State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0011

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Terry Allynn Carlson,
Appellant.

Filed November 15, 2021
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Carlton County District Court
File No. 09-CR-19-1200

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Ed Stockmeyer, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Lauri A. Ketola, Carlton County Attorney, Carlton, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defe nder, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FLOREY, Judge
In this appeal from his conviction of fourth -degree assault of an employee of a
secure treatment facility, appellant argues that the district court violated his due -process
2
rights by denying his requests for a rule 20 competency evaluation. Minn. R. Crim. P.
20.01, subd. 3. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Terry Allynn Carlson was indet erminately civilly committed to the
Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) as a sexually dangerous person in 2007. At that
time, appellant was diagnosed with paraphilia, antisocial -personality disorder, and
borderline intellectual functioning.
In 2019, r espondent State of Minnesota charged appellant, who remains civilly
committed at MSOP, with fourth -degree felony assault of a secure -treatment-facility
employee for ejaculating onto his primary clinician’s (the victim’s) pants during a game of
dominoes with the victim and two other MSOP clients.
Appellant attended numerous proceedings throughout the course of this matter. At
an early hearing, the state noted that appellant refused to comply with two search warrants
for his DNA. Appellant’s attorney stated that she advised her client that the warrants were
valid and that he should comply. But appellant argued that law enforcement already has
his DNA sample because he is a registered sex offender and was “discriminating” against
him by failing to investigate the other clients.
At an intermediate settlement conference, defense counsel requested a rule 20
competency evaluation; however, she clarified that it was appellant, not her, requesting the
evaluation. The state did not object to a competency evaluation but noted that it saw no
evidence supporting the need for an evaluation. The district court denied the request
without discussing its merits, noting that appellant could raise it again later.
3
At a final settlement conference, appellant asked to proceed as self-represented. He
explained disagreements, lack of communication, and other issues with his attorney. He
asked about standby counsel and wh ether he would have to submit exhibits before trial.
He again requested a competency evaluation, which the district court denied. Appellant
asked whether the district court might rule differently if he presented evidence such as low
IQ, mental illness, or other past issues. The district court said that it might.
Subsequently, s everal hearings were held on multiple motions that appellant
submitted while representing himself, including motions to remove the district court judge,
dismiss the case, have a speedy trial, reappoint counsel, have a competency evaluation, and
address various discovery and evidentiary issues. At the hearings, appellant clarified and
defended his motions.
The district court denied appellant’s motion to remove the judge 1 but granted his
motion to reappoint an attorney. It then continued appellant’s remaining motions,
including his motion for a competency evaluation, to a subsequent hearing at which
appellant was represented by the same attorney who had initially represented him. At that
hearing, the district court noted that appellant behaved well throughout the proceedings. It
denied his motion for a competency evaluation, seeing no evidence that he did not
understand his rights or the proceedings. It also noted that defense c ounsel could still
request a competency evaluation. Defense counsel never did.

1 Appellant’s motion to have a different judge did not state any for-cause reasons.
4
At a jury trial, appellant confirmed that he understood the new trial protocols due to
the COVID-19 pandemic and acknowledged that those protocols might affect the trial. He
stipulated to the element of the crime requiring that he be a civilly committed sex offender
and confirmed that he understood that the prosecution would therefore not be able to offer
evidence of his civil commitment. He consulted with his attorney often throughout the voir
dire process and reviewed juror questionnaires on his own for an hour.
During the trial, appellant had opportunities to consult with his attorney regarding
witness cross -examination. He also consulted with his attorney regarding wheth er he
would testify. Both his attorney and the district court examined him about his decision to
testify, and he acknowledged understanding his rights, the risks of testifying, and that he
must tell the truth. It does not appear that appellant’s behavior caused any disruptions
during the proceedings.
Finally, appellant testified that his relationship with the victim was previously good.
He testified that he lifted his shirt after the incident to show that everything was in his pants
with his zipper zipped. He asserted that the video footage of the incident did not show that
he was masturbating; instead, it showed only that he put his hand under the table for a
minute. He further pointed out that another client’s hands were not visible on the video.
Finally, appellant testified that even though DNA evidence showed that his semen was
found on the victim’s pants, he did not purposefully ejaculate on the victim, thus negating
the element of intent.
The jury found appellant guilty. The district court convicted him and sentenced him
to one year and one day in prison. This appeal follows.
5
DECISION
Appellant asserts three reasons to doubt his competency: he (1) has been civilly
committed since 2007; (2) has a diagnosed mental illness; and (3) had himself “questioned
whether he was competent to stand trial.” We are not persuaded.
A defendant has a due -process right to not be tried or convicted if the defendant is
legally incompetent. Bonga v. State, 797 N.W.2d 712, 718 (Minn. 2011). A defendant is
incompetent if “due to mental illness or cognitive impairment, [the defendant] lacks ability
to: (a) rationally consult with counsel; or (b) understand the proceedings or participate in
the defense.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 2; Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402
(1960). If the district court, prosecutor, or defense attorney have “reason to doubt ” the
defendant’s competency, they must raise the issue. Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 3;
Bonga, 797 N.W.2d at 718. If the district court determines that “reason to doubt”
competency exists in a felony matter, it “must order an examination of the defendant’s
mental condition,” among other procedures. Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 3(b).
Relevant considerations for determining whether “reason to doubt” a defendant’s
competency exists include the defendant’s irrational behavior, trial demeanor, and prior
medical opinions on competence. Bonga, 797 N.W.2d at 719 (citing Drope v. Missouri ,
420 U.S. 162, 179, 95 S. Ct. 896, 907 (1975)). But there is no specific amount or type of
evidence that establishes “reason to doubt” competency. Id. The correctness of the district
court’s decision whether to conduct further inquiry into a defendant’s competency depends
on the circumstances of each case. Id.
6
When, as here, a defendant argues that the district court failed to provide adequate
procedures, the question is not whether the defendant is competent, but whether the district
court should have inquired further into whether the defendant is competent. Id. at 718. If
the parties do not dispute the evidence relevant to competency, we review de novo the
district court’s decision whether to conduct further inquiry, asking whether the district
court gave “proper weight to the information suggesting incompetence.”2 Id. at 710; State
v. O’Neill, 945 N.W.2d 71, 77-78 (Minn. App. 2020).
Our de novo review of the record shows that appellant had the ability to rationally
consult with counsel, understand the proceedings, and participate in his defense. Appellant
asked the district court questions to clarify the proceedings and his obligations. He
submitted numerous motions that were tailored to the facts and issues in his case. He
coherently explained and clarified his position on his motions. At trial, his testimony
showed that he understood the weaker points of the state’s case, including proof of intent,
that the video evi dence did not show his hands moving, and that another client’s hands
were also out of view. These circumstances provide no reason to doubt that he understood
the proceedings.
Additionally, the record shows that, while represented, appellant consulted with his
attorney about evidence, the validity of the state’s search warrants, his request for a
competency evaluation, his desire to represent himself, voir dire issues, and whether he

2 The state disputes the evidence relevant to competence by arguing that appellant cannot
rely on the district court’s 2007 and 2008 orders regarding appellant’s civil commi tment
because those orders are not part of the record. We need not resolve the disputed-evidence
issue because, even if we accept all of appellant’s evidence, his arguments fail.
7
would testify, among other things. These facts provide no reason to dou bt his ability to
rationally consult with his attorney and participate in his defense.
The district court did not err by giving little weight to (1) appellant’s indefinite civil
commitment; (2) his diagnoses of mental illness and cognitive impairment; and (3) his own
doubt about his competence.
First, prior civil commitment “is not a judicial determination of legal
incompetency.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.23, subd. 2(a) (2020); see also Minn. Stat. 253D.03
(2020) (incorporating section 253B.23 for purposes of commitment of sex offenders).
Additionally, appellant was committed as a sexually dangerous person, not because of
mental illness alone. Commitment of a sexually dangerous person requires the district
court to find that the offender’s mental condition i nhibits the offender’s ability to control
sexual impulses. Minn. Stat. § 253D.02, subd. 16 (2020); In re Linehan, 594 N.W.2d 867,
876 (Minn. 1999). Appellant’s commitment as a sexually dangerous person who also
suffers from certain mental illnesses demonstrates that the committing court found that his
mental conditions inhibited his ability to control his sexual impulses, not that his mental
conditions inhibited his ability to rationally consult with his attorney, understand the
proceedings, or participat e in his defense. Further, appellant’s behavior during the
proceedings in this case is more probative of his “present abilit[ies]” than 13 -year-old
commitment orders. 3 See Dusky , 362 U.S. at 402 (noting that competence is test of

3 Appellant argues that, although he was found competent to enter a civil commitment
stipulation in 2007, “that finding did not alleviate doubt that he was competent” in 2020.
But it does not appear that the district court relied on the 2007 competency finding for its
decision to deny appellant’s requests for a competency evaluation in this case.
8
“sufficient present ability” to consult with attorney and understand proceedings (emphasis
added)).
Second, neither mental illness nor cognitive impairment alone make a defendant
incompetent. See Harris -Franklin v. State , No. A20-0770, 2021 WL 1082332, at *5
(Minn. App. Mar. 22, 2021), rev. denied (Minn. June 15, 2021) .4 Those conditions must
instead cause the defendant an inability to rationally consult with his attorney, understand
the proceedings, or participate in his defense. Appellant suggests no reasons why his
current mental conditions limit those abilities.
Third, “courts have ruled that mere conclusory assertions are insufficient to avoid
an adverse ruling.” In re Civil Commitment of Poole , 921 N.W.2d 62, 68 (Minn. App.
2018) (citing cases in a variety of contex ts and applying this principle to reduction -in-
custody civil-commitment cases). Appellant’s conclusory assertion that he doubts his own
competency is insufficient to show reason to doubt his competency.
In sum, the district court did not err by denying ap pellant’s requests for a
competency evaluation.
Affirmed.

4 We cite to this nonprecedential opinion for its persuasive value. Minn. R. Civ. App. P.
136.01, subd. 1(c).