Jeffrey S. Sheridan, et al.,

1
STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A21-0007

Tax Court Moore, III, J.

Jeffrey S. Sheridan, et al.,

Relators,

vs. Filed: August 25, 2021
Office of Appellate Courts
Commissioner of Revenue,

Respondent.

________________________

Randall A. Kins, Sheridan & Dulas P.A., Eagan, Minnesota for relators.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Kristine K. Nogosek, Mawerdi A. Hamid, Assistant
Attorneys General, Saint Paul, Minnesota for respondent.

________________________

S Y L L A B U S
1. The phrase “[a]ny such tax on aircraft shall be in lieu of all other taxes,” as
used in article X, section 5 of the Minnesota Constitution, prohibits only the application of
duplicative personal property taxes on aircraft.
2
2. Because it is not a duplicative personal property tax, the tax imposed on
aircraft by Minnesota Statutes § 297A.82 (2020), does not violate article X, section 5 of
the Minnesota Constitution.
Affirmed.
O P I N I O N
MOORE, III, Justice.
The issue in this case is whether the sales or use tax i mposed on the purchase of
aircraft, Minn. Stat. § 297A.82 (2020), violates article X, section 5 of the Minnesota
Constitution, which allows the Legislature to tax aircraft using the airspace over Minnesota
“in lieu of all other taxes.” Jeffrey Sheridan and Kirk Lindberg (“relators”) purchased
aircraft outside Minnesota, paid the use tax, paid a separate annual tax imposed on aircraft
under Minn. Stat. § 360.531, subd. 1 (2020), and then requested a refund of the use tax ,
asserting that it is unconstitutional under the “in lieu” clause in article X, section 5.
Respondent Commissioner of Revenue denied the refund. In the ensuing litigation, the
Tax Court upheld the constitutionality of the Minnesota sales or use tax for aircraft
purchases. Because we conclude that article X, section 5 precludes only the application of
duplicative personal property taxes to aircraft, we affirm.
FACTS
A brief summary of the relevant taxes is helpful to understanding this dispute. There
are two taxes related to aircraft at issue here. Minnesota imposes either a sales tax or use
tax on the purchase of aircraft, Minn. Stat. § 297A.82, subds. 1 –3, and also imposes an
annual tax on aircraft under Minn. Stat. § 360.531, subd. 1. The sales or use tax must be
3
paid before the aircraft is registered or licensed in Minnesota: “An aircraft must not be
registered or licensed in this state unless the applicant presents proof that the sales or use
tax imposed by this chapter has been paid or that the transaction is exempt from the sales
and use tax.” Minn. Stat. § 297A.82, subd. 1. This one-time tax is based on a percentage
of the purchase price for the aircraft. Minn. Stat. §§ 297A.62–.63 ( generally applying a
6.5 percent tax rate on the purchase price).1
The annual tax on aircraft, by contrast, is based on the manufacturer’s list price or,
if that is unavailable, the list prices of comparable aircraft. Minn. Stat. § 360.531, subds.
1–4. This tax is imposed for the privilege of operating aircraft in the airspace of Minnesota.
See Minn. Stat. §§ 360.54, 360.58 (2020). W e now turn to the facts, which are neither
complicated nor disputed.
Sheridan purchased an aircraft outside of Minnesota. He paid $2,921.25 for the use
tax and $98.35 for the annual tax. Lindberg similarly purchased an aircraft outside
Minnesota. He paid $11,515.62 for the use tax and $418.75 for the annual tax. Sheridan

1 The sales tax and use tax are complementary taxes intended to avoid multiple taxes
imposed on the same transaction by more than one state. See Morton Bldgs., Inc. v.
Comm’r of Revenue, 488 N.W.2d 254, 257 (Minn. 1992); see also W. Hellerstein, J.
Hellerstein, & John A. Swain, State Taxation ¶ 16.01[1] (3d ed. 2017) (noting the
“complementary nature of sales and use taxes”). The sales tax applies to transactions that
occur between the customer and the seller in the state of Minnesota, Minn. Stat. § 297A.62,
subd. 1, while the use tax applies to transactions between a customer and seller that occur
outside Minnesota when the property transferred in that transaction is used, stored,
distributed, or consumed in the state, Minn. Stat. § 297A.63, subd. 1. See Morton Bldgs.,
Inc., 488 N.W.2d at 257 (explaining that use taxes are imposed to “counteract the tendency
of consumers to shop in states with low or no sales taxes”). For ease of reference, we refer
to both the sales and use tax as a “use” tax, unless otherwise stated.
4
and Lindberg then filed for refunds of their use-tax payments, both of which were denied.
They sued the Department of Revenue, arguing that the use tax is unconstitutional under
article X, section 5 of the Minnesota Constitution. 2 The parties submitted a joint
stipulation of facts and made cross- motions for summary judgment. The Tax Court
concluded that the “plain meaning of the Minnesota Constitution does not prohibit both” a
use tax and an annual personal property tax on aircraft. Sheridan v. Comm’r of Revenue,
No. 9366 R, 2020 WL 7250900, at *6 (Minn. T.C. Dec. 4, 2020). Thus, the court denied
relators’ motion and granted the Commissioner’s motion. Id. Relators sought review of
the decision of the Tax Court by writ of certiorari.
ANALYSIS
We review Tax Court decisions to determine whether “the Tax Court was without
jurisdiction,” whether the Tax Court’s order “was not justified by the evidence or was not
in conformity with law,” or whether “the Tax Court committed any other error of law.”
Minn. Stat. § 271.10, subd. 1 (2020). On review to our court, relators present the same
argument they made to the Tax Court. They contend that by imposing a tax in addition to
the personal property tax authorized by section 360.531, section 297A.82 violates article
X, section 5 of the Minnesota Constitution. That provision reads:
The legislature may tax aircraft using the air space overlying the state on a
more onerous basis than other personal property. Any such tax on aircraft
shall be in lieu of all other taxes. The legislature may impose the tax on

2 Relators filed their complaint in district court, which transferred the case to the Tax
Court pursuant to Erie Mining Co. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 343 N.W.2d 261, 264 (Minn.
1984) (“The district court may either decide [a] constitutional issue or refer the matter . . .
to the tax court which will then have subject matter jurisdiction to rule initially on the
constitutional issue.”).
5
aircraft of companies paying taxes under any gross earnings system of
taxation notwithstanding that earnings from the aircraft are included in the
earnings on which gross earnings taxes are computed. The law may exempt
from taxation aircraft owned by a nonresident of the state temporarily using
the air space overlying the state.

Minn. Const. art. X, § 5 (emphasis added). For ease of reference, we refer to this provision
as the “Aircraft Amendment,” and we refer to the second sentence, emphasized above, as
the “in-lieu clause.” Constitutional interpretation is an issue of law. Ninetieth Minn. State
Senate v. Dayton, 903 N.W.2d 609, 617 (Minn. 2017). We review the Tax Court’ s
application of law de novo. Avis Budget Car Rental LLC v. C nty. of Hennepin, 937
N.W.2d 446, 449 (Minn. 2020).
Relators’ argument is straightforward. They assert that the phrase “in lieu of”—the
phrase used in the in- lieu clause— means “instead of.” In their view, this phrase means
that the Aircraft Amendment unambiguously restricts the Legislature’s taxing authority to
just one tax on aircraft for all purposes, in place of all other potential taxes. Because both
section 360.531 and section 297A.82 impose taxes on aircraft, but the in-lieu clause limits
the taxing authority to one type of tax, relators contend that the use tax amounts to unlawful
double taxation under the Aircraft Amendment. They therefore urge us to strike down
section 297A.82 as unconstitutional.
The Commissioner agrees that the provision is unambiguous. But, he contends, the
in-lieu clause does not limit the Legislature to one type of tax on aircraft. In support, the
Commissioner points to preamble language of the session law in which the Legislature
proposed the Aircraft Amendment, which stated that the proposed tax would be “in lieu of
personal property taxes,” see Act of Apr. 24, 1943, ch. 666, § 1, 1943 Minn. Laws 1195,
6
1195–96 (emphasis added), not “in lieu of all other taxes,” which is the language in the
amendment itself. Relying on the language from the session law , the Commissioner
contends that “all other taxes” must be understood in the context of the only tax at issue
when the Aircraft Amendment was passed —personal property taxes. The Commissioner
therefore concludes that the in-lieu clause unambiguously prohibits only the application of
duplicative personal property taxes on aircraft. And because section 297A.82 is not a
personal property tax, it is therefore not a duplicative tax barred by the Aircraft
Amendment.
In the alternative, assuming we conclude that the Aircraft Amendment is
ambiguous, the Commissioner urges us to defer to the Department’s longstanding
interpretation of that amendment, which is consistent with his position that the in -lieu
clause prohibits only duplicative personal property taxes. The Commissioner points out
that the Department’s interpretation of the Aircraft Amendment has been applied by the
Tax Court since 1972, when similar challenge s were first raised. See Lloyd Alsworth &
Fairmont Flying Serv., Inc. v. Comm’r of Tax’n, No. 1614, 1972 WL 124 , at *2 (Minn.
T.C. Nov. 9, 1972); see also Onan Corp. v. Comm’r of Tax’n, No. 1892, 1977 WL 952, at
*10 (Minn. T.C. Mar. 30, 1977).
I.
As a duly enacted statute, section 297A.82 enjoys a presumption of
constitutionality. Olson v. Comm’r of Revenue, 955 N.W.2d 605, 607 n.1 (Minn. 2020).
We proceed with caution because the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute
7
bears a heavy burden to overcome that presumption. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Comm’r of
Revenue, 880 N.W.2d 844, 848 (Minn. 2016).
To resolve the parties’ dispute, then, we must interpret the language of the Aircraft
Amendment. We have said that the “rules applicable to the construction of statutes” apply
to the construction of the constitution. State ex rel. Mathews v. Houndersheldt, 186 N.W.
234, 236 (Minn. 1922) ; see Clark v. Ritchie, 787 N.W.2d 142, 146 (Minn. 2010) (stating
the rules of statutory interpretation “are equally applicable to the constitution”).
Accordingly, we interpret the constitution to effectuate the Legislature’s intent. See State
v. Twin City Tel. Co., 116 N.W. 835, 836 (Minn. 1908). But in addition to legislative
intent, we also strive to effectuate the intent of “the people who ratified” the constitutional
provision at issue. Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 825 (Minn. 2005). “[W]here the
language used is clear, explicit, and unambiguous, the language of the provision itself is
the best evidence of” such intent. State ex rel. Gardner v. Holm, 62 N.W.2d 52, 55 (Minn.
1954). If the text of the constitution is unambiguous, “it must be taken as it reads—there
is no room for construction.” Houndersheldt, 186 N.W. at 236. Thus, we begin by
determining whether the Aircraft Amendment is ambiguous.
A.
Ambiguity arises only if the text is “subject to more than one reasonable
interpretation.” State v. Townsend , 941 N.W.2d 108, 110 (Minn. 2020). In this inquiry,
we look to the plain language of the legislative enactment itself, including relevant
dictionary definitions of undefined phrases and other sections of the same legislative
enactment. See State v. Prigge, 907 N.W.2d 635, 638–40 (Minn. 2018).
8
We therefore begin with the words of article X, section 5. The first two sentences
of the provision are crucial and read as follows: “The legislature may tax aircraft using the
air space overlying the state on a more onerous basis than other per sonal property. Any
such tax on aircraft shall be in lieu of all other taxes.” 3 Confining our review to the plain
text for the moment, there is some persuasive force to relators’ contention that this
provision limits the Legislature’s taxing authority to one tax on aircraft instead of all other
potential taxes. There is also some merit to the Commissioner’s argument that the
reference in the first sentence to “other personal property” signals an intent to exclude only
other personal property taxes.
The problem with both interpretations, however, is that it is ultimately unclear
which tax is referenced under this provision. While the first sentence specifically refers to
“other personal property” and thus might describe a personal property tax,4 it also refers to
aircraft “using” air space over Minnesota; thus, the sentence could plausibly refer to a use
tax,5 not a personal property tax. As another possibility, the language may refer to a

3 The third sentence, which allows gross-earnings taxes to be imposed in addition to
the tax authority provided by the first sentence, is unhelpful. At the time article X, section
5 was passed, gross-earnings taxes were considered direct taxes on property. See, e.g., Am.
Ry. Express Co. v. Holm, 211 N.W. 467, 468 (Minn. 1926). Thus, regardless of what type
of tax is referenced in the first sentence, the third sentence could be read as supporting
either relators or the Commissioner.

4 “A tax on personal property (such as jewelry or household furniture) levied by a
state or local government.” Personal Property Tax, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.
2019).

5 “A tax imposed on the use of certain goods that are bought outside the taxing
authority’s jurisdiction. Use taxes are designed to discourage the purchase of products that
9
privilege tax. 6 The text itself is not clear, and neither party adequately confronts this
problem. They each assume without explanation that the tax referenced in the first
sentence—the one that is apparently authorized under the provision— unambiguously
carries either a broad or narrow meaning, depending on how they read section 360.531.
We find no textual support for either assumption.
Relators may have relied on the subdivision title, also known as a headnote, to
assume that section 360.531 is the statute that authorizes the tax referenced in the first
sentence of the constitutional provision; that is, the tax that the constitution states “shall be
in lieu of all other taxes ” on aircraft. See Minn. Stat. § 360.531, subd. 1 (using the
headnote, “in lieu tax”). But this headnote “has no value as an aid to statutory construction
for a determination of the legislative intent,” In re Dissolution of Sch. Dist. No. 33, 60
N.W.2d 60, 63 (Minn. 1953), because “headnotes . . . are mere catchwords . . . and are not
part of the statute.” Minn. Stat. § 645.49 (2020).
Nor can we conclude that the constitutional language is unambiguous by reading it
in light of the text of section 360.531 itself. We have said that we will read multiple parts
of a statute together, rather than in isolation. State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Minn.

are not subject to the sales tax.” Use Tax, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). See
Minn. Stat. § 297A.61, subd. 6 (2020) (defining “use” as the “exercise of a right or power
incident to the ownership of any interest in tangible personal property”).

6 A tax paid for the “privilege of carrying on a business or occupation for which a
license or franchise is required.” Privilege Tax, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019);
see also Raymond v. Holm, 206 N.W. 166, 16 7 (Minn. 1925) (explaining that the motor-
vehicle tax is “primarily a property tax,” but also a privilege tax because “motor vehicles
are prohibited from using the public highways until the tax is paid”).
10
2015) (applying the whole-statute canon). But as we explained in Prigge, statutes enacted
at two different points in time in the legislative process are not the “same statute” and thus
the whole-statute canon does not permit us to read them together in a pre-ambiguity
analysis. 907 N.W.2d at 639–40 (distinguishing between the “related-statutes canon,”
which applies only “ after a determination of ambiguity,” and the “ whole-statute canon,”
which “does not require ambiguity before it may be applied.”). This reasoning is relevant
here. In 1943, the Legislature approved the Aircraft Amendment for submission to
Minnesota voters in the 1944 election. Act of Apr. 24, 1943, ch. 666, § 1, 1943 Minn.
Laws 1195, 1195–96. Two years later and after the amendment passed in the 1944 general
election, section 360.531 was enacted by the Legislature. Act of Apr. 19, 1945, ch. 411,
§ 3, 1945 Minn. Laws. 787, 789 (codified as amended at Minn. Stat. § 360.531). Thus, the
whole-statute canon does not allow us to interpret a constitutional provision by reference
to a statute that was enacted by the Legislature at a later point in time.
Having determined that the text and headnote of section 360.531 are inapplicable in
resolving ambiguity in the Aircraft Amendment, we return to the text of that constitutional
provision. Looking only to the plain language, the Aircraft Amendment could reasonably
be read in several different ways.
To begin with, the Commissioner’s interpretation is reasonable. The first sentence
explicitly refers to personal property; therefore, the in-lieu clause could be read to prohibit
only duplicative personal property taxes , as the Commissioner argues. And relators’
reading—that this provision limits legislative taxing authority to one tax on aircraft instead
of all other taxes—is also reasonable. The text itself, however, does not definitively tell us
11
which tax may be imposed and which taxes may not. Thus, relators’ reading spawns two
additional reasonable interpretations of the Aircraft Amendment. It could authorize the tax
imposed by section 360.531 and prohibit the tax imposed by section 297A.82—as relators
contend. But it could also be read for precisel y the opposite proposition: It could allow
the tax imposed by section 297A.82 and prohibit the tax impos ed by section 360.531.
Because the Aircraft Amendment is subject to several reasonable interpretations, we
conclude that the language of this provision is ambiguous.7
B.
Having concluded that the language of article X, section 5 is ambiguous, w e now
turn to the canons of construction to resolve that ambiguity. We examine the circumstances
under which the Aircraft Amendment was enacted, legislative history, and the occasion,
necessity, and object to be attained by its passage. See Minn. Stat. § 645.16. In doing so,
we keep in mind that we must ascertain and effectuate “the intent of the constitution as
indicated by the framers and the people who ratified it.” Kahn, 701 N.W.2d at 825. Our

7 In reaching this conclusion, we reject the Commissioner’s suggestion that we defer
to his longstanding interpretation of this constitutional provision, which has been accepted
by the Tax Court. See Lloyd Alsworth & Fairmont Flying Serv., Inc. v. Comm’r of Tax’n,
No. 1614, 1972 WL 124, at *3 (Minn. T.C. Nov. 9, 1972) (concluding that article X, section
5 “does not prohibit an excise tax on aircraft”). Although we may defer to an agency’s
longstanding interpretation of ambiguous statutes and regulations, see Minn. Stat.
§ 645.16(8); Marks v. Comm’r of Revenue, 875 N.W.2d 321, 327 (Minn. 2016), it is “the
duty of our court—the Minnesota Supreme Court—to correctly read, interpret, and apply
the text of Minnesota’s Constitution.” League of Women Voters Minn. v. Ritchie,
819 N.W.2d 662, 668 (Minn. 2012) (Anderson, Paul, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)
(citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, (1803)). The Commissioner and the
Tax Court reside in the Executive Branch; deferring to the executive’s interpretation of the
Constitution would encroach on our “province and duty . . . to say what the law is.”
Marbury, 5 U.S at 177; see also Minn. Const. art. III, § 1.
12
analysis therefore proceeds by examining these canons to determine what taxes the
Legislature and the Minnesota voters were referring to in the phrase “[a]ny such tax on
aircraft shall be in lieu of all other taxes.”
1.
We begin with the historical circumstances that led to adoption of the Aircraft
Amendment. When this constitutional amendment was voted upon in 1944, Minnesota’s
taxation scheme looked very different from the one we have today. Dating back to the
Territorial Legislature, revenue was raised by relying almost entirely on a system of ad
valorem property taxes. W.K. Montague, The Development and Present Form of the
Minnesota Tax System, Minn. Stat., vol. 18 at 54–55 (1947); see also Minn. Stat. (Terr.)
chs. 7, 10 (1849). This general property tax s ystem carried over into Statehood. See
generally Minn. Gen. Stat. ch. 9, §§ 1–22 (1858); see also Kathleen A. Gaylord & Susan
C. Jacobson, History of Taxation in Minnesota, Tax Study Commission at 11 (1979).
Under the general property tax system, each county in Minnesota assessed the
market value of real and personal property located in its borders. Montague, supra at 62,
73. Assessors calculated the property’s “assessed value” by applying a statutory rate to the
property’s market value. Id. This assessed value would then be confirmed and adjusted
by the city board, the county board of equalization, and the state commissioner of taxation.
Id. at 62–63. From there, property was subject to tax levies at the city, county, and state
levels. Id. at 63, 71–73.
A series of tax reforms in the early 1900’s generated other sources of revenue.
Gaylord, supra at 13. One of those reforms created a new motor- vehicle tax and, at the
13
same time, removed motor vehicles from the general property tax system. See Act of
Feb. 21, 1919, ch. 530, §1, 1919 Minn. Laws 737, 737– 52 (“Babcock Amendment”).8
Aircraft, however, remained subject to the general property tax for a time afterward. See
State v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 7 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. 1942); see also Montague, supra at 93.
In Northwest Airlines, we upheld the application of the general property tax to aircraft.
7 N.W.2d at 698. Because this case dealt with the taxation of airplanes flying across state
lines, our holding “raised many problems of public policy with respect to taxation of
airplanes, and led to conferences with taxing officials of other states and federal authorities
on the subject.” Montague, supra at 93. In short, subjecting aircraft to the general property
tax made it difficult to foster interstate comity.
To address this difficulty, and also to provide funding for the construction of airports
and other air-travel infrastructure,9 the 1943 Legislature approved the Aircraft Amendment
for submission to the voters. See Act of Apr. 24, 1943, ch. 666, § 1, 1943 Minn. Laws
1195, 1195–96. The legislative history for this amendment shows that, initially, the
Aircraft Amendment drew heavily from the Babcock Amendment. See Hearing on H.F.
517, H. Comm. Aircraft & Airways, 53rd Minn. Leg., March 11, 1943 (meeting minutes).

8 See also Minn. Const. of 1857, art. XVI, §§ 2 –3 (1920); Act of Mar. 13, 1931, ch.
418, § 1, 1931 Minn. Laws 613, 613–14; Minn. Stat. §§ 168.02, .06, subd. 7 (1941)
(explaining that certain vehicles exempt from the motor-vehicle tax would instead be
subject to “taxation as personal property”).

9 The Aircraft Amendment was constitutionally necessary for the State to assist in the
construction of airports and other air navigation facilities. See Minn. Const. of 1857, art.
IX, § 5 (1941) (“The state shall never contract any debts for works of internal
improvements, or be a party in carrying on such works” except as otherwise authorized by
the constitution).
14
But after some debate, the Legislature made additional alterations and decided to fund
airport construction with a separate aircraft tax. See id.; Hearing on H.F. 517, H. Comm.
Aircraft & Airways, 53rd Minn. Leg., March 5, 1943 (meeting minutes). Once the Aircraft
Amendment was approved by the Legislature, it was set to be voted upon at the 1944
general election.
As the Commissioner points out, the preamble language in the session law
proposing the Aircraft A mendment described the aircraft tax as one “in lieu of personal
property taxes.” Act of Apr. 24, 1943, ch. 666, § 1, 1943 Minn. Laws at 1195 (emphasis
added). Public discussion leading up to the election similarly focused on the amendment’s
impact on the personal property tax system.
For instance, using language provided by the Attorney General, the Secretary of
State published notice in Minnesota newspapers explaining that the purpose of the Aircraft
Amendment taxation clause was
[t]o permit the legislature to provide by law for the taxation of aircraft on a
different basis from other personal property, thus permitting the imposition of
taxes on aircraft similar to those now imposed on motor vehicles, in lieu of the
personal property tax now imposed on aircraft.

J.A.A. Burnquist, Proposed Amendment to the Constitution of Minnesota, Eveleth News-
Clarion, Oct. 5, 1944, at 4 (emphasis added); see Minn. Stat. § 3.21 (1941) (requiring the
Attorney General to provide “a statement of purpose and effect” for proposed constitutional
amendments to the Secretary of State at least four month s preceding the election, and
directing the Secretary of State to give “three weeks’ published notice of such statement”
in all legal newspapers of the state prior to the election).
15
Other public information discussed the perceived tax ramifications of the Aircraft
Amendment. See Theodore B. Knudson, Air Amendment Vital to Twin Cities’
Development as Great Aviation Center, Hennepin Lawyer, Apr. 1944, at 115. For
example, in advocating passage of the amendment, Knudson’s article explained the
desirability of removing aircraft from the general property taxation system, noting that the
“ambulatory character of the airplane” created “confusion between local governmental
units” as to who was entitled to proceeds from the general property tax as applied to
aircraft. Id. at 116.
Finally, the ballot language used in the 1944 election is informative. The
Legislature used the following language to explain the tax implications of the amendment
when posing the question to voters of whether to amend the Minnesota Constitution:
Shall the Constitution be amended by adding thereto a new article . . .
authorizing the levy of an excise tax on fluids and other means or
instrumentalities used for aircraft and airport power purposes, or the business
of selling or dealing therein, and taxes on aircraft in lieu of personal property
taxes.

Secretary of State, Minnesota Legislative Manual 1945, 354–55 (1945) (emphasis added).
Thus, in the legislative process and public discourse leading up to the 1944 general
election, Minnesotans were told that the in-lieu clause in the Aircraft Amendment was
merely meant to remove aircraft from the general property tax system, similar to the change
the Legislature had made for motor vehicles some years earlier. As embodied in the
constitution after the election, however, the in-lieu clause excludes “all other taxation
thereon,” instead of merely excluding personal property taxes. See Minn. Const. of 1857,
16
art. XIX, § 4 (1945). One year later, the Legislature passed section 360.531. Act of
Apr. 19, 1945, ch. 411, § 3, 1945 Minn. Laws 787, 789.
2.
The above context reveals that Minnesota voters were told, repeatedly, that the in-
lieu clause in the Aircraft Amendment merely removed aircraft from the general property
taxation system that existed at that time. Given the historical dominance of the general
property tax, the language on the ballot used by voters, communications from the Attorney
General, and public discussions regarding the Aircraft Amendment’s tax impact, no
reasonably-informed voter in 1944 would have understood the phrase “all other taxes” in
the Aircraft Amendment to extend to taxes that were not then in existence; that is, to have
the meaning championed by relators today.
Instead, voters would have understood the phrase “all other taxes” to refer only to
the personal property taxes existing at that time. See State v. M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d 276, 285
(Minn. 2013) (Stras, J., concurring) (looking to the “widely understood meaning” of a
constitutional provision at the time it was ratified). Relators ask us to depart from that
understanding based on the changing statutory structure of Minnesota’s tax regime. But to
do so would be to ignore the constitutional requirement for voters to approve constitutional
amendments, see Minn. Const. art. IX § 1 (requiring amendments proposed by the
Legislature to be approved “the people”), and our obligation to effectuate the intent of “the
people who ratified” the Aircraft Amendment. Kahn, 701 N.W.2d at 825; see also State v.
Pett, 92 N.W.2d 205, 207 (Minn. 1958) (“ The right to amend the constitution rests
exclusively with the people . . .”); Julius v. Callahan, 65 N.W. 267, 267 (Minn. 1895) (“[I]t
17
is not the action of the legislature in proposing the amendment, but the action of the people
in adopting it, that gives it effect as a part of the organic law of the state.”).
Moreover, we have observed that “official representation[s] made to the voters”
serve as a consideration when we interpret the language of Minnesota’s Constitution. City
of Golden Valley v. Wiebesick, 899 N.W.2d 152, 159 (Minn. 2017). This is a particularly
vital consideration in this case. Official representations to the voters—including the ballot
language itself and published statements from the Attorney General—communicated only
one message regarding the meaning of the in-lieu clause: It would remove aircraft from
the general property tax system. We therefore decline to transform the Aircraft
Amendment into an evolving preferential tax protection for aircraft owners when the
Minnesota voters who ratified that language never understood it to have that effect. They
voted to remove aircraft from the general property taxation system, not from any and all
future forms of taxation.
In sum, the circumstances under which the Aircraft Amendment was passed, the
occasion and necessity for the amendment, and its legislative history lead us to conclude
that the phrase “all other taxes” in article X, section 5 of the Minnesota Constitution means
“all other personal property taxes.” And given the timing and language used in section
360.531, we further conclude that the Legislature intended to exercise the authority given
to it by the voters through the first sentence of the Aircraft Amendment by passing that
18
statute.10 We therefore hold that the in-lieu clause of the Aircraft Amendment prohibits
imposition of personal property taxes on aircraft aside from the annual tax imposed by
section 360.531.11 In other words, it prohibits only the imposition of duplicative personal
property taxes on aircraft.
II.
Finally, we consider whether section 297A.82 violates the in-lieu clause of the
Aircraft Amendment. Because we have concluded that this constitutional provision
excludes only duplicative personal property taxes on aircraft, we must classify the type of
tax that is imposed by section 297A.82. If it is a personal property tax, it is
unconstitutional.

10 We do not suggest that the Aircraft Amendment was necessary for the Legislature
to impose a new tax on aircraft. We have previously stated that the Legislature’s power of
taxation is “inherent” and embraces “every conceivable subject of taxation” “except as it
is limited by the state or the national Constitution.” Reed v. Bjornson, 253 N.W. 102, 104
(Minn. 1934). Because of its inherent taxation power, the Legislature is not necessarily
required to pass a constitutional amendment anytime it wishes to impose a new tax. See
Henry Rottschaefer, A State Income Tax and the Minnesota Constitution, 12 Minn. L. Rev.
683, 68 3–84 (1928) (explaining that the motor-vehicle tax was adopted after a
constitutional amendment that functioned “to allocate the proceeds of such taxes to
prescribed purposes” rather “than to remedy any defect in legislative power to impose
them,” even though that may also have been a purpose, and stating it “might almost be said
that we are acquiring a habit of amending our constitution whenever we wish to resort to
theretofore untouched sources of revenue.”). We merely note that section 360.531 was
passed by the Legislature in response to whatever apparent taxing authority was created in
the first sentence of the Aircraft Amendment.

11 We have previously described the motor-vehicle tax, upon which section 360.531
was based, as “a blended property and privilege tax.” State ex rel. Ry. Express Agency v.
Holm, 295 N.W. 297, 297 (Minn. 1940). The fact that we understood the type of tax
imposed by section 360.531 to be a type of property tax underscores our conclusion that
the in-lieu clause prohibits all other personal property taxes on aircraft.
19
Relators do not assert a clear position on the type of tax imposed by section 297A.82
because their position is that the “in lieu” tax imposed by section 360.531 is the only one
that is permitted by the constitution. The Commissioner, for his part, argues that section
297A.82 imposes a use tax on aircraft and is thus a type of excise tax.
We have classified taxes based on the label given to them by the Legislature, see
Soo Line R.R. Co. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 377 N.W.2d 453, 455 (Minn. 1985), and the
methods by which they are imposed. See State v. Nw. States Portland Cement Co., 84
N.W.2d 373, 380 (Minn. 1957), aff’d, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
Here, the Legislature quite clearly labeled the tax imposed by section 297A.82 as a
sales or use tax. See Minn. Stat. §§ 297A.62–.63. Sales and use taxes are also a type of
excise tax. See Excise Tax, Black ’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining an “excise
tax” as a “tax imposed on the manufacture, sale, or use of goods”). Moreover, the methods
used to impose the tax authorized by section 297A.82 confirm that it is an excise tax. The
tax is based on a percentage of the purchase price of the sale of an aircraft and it is collected
at the time of the sale, Minn. Stat. § 297A.62, subd. 1; or for a use tax, when the property
is brought into the state for use, again based on the sales price, Minn. Stat. § 297A.63, subd.
1. Additionally , the tax is imposed on a specific transaction—the sale or use of the
plane— as measured by the “total amount of consideration” paid. Minn. Stat. § 297A.61,
subds. 4, 6–7. All these characteristics indicate that section 297A.82 imposes an excise
tax.
20
We therefore agree with the Commissioner and the Tax Court that section 297A.82
imposes an excise tax on sales and purchases of aircraft. 12 Because it is not a personal
property tax on aircraft, we hold that it is does not violate the in-lieu of clause in article X,
section 5 of the Minnesota Constitution.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the decision of the Tax Court.
Affirmed.

12 Relators contend that the distinction between an excise tax and a property tax is
simply an “amusing philosophical indulgence” that we should not entertain. This argument
is not well founded given that we have repeatedly recognized this distinction. “The subject
of an ad valorem tax is property, and that of an excise tax is a right or privilege.” Reuben
L. Anderson-Cherne, Inc. v. Comm’r of Tax’ n, 226 N.W.2d 611, 614 (Minn. 1975); see
also Color-Ad Packaging, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 428 N.W.2d 806, 806– 07 (Minn.
1988) (explaining that sales tax is on “the freedom of purchase” and use tax is on “the
enjoyment of that which was purchased”); Pullman Co. v. Comm’r of Tax’n, 25 N.W.2d
838, 846 (Minn. 1947) (Magney, J., dissenting) (stating that excise and property taxes
“relate to distinct and different subjects”).