In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: J. M., Parent.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0005

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
J. M., Parent.

Filed May 17, 2021
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-JV-20-632

Kelly Lawton Rogosheske, Rogosheske Lawton, P.C., St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant-
mother J.M.)

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Jenese Larmouth, Assistant Coun ty Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Ramsey County Social Services)

Marlene Goldenberg, Goldenberg Law, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for child)

Susan Fleck, St. Paul, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Worke, Pres iding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant-mother challenges the district court’s termination-of-parental-rights
(TPR) order, arguing that the record does not support TPR and that the district court
erroneously adopted respondent’s proposed findi ngs of fact and conclu sions of law. We
affirm.
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FACTS
Appellant-mother J.M. (mothe r) gave birth to a son in September 2009. In 2015,
mother’s son was adjudicated a child in need of protection or services (CHIPS) in Dakota
County due to neglect. Mother was reunified with her s on in April 2017; however, four
months later, in August 2017, respondent Ramsey County Social Services Department (the
department) received a report that mother’s husband was abusing her during her then-
current pregnancy and in the presence of her son. The department also received a report
that mother was using heroin.
In October 2017, mother gave birth to a daughter who had high levels of methadone
in her system. Mother agreed to work a case plan, but fa iled to follow through, and the
children were consequently adjudicated CHIP S on November 30, 2018. The children’s
father, mother’s husband, had his parental rights involuntarily terminated in January 2019.
On February 5, 2019, mother was court-ordered to engage in a case plan. On September 27,
2019, the district court issued an order for emergency protective care of the children. The
children have been in out-of-home placement since.
On May 22, 2020, the department filed a petition to terminate mother’s parental
rights. The department asserted that TPR was in the children’s best interests and that three
statutory provisions supported TPR: (1) mother failed to comply w ith the duties of the
parent-child relationship, (2) mother is a pa lpably unfit parent, and (3) reasonable efforts
failed to correct the conditions leading to the children’s out-of-home placement. See Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4), (5) (2020).
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The district court held a hear ing in late 2020. The son’s attorney noted that the child
was “not in favor of” the petition.
The family’s social worker testified that mother’s primary issues were related to
chemical dependency, domestic violence, lack of parenting skills, and mental health.
The social worker testified that mother “has been activ ely using . . . heroin, meth,
and [unprescribed] prescription medications” since before the social worker’s involvement
in the case. Mother comple ted a chemical-dependency evaluation in July 2020 and was
referred to inpatient treatment, which she atte nded for only two days. Mother also failed
to submit to any urinalysis (UA) tests.
Mother underwent another chemical-dep endency evaluation in September 2020,
and the evaluator recommended methadone ma nagement and a higher level of care
consisting of outpatient services with lodging. Mother did not appear to be following that
recommendation, however, because she was addressing only her methadone management.
The social worker contacted the counselor who conducted th e September evaluation, but
had not received verification of mother’s treatment plan, UA results, or progress notes.
The social worker testified that mother also failed to address her domestic-abuse and
parenting-skills issues. The social worker ha d been meeting mother three or four times a
month to give her gift cards to use to get to appointments and for food, but mother never
went to her appointments.
The social worker testifie d that because of mother’s issues, the children have had
lack of structure and consistency and witnesse d the lack of trust between mother and her
husband. Mother’s issues have caused her son to have low sel f-esteem and question
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whether he is “normal.” Her son worried ab out mother’s well-being because of her drug
use and violent relationships. The social wo rker stated that mother sometimes misses
phone calls or has slurred speech on the phone with the children, which causes her son to
become angry and end the calls early. The social worker stated that mother’s son benefits
from living in his foster home and receives l ove, care, and structure. He can also focus
solely on being a child, not on the responsibility of caring for his sister. He has learned to
build trust and to recognize right from wrong. Mother’s daught er has been in foster care
for half of her life. She recognizes mother’s voice but does not know her by sight.
The social worker opined th at mother lacks motivation to follow through with a case
plan. She stated that mother does not have the skill set to parent the children and that she
has shown an inability to lead a sober life, which leads to an unstructured and unsafe
environment for the children. She was also concerned abou t mother’s relationship with
mother’s husband and stated that mother’s husband’s involvement with the children would
be traumatizing to them.
The guardian ad litem (GAL) testified that she was involved with the children when
they were under protective supervision with mother. The GAL had concerns about the
well-being of the children. She stated that the children witnessed “a lot of violence” and
that the son missed a lot of school. The GAL testified that although she tried to make
regular contact with mother, mother did not maintain contact. The GAL expressed
concerns about mother’s chemical depende ncy because mother had been asked to
participate in treatment for so long but had not successfully maintained sobriety.
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The GAL stated that the son was worried about mother and asked the GAL to get
her help. When the son was with mother, he talked about “har ming himself, killing
himself” and was in a “constant state of panic. ” But in his foster home, he is calm, does
not disassociate, has learned to trust adults, and feels safe. For the entirety of the daughter’s
life, mother has been offered services, but the GAL testified that nothing changed in those
three years. Thus, the GAL did not see anyt hing changing in the reasonably foreseeable
future. The GAL testified that it was in th e best interests of th e children to terminate
mother’s parental rights.
Mother testified that she was not using illegal drugs when she was pregnant with
her daughter but admitted that she was addicted to pain medication at that time. Mother
stated that she was referred to Mothers Firs t to address her chemical dependency. But
mother testified that things fell apart when she was raped in front of her children in 2017.
Mother began using heroin. In 2020, sh e was using heroin daily; she also used
methamphetamine two times. She stated that she continued to use heroin to avoid
withdrawal symptoms. Mother claimed that she was attendi ng outpatient treatment. She
stated that she has not followed through with treating her chemical dependency because
she has not had “proper help or enough time.”
Mother testified that she initially addressed the domestic-abuse issues by obtaining
an order for protection (OFP) against her husband, not because she wanted one, but so that
the department would not take her children. But she adm itted that she did not follow
through with domestic-abuse services because of the pandemic. And at the time of trial,
mother was living with her husband. She testified that he received anger-management and
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cognitive-skills services, and that he is “a very great father.” Although she did not currently
have a home for the children, she claimed that she would have an apartment soon because
her husband’s boss was going to rent it to her husband so that the family could stay together.
Mother believed that if she had more time, sh e could complete her case plan. She stated
that “when no one . . . in [the department ] is offering help to you, it’s hard and
overwhelming and overbearing wh en they come at you with a case plan and they won’t
help you to get the services.”
After trial, the district court filed an orde r terminating mother’s parental rights. The
district court determined that reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions leading to
the children’s out-of-home placement—namely, mother’s chemical use, domestic-violence
issues, untreated mental-health issu es, and lack of parenting skills. See Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5). The district court determined that mother repeatedly refused or
neglected to comply with the duties of the parent-child relationship. See id., subd. 1(b)(2).
The district court also determined that mother is palpably unfit to parent the children. See
id., subd. 1(b)(4). The district court balanced the best-interests factors and concluded that
it is in the children’s best inte rests to terminate mother’s pa rental rights. This appeal
followed.
DECISION
Termination of parental rights
This court will affirm the district court’ s TPR order “when at least one statutory
ground for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence and termination is in
the best interests of the child, provided that the county has made reasonable efforts to
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reunite the family.” In re Welfare of the Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn.
2008) (citation omitted). “Considerable deferenc e is due to the district court’s decision
because a district court is in a superior pos ition to assess the credibility of witnesses.” In
re Welfare of L.A.F. , 554 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1996). A district court’s conclusion
that a statutory ground for termination has been proven by clear and convincing evidence
will not be overturne d unless the appellant demonstrates th at the district court abused its
discretion. In re Welfare of th e Children of J.R.B. , 805 N.W.2d 895, 900 (Minn. App.
2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). “[A] district court abuses its discretion if it acts
against logic and the facts on record, or if it enters fact findings that are unsupported by the
record, or if it misapplies the law.” In re Adoption of T.A.M., 791 N.W.2d 573, 578 (Minn.
App. 2010) (quotation and citation omitted).
Here, the district court determined that the department proved three statutory
grounds for TPR by clear and convincing evidence. Mother challenges the determinations
that she failed to satisfy her parental duties and is palpably unfit. She does not appeal the
determination that reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions leading to the
children’s out-of-home placement. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5). Because
mother does not challenge this determination, and because we will affirm the district
court’s TPR order “when at least one statutory ground for termination is supported by clear
and convincing evidence,” we conclude that this statutory ground is established and
supports TPR. S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385.
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Although the presence of one statutory gr ound for TPR would support affirmance
of the district court’s order, we will review mother’s arguments regarding another statutory
ground—whether she failed to comply with her parental duties.
Mother argues that the district court err oneously concluded that she failed to comply
with her parental duties because (1) she completed “all or a substantial portion of her case
plan,” (2) her domestic-abuse classes were disrupted by the pandemic, (3) she has a strong
bond with her son, (4) she cared for the children during the protective-supervision period,
(5) she was in treatment at the time of trial, and (6) she maintained visits with the children.
A statutory basis for TPR exists when:
the parent has substantially, continuously, or repeatedly
refused or neglected to comply with the dutie s imposed upon
that parent by the parent and ch ild relationship, including but
not limited to providing the child with necessary food,
clothing, shelter, education, and other care and control
necessary for the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health
and development.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2). The district court concluded that mother refused or
neglected to comply with her parental dutie s because she prioritized her chemical use,
which led to dangerous situations for the children, including abuse inflicted by her husband.
The record supports the district court’s determination. Moth er admittedly used
drugs throughout her pregnancy with her dau ghter, was abused by her husband and other
men in front of her children, did not send her son to school, and does not have a safe home
for the children.
Mother failed to seek recommended inpatient treatment for her chemical
dependency. Mother testified that she was re ceiving outpatient treatment, but the record
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only shows that mother was receiving daily methadone for maintena nce. She did not
indicate what treatment she received other than that. The social worker testified that
mother’s most recent evaluatio n recommended treatment at a higher level of care, but
mother did not follow that recommendation.
Moreover, mother’s husband had his pare ntal rights involuntarily terminated.
Mother admitted that he was abusive and that he abused her in front of the children. But
mother obtained an OFP only because she did not want the children removed, and she failed
to follow through with addressing the domestic-abuse issues. Indeed, mother was staying
with her husband at the time of trial and stated that she pl anned for the family to live
together. The social worker and the GAL both stated that it was not in the children’s best
interests to have mother’s husband in their lives; the social work er stated that it would be
“traumatizing” for the children.
Because the record shows that mother failed to comply with her parental duties by
continuing to use chemicals and maintaining an unhealthy and dangerous relationship with
her husband, the district court appropriately determined that this factor supports TPR.
Mother also challenges the district court’s determination that she is a palpably unfit
parent. Because only one statutory ground is necessary for TPR, and because we have
concluded that two statutory grounds support TPR, we need not address this statutory
ground for TPR.
Finally, mother argues that TPR is not in the children’s best in terests because the
children love her, the children were traumatized by the removal, and her son contested the
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petition. Mother claims that with more time she can correct the conditions leading to the
out-of-home placement.
Three factors must be analyzed in determ ining whether TPR is in a child’s best
interests—the child’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship, the parent’s
interest in preserving the relationship, and any competing interests of the child. J.R.B., 805
N.W.2d at 905; Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04 (c)(2)(ii). “Competing interests include such
things as a stable environment, health considerations and the child’s preferences.” J.R.B.,
805 N.W.2d at 905 (quotation omitted). When a statutory basis for TPR exists, if the
interests of the parent and those of the child conflict, the child’s inte rests are paramount.
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2020). We give considerable deference to a district
court’s best-interests findings because the analysis involves credibility determinations. In
re Welfare of the Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 92 (Minn. App. 2012).
The district court found that mother l oves the children and wants to have them
returned to her. The district court also f ound that the son loves mother and, at times,
expresses his desire to return home. The da ughter is too young to express a preference,
and the record shows that she has been in out-of-home placem ent for almost half of her
young life and recognizes only mother’s voice.
The district court found that the children’s competing interests were overwhelming.
They need stability and a bond with a caregiver. The children need a caregiver who values
education, is able and willing to teach them basic values, tends to their developmental
needs, and keeps them safe. The evidence presented to the district court demonstrated that
mother expected her son to provide care for his infant sister, did not take her son to school,
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and had strange men in her apartment. Similarly, the evidence showed that the son worried
about mother’s drug use, violent relationshi ps, inability to provide basic needs, and
unwillingness to follow her case plan. The district court properly prioritized the children’s
competing interests in concluding that TPR is in the children’s best interests.
Proposed findings
Mother also argues that the district court violated her due-process rights by
adopting, nearly verbatim, the department’s proposed findings.
A proper TPR order includes detailed, specific, and sufficient findings that provide
an appellate court with a meaningful opportunity for review. In re Welfare of M.J.L., 582
N.W.2d 585, 588 n.3 (Minn. App. 1998). Prefe rred practice is “for a [district] court to
independently develop its own findings” to “reflect the court’s independent assessment of
the evidence.” In re Children of T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d 703, 707 n.2 (Minn. 2005) (quotation
omitted). But a district court is not prohibited from adopting proposed findings; thus, the
verbatim adoption of proposed findings does not itself compel reversal. See Pederson v.
State, 649 N.W.2d 161, 163 (Minn. 2002).
A majority of the district court’s findi ngs come directly from the department’s
proposed findings. But the district court’s fi ndings do not follow th e proposed findings
verbatim, specifically in the best-interests section. Moreover, the record demonstrates that
the district court was involv ed throughout the trial by ques tioning witnesses and taking
notes.
The changes that the district court ma de in its order and the court’s active
participation in the proceedings demonstrate that the district court independently assessed
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the evidence as required by caselaw. See T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d at 707 n.2 (“[T]he district
court’s findings should reflect the court’s independent assessment of the evidence . . . .”).
Further, the record supports the district court’s findings. Therefore, we see no error on this
point. See Dukes v. State, 621 N.W.2d 246, 258-59 (Minn. 2001).
Affirmed.