county since
October 2019 and her participation in the family group conference on December 6, 2019,
where aunt confirmed that she wanted to adopt X. Aunt’s letter summarizes additional
contacts between her and the county in December 2019, March 2020, and April 2020. The
county told aunt that proceedings were on hold because of the COVID-19 pandemic and
she received no further update until she reached out to the county in July and learned her
brother’s parental rights had been terminated.
We also note that aunt’s letter about her contacts with the county is corroborated by
several of the out-of-home placement plans and GAL reports, with no indication that the
county preferred the foster family until the county adoption worker’s September 8, 2020
letter to the court. Further, the county conceded during oral argument before this court that
aunt’s reconsideration letter accurately related her contacts with the county.
We are genuinely disturbed by what this record suggests was the county’s apparent
failure to communicate with the district court about the county’s ongoing contacts with
aunt and her interest in adopting X. Despite the GAL’s contact with aunt at the family
conference in December 2019, the GAL told the district court at the hearing on intervention
25
that she “wish[ed] we would have known about [aunt] at the beginning.” Similarly, the
district court’s termination order relieved the county of relative-search efforts and found
that no relative placement options exist, even though the county acknowledges that, at that
point, aunt repeatedly had shown interest in adopting X. In short, aunt’s repeated contacts
with the county and the county’s failure to communicate those contacts to the district court
are relevant context for determining the timeliness of aunt’s motion for permission
intervention.
Second, aunt’s reconsideration letter and motion to intervene were filed promptly
after she learned the county preferred adoption by the foster family and had requested that
the district court rule her out as a placement option. The county asked the court to rule out
aunt as a placement option on October 28, 2020. Aunt’s motion to intervene was filed on
November 6, 2020. Thus, while the district court correctly noted the importance of
timeliness when considering aunt’s motion to intervene, we conclude that its implicit
finding that aunt’s motion was untimely is unsupported by this record.
C. Aunt’s equivocation about adoption
The district court’s final reason for denying aunt’s motion to intervene was that she
equivocated about adopting X. In the district court’s order denying aunt’s motion to
intervene, the court stated:
[I]t is important to note that when contacted in October of 2019
with respect to possible placement of [X] in their home, [aunt]
equivocated because of concerns by her husband. With the
passage of time, [X] has developed a healthy attachment with
skilled, caring and nurturing foster parents who should adopt
and raise this little girl.

26
Aunt admits that she and her husband hesitated in December 2019 but adds that their
hesitation was brief and that they repeatedly affirmed their interest in adopting X in all later
communications with the county. Importantly, the county does not dispute aunt’s argument
in this regard. While aunt and her husband had questions about the adoption process and
wanted more information, they contacted the county to confirm they wanted to adopt X
within days of expressing uncertainty. More importantly, aunt followed up with the county
and GAL and expressed her firm interest in adopting X. Finally, the district court does not
determine that aunt’s brief hesitation affected X’s best interests in the motion to intervene.
We conclude that the district court abused its discretion by determining, on this record, that
aunt’s hesitation militated against her motion for permissive intervention.
10
We conclude our analysis of the order denying aunt’s motion for permissive
intervention by reiterating that a district court should consider all circumstances relevant
to a child’s best interests when addressing a motion under rule 34.02. Relevant

10 Aunt contends that the district court committed legal error by relying on her early
hesitation to deny her motion to intervene. Aunt relies on Minn. Stat. § 260C.221(b)(2)
(2020), which provides, “A decision by a relative not to be identified as a potential
permanent placement resource or participate in planning for the child at the beginning of
the case shall not affect whether the relative is considered for placement of the child with
that relative later.” (Emphasis added.) Aunt’s argument asks us to apply a statutory
provision about X’s placement to her motion to intervene. This is troubling for the reasons
already discussed. Still, there is some merit to aunt’s position. It is undisputed that aunt’s
hesitation occurred “at the beginning of the case” in December 2019. And because section
260C.221(b)(2) establishes that a relative’s early decision “not to be identified” cannot
affect whether that relative is a placement option, then perhaps a relative’s early hesitation
should not preclude them from moving to intervene in adoption proceedings. Still, we need
not decide this issue because the record does not support the district court’s determination
that aunt’s early and brief hesitation weighed against her motion for permissive
intervention.
27
circumstances may include, among other things, the movant’s status as a relative, the
timeliness of the motion, and any needs-of-the -child factor(s) in Minn. Stat. § 260C.212,
subd. 2(b), that bear on whether it would be in the child’s best interests to grant the
intervention motion.
Here, none of the district court’s reasons support its decision to deny aunt’s motion
to intervene. First, the district court misapplied the best-interests test in rule 34.02 by using
the factors in Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(b), and focusing on X’s permanent
placement, instead of X’s best interests on the intervention motion . The district court’s
focus on disruption of X’s care and safety failed to address X’s bests interests in the motion
to intervene and placed aunt at an unfair disadvantage because she has had little or no
contact with X. Second, the district court appropriately considered whether aunt’s
intervention motion was timely, but the record does not support the court’s determination
that aunt’s motion was untimely. Third, the record does not support the district court’s
determination that aunt’s early and brief hesitation about adopting X defeated her motion
to intervene. Because the district court’s reasons for denying aunt’s motion to intervene are
not supported by the record, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by
denying aunt’s motion for permissive intervention.
II. The district court abused its discretion by ruling out aunt as a placement
option, determining that the county was not unreasonable in failing to place X
with aunt, and relieving the county of relative-search efforts.

If a district court is going to rule out a relative as a placement option, the district
court “must . . . explicitly exclude[e]” that relative “from being considered as a suitable
adoptive placement option,” and it errs if it relies “on an implicit ruling of ineligibility.”
28
J.L.G., 924 N.W.2d at 16. Appellate courts review a district court’s decision to rule out a
relative as a placement option for abuse of discretion. Id. at 14. Here, we have grave doubts
whether this district court’s statement that it “agrees” with the county that aunt should be
“ruled out” is the “explicit ruling” required by caselaw.
But even if we assume that the district court explicitly ruled out aunt as a placement
option, we would conclude that the district court abused its discretion by doing so. Given
the legislature’s express directive to prioritize consideration of relatives for placement of a
protected child, the county’s acknowledgement of aunt’s early engagement and her
expressions of interest in adopting X since December 2019, and aunt’s apparent fitness as
a placement option (also credited by the district court), the district court’s decision to rule
out aunt was an abuse of discretion. For the same reasons, we also conclude that the district
court abused its discretion by finding that the county was not unreasonable in failing to
place X with aunt and by relieving the county of relative-search efforts.
We sincerely commend the district court for its ongoing efforts to ensure the best
interests of X are met. We are troubled that the district court appears to have lacked access
to information about aunt’s contacts with the county. We also recognize that, given the
horrific abuse suffered by X, the district court and the county were striving to find the best
permanent-placement option for X, and that her current foster family has provided X with
a safe and loving home.
But we urge the district court and the parties to follow the express direction of the
legislature: when making permanent-placement decisions, the county shall place a child in
a home selected by first considering placement with relatives and then considering
29
placement with important friends, such as X’s current foster family. See Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.212, subd. 2(a)(1)-(2); Minn. Stat. § 260C.605. Given aunt’s extensive contacts
with the county and her repeated and explicit expressions of interest in adopting X, along
with the county’s failure to disclose aunt as a permanency option to the district court until
after the county requested to rule her out, we cannot conclude that the county considered
aunt before considering X’s current foster family as a permanent-placement option. In
short, the district court ’s decision to deny aunt’s motion to intervene sidestepped aunt’s
statutory priority as a blood relative for consideration in X’s placement. This was an abuse
of discretion. We, therefore, reverse and remand the district court’s decision with
instructions to grant aunt’s motion to intervene and for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. We express no opinion on the merits of any motion for adoptive placement.
DECISION

The legislature has directed that permanent placement of a protected child under the
guardianship of the commissioner in adoption proceedings shall prioritize consideration of
relative placement options. The district court, however, abused its discretion when denying
aunt’s motion for permissive intervention by failing to consider X’s best interests in the
motion to intervene. The district court also abused its discretion by ruling out aunt as a
placement option for X, determining that the county was not unreasonable in failing to
place X with aunt, and relieving the county of relative-search efforts.
Reversed and remanded.